Critical Education Articles Placed in the Teacher Staff Lounge While I Was a Teacher, Part Fourteen: A Critique of the Educational Nature of So-called Educational Reforms

This is a continuation of a series of posts on summaries of articles, mainly on education.

When I was a French teacher at Ashern Central School, in Ashern, Manitoba, Canada, I started to place critiques, mainly (although not entirely) of the current school system. At first, I merely printed off the articles, but then I started to provide a summary of the article along with the article. I placed the summaries along with the articles in a binder (and, eventually, binders), and I placed the binder in the staff lounge.

As chair of the Equity and Justice Committee for Lakeshore Teachers’ Association of the Manitoba Teachers’ Society (MTS), I also sent the articles and summary to the Ning of the MTS (a ning is “an online platform for people and organizations to create custom social networks”).

As I pointed out in a previous post, it is necessary for the radical left to use every opportunity to question the legitimacy of existing institutions.

The attached article for the ESJ Ning is prefaced by the following:
Hello everyone,
Attached is another article that I sent for the ESJ Ning. I prefaced it with the following:

Daniel Rossides’ article, “Knee-Jerk Formalism: Reforming American Education,” provides a detailed criticism of various school reforms in the United States. Since it does not focus on reforms for high-stakes testing (which have not found general acceptance in Canada), much of his criticism is also directed to Canadian school reforms.

Rossides not only argues against the neoliberal reform effort at high-stakes testing but also liberal reformers of schools. In fact, he argues that all school reform efforts in their current form will lead to naught.

He questions the view that schools (he calls it education) produce good workers and good citizens. There is no evidence to support those two claims. He also questions the view that schools sort individuals into various hierarchies at work according to relative merit.

Rossides’ reliance on educational research to justify his conclusions is all the more interesting since educational research invariably assumes that modern schools constitute the standard for determining the validity and reliability of educational research. The inadequacy of educational research will not be addressed here, but on the basis of educational research itself changes in schools can do little to offset the disadvantages of poverty.

Rossides argues that the school outcomes of those children and adolescents whose parents are from the lower classes will not change unless we shift resources both to those lower-class families and to the schools where those children and adolescents attend. School reforms that aim at supposedly changing the outcomes for the lower classes have been shown to be historically ineffective. School reform focuses on—school reform and not in reform of the socio-economic conditions of the lower class families and their neighbourhood.

The modern school system is characterized by a class system according to socio-economic status (SES). [The adequacy of such a definition of class should be queried, but I will not do so here. For some purposes, SES is legitimate—but it is hardly an adequate characterization of class since the source of income and not just the level is relevant in determining class.]

It is the middle- and upper-classes who have aided in producing lower-class learners with disabilities, the mentally retarded and so forth—by defining children and adolescents of lower-class parents by defining the characteristics of such children and adolescents as learned disabilities, mental retardation and so forth and then treating the children and adolescents as learners with disabilities, with mental retardation and so forth.

The extremely skewed nature of wealth and income, the persistence over generations of middle- and upper class dominance and lower class subordination, an excess of workers over the demand for workers (especially at the lower levels) with corresponding  poverty-stricken families and the domination of social and political life by the middle- and upper classes aids in defining the children and adolescents of the lower classes as deviant and labelled according to middle- and upper-class standards (and not, of course, vice versa—except when rebellions break out).

Although Rossides referent is the United States, there is little doubt that much of what he writes applies to Canada.

The modern school system is characterized by what seems to be classlessness: all classes attend the same school. The facts belie such a rosy picture.  Features of the school system are biased towards the middle and upper classes and against the lower classes; such features as an emphasis on literacy, abstract knowledge and patriotism (one—white—principal had the hypocritical audacity to announce over the PA system that Canada was the best country in the world—when two thirds of the student population were probably living in substandard conditions).

The fact that children and adolescents of various classes attend the same school, given the emphasis on middle-class and upper class concerns and definitions of what constitutes and education (such as academic subjects and literacy rather than the use of the body in combination with literacy and academic subjects), along  with a grading and testing system that streams or tracks students, as Rossides notes, hardly leads to a meritocracy. Rather, it merely reproduces the status quo.

Furthermore, there has been a decided trend towards class-based segregation of schools, with inner-city schools for the children and adolescents of the lower classes and suburban schools for the middle- and upper classes. (Of course, there is an added racist aspect of this structure, but poor white children are also caught in the web—or trap).

Rossides notes that, when SES was factored out of the equation, school reforms had little impact on the academic outcome of children and adolescents from poorer families. (Note, however, the bias of defining “success” in terms of academic outcomes.) The author points out that what is needed is not just more resources at the school level but more resources at the level of the family. Without addressing the extreme inequality of family incomes, changes in school resources and school reforms will likely have little effect in changing outcomes (despite the rhetoric of school bureaucrats and liberal ideologues in universities).

Equalizing school expenditures will not address the inequities that characterize income inequalities.

Rossides points out that study after study has shown that school aspirations, school outcomes, expenditure per capita, regularity of attendance, scholarships, entrance into college or university and so forth correlate highly with social classes and class origin.

In post-secondary institutions, the proportion of members of the lower classes represented on governing boards is lower than their proportion in the population and, correspondingly, the proportion of members from the middle and upper classes is overrepresented.

The proportion of those young adults who attend university is class-based, with more than double, for example, attending a four-year college program than those from the lower middle and working classes. Scholarships are skewed towards to those already with high grades, and these are typically not the lower classes. Thus, young adults whose parents can more afford to pay for their tuition and other expenses receive free money whereas young adults whose parents cannot afford to pay for their children’s tuition and other expenses are excluded from consideration—all this under the cloak of equality of opportunity.

The divide between public universities and colleges and private ones has practically been removed in many instances, with public colleges and universities operating as private institutions, with high tuition and partnerships with private firms (but with no public accountability in many instances). Public universities and colleges function more like markets than public institutions and are accessible to those with money—or high grades (which often probably correlate).

Rossides pinpoints formal education’s simple role: to determine where one enters in the occupational hierarchy. Formulated differently, the primary role of schools and other formal institutions linked to them is to allocate people to positions on the market for workers. The rhetoric about learning is secondary to this role.

Employers certainly believe that more formal schooling results in better workers, so credentials are important for hiring. However, once hired, differences in levels of formal schooling, surprisingly, do not lead to increases in productivity. 

Credentials and class are correlated, so credentials form another mechanism for the perpetuation of class differences.

Rossides also criticizes the view that schooling leads to improved citizenship—increase in knowledge about politics and creative public service (active and creative political participation). Political participation in fact has declined. Furthermore, in the United States, schools have not led to increased integration of children and adolescents through civics and other courses. The rhetoric of schools as producers of good citizens hides a reality of schools that perpetuate class divisions and inequality.

Although Rossides’ point is well taken, he seems to miss something vital about what schools do when he refers to schools hiding the real nature of schools. Schools do in some ways serve to integrate children and adolescents into the real world of inequality and class divisions by—hiding those realities from them. (Besides, he implies as much further in the article, in relation to his explanation of why school failure continues for the lower classes.)

 Through the rhetoric of equality of opportunity, civics and other courses (such as history), children and adolescents learn the supposed equality of all and supposed meritocracy. Rather than having children and adolescents learn just how unfair and inequitable modern society is, schools cover up the reality through the administrative, hierarchical structure, with administrators frequently attempting to impose their middle-class will on working-class children and adolescents (who may rebel in school through various means, ranging from passive absenteeism to active “misbehaviour”) in the name of efficient administration and ”learning.” By redefining children and adolescents as pure “learners” (learning machines), administrators then often discipline them for not acquiescing in the unequal situation in which many working-class (coupled often with racially oppressed) youth find themselves.

Schools have also not led to increased knowledge of the world in which they live that they can and do use in their daily lives. The knowledge that children and adolescents learn in schools is often what could be called “inert” knowledge—knowledge that is never used. Even if children and adolescents learned abstractly what political participation involved, since they do not use such knowledge in their daily lives (perhaps they would use it against school administration), they do not really learn to become good citizens.

Schools also serve to depoliticize learning by focusing on abstract cognitive skills rather than skills that relate to the daily lives of children and adolescents. Individuals become, to a greater and greater degree, interchangeable non-political units. Abstract literacy, by failing to link up to the social experience of children and adolescents, is soon forgotten outside school boundaries. The environment in which it is learned is so artificial that children and adolescents cannot transfer what they have learned to any other environment.  Furthermore, we have one life, but the fragmented way in which we study the world in school and formal learning prevents any synthesis of our experiences in school. That too leads to rapid forgetting of what was learned in schools.

This fragmentation of experience contributes to the continuance of the status quo since those in and outside schools can focus on their limited activity within a fragmented, academic and abstract curriculum and ignore the poverty, oppression and devastation that the children and adolescents inside and outside the school experience.

Rossides then explains why, despite the failure of schools to make children and adolescents better workers and citizens, by noting that the situation accords with the interests of the upper class in maintaining the appearance of a meritocracy; in other words, the present school system aids in hiding its own oppressive nature of the working class. Those who have an economic and cultural interest in maintaining the present system of inequality limit access to credentials to their own children while presenting the present system as the very embodiment of equality and meritocracy. Much of what is studied, the author implies, is irrelevant, but it serves to weed out the lower classes from occupations that pay higher incomes.

The claim that schooling (or “education”) is the key to ensuring equality, social justice and equity serves to divert attention, as well, from the social inequalities, social injustices and social inequities rampant in our society.

After briefly looking at the invalidity and unreliability of mass testing suggested by conservative proponents of school reform, the author makes an interesting and important point about how conservative school reform has pushed for student outcomes based on so-called objective norms (outcome-based education again). Since Rossides considers this a conservative reform effort, it can be concluded, if his analysis is valid, that the NDP has instituted a conservative performance system provincially without many people, including teachers, even raising objections to this conservative trend.

He mentions in passing that parents of the upper class oppose any attempt to eliminate the grading system since the grading system is integral to the children of the upper class “inheriting” the same class position—a very interesting observation that warrants much more analysis and serious discussion. Unfortunately, it seems that educators do not want to discuss seriously such issues.

Rossides does maintain that the push for outcome-based education has no objective basis since there is no agreement on what constitutes objective standards. It would be interesting to have the Minister of Education, Nancy Allen, in the spotlight in order to determine how she defines such objective standards and how she developed such standards—along with other conservatives, of course.

The author argues that there are two real reasons for the poor performance of the United States (and, I might add, Canada). Firstly, there is the belief and practice that an unplanned economy, including unplanned capital investment, will lead to the good life. Secondly, there is the belief and practice that the antiquated political-legal system will enable most people to live a good life.

The back-to-basics movement (reading, writing and mathematics) typical of the present trend in the school system substitutes what should be means to ends into ends in themselves. (The same could be said of the so-called academic subjects.)

Rossides does contend that schools do matter, but he then commits similar errors as the views that he has criticized. He outlines what a good school is in purely conventional terms, such as a strong administrator who emphasizes academic subjects and reading. Rossides takes from one hand and gives with the other. He further argues that the main problem with schools, as learning institutions, has not been historically and is not now at the elementary school level but at the high-school level. Such a view deserves to be criticized.

Elementary schools focus mainly on reading—without many children (especially those from the working class) understanding why they are engaged in a process of learning how to read, write and do arithmetic. There is undoubtedly pedagogical process, but such progress applies just as much to high schools as it does to elementary schools.

The main function of elementary schooling is to have the children learn to read, write and do arithmetic, with the primary emphasis on reading. Elementary school teachers are specialists at best in reading.(It would be interesting to do a study on how many reading clinicians started out as elementary school teachers and how many taught only at the high-school level.) There are many problems with such a conception of learning. I merely refer to the many articles on Dewey’s philosophy and practice of education.

The author vastly overestimates the efficacy of elementary schools as institutions for real learning (as opposed to learn to read, write and do arithmetic—often for no ends than to read, write and do arithmetic. In other words, elementary schools, instead of teaching reading, writing and mathematics as means to an end, generally reduce them to the end of elementary school education.

Of course, the lack of inquiry into the world, a lack so characteristic of elementary schools and contrary to the nature of young children, becomes a burden that eventually distorts most children’s minds. The wonder of childhood becomes the boredom of formal learning rather than an expansion and deepening of our grasp and wonder of our experiences of the world.

Rossides` article, therefore, does have its limitations. Despite these limitations, his article contains an incisive critique of the neoliberal movement towards educational reform—and, more generally, the rhetoric that surrounds educational reform.

Should not those who attempt to achieve equity and social justice expose the rhetoric of educational reform?

Fred 

The Rate of Exploitation of Workers at Metro, One of the Largest Private Employers in Quebec, or: How Unionized Jobs Are Not Decent or Good Jobs

Introduction

In three others posts I presented a list of some of the largest employers in Toronto according to level of employment (see A Short List of the Largest Employers in Toronto, Ontario, Canada), Calgary  (see  A Short List of the Largest Employers Based in Calgary, Alberta, Canada, Based on the Number of Employees)  and Quebec (see  A Short List of the Largest Employers in Quebec According to the Number of Employees). Metro was the largest employer in terms of the number of employees in Quebec. 

What is Metro? 

The nature of Metro is set out in its Annual Report: 

COMPANY PROFILE

METRO INC. is a food and pharmacy leader in Québec and Ontario. As a retailer, franchisor, distributor, and manufacturer, the company operates or services a network of 950 food stores under several banners including Metro, Metro Plus, Super C, Food Basics, Adonis and Première Moisson, as well as 650 drugstores primarily under the Jean Coutu, Brunet, Metro Pharmacy and Food Basics Pharmacy banners, providing employment directly or indirectly to almost 90,000 people.

I have tried to calculate the rate of exploitation of workers in various companies, including  Magna International (see The Rate of Exploitation of Workers at Magna International Inc., One of the Largest Private Employers in Toronto, Part One); Magna International is one of the largest employers in Toronto. 

In this post, I calculate the rate of exploitation of Metro workers. 

The Nature of the Rate of Exploitation

But what is the rate of exploitation? And why not use the usual rate of profit or the rate of return? The rate of profit is calculated as profit divided by investment. Since employers purchase both the means for work–buildings, computers, office supplies, raw material–and hire workers–we can classify investment into two categories: c, meaning constant capital, or the capital invested in commodities other than workers; and v, or variable capital, the capital invested in the hiring of workers for a certain period of time (wages, salaries and benefits).

The purpose of investment in a capitalist economy is to obtain more money (see The Money Circuit of Capital), and the additional money is surplus value when it is related to its source: workers working for more time than what they cost to produce themselves. The relation between surplus value and variable capital (or wages and salaries) is the rate of surplus value or the rate of exploitation, expressed as a ratio: s/v.

When the surplus is related to both c and v and expressed as a ratio, it is the rate of profit: s/(c+v).

In Marxian economics, you cannot simply use the economic classifications provided by employers and governments since such classifications often hide the nature of the social world in which we live. The rate of profit underestimates the rate of exploitation since the surplus value is related to total investment and not just to the workers. Furthermore, it makes the surplus value appear to derive from both constant capital and variable capital.

I decided to look at the annual report of some of the largest private companies (if they are available) in order to calculate the rate of exploitation at a more micro level than aggregate rates of surplus value at the national or international level. Politically, this is necessary since social democrats here in Toronto (and undoubtedly elsewhere) vaguely may refer to exploitation–while simultaneously and contradictorily referring to “decent work” and “fair contracts.” Calculating even approximately the rate of exploitation at a more micro level thus has political relevance.

Conclusions First

As usual, I start with the conclusion in order to make readily accessible the results of the calculations for those who are more interested in the results than in how to obtain them.

Adjusted Results

Adjusted earnings before income taxes (surplus value, or s) $1110.62 (in millions of Canadian dollars–in all calculations unless otherwise indicated)
Wages, fringe benefits and employee benefits expense: $966.4 

The Rate of Exploitation of Metro Workers

To calculate the rate of surplus value, we need to relate “Adjusted earnings before income taxes” to “Wages, fringe benefits and employee benefits expense” So, with the adjustments in place:, s=1110.62; v=966.4. The rate of exploitation or the rate of surplus value=s/v=1110.62/966.4=115 percent.

That means that for every hour worked that produces her/his wage, a worker at Metro works around an additional 69 minutes (1 hour 9 minutes) for free for Metro. Alternatively expressed, for every hour worked that produces her/his wae, a worker at Metro works 28 minutes that produces her/his wage and 32 mintues for free for Metro. 

I calculate the division of the working day according to various lengths of the working day.  I use minutes rather and not just hours.

  1. For a 4 hour working day (240 minutes), Metro workers spend 112 minutes (1 hour 52 minutes) to obtain their wage for the day, and they spend 128 minutes (2 hours 8 minutes) in obtaining a surplus value or profit for Metro. 
  2. For a 5 hour working day (300 minutes), Metro workers spend 140 minutes (2 hours 20  minutes) to obtain their wage for the day, and they spend 160 minutes (2 hours 40 minutes) in obtaining a surplus value or profit for Metro. 
  3. For a 7 hour working day (420 minutes), Metro workers spend 195 minutes (3 hours 15 minutes) to obtain their wage for the day, and they spend 225 minutes (3 hours 45  minutes) in obtaining a surplus value or profit for Metro. 
  4. For an 8 hour working day (480 minutes), Metro workers spend 223 minutes (3 hours 43  minutes) to obtain their wage for the day, and they spend 237 minutes (3 hours 57 minutes) in obtaining a surplus value or profit for Metro. 
  5. For a 9 hour working day (540 minutes), Metro workers spend 251 minutes (4 hours 11 minutes) to obtain their wage for the day, and they spend 289 minutes (4 hours 49 minutes) in obtaining a surplus value or profit for Metro. 

Of course, during the time that the worker works to obtain an equivalent of her/his own wage, s/he is subject to the power of management and hence is also unfree during that time (see The Rate of Exploitation of Magna International Inc., One of the Largest Private Employers in Toronto, Part Two, Or: Intensified Oppression and Exploitation and   Employers as Dictators, Part One).

Most Metro workers belong to a union. This is what the annual report has to say about labour relations: 

LABOUR RELATIONS

The majority of our store and distribution centre employees are unionized. Collective bargaining may give rise to work stoppages or slowdowns that could impact negatively the Corporation. We negotiate agreements with different maturity dates and conditions that ensure our competitiveness, and terms that promote a positive work environment in all our business segments. We have experienced some minor labour conflicts over the last few years but expect(3) to maintain good labour relations in the future.

Do you think that these facts contradict the talk by the left and unionists of “fair wages,” “fair contracts” (see  Fair Contracts (or Fair Collective Agreements): The Ideological Rhetoric of Canadian Unions, Part One for the rhetoric of the largest union in Canada, the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE)) and “decent work?” Do they ignore the reality of life for workers, whether unionized or non-unionized?

If exploitation and oppression of workers is a constant in their lives, even if they are only vaguely aware of it, should this situation not be frankly acknowledged by their representatives? Do such representatives do so? If not, why not?  Do workers deserve better than neglecting the social context within which they live and work? Should such problems be addressed head on rather than neglected? 

Even if workers were not exploited, they would still be oppressed since they are used as things (means) for purposes which they as a collectivity do not define (see The Money Circuit of Capital). Does that express something fair? Management rights clauses (implied or explicit in collective agreements give management as representative of employers–and as a minority–the power to dictate to workers what to do, when to do it, how to do it and so forth–and is not the imposition of the will of a minority over the majority a dictatorship? (See  Employers as Dictators, Part One). Is that fair? Do union reps ever explain how a collective agreement somehow expresses something fair? Is that fair?

Is the following an example of what union reps mean by a “fair contract?”

Between METRO ONTARIO INC. C.O.B. AS METRO RIDEAU
and
UNIFOR AND ITS LOCAL 414 UNIFOR Union Canada
Effective from: February 18, 2017 to February 17, 2020

ARTICLE 6: MANAGEMENT RIGHTS

6.01 The union acknowledges the right of the company to manage and operate its business in all respects, to direct the working force and to establish and maintain reasonable rules and regulations.

6.02 The union acknowledges further that it is the function of the company to hire, promote, demote, transfer and lay-off employees and to suspend, discipline and discharge employees for just and sufficient cause. Any exercise of these rights in conflict or inconsistent with the provisions of this agreement shall be subject to the provisions of the grievance procedure set forth in Article 4.

How does the existence of a collective agreement turn the exploitative and oppresive situation of workers into one where they have a “fair contract” and “decent work?” Unions can limit exploitation and can control some aspects of their working lives, but in principle workers are things to be used by employers even with unions. This does not mean that a non-unionized environment is the same as a unionized environment. With unions that are independent of particular employers, that is to say, are real unions, there is an opportunity for workers to develop organizations of resistance against the power of particular employers.

Workers and not just unions, however, cannot resist the power of the employers as a class unless workers organize as a class, and furthermore they cannot change the situation unless they themselves realize the limitations of their own local, regional and national organizations when faced with the power of the class of employers (and the government that supports them), teach that to their members and are open persistently to criticism from below. In addition, unless they start to organize as a class with the aim of eliminating the class power of employers, they will be subject to a back-and-forth movement of reform and counter-reform (see Anti-Neoliberalism Need Not Be Anti-Capitalist: The Case of the Toronto Radical John Clarke, Part Four: The Welfare State and Neoliberalism, or The Infinite Back and Forth Movement of Capitalism). 

The ideology of unions–that somehow they can produce a “fair contract” and “decent work”–needs, though, to be constantly criticized. Workers deserve better than the acceptance of such ideology by the social-democratic or social-reformist left.

Data on Which the Calculation Is Based

The calculation of the rate of exploitation is undoubtedly imperfect, and I invite the reader to correct its gaps. Nonetheless, the lack of any attempt to determine the rate of exploitation at the city level has undoubtedly reinforced social-reformist tendencies.

I initially try to outline how the annual report calculates the Earnings Before Income Taxes (EBIT) and then makes some adjustments according to Marxian theory and on the basis of certain quantiative assumptions. 

Now, the calculation (in millions of Canadian dollars)

Sales 16,767.5 
Cost of sales (13,438.8) 
Gross margins 3,328.7 [16,767.5-13,438.8=3,328.7]

Operating expenses
Wages and fringe benefits (880.6)
Employee benefits expense (note 23) (85.8)
Rents and occupancy charges (529.2)
Retail network restructuring expenses (36.0)
Gain on divestiture of pharmacies 6.0
Others (481.6)
Total operating expenses 2007.2 (Add all the numbers in parentheses and subtract the 6.0 that is not=2007.2)

Since wages and benefits constitute variable capital (v), we should add them together:
Wages, fringe benefits and employee benefits expense: 966.4

Income net of operating expenses $1,321.5 [Gross margins-Total operating expenses=3,328.7-2007.2=1,321.5]

Depreciation and amortization

Fixed assets (note 11) (210.3) 
Investment properties (note 12) (0.7) 
Intangible assets (note 13) (75.4) 
Total (286.4) (=210.3+0.7+75.4)

Income net of depreciation and amortization 1035.1 [1,321.5-286.4=1035.1]

Financial costs, net
Current interest (2.9) 
Non-current interest (103.5) 
Interests on defined benefit obligations net of plan assets (note 23) (2.1) 
Amortization of deferred financing costs (2.9) 
Interest income 7.8 
Passage of time (0.2) 

Total net financial costs (103.8) (numbers in parentheses mean that the numbers were deducted from income as they are considered an expense from a particular capitalist’s point of view; those without parentheses are income and need to be subtracted since they are income) (2.9+103.5+2.1+2.9+0.2=111.6; 111.6-7.8=103.8)
Earnings before income taxes 931.3 (1035.1-103.8=931.3). 

The annual report, though, has “Earnings before income taxes” as 969.2. However, this number includes the following: 

Gain on disposal of a portion of the investment in an associate 36.4 (note 10)
Gain on revaluation and disposal of an investment at fair value 1.5 (note 10)

Note 10 indicates the following:

During the first quarter of 2019, the Corporation finalized the disposal of the entire investment at fair value in Alimentation Couche Tard Inc. (ACT).

It cannot be assumed that the value of property disposed of has nothing to do with the exploitation of Metro workers; the profit obtained from their exploitation might have been reinvested in the acquisition of ACT in the first place.

However, since such possible exploitation would have occurred earlier, I will exclude it from the calculations since the issue is the current rate of exploitation in 2019. 

36.4+15.=37.9; 969.2-37.9=931.3
Earnings before income taxes and before adjustments 931.3

Adjustments 

Adjustments of Surplus Value (Profit)

In Marxian theory, it is necessary to question whether some expenses are expenses for both the individual employer and for the class of employers (and fractions of their class, such as those who live on interest); where there is a coincidence of expenses for individual employers and the class of employers, the expense is deducted from total revenue.

Adjustment of Interest

On the other hand, there are expenses that are expenses for the individual employer but are not expenses when looked at from the point of view of the class of employers; in such an instance, they are paid out from the surplus value produced or obtained by workers and are to be included in income before taxes. For example, interest is such a category. 

As I wrote in another post: 

As explained in another post, interest in many instances can be treated as part of the surplus value produced and therefore added to net income since, although from the point of view of the individual capitalist it is an expense, from the capitalist economy as a whole it is derived from the production of surplus value. 

In addition, there are some so-called expenses that are allegedly salaries and other forms of income that are likely derived from surplus value; they have the form or appearance of wages or salaries but are really surplus value in disguise (such as the “salary” of CEOs). They need to be subtracted from expenses and added to “Earnings before income taxes.”  

Since interest forms part of surplus value, the total interest paid, 111.6, needs to be added to “Earnings before incomes taxes.” Accordingly: 

Temporality adjusted earnings before income taxes 1042.9 (931.3 + 111.6=1042.9)

Adjustment of Various Managerial Benefits

Various forms of income are available for senior managers and key employees that likely are derived exclusively from exploiting the rest of the workers. There are three categories in particular that apply here: stock option plan, peformance share unit plan and deferred share unit plan. Below, I quote from the annual report to show the nature of each plan as a plan for upper managerial employees of one form or another:

Stock option plan
The Corporation has a stock option plan for certain Corporation employees providing for the grant of options to purchase up to 30,000,000 Common Shares. As at September 28, 2019, a balance of 4,189,336 shares could be issued following the exercise of stock options.

Performance share unit plan (PSU)
The Corporation has a PSU plan. Under this program, senior executives and other key employees (participants) periodically receive a given number of PSUs. The PSUs entitle the participant to Common Shares of the Corporation, or at the latter’s discretion, the cash equivalent, if the Corporation meets certain financial performance indicators. 

Deferred Share Unit Plan (DSU)
The Corporation has a DSU plan designed to encourage stock ownership by directors who are not Corporation officers. Under this program, directors who meet the stock ownership guidelines may choose to receive all or part of their compensation in DSUs. 

Conveniently, the money for these managers is separately calculated for each category: 

Stock options: $2 million; PSUs: $6.6 million; DSUs: $6.2 million. Total: $14.8 million. This must be added to Earnings before income taxes. 

Temporarily adjusted earnings before income taxes 1057.7 (1042.9+14.8)

Adjustment for Rents and occupancy charges

As I wrote in another post: 

Another expense category is also relevant for making adjustments–the category “Rents and occupancy charges.” The rent of buildings, like the rent of equipment, is an expense both at the level of the firm and at the level of the economy as a whole. However, in the case of occupancy, rent also includes the capitalized value of land, and this capitalized value of land is derived from surplus value (see Jorden Sandemose (2018), Class and Property in Marx’s Economic Thought: Exploring the Basis for Capitalism). Again, without further information, it is impossible to tell or determine the proportion that is paid for the rental of buildings and the rental of land. I will assume that 10 percent of rent is due to the exclusive ownership of land (a non-produced means of production).

This 10 percent is equal to $52.92 million and must be added to the category “Earnings before income taxes.” Accordingly:

Adjusted Results

Adjusted earnings before income taxes 1110.62 (1057.7+52.92)
Wages, fringe benefits and employee benefits expense: 966.4

The Rate of Exploitation of Metro Workers

To calculate the rate of surplus value, we need to relate “Adjusted earnings before income taxes” to “Wages, fringe benefits and employee benefits expense” So, with the adjustments in place:, s=1110.62; v=966.4. The rate of exploitation or the rate of surplus value=s/v=1110.62/966.4=115 percent.

That means that for every hour worked that produces her/his wage, a worker at Metro works around an additional 69 minutes (1 hour 9 minutes) for free for Metro. Alternatively expressed, for every hour worked that produces her/his wae, a worker at Metro works 28 minutes that produces her/his wage and 32 mintues for free for Metro. 

According to a few people who have worked at Metro, the length of the working day is:

you will work up to 9 hrs or 4hrs

On a average day you work 8 hours

5-8hours/day

7 hours a day and 4 hours on weekdays.

I will calculate the division of the working day from the shortest to the longest in the above quotes accordingly. I use minutes rather and not just hours.

  1. For a 4 hour working day (240 minutes), Metro workers spend 112 minutes (1 hour 52 minutes) to obtain their wage for the day, and they spend 128 minutes (2 hours 8 minutes) in obtaining a surplus value or profit for Metro. 
  2. For a 5 hour working day (300 minutes), Metro workers spend 140 minutes (2 hours 20  minutes) to obtain their wage for the day, and they spend 160 minutes (2 hours 40 minutes) in obtaining a surplus value or profit for Metro. 
  3. For a 7 hour working day (420 minutes), Metro workers spend 195 minutes (3 hours 15 minutes) to obtain their wage for the day, and they spend 225 minutes (3 hours 45  minutes) in obtaining a surplus value or profit for Metro. 
  4. For an 8 hour working day (480 minutes), Metro workers spend 223 minutes (3 hours 43  minutes) to obtain their wage for the day, and they spend 237 minutes (3 hours 57 minutes) in obtaining a surplus value or profit for Metro. 
  5. For a 9 hour working day (540 minutes), Metro workers spend 251 minutes (4 hours 11 minutes) to obtain their wage for the day, and they spend 289 minutes (4 hours 49 minutes) in obtaining a surplus value or profit for Metro. 

It should be noted that I have used the verb “obtain” rather than “produce.” In Marxian economics, sales workers do not produce surplus value but rather transfer the surplus value already produced. This does not mean that these workers are not exploited capitalistically; they are used impersonally by the employer to obtain surplus value and a profit. Furthermore, things produced by others are used by employers such as Metro to control their working lives in order to obtain surplus value or profit.

Furthermore, some Metro workers do produce surplus value in that their labour involves transportation services; storage workers may perhaps also produce surplus value (this is a grey area for me). 

Of course, during the time that the worker works to obtain an equivalent of her/his own wage, s/he is subject to the power of management and hence is also unfree during that time (see The Rate of Exploitation of Magna International Inc., One of the Largest Private Employers in Toronto, Part Two, Or: Intensified Oppression and Exploitation and   Employers as Dictators, Part One).

Most Metro workers belong to a union. This is what the annual report has to say about labour relations: 

LABOUR RELATIONS

The majority of our store and distribution centre employees are unionized. Collective bargaining may give rise to work stoppages or slowdowns that could impact negatively the Corporation. We negotiate agreements with different maturity dates and conditions that ensure our competitiveness, and terms that promote a positive work environment in all our business segments. We have experienced some minor labour conflicts over the last few years but expect(3) to maintain good labour relations in the future.

Do you think that these facts contradict the talk by the left and unionists of “fair wages,” “fair contracts” (see  Fair Contracts (or Fair Collective Agreements): The Ideological Rhetoric of Canadian Unions, Part One for the rhetoric of the largest union in Canada, the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE)) and “decent work?” Do they ignore the reality of life for workers, whether unionized or non-unionized?

If exploitation and oppression of workers is a constant in their lives, even if they are only vaguely aware of it, should this situation not be frankly acknowledged by their representatives? Do such representatives do so? If not, why not?  Do workers deserve better than neglecting the social context within which they live and work? Should such problems be addressed head on rather than neglected? 

Even if workers were not exploited, they would still be oppressed since they are used as things (means) for purposes which they as a collectivity do not define (see The Money Circuit of Capital). Does that express something fair? Management rights clauses (implied or explicit in collective agreements give management as representative of employers–and as a minority–the power to dictate to workers what to do, when to do it, how to do it and so forth–and is not the imposition of the will of a minority over the majority a dictatorship? (See  Employers as Dictators, Part One). Is that fair? Do union reps ever explain how a collective agreement somehow expresses something fair? Is that fair?

Is the following an example of what union reps mean by a “fair contract?”

Between METRO ONTARIO INC. C.O.B. AS METRO RIDEAU
and
UNIFOR AND ITS LOCAL 414 UNIFOR Union Canada
Effective from: February 18, 2017 to February 17, 2020

ARTICLE 6: MANAGEMENT RIGHTS

6.01 The union acknowledges the right of the company to manage and operate its business in all respects, to direct the working force and to establish and maintain reasonable rules and regulations.

6.02 The union acknowledges further that it is the function of the company to hire, promote, demote, transfer and lay-off employees and to suspend, discipline and discharge employees for just and sufficient cause. Any exercise of these rights in conflict or inconsistent with the provisions of this agreement shall be subject to the provisions of the grievance procedure set forth in Article 4.

How does the existence of a collective agreement turn the exploitative and oppresive situation of workers into one where they have a “fair contract” and “decent work?” Unions can limit exploitation and can control some aspects of their working lives, but in principle workers are things to be used by employers even with unions. This does not mean that a non-unionized environment is the same as a unionized environment. With unions that are independent of particular employers, that is to say, are real unions, there is an opportunity for workers to develop organizations of resistance against the power of particular employers.

Workers and not just unions, however, cannot resist the power of the employers as a class unless workers organize as a class, and furthermore they cannot change the situation unless they themselves realize the limitations of their own local, regional and national organizations when faced with the power of the class of employers (and the government that supports them), teach that to their members and are open persistently to criticism from below. In addition, unless they start to organize as a class with the aim of eliminating the class power of employers, they will be subject to a back-and-forth movement of reform and counter-reform (see Anti-Neoliberalism Need Not Be Anti-Capitalist: The Case of the Toronto Radical John Clarke, Part Four: The Welfare State and Neoliberalism, or The Infinite Back and Forth Movement of Capitalism). 

The ideology of unions–that somehow they can produce a “fair contract” and “decent work”–needs, though, to be constantly criticized. Workers deserve better than the acceptance of such ideology by the social-democratic or social-reformist left.

Is Amnesty International a Progressive Organization?–or Is the Term “Progressive Organization” an Example of an Abstract Slogan of Social Democrats? Part Two

Introduction

In a previous post, I looked in a general way at the shortcomings of Amnesty International (AI) as a “progressive organization”–one of the abstract slogans of the social-democratic or social-reformist left here in Toronto (and undoubtedly elsewhere).

In an article posted on the Socialist Project’s website (https://socialistproject.ca/2021/12/swords-into-ploughshares/), Simon Black speaks to Sam Gindin, a social democrat or social reformer here in Toronto, Ontario, Canada and author, along with the late Leo Panitch, of the book (2013) The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of American Empire. 

Mr. Black states the following:

SB: Canadian arms exports to Saudi Arabia have been opposed by a range of civil society organizations, from Amnesty International to Oxfam. Collectively these organizations have also called for the federal government to work with trade unions representing workers in the arms industry to develop a plan that secures the livelihoods of those who would be impacted by the end of arms exports to Saudi Arabia. And in Labour Against the Arms Trade’s work with these organizations, we’ve always stressed the importance of centring this demand. Why is it important that mainstream, liberal human rights and humanitarian organizations are calling for a just transition for arms industry workers?

Mr. Gindin’s response?

Progressive organizations like Oxfam and Amnesty [my emphasis] are right to see that this [challenge to profit priorities] is a challenge to capitalist power and capitalism itself and so can be a barrier to convincing people, particularly workers and communities where these arms are manufactured, like the LAVs in London, Ontario. But it’s the only honest – and possible – way forward. The message is not just that there are potential alternatives, but also that they could be introduced only if we could build the kind of social force that’s necessary to [implement them]. Sometimes people want to obscure the fact that our demands are radical, because they feel like [this reality will make it] harder to mobilize. [But] unless we can respect workers enough to address the reality and win them over, we’re left with a progressive demand that is in essence an abstract slogan.

I have already addressed the issue of whether Oxfam is a “progressive organization” in a previous post (Is Oxfam a “Progressive Organization?”–An Abstract Slogan (Rhetoric) of Social Democrats).

In this post, I will look at the specific shortcoming of AI in relation to the world of work in the context of a society dominated by a class of employers. I will also look, briefly, at its shortcomings when it comes to the capitalist state in general and to police in particular.

The Focus of AI on Human Rights Leads to Silence Over Economic Coercion, Exploitation and Oppression of Workers on a Daily Basis

As I argued in the previous post, the human-rights movement emerged as a substitute for a socialist movement. In essence, the class power of employers is, implicitly or explicitly, assumed to be legitimate. AI therefore shifts our attention from the daily economic coercion characteristic of a society dominated by the class power of employers to more direct forms of coercion that involve work. Although such forms of coercion should hardly be ignored, the shift to an almost exclusive focus on more direct forms of coercion at work lead to a legitimation of the economic or indirect form of coercion characteristic of the more industrialized capitalist countries (and also of many less industrialized capitalist countries).

On Amnesty International’s website (https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/ , there are 19 issues listed:

  1. armed conflict
  2. arms control
  3. child rights
  4. climate change
  5. corporate accountability
  6. death penalty
  7. detention
  8. disappearances
  9. discrimination
  10. freedom of expression
  11. indigenous peoples
  12. international justice
  13. living in dignity
  14. police violence
  15. refugees, asylum seekers and migrants
  16. sexual and reproductive rights
  17. torture
  18. United Nations
  19. Universal Declaration of Human Rights

Quite a list. Let us, however, look at at point 13, “Living in dignity.”

The ideal company would provide “fair conditions of employment” (drawn from the “Living in Dignity” section). What “fair conditions of employment” would mean is not elaborated on at the website, but the AI document (2014) Human Rights for Human Dignity: A Primer on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights does elaborate. From page 54:

The right to work and rights at work

The [United Nations] Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has emphasized the interdependence of the provisions of the Covenant that safeguard the right to work, rights at work and the right to form and join a trade union, as well as to strike. The right to work remains less well understood than some of the other rights discussed here and is sometimes misinterpreted as the right to a job. The right to work entails access to employment without discrimination of any kind, to choose freely and not be forced into work, access to a system of protection against unfair dismissals, and a supportive structure that aids access to employment, including appropriate vocational education.105 The right to work covers both paid work and people working independently (referred to as
livelihoods in certain contexts) and requires governments to extend protections to people
working in the informal sectors of the economy.

Rights at work protect the right of everyone to just and favourable conditions of work,
including to fair wages, equal pay for work of equal value, safe and healthy working
conditions, reasonable limitations on working hours, protections for workers during and
after pregnancy, and equality of treatment in employment.

The idea of the right to work is thus taken from a document published by the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

The AI document referred to above says:

The right to work entails access to employment without discrimination of any kind

The implied emphasis here is on discrimination and not on the absolute right to access employment. Employers are not to discriminate in permitting access to work–they need to treat all workers equally regardless of race, gender and so forth. If there is a lack of discrimination, it is implied, then the employment relation is legitimate–subject to other conditions, such as not being coerced employment. From Karl Widerquist (2010), “The Physical Basis of Voluntary Trade,” in pages 83-103, Human Rights Review, Volume 11, page 87:

… coercion (or force) implies a deviation from “the normal course of events;” thus, the answer depends on what one considers the normal course of events to be.

What does AI consider to be “the normal course of events?”

The right to work entails … [the right] to choose freely and not be forced into work.

AI’s position assumes a normalized conception of what constitutes work that is freely chosen, and thereby judges what deviates from this normalized conception as a human rights abuse.

A lack of discrimination at work and not being coerced directly to work for an employer, however, is quite consistent with the indirect coercion of workers and their exploitation and oppression  that characterizes the class power of employers–aka capitalism. AI is silent about economic coercion–the golden chain which obliges workers to work involuntarily.

Mr. Gindin, by referring to AI as a “progressive organization,” simply papers over the issue.

From Widerquiest, page 84:

In two senses, a market economy can be characterized as voluntary. First, people can choose with whom they trade subject to the limits of the property rights of the people involved. They can say yes or no to any one other than the participant. Second, people have the legal right to choose whether or not to trade at all. They have the legal right to say yes or no to trade with all other participants. We can call these the physical conditions of voluntary trade.

But, there is a crucial third sense in which trade is not voluntary for many people today. That is, they are effectively denied any legal means to survive without providing services to someone who controls property. If the law ignores the existence of human needs, it can nominally establish the legal conditions of voluntary trade while legally subverting the physical conditions necessary for voluntary trade. Many people enter the economic system owning nothing; finding that all the resources are owned by someone else, they see that someone will interfere with any effort they make to meet their own needs. Therefore, they are forced to provide services for property owners to obtain money to buy resources. It is the aspect of obtaining money that concerns the discussion here, not spending it. Although trade involves both buying and selling, it is the things we do to obtain money that involve providing services for others; spending money involves other people providing services for us. It is not particularly problematic that a person with government-created tokens called money has to hand them to other people to receive goods and services, but it is a problem for voluntary trade if a person without money has no legal means to survive unless she provides services for people who hold money. It is, of course, desirable that nonmarket interaction, such as marriage and friendship, is also voluntary; but, the primary concern here is trade, specifically the things people do to get money which, for most of us means the labor market.

This article builds on the work I have done to define and argue for the importance of
freedom as effective control …  which, in short, is freedom as the power to say no. More exactly, … freedom is the effective power to accept or refuse interaction with other willing people. I have argued that genuinely voluntary interaction requires that all people have … freedom and that … freedom requires an exit option—some way that a person can survive without being forced to provide services for, to take orders from, or to meet conditions set by any particular group of other people (Widerquist 2006a). … the conditions necessary to secure the power to say no are often ignored in law and in many discussion of economics and human rights, in ways that make one group of people subservient to another. A society that establishes nominal self-ownership but interferes with individuals’ attempts to preserve their effective control self-ownership secures the right to say no but denies the power to say no.

AI makes an implicit distinction between “forced work” and work that is freely chosen. If the work is freely chosen, then it is legitimate, and there is no human rights abuse, as far as AI is concerned. Only if the work is not freely chosen is it illegitimate and a breach of human rights. However, AI implicitly accepts that the billions of workers who work for an ideal company somehow freely choose to work for that employer. As I have argued elsewhere, workers do indeed have some freedom to choose–they generally are not forced to work for a particular employer; that does not prevent them from being forced, as a class, from working for an employer (see Do Workers Work for a Particular Employer or for the Class of Employers? Part One: A Limitation of Some Radical Left Critiques of Capitalist Relations of Production and Exchange (A.K.A. Capitalism) and  Do Workers Work for a Particular Employer or for the Class of Employers? Part Two: Critique of Unions and the Social-Reformist or Social-Democratic Left; see also The Money Circuit of Capital).

Of course, AI implicitly considers that workers who work for an employer without any explicit economic coercion are not forced to work. Mr. Gindin may not consciously agree with such a view, but by rubber-stamping the view that AI is a progressive organization, he in fact does agree to such a view.

Forcing workers to work for employers is not personal; such a situation forms part of the economic structure of a society dominated by a class of employers and is reinforced by the legal system. From Widerquist, page 88:

The question is why people enter the market in a position in which they must sell their labor to people who own property. For this, there is only one explanation: if propertyless individuals try to produce goods to meet their own needs without trade, someone who claims ownership of the natural resources they need to do so will interfere with them, thus, forcing them to work for people who own property. According to Robert Hale, if the law designates other people as owners of anything with which an individual might secure her own diet, those laws coerce her to offer whatever services she can to someone with property (Hale 1923, 471–473).

Contradictory Call for States to Enforce Human Rights

According to AI:

States have a responsibility to protect human rights.

Human rights as defined by AI can only be enforced by states. However, as AI recognizes in its 19-point list, states often abuse AI’s definition of human rights–such as torture or disappearances. States are supposed to enforce human rights–but states are, even in terms of AI’s own limited definition of human rights–some of the worst perpetrators of human rights. How are states then to enforce human rights with any consistency since they themselves can only enforce human rights?

The old question “Do not the educators themselves need to be educated?” applies here: Do not states themselves need to be regulated? Who is going to do that? AI simply does not address the problem.

Consider point 14 on “police violence.” According to AI:

The most important thing to remember is this: it is the utmost obligation of state authorities, including police, to respect and protect the right to life.

This is ideology in a number of ways. Firstly, the emergence of the modern police goes hand in hand with the oppression and control of members of the working class (see Reform Versus Abolition of the Police, Part 8: The Police and the Political Economy of Capitalism). AI simply ignores the major function of the police as a control mechanism for ensuring workers do not get out of hand. As I wrote in that post:

Modern police function to maintain workers, citizens, immigrants and migrants in a state of poverty–not in the sense of a level of consumption below a defined poverty line, but in terms of a state of dependence on having to work for a class of employers. Those who form the edges of this kind of poverty–who are almost teetering into indigence–are particular targets of the modern police since they represent a more likely direct threat to the premises of that state of poverty and dependence on employers.

Secondly, police hardly exist to “respect and protect the right to life.” If they did, then the police would protect workers’ lives at work–which is hardly what happens. As I wrote in another post:

Some representatives of employers surely did not know what was best for the capitalist economy–whether to shut down for as long as necessary until the number of deaths and infections were reduced, to leave parts of the economy (in addition to essential economic structures, such as food, hand sanitizer and mask production) functioning or to leave most of the economy dominated by a class of employers functioning. But “sacrificing ourselves for our employers” even in normal times is run of the mill. Why is it that there are, on average, over 1,000 deaths officially at work per year and more than 600,000 injuries in Canada (and many more deaths when unofficial deaths are included (see Working and Living in a Society Dominated by a Class of Employers May Be Dangerous to Your Health).

That the police do protect life to a certain extent is true–but a half-truth. The other side is not only the lack of protection of life at work but the persistent threat of the use of the police as a weapon against workers, citizens, immigrants and migrant workers.

AI recognizes that laws may make it legal for the state or government to threaten life; on the other hand, it relies on the state or government to protect workers, citizens, immigrants and migrant workers. This position is contradictory, but nowhere does AI address the contradiction.

Conclusion

Nor does Mr. Gindin. Indeed, his abstract slogan “progressive organization” hides the contradiction, sweeping it underneath an apparent purely positive characterization of AI as “progressive.” For anyone who has been subject to the exploitation and oppression of employers, on the one hand, and the power of the capitalist state (including the police) on the other, Mr. Gindin’s reference to AI being “a progressive organization” rings hollow.

As I wrote Mr. Gindin claimed, as I indicated in my post in this series on Oxfam (see Is Oxfam a “Progressive Organization?”–An Abstract Slogan (Rhetoric) of Social Democrats):

Mr. Gindin implied that it was necessary to create “material structures” first rather than engage in criticizing the ideology of trade-unions (see my critique Fair Contracts or Collective Agreements: The Ideological Rhetoric of Canadian Unions, Part Four: The National Union of Public and General Employees (NUPGE)). Oxfam certainly has a material structure. Is Oxfam the embodiment of Mr. Gindin’s ideas (since it is “a progressive organization”)? Or is there need to question the implicit assumption by Oxfam that the exploitation and oppression of workers is legitimate? If so, why would Mr. Gindin call it a “progressive organization?”

Does not Mr. Gindin, like so many social-democrats, engage in abstract slogans by claiming that Oxfam is a progressive organization that somehow threatens capitalism?

The same critique applies to AI.

Does not Mr. Gindin, like so many social-democrats, engage in abstract slogans by claiming that Amnesty International is a progressive organization that somehow threatens capitalism? Or are organizations that do not threaten capitalism somehow progressive?

Guilty Until Proven Innocent: The Real Assumption of Some Bureaucratic Tribunals, Part Four

It is supposed to be a fundamental principle of criminal law that a person is presumed innocent until proven otherwise by the State (government). This is the ideology or the rhetoric (which much of the left have swallowed). The reality is otherwise. In reality, the administrative apparatus of various organizations of the government and semi-governmental organizations assume that you are guilty first and that you have to prove your innocence; otherwise, you suffer negative consequences.

An example is the requirements that the Ontario College of Teachers imposed on me in order for me to qualify as a teacher in the province of Ontario after I moved from the province of Manitoba. To qualify as a teacher in Ontario, you must gain the approval of the Ontario College of Teachers (OCT). The OCT website explains what this organization does:

ABOUT THE COLLEGE

The Ontario College of Teachers licenses, governs and regulates the Ontario teaching profession in the public interest.

Teachers who work in publicly funded schools in Ontario must be certified to teach in the province and be members of the College.

The College:

  • sets ethical standards and standards of practice
  • issues teaching certificates and may suspend or revoke them
  • accredits teacher education programs and courses
  • investigates and hears complaints about members

The College is accountable to the public for how it carries out its responsibilities.

You can find the qualifications, credentials and current status of every College member at Find a Teacher.

The College is governed by a 37-member Council.

  • 23 members of the College are elected by their peers
  • 14 members are appointed by the provincial government.

To qualify as a teacher in Ontario, among other things, you have to answer a questionnaire. On the questionnaire, there are questions concerning arrest–and since I was arrested by the RCMP (the Royal Canadian Mounted Police)  (but never convicted), I was obliged to prove my innocence in various ways.

I sent, along with my explanation, a table that I had constructed concerning my experiences (and the experiences of my daughter, Francesca) with the child welfare organization Winnipeg Child and Family Services (CFS), located in Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada. The table that I constructed about events is a revised version (always subject to change as I gather further evidence). I will post the table gradually, in the section Publications and Writings on this blog.

Below is the answer to the final question, I believe, about additional considerations:

III. Another aspect of the issue is the clash between the principal’s views and mine.

When Randy Chartrand was principal (from 2009 to 2011), I used to place the occasional article (including my own) or other information that might be relevant to teachers on the bulletin board. Randy had no problems with these activities.

In September 2011, when Neil MacNeil became the new principal. I became the chair of the Equity and Social Justice Committee of the local teachers’ association. I sent articles and commentaries to the Manitoba Teachers’ Society Ning on Equity and Social Justice and decided to place printed copies of such material (at my own expense) in binders in the teachers’ lounge. I provide a couple of examples of such material. (the first one is on the definition of equity and social justice and another is Sarason’s article on flawed education and the summary of the article that I had provided).

One day in the fall of 2011, the Mr. MacNeil sent all teachers an article via email on brains and adolescent behaviour; he also put the same article in printed format in the teachers’ mail box (I do not have a copy). The article claimed that, due to adolescent brain structure and growth, adolescents behaved in reckless ways. Since my own understanding of the human life process is opposed to such reductionism of human nature to brains—such reduction is typical of many articles on brain research (see the accompanying article, “The Grammar of the Human Life Process: John Dewey’s new theory of language”), I researched the issue and placed an article opposing such a view (see the accompanying article, Mike Males, “Is Jumping Off the Root Always a Bad Idea?: A Rejoinder on Risk Taking and the Adolescent Brain”) and placed the article in the binder. This issue is related to clinical supervision.

In relation to the issue of clinical supervision for 2011-2012, during the consultation concerning my professional development plan, I had indicated that I would like to continue to contribute to the school through the submission of summaries of articles that I had read alongside the particular articles in question. During the consultation, the principal specifically claimed that the staff had expressed its disdain for my efforts. Since no one had approached me negatively concerning my efforts, I inferred that it was the principal who considered my efforts with disdain. I was placed once again on the clinical supervision model (on October 26). I continued to print (at my own expense) articles and summaries of the articles that I had sent to the MTS Ning and place them into a binder in the staff lounge until I went on sick leave in February 2012.

This is part of my explanation for answering “yes” in several of the questions.

Dr. Fred Harris