Socialism, Part Two: What It May Look Like

The following is a continuation of an earlier post (Socialism, Part One: What It May Look Like) about the nature of socialism–which is a solution to problems that capitalism, characterized by the domination of a class of employers, cannot solve. Socialism is not something that emerges from a utopian view independently of the nature of capitalism but requires a critical approach to capitalism.

In the following, Tony Smith elaborates on the democratic nature of the workplace, which is subject to control not only by the workers at the particular workplace electing managers but also by certain community organizations that represent specific community interests. From  Globalisation: A Systematic Marxian Account (2006. Boston: Brill), page 303:

(ii) Managers of worker collectives are democratically accountable to those
over whom they exercise authority, either through direct elections or through
appointment by a workers’ council that is itself directly elected. These
enterprises are required to have representatives from a range of social
movements (environmental groups, consumer groups, feminist groups, and
so on) on their boards of directors, accountable to those movements.

What do you think of such proposals? How do they relate to democracy? To the lack of democracy in your life? Do you think that such proposals are worth fighting for?

 

 

The Educational Needs of the Labour Movement: A Radical Imagination

The radical left in Toronto (and probably elsewhere) has failed to engage in the radical imagination. When I participated as a facilitator in a few educational workshops for some workers and worker representatives at the Greater Toronto Airport Authority (GTAA), two other leftists  and I created a program that included three sections on capitalism. The first section dealt with the capitalist class (a part of the class of employers), the second section with the working class and the third section with the capitalist state (or capitalist government). It was a two-day session.

The next session, however, was reduced to only one day. The sections on the capitalist class, the working class and the capitalist state or government were omitted. I went along with such an omission–and regretted it afterwards. I should have been more vigorous in my objections.

For over two years, we waited again to give another course!

Finally, this year, the two men gave another course (I had withdrawn from the organization to which they belonged). It would be interesting to find out whether their course focused exclusively on worker activism at the local level and excluded the more general context of an economy dominated by a class of employers and the related social structures that accompany such domination. Did they include content that involved the radical imagination?

Below is a quote from Stanley Aronowitz’s book The Death and Life of American Labor: Toward a New Workers’ Movement. London: Verso, 2014,

near the end of chapter 6 (no page number):

Today, labor education has suffered sharp decline. After World War II, some unions relied primarily on university-based union leadership programs to train their shop-level stewards and officers in contract administration, labor law, and political action; others sent their full-time organizing and service staff to short-term education and training sessions offered by the universities. In the 1970s, worker education entered a new phase when some universities began offering degree programs to union members and their families. There is intellectual training available through the unions today. But it is not radical intellectual training. What has disappeared is the radical imagination.

The times require a radical imagination that goes beyond the clichés that the social-reformist left dish out–like “decent or good jobs,” “fair wages,” “economic justice” and “social justice.” We need labour education that incorporates a different vision of life–a humanized life, a life that respects human life. Such a life is impossible given the power of employers, and hence such a vision requires a vision that seeks to challenge and to go beyond such power. What is needed is a socialist vision.

 

 

 

Basic Income: A Critique of the Social-Reformist Left’s Assumptions and Analysis: Part Two

This is a continuation of my last post. In this post, I will address Mr. Bush’s confused analysis of relations at work and in exchange in a situation dominated by a class of employers, which he confusedly analyzes in his April 26, 2017 article published on the Socialist Project website (Basic Income and the Left: The Political and Economic Problems).

As I noted in my previous post, I will show that Mr. Bush, on the one hand, uses Karl Marx’s theory of surplus value for conservative purposes and, on the other, that he fails to connect Marx’s theory of “costs” to Marx’s theory of surplus value–a connection that has radical implications. Such implications, at the practical level, permit us “to focus on strategies that can help us build the power we need to achieve economic justice and dignity for all”–that really go beyond the class power of employers rather than the pseudo-radicalism offered by Mr. Bush’s “messy business of material reality.”

In the section of that article, entitled “The BI and the Logic of Capitalism,” Mr. Bush has the following to say:

Capitalism operates on the extraction of surplus labour from workers. Workers sell their potential to work on the labour market and employers put them to work, paying them a wage that is less than the value they produce with their labour. This surplus labour is ultimately the source of profits. Capitalism needs workers. Much of the history of capitalism centres around the creation of a working class that is more or less reliant on selling its labour power for a wage in order to live.

If workers in large enough numbers are able to sit outside of the labour market and sustain their basic needs, capitalism would cease to function. BI naively assumes that capitalists and the state would not respond politically and economically to the changing market condition of labour. The logic of capitalism would push capitalists to, at the very least, raise wages and increase prices on goods and services. The ultimate goal would be to compel workers back into the labour market, and make them dependent on selling their labour power in order to live.

It is fascinating to see how a social reformist tries to turn  a radical social theory into a conservative one that agrees with his own reformist conclusions. Let us look more closely at this “analysis.”

Firstly, Mr. Bush simply draws a false conclusion: “BI naively assumes that capitalists and the state would not respond politically and economically to the changing market condition of labour.” Some versions of BI may naively assume that, but certainly not a radical version of basic income (see a previous post  A Radical Basic Income as a Radical Reform). Mr. Bush simply wants to exclude all consideration of radical basic income policies that go beyond the present system of capitalist system consciously. He likely does so because he wants to draw reformist conclusions from Marx’s radical social theory.

Secondly, let us now turn to how capitalism operates. Mr. Bush claims that the essence of capitalism is the extraction of surplus labour from workers that is greater than the wage that the workers receive. For example, if workers at a brewery work for seven hours a day, and they receive a wage of $35 an hour, then if for every hour they produce a value of $70 an hour, they are exploited 100 percent. If they produce a value of $105 an hour they are exploited 150 percent, and so on. The point is that if there is to be a profit, the workers must produce more than the cost of their own wage, or the $35 an hour.

The problem with this view is that it is only a partial truth, or a one-sided view of what Mr. Bush calls “the messy business of material reality.” Mr. Bush evidently prides himself in being practical, and yet he fails to link up his reference to costs (referred to in my previous post) and the theory of surplus value.

Workers are costs to employers, and the worker receives the cost of what is required to produce “their potential to work” as Mr. Bush says. They receive, apparently, their full value, in exchange, for their wage. They certainly do so when considered only in the immediate exchange between the employer and the workers. Mr. Bush, however, excludes from consideration the question of time and prior conditions.

I will provide a long quote from Karl Marx since Mr. Bush, without referencing him, provides Mr. Bush with the theory of surplus value–but Mr. Bush omits any consideration of Marx’s theory of costs  as it relates to wages–conveniently for Mr. Bush. From Capital: C

Let us now return to our example. It is the old story: Abraham
begat Isaac, Isaac begat Jacob and so on. The original capital of
£10,000 brings in a surplus-value of £2,000, which is capitalized.
The new capital of £2,000 brings in a surplus-value of £400, and
this too is capitalized, transformed into a second additional
capital, which in its turn produces a further surplus-value of £80.
And the process continues in this way.

We leave out of account here the portion of the surplus-value
consumed by the capitalist. We are also not interested, for the
moment, in whether the additional capital is joined on to the
original capital, or separated from it so that it can valorize itself
independently. Nor are we concerned whether the same capitalist
employs it who originally accumulated it, or whether he hands it
over to others. All we must remember is this: by the side of the
newly formed capital, the original capital continues to reproduce
itself and to produce surplus-value, and this is true of all accumulated
capital in relation to the additional capital engendered by it.
The original capital was formed by the advance of £10,000.
Where did its owner get it from? ‘From his own labour and that of
his forefathers’, is the unanimous answer of the spokesmen of
political economy.4 And, in fact, their assumption appears to be
the only one consonant with the laws of commodity production.
But it is quite otherwise with regard to the additional capital of
£2,000. We know perfectly well how that originated. There is not
one single atom of its value that does not owe its existence to unpaid
labour. The means of production with which the additional
labour-power is incorporated, as well as the necessaries with which
the workers are sustained, are nothing but component parts of the
surplus product, parts of the tribute annually exacted from the
working class by the capitalist class. Even if the latter uses a portion
of that tribute to purchase the additional labour-power at its
full price, so that equivalent is exchanged for equivalent, the whole
thing still remains the age-old activity of the conqueror, who buys
commodities from the conquered with the money he has stolen from
them.

If the additional capital employs the person who produced it,
this producer must not only continue to valorize the value of the
original capital, but must buy back the fruits of his previous labour
with more labour than they cost. If we view this as a transaction
between the capitalist class and the working class, it makes no
difference that additional workers are employed by means of the
unpaid labour of the previously employed workers. The capitalist
may even convert the additional capital into a machine that throws
the producers of that capital out of work, and replaces them with
a few children. In every case, the working class creates by the surplus
labour of one year the capital destined to employ additional
labour in the following year.5 And this is what is called creating
capital out of capital.

The accumulation of the first additional capital of £2,000 presupposes
that a value of £10,000 exists, advanced by the capitalist,
and belonging to him by virtue of his ‘original labour’. The
second additional capital of £400 presupposes, on the contrary,
only the prior accumulation of the £2,000, of which the £400 is
the capitalized surplus-value. The ownership of past unpaid labour
is thenceforth the sole condition for the appropriation ofliving unpaid
labour on a constantly increasing scale. The more the capitalist
has accumulated, the more is he able to accumulate.
The surplus-value that makes up additional capital no. 1 is the
result of the purchase of labour-power with part of the original
capital, a purchase which conformed to the laws of commodity
exchange and which, from a legal standpoint, presupposes nothing
beyond the worker’s power to dispose freely of his own
capacities, and the money-owner’s or commodity-owner’s power to
dispose freely of the values that belong to him; equally, additional
capital no. 2 is merely the result of additional capital no. 1, and
is therefore a consequence of the relations described above; hence
each individual transaction continues to conform to the laws of
commodity exchange, with the capitalist always buying labourpower
and the worker always selling it at what we shall assume is
its real value. It is quite evident from this that the laws of appropriation
or of private property, laws based on the production and
circulation of commodities, become changed into their direct
opposite through their own internal and inexorable dialectic. The
exchange of equivalents, the original operation with which we
started, is now turned round in such a way that there is only an apparent
exchange, since, firstly, the capital which is exchanged for
labour-power is itself merely a portion of the product of the labour
of others which has been appropriated without an equivalent; and,
secondly, this capital must not only be replaced by its producer,
the worker, but replaced together with an added surplus. The relation
of exchange between capitalist and worker becomes a mere
semblance belonging only to the process of circulation, it becomes
a mere form, which is alien to the content of the transaction itself,
and merely mystifies it. The constant sale and purchase of labourpower
is the form; the content is the constant appropriation by the
capitalist, without equivalent, of a portion of the labour of others
which has already been objectified, and his repeated exchange of
this labour for a greater quantity of the living labour of others.

The immediate exchange between workers and employers is an exchange of equivalents, so that workers receive the value of their cost of production. However, when considering the larger context of previous production, then the immediate exchange between employer and workers is a semblance. The employer uses a part of the surplus produced by the workers in a previous round as means of production (machines, raw material, buildings, etc.) and another part (socially as money and physically as means of consumption, such as food, clothing, shelter) to further employ them (in addition to the initial investment).

As “costs,” the workers previous products are used against them to further exploit them. Mr. Bush entirely ignores this fact. He ignores the wider context. He ignores “the messy business of material reality.” Why is that? Mr. Bush is really quite arrogant. He pretends to be a very practical person, but he is in reality a very impractical person since he disregards the wider context when engaging in practice. Is this not folly?

In a previous post (Intelligent Activity According to John Dewey: Its Political Implications for the Left), I wrote the following:

The lack of such discussion among most workers shows the extent to which those who call for “practice” and believe that they are eminently practical are eminently impractical; they neglect one of the fundamental conditions for practical intelligence: taking into account the social context when acting. To neglect the social context when acting is to act unintelligently.

What exactly is the aim of those who engage in “practice” among the left? Is there any real discussion about the aims? Or is there simply a rush to engage in one “practice” after another without really engaging in any attempt to unify in a consistent fashion the various actions? If so, is that acting intelligently? Or is it acting unintelligently?

Mr. Bush proposes, practically, that the working class engage in unintelligent activity. More colloquially expressed, he proposes (even if he is unaware of this) that the working class act stupidly.

This is hardly in the interests of the working class.

I strongly suggest that Mr. Bush alter radically his theory and practice.

Unfortunately, there is already evidence that he will not do so. On Facebook, he and I engaged in in a short debate over the issue of whether the fight for $15 and an hour (and various employment reforms) should be paired with the concept of fairness (as indeed it was in Ontario). Mr. Bush explicitly stated that it was fair. I argued that such reforms indeed should be defended–while criticizing any concept of fairness.

My prediction for Mr. Bush’s future is that he will end up with a similar attitude to Mr. Urkevitch (see an earlier post,   Comments from John Urkevich, AESES-UM Business Agent, to my Critique of the Grievance and Arbitration Procedure: Letter to the Editor, Inside The Association of Employees Supporting Educational Services (AESES), Vol. 17, No. 4, May 1994). He will become a staunch defender of practice within the status quo of the employer-employee relation–like Mr. Urkevitch and many other union representatives.

It should be remembered that Mr. Bush is seen by many in Toronto, the largest city in Canada, as a practical leftist, a socialist and a good trade-unionist. That his views have not received any critical scrutiny illustrates the dominance of social-reformist leftism in Canada and the need for the creation of a more critical  but also practical leftism in Canada in general and Toronto in particular.

 

Basic Income: A Critique of the Social-Reformist Left’s Assumptions and Analysis: Part One

Introduction

I am dividing the post into two parts, with the first part devoted to more concrete concerns, and the second part to more theoretical concerns.

David Bush, in an April 26, 2017 article published on the Socialist Project website (Basic Income and the Left: The Political and Economic Problems), argues that the proposal for a basic income is unrealistic in terms of capitalist relations. Like the later pamphlet by the Ontario Coalition Against Poverty (OCAP) (Basic Income in the Neoliberal Age) (Toronto: 2017), he does not consider the basic income proposal strategically worthwhile since it cannot be realized within capitalist relations.

As I argued in an earlier post (Basic Income: A Critique of the Ontario Coalition Against Poverty’s Stance), proposing a basic income that contradicts what even OCAP recognizes is economic coercion is a strategy that calls into question the power of employers as a class and hence economic coercion. David Bush, though, considers that the debate among the left does not take “material reality” into account. He says the following:

Instead of a concrete debate about the economic and political aspects of BI, it is discussed as an ideal separated from the messy business of material reality.

Mr. Bush is going to give the idealist left a lesson in the “messy business of material reality.” What is material reality for Mr. Bush?

Mr. Bush obviously believes that he is a realist–he can deal with “the messy business of material reality”–whereas the radical left are idealists. He says the following:

The strategy of those advocating BI centres on crafting policies in a vacuum and hoping governments enact them.

This romantic idealism has stymied serious analysis of the policy from the Left. Taking a step back and looking at the economic and political logic of BI, I hope to show that however well-meaning the policy is, it is economically flawed and a politically dangerous demand for the Left to adopt.

Mr. Bush is a grass roots organizer and practitioner, and because of this he believes that he has a better grasp of the “messy business of material reality”–whereas the radical left, romantic idealists that they are, are unrealistic.

Let us now look at the beginning of this “serious analysis of the policy from the Left.” But just a point: Some who advocate a basic income have no illusion that governments in their present structure will institute a policy that will eliminate economic coercion; such governments, rather, thrive on economic coercion and will not institute a policy that will undercut their own existence.

Costing Basic Income–An Employer Approach

The title of Mr. Bush’s next section is “Costing BI.”

Mr. Bush then refers to three models of basic income. He then makes the following astounding assertion:

The first question we should ask is, what are the basic costs of these models? Looking at Ontario, Michal Rozworski has pointed out the cost of the universal model, even when set at a low rate, is exorbitant.

This is a good example of Mr. Bush’s way of dealing with the “messy business of material reality.” We are not to question the fact of costs; we are to assume that costs are somehow sacred and propose policies only on the basis of costs within the structure of the power of the employers as a class. Mr. Bush’s “first question” assumes that we are to measure a policy on the basis of money–this is his way of dealing with the “messy business of material reality.”

In other words, Mr. Bush does not inquire into why things in our society have a price and in fact why human beings have a price–they simply do. We are then supposed to be “realistic” by accepting this “fact” (and it is a fact) rather than investigating the conditions and implications of this fact for human life and welfare. See The Money Circuit of Capital for the social implications of measuring human beings and our life process in term of money (costs). I will further criticize this approach in the next section.

This jump into costs is related to the inadequacy of Mr. Bush’s next section (entitled The BI and the Logic of Capitalism). The inadequacy of this section will be addressed in the subsequent post (part two).

However, in relation to  OCAP’s pamphlet on basic income, Mr. Bush’s analysis is inferior: at least OCAP managed to express part of the truth of the fact of measuring human life and human welfare in terms of “costs.” In the OCAP pamphlet, it is written:  “Capitalism needs economic coercion for its job market to function” (page 6). If economic coercion is characteristic of the job market, then the left should adopt a policy that short-circuits this economic coercion–such as a radical basic income policy (see an earlier post,  A Radical Basic Income as a Radical Reform).

By treating human beings as “costs” (purchasable with money), Mr. Bush assumes that economic coercion is inevitable without connecting the dots. By nonchalantly accepting costs as a fact of life and a so-called necessary part of the world–part of the “messy business of material reality” (actually part of the messy business of capitalist reality), Mr. Bush becomes an ideologue of employers without realizing it.

Mr. Bush continues this illogic of treating human beings as costs; the reader will be spared any further reference to this “messy business of material reality.”

In the subsequent post, I will pursue Mr. Bush’s illogic by looking at his next section, entitled “The BI [Basic Income] and the Logic of Capitalism.” It will be shown that Mr. Bush fails to connect up treating people as costs with what he thinks is Karl Marx’s theory of surplus value.

However, I will not wait until the next post to expose Mr. Bush’s real intent.

He gives his own position away when he states the following:

Rather than raising the rates for social assistance, increasing the minimum wage or spending more on social services the government is touting its BI experiment.

These reforms are what Mr, Bush is really after. The basic income experiment as proposed by the Liberal government and even right-wing parties and governments would interfere with these reforms. The real alternative is “raising the rates for social assistance, increasing the minimum wage or spending more on social services.” These reforms are all–within the context of economic coercion and economic blackmail, are they not? There is nothing wrong with fighting for reforms–workers need to improve their lives, but why not improve their lives but not having any illusions about the fairness of such reforms? Why not propose some reforms that do definitely exceed the power of employers and the government to meet them? Mr. Bush is really a social democrat who wants social reform while assuming the eternal nature of the power of employers as a class.

Mr. Bush further gives himself away as a social reformist who accepts the inevitability of the power of employers as a class when he says:

The very same forces that make it difficult to win improvements in current social programs….

That is what Mr. Bush really calls dealing with the “messy business of material reality.” The only viable strategy is–improvements in social programs. Forget about eliminating the economic blackmail characteristic of the power of employers as a class. Forget about trying to develop policies and strategies that address the root of “material reality” characterized by economic coercion and economic blackmail. We need to fight–for social reforms only; everything else is idealistic nonsense. Such is the way in which Mr. Bush deals with the “messy business of material reality.”

Mr. Bush, like other social-democratic reformists, then refers to dignity for all without explaining how this is to be achieved within the context of the class power of employers:

Burying the idea of BI as a viable strategy to respond to inequalities and injustices of capitalism allows us to focus on strategies that can help us build the power we need to achieve economic justice and dignity for all.

Mr. Bush, like other social-reformist leftists, has no intention of really questioning the power of employers as a class. Social reform, and more social reform, and more social reform–that is all they have to offer.

Perhaps Mr. Bush can explain how “economic justice and dignity for all” is possible in conditions characterized by “economic coercion?” By the money circuit of capital? By treating human beings systematically and necessarily as means rather than ends?

I prefer the analysis of Tony Smith, in his book Beyond Liberal Egalitarianism: Marx and Normative Social Theory in the Twenty-First Century (Leiden: Brill, 2017, pages 342-343) to Mr. Bush’s reformist rhetoric:

The abolition of labour markets, that is, the abolition of wage labour as
a social form, would contribute greatly to overcoming the ‘bifurcation of the
political’. It is also required if we are to ever attain a world in which the [sic] ‘all persons are equal, so far as the importance of their basic interests are concerned’.3
To accomplish this, the production and distribution of goods and services could
be undertaken by worker co-operatives, with managers democratically elected
by, and accountable to, those over whom they exercise authority.

Smith refers specifically to a demand for a basic income that goes beyond anything that the class power of employers could satisfy (page 346):

It is not the mere presence of markets that establishes the alien power of
capital. What makes capitalist market societies so different from pre-capitalist
societies with markets is the society-wide compulsion to place the accumulation
of surplus value above all other ends. The democratising of decisions regarding
the levels and priorities of new investments, combined with full employment
and basic income guarantees that are not feasible in capitalism, removes the
compulsion.

Note that Smith does not limit the proposal to only a basic income that is not “feasible in capitalism.” Mr. Bush, by contrast, will always propose policies that are feasible within capitalism. This is his way of dealing with the “messy business of material reality.”

Rather than concluding on a purely negative note, however, it should be recognized that Mr. Bush at least should be commended in putting into writing and publicly his beliefs. How else can errors and hence corrections arise? Many of the social-democratic left here in Toronto (and I suspect elsewhere) hide behind their “practice” and are unwilling to come out publicly to expose their beliefs to criticism. Mr. Bush should be commended for having the courage for publicly declaring his beliefs.

Given the inadequate nature of Mr. Bush’s views, he should modify his beliefs and thereby change his practice. If he (and other social reformers) should, however, persist in their dogmas, both theoretically and practically, then of course they should be thoroughly criticized.

In my next post, I will show that Mr. Bush, on the one hand, uses Karl Marx’s theory of surplus value for conservative purposes and, on the other, that he fails to connect Marx’s theory of “costs” to Marx’s theory of surplus value–a connection that has radical implications. Such implications, at the practical level, permit us “to focus on strategies that can help us build the power we need to achieve economic justice and dignity for all”–that really go beyond the class power of employers rather than the pseudo-radicalism offered by Mr. Bush’s “messy business of material reality.”

 

 

Comments from John Urkevich, AESES-UM Business Agent, to my Critique of the Grievance and Arbitration Procedure: Letter to the Editor, Inside The Association of Employees Supporting Educational Services (AESES), Vol. 17, No. 4, May 1994

As I wrote in my last post (Critique of the Grievance and Arbitration Procedure: Letter to the Editor, Inside The Association of Employees Supporting Educational Services (AESES), Vol. 17, No. 4, May 1994), I would provide the business agent’s reply to my letter to the editor in the same volume of the union newsletter. Here it is verbatim:

Mr. Harris’ comments are noteworthy in several respects albeit difficult to understand. I  believe that Mr. Harris is attempting to convey the message that a collective agreement only goes so far in reducing management’s unbridled right to manage its affairs and its working force and therefore a union, any union, is only as effective as the collective agreement it has to work with on behalf of its membership.

I would agree, as would most, that collective agreements only limit management’s right to manage and that which is not specifically abridged by a collective agreement remains within the employer’s purview. This right, however, is tempered by legislation which dictates that the exercising of management rights must be reasonable, fair, non-arbitrary, non-discriminatory and in good faith. Although arbitrators do not generally accept the argument that because there is a collective agreement, management is restricted to dealing only with those functions as specified in the agreement unless there is union agreement, neither do arbitrators accept the argument that management has an unfettered right to act completely as it wishes, in particular when it comes to severing or detrimentally affecting an employee benefit.

Mr. Harris reiterates the definition of a grievance which is found in our collective agreement but in so doing leaves the impression that such a definition is restrictive. I would suggest that this defines a grievance in its broadest sense.

Arbitration is the final step in the grievance procedure and therefore is part and parcel of the procedure and not an entity of its own. The arbitration of a grievance occurs only if the parties cannot come to a mutually acceptable resolution of the issue either during the process or before a grievance is ever filed. Many of the issue that arise during the life of a collective agreement are resolved without either the necessity of a grievance of arbitration. Depending on the state of the employer/employee relationship, common sense and fairness can prevail without a confrontation.

The reason that management does not file grievances is because the employer/employee relationship is such that the employer acts and the employee reacts. The union’s right to be proactive is curbed by the law which prohibits employees from withholding their services during the term of a collective agreement and specified that all agreements must contain a method of resolving disputes which arise during the term without a work stoppage (grievance procedure). Whenever management takes an action the employee must continue as normal whether or not the employer is correct (there are some exceptions). This is aptly coined as the “work now–grieve later” principle. If this were not the case then I suspect that management grievances would be a fact of life.

I do not agree, as Mr. Harris suggests, that because management’s right is merely restricted by a collective agreement that employees should not voice their concerns or their problems, unless it is certainty that a grievance is winnable. Union members should always check with their union representative any questionable act of management. After all the employer only has control over the how, what, and when, it does not have the right to treat employees in an unjust or undignified manner. Employees are not channel.

I have provided Mr. Urkevich’s response in full without my intervention so that the reader could see the whole response before I begin to analyze the response (an opportunity which I did not have since, as I said, I was no longer a member of the union).

….Mr. Harris is attempting to convey the message that a collective agreement only goes so far in reducing management’s unbridled right to manage its affairs and its working force and therefore a union, any union, is only as effective as the collective agreement it has to work with on behalf of its membership.

I fail to see how anyone could infer from what I wrote that that is the message that I wanted to convey. Unions need to teach their members the limitations of the legal rights of union members as contained in collective agreements–and those legal rights are very limited. That is what I wanted to convey.

Union representatives, in order to “sell” a contract, often exaggerate the fairness of a collective agreement and thereby do their members a disservice because they then teach them the opposite; they imply that, by being “fair,” collective agreements are not very limited instruments for protecting their collective interests. See, for example, reference to a “fair contract” by the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) Local 3902 of the University of Toronto (CUPE 3902, University of Toronto Education Workers).

I would agree, as would most, that collective agreements only limit management’s right to manage and that which is not specifically abridged by a collective agreement remains within the employer’s purview. This right, however, is tempered by legislation which dictates that the exercising of management rights must be reasonable, fair, non-arbitrary, non-discriminatory and in good faith.

Mr. Urkevich, like many union representatives, begs the question. Why does he assume what he needs to prove, namely, that the employer/employee relation can be “reasonable, fair?” In the money circuit of capital, for example, it has been shown that employees are mere means for the benefit of employers (see  The Money Circuit of Capital). Indeed, as I wrote in that section:

Immanuel Kant, a German philosopher, argued that, in order to act ethically, it is necessary to treat people never as means only but as ends in themselves: “For, all rational beings stand under the law that each of them is to treat himself and all others never merely as means but always at the same time as ends in themselves” (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. New York: Cambridge University Press, page 41). Human beings need to be treated as ends and not as means. To treat human beings as ends in themselves, it is necessary to have those who engage in realizing the ends also engaged in participating in the formulation of the ends.

If human beings, as employees, are treated as means to others’ ends, then how is such a situation “fair and reasonable”? For the employer, by definition, it is fair and reasonable. Is it for the workers though? Does not Mr. Urkevitch take the point of view of the employer as his standard? Should we? Why?

Is not Mr. Urkevich’s reference to “legistlation which dictates that the exercising of management rights must be reasonable, fair, non-arbitrary, non-discriminatory and in good faith” meant to justify Mr. Urkevitch’s own role as union business agent since, otherwise, Mr. Urkevich would be justifying unreasonable actions, unfair actions, and so forth.

Although arbitrators do not generally accept the argument that because there is a collective agreement, management is restricted to dealing only with those functions as specified in the agreement unless there is union agreement, neither do arbitrators accept the argument that management has an unfettered right to act completely as it wishes, in particular when it comes to severing or detrimentally affecting an employee benefit.

Of course arbitrators would not permit employers to let managers do what they will with employee benefits or, for that matter, employees in general. The treatment has to be consistent with the line of business. However, this leaves management with a very wide latitude of power to determine what can and cannot be done at work.

Whenever management takes an action the employee must continue as normal whether or not the employer is correct (there are some exceptions). This is aptly coined as the “work now–grieve later” principle. If this were not the case then I suspect that management grievances would be a fact of life.

Mr. Urkevitch, like many union representatives, assume without further ado that the employer/employee relation is inherently reasonable. I categorically deny that, and for reason already provided in reference to Kant and the money circuit of capital.

Management has a monopoly of decision-making power except as restricted by the collective agreement (and limited legislation); why employers have such a monopoly of decision-making power Mr. Urkevitch does not even question–undoubtedly like many other trade-union representatives and social-reformists.

Mr. Urkevitch merely repeats what needs to be explained: “Whenever management takes an actio the employee must continue as normal…” Why must the employee do so? Because of economic coercion, perhaps? (See “Capitalism needs economic coercion for its job market to function” (Ontario Coalition Against Poverty: OCAP)). It is the economic power of employers compared to employees that shapes legislation in favour of employers?

Mr. Urkevitch, undoubtedly like many union representatives, with a manipulative “if” (“If this were not the case”–but it is not the case–and that makes all the difference in the world for the daily lives of unionized workers–seeks to minimize the importance of the fact that it is mainly unions that file grievances and not management–because management has the power to make the major decisions that effect the lives of millions of workers.

I do not agree, as Mr. Harris suggests, that because management’s right is merely restricted by a collective agreement that employees should not voice their concerns or their problems, unless it is certainty that a grievance is winnable.

This reasoning is pure fantasy. Employees should voice their concern in various ways–even if the grievance is not winnable. Where did I imply that only if the grievance is winnable should workers voice their concern?

After all the employer only has control over the how, what, and when, it does not have the right to treat employees in an unjust or undignified manner. Employees are not channel.

This last sentence likely sums up the attitude of many union representatives. No, employees are not chattel, that is to say, they are not slaves, owned 24 hours a day. They are not required to work for a particular employer. No one forces them to work for a particular employer.

However, just as with the manipulative use of the word “if” above, Mr. Urkevitch uses the word “only” in order to minimize the importance of how much power management has over the lives of even unionized workers: “the employer only [my emphasis] has control over the how, what, and when….”

Mr. Urkevitch evidently does not think that “control over the how, what, and when” is “unjust or undignified.”

I do. (See above, referring to Kant and the money circuit of capital). Employers, by controlling “the how, what, and when”–control the lives of workers, which is undignified and unjust.

Union representatives, like Mr. Urkevitch, however, obviously believe that it is just. They believe in the justice of the collective agreement, where “the employer only has control over the how, what, and when.”

Union representatives imply, often enough, that there is somehow something fair about collective agreements. No one seems to challenge them to explain what they mean by fair collective agreements.

For instance, here is an example from a relatively recent union representative in Ontario:

Toronto (24 May 2018)…

Warren (Smokey) Thomas, President of the Ontario Public Service Employees Union (OPSEU/NUPGE) said he is hopeful the employer is ready to step up and do what is right for 20,000 of its workers who have suffered for decades under appalling working conditions.

“We’ve heard countless horror stories from our new members about poor pay and job security, no vacation time, they don’t even get sick days,” said Thomas.
“The fact our members overwhelmingly voted to join OPSEU/NUPGE in the largest organizing drive in Canadian history sends a strong message that times are changing. I hope this employer will work with us and make sure our members get a fair contract,” he said.

Of course, unions generally do improve wages and working conditions, but such improvements do not give them the right to declare that any collective agreement is somehow fair. They abuse their position by doing so, and by abusing their position, they open themselves up to legitimate criticism.

Unfortunately, few among the so-called left engage in such criticism. Rather, at best they follow along behind the unions, seeking “openings” here and there to open up discussion rather than openly criticizing all talk of fair contracts or collective agreements. They do a disservice to the regular worker but certainly aid both union representatives–and the class of employers.

One final point: although any particular employee is not obliged to work for any particular employer, what of the class of emloyees in relation to the class of employers? Can the class of employees simply not work for an employer, freely and realistically? If not, what does that make them?

So many questions, but so few answers–by union representatives and, undoubtedly, by many social reformists.

 

 

Critique of the Grievance and Arbitration Procedure: Letter to the Editor, Inside The Association of Employees Supporting Educational Services (AESES), Vol. 17, No. 4, May 1994

In a previous post, I provided the current management rights clause between AESES and the University of Manitoba  (Management (Employer) Rights, Part Three: Public Sector Collective Agreement, Manitoba). This is a continuation, of sorts.

The title indicates what the content of this post will be about.

In 1994, I worked on a project at Dafoe Library at the University of Manitoba (Canada) for a few months (one of the few positions I had because I was probably blacklisted because of my previous union and radical activity in my workplace in School District No. 57, Prince George, British Columbia). I sent in the following to the union newsletter. Unfortunately, I could not pursue any further the debate since the project had ended–and consequently my union membership.

The following is a verbatim letter to the editor of the AESES newsletter. The next post, probably next week, will be the business agent’s reply to my letter in the same newsletter.

Unions need to instruct members concerning the legal limits of the union’s capabilities, and members need to know what they can legally expect from the union. Unfortunately, from my own observations, many members do not know what the limits of union power are as it presently exists. They do not even have a clear grasp of the grievance and arbitration procedure. The following is thus meant both to inform members of the procedure and to generate some debate over the nature and function of unions.

A grievance is frequently defined as any difference arising from the interpretation, application, administration, or alleged violation of a collective agreement. If a grievance is not resolved in the grievance process, it may end in arbitration (a sort of court which determines whether the grievance is valid). The problem is that most arbitrators in Canada interpret the collective agreement as merely limiting management’s general right to manage work–including the lives of the workers–as it sees fit. With few exceptions, management retains its general right unless specifically restricted in the agreement.

Some union executives may disagree, claiming that the collective agreement expresses the joint and equal will of both parties (management and the union); the collective agreement is a contract like any contract and is binding on the parties. Such a view fails to account for the specific nature of the employment contract. The employment contract entails the control by management of employees’ activities. Indeed, arbitrators differentiate independent contractors from employees primarily (though not exclusively) on the basis of the level of control: an independent contractor is not under the control of an employer, but an employee is. In other words, an employee is a subordinate.

Moreover, if the employment contract were similar to other contracts, both parties would likely claim a breach of the agreement roughly the same number of times. However, the vast majority of grievances are initiated by unions. Why is that? The answer has already been formulated above: management need not initiate grievances because it has the general right to manage work.

However, many issues important to workers which emerge during the term of the collective agreement are not covered by the collective agreement. Given that arbitrators’ authority is restricted to the collective agreement, it is unlikely that workers will win grievances that end in arbitration if no provisions exist in the agreement which restrict management’s general rights To be sure, arbitrators have some leeway in applying arbitral jurisprudence, but they are ultimately restricted by the collective agreement which exists.

The Socialist Project’s Critique of Doug Ford’s Attack on Local Democracy Falls Short

The Socialist Project has rightly condemned Doug Ford (the new Premier of Ontario, Canada) for his unilateral reduction of the number of Toronto city councilors (in the midst of Toronto elections, no less–indeed, an autocratic act) (see Ford’s Attack on Local Democracy in Toronto).

Despite their criticism of Ford’s autocratic manner, they should also look at the so-called left’s own anti-democratic practices.

Being ignorant of who exactly are the members of the Socialist Project, I will limit my commentary to the probable membership of Sam Gindin in that organization.

I belonged to an organization called the Toronto Labour Committee until last November, when I resigned over what I perceived as a lack of discussion over what I considered to be vital issues relevant to regular members of the working class (not union representatives). My view is that the Toronto Labour Committee was too closely tied to the union movement and had compromised itself in several ways democratically. It is probable that the Socialist Project does the same.

I will not go into the details of how it compromised itself (of course, if Sam or other members of the Toronto Labour Committee raise the issue–then, of course, I will then pursue the issue in further detail).

I will simply point out one issue that illustrates the limited nature of the Socialist Project’s call for democracy in the case of Ford, which should also be directed at the so-called left.

From the Socialist Project’s post:

Democracy is not about “economic efficiency.” It is about providing for free and open debate and discussion between competing points of view in order to make decisions.

Is there any evidence that there is such “free and open debate and discussion between competing points of view in order to make decisions” within the Toronto Labour Committee? For example, I tried to raise the issue of health and safety and how systemic such problems were in the context of a capitalist economy (referring to the work by Bob Barnetston The Political Economy of Workplace Injury in Canada, where he pointed out that over 1000 workers died a year on the job and over 630,000 are injured. There was silence.

Subsequently, when a representative of a local labour council called for support of some striking brewery workers here in Toronto, she justified her call for such support on the basis of referring to what the workers supposedly want–good jobs and a fair deal.

I had worked in a brewery for around four years in Calgary, Alberta, Canada. I questioned this reference to a good (or decent) work and a fair contract. I did not try to attack the representative personally. I tried to address the issues.

I also pointed out that the striking workers did deserve our support–that it was a question of solidarity.

Wayne Dealy, who is a representative of a local Toronto union here, then intervened, stating the following:

Is this meant to be a serious intervention or are you taking the piss?

I expressed a point of view that was different–and was roundly insulted on a listserve.

I replied:

It is meant to be a serious intervention. If Wayne Dealy has something against the intervention–apart from emotional venting and insults-he is welcome to debate the issue.

Social democrats, unionists and others who consider themselves to be progressive often refer to good or decent jobs and fair contracts (deals). This is an assumption that is rarely questioned. Indeed, the tone of Wayne’s response is indicative of the lack of real concern over the issue of the power of employers as a class in relation to employees as a class. In other words, Wayne’s response itself shows just how much the issue needs to be debated. That topic will start to be addressed at the next Toronto Labour Committee on March 9, from 7:00-9:00 at 31 Wellesley.

Fred Harris, Ph. D., philosophy of education, former brewery worker

I was too hopeful. No one from the listserve–including Sam Gindin–addressed the real issues of whether there is such a thing as good jobs or a fair contract.

Wayne Dealy replied:

Deepest apologies. Those fourteen words have been buried deep inside
me for years and they could no longer be contained. I regret that you
suffered so for their ill-timed appearance.

Apologies too for not showing more gratitude for the fact that you
deigned to use Tracy’s call for picket-line support to explain to us
in plain language how wage labour is exploitative. Sam, David, Tracy
et al, I hope you all were taking notes. All of us on this list are
obviously and sorely in need of simple explanations of such things;
fortunately Fred is here to fill that void.

On a more personal note, thanks to your second intervention, my
consciousness has been raised even further: I now see the problem all
along was my “lack of real concern over the issue of the power of
employers as a class in relation to employees as a class”.

And the fact that you were able to suss me out from my fourteen
ill-chosen words? Mind. Blown.

Thanks again, truly, for sharing your insights. This group is
extremely fortunate to have a Promethean figure like yourself who so
selflessly kept the ember of class analysis alive so that it could be
shared with all us sinners.

Wayne.

p.s. If I had wanted to insult you I would have called you a
condescending prick

Wayne G. Dealy
Ph.D. Candidate
Department of Political Science

 
University of Toronto

From there the issue got sidetracked, and the issue of whether there can be decent jobs or a fair contract in the context of a class of employers vanished (I take some responsibility–although only some responsibility for this–I got sidetracked rather than focusing on these two issues, which is what I should have done all along).

I doubt that there has been any real

free and open debate and discussion between competing points of view in order to make decisions.

The class issue has been buried by political rhetoric, insults and excuses. Sam Gindin, for example, used the excuse that the reference to “decent work” was a purely “defensive” move. Has there been any “free and open debate and discussion between competing points of view in order to make decisions” about the appropriateness of using such a term as “decent work” or a “fair contract”? I doubt it.

So-called socialists in Toronto (and probably elsewhere) should look internally to see whether they really are practicing “free and open debate and discussion between competing points of view in order to make decisions.” That would indeed be welcome.

As Alan R.H. Baker (Geography and History: Bridging the Divide) wrote, page 213:

I subscribe to consensual historical geography. Of course, any
consensus in history can be sought, and sometimes achieved, only by debate. This
brings me to my third principle of historical geography: debate is central to the
practice of historical geography. Rethinking and revising current, orthodox interpretations should be the norm in historical geography: it should be conventional to be radical. Current ideas and assertions must be, and must expect to be, revised as new evidence comes to light, as new techniques of analysis become available, as new problems deserving attention are identified, and as new ideas and theories are brought into play. Debate, both about substantive issues and about research methodologies, lies at the heart of historical geography as it does also of history (Fig. 6.3). Within historical geography, as within history, there should be an unrelenting criticism of all orthodoxies and conventional wisdoms, as well as an
unremitting awareness of discourses in cognate disciplines.

Do the so-called socialists really engage in debate with a view of achieving some kind of consensus? Will trade-union leaders abandon their views if it is shown that they are mistaken? If they do not, what will socialists do? Or are socialists so afraid of upsetting their trade-union connections (Sam Gindin once indicated that he did not want to become isolated) that they would practically desist from engaging in “free and open debate and discussion between competing points of view in order to make decisions?”

Sam Gindin claimed that we are supposed to be humble. Why? Why should regular workers be humble? They are oppressed and exploited every day. Why should they be humble in the face of union leaders who talk of fair contracts and good jobs? They should be angry at such talk–not humble. They deserve a far better life than what they now experience as things to be used by employers.

A final question: Is there free and open debate and open discussion between competing points of view” among regular workers about management rights, whether unionized or non-unionized? Frankly, I doubt it. If there is evidence to the contrary, I hope others would correct my error.