I have little to comment on here—I already referred to a major objection of implying that there is such a thing as a “real” economy in a capitalist society that is separate from a labour process that is not social as it is being performed and therefore requires a further process of exchange.
I have more questions than comments for this chapter:
Page 203:
Of relatively little significance at the beginning of the new millennium, the notional value of credit derivatives traded globally ballooned to $26 trillion by the first half of 2006.
Can anyone explain clearly and in simple terms what a derivative is? Are there any exercises that would permit us to gain an adequate understanding of derivatives in modern capitalism?
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The resulting pools are then divided into “tranches,” representing different levels of risk, and organized into different rates of return.
The greater the risk, the lower the price, and the possible greater rate of return?
Page 218:
But the depth of the crisis quickly became clear. What began in the US subprime mortgage market became a global financial credit crunch, as capitalists were forced to reckon with the fact that assets of all types were overvalued. Stock prices crashed. Commercial real estate cratered. Over-indebted companies were unable to access sufficient cash. Many firms found that even funding day-to-day operations became impossible without the functioning of capital markets. The system itself was pushed to the brink of collapse, and only a herculean, internationally coordinated series of bailouts was able to keep the financial system from imploding entirely
But despite this, there was no effective movement to end capitalism. Why? Does the dominance of social democrats or social reformers on the left have anything to do with this?
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In the lead up to the Great Recession, many nations were in effect required to carry dollar reserves in order to protect their currencies. The result is a net tax on developing nations benefiting the United States as issuer of fiat world money.
This needs to be explained in much more detail. Why is there a “net tax” on developing nations? How does the United States benefit from having its dollar the international unit of account or international monetary unit?
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Rather than a permanent state of stagnation intermittently propped up with new financial innovations, we see continual dynamism and growth—at the expense of the world’s poor and working class.
Again, it is always at their expense–but why have they not revolted then, if capitalism is so negative?
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Profits cannot be created without the exploitation of labor at the point of production, even if large sums are traded and lost.
What of credit cards? Student debt?
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But more importantly even if they couldn’t afford the loans, and dared to dream of homeownership anyway, that was certainly not their fault. Blame lies with a system that is based on low-wage and precarious labor, where people work hard all their lives, and still find that basic needs like decent shelter are luxuries for the rich.
This idea that there is such a thing as a pure victim may be relevant in certain cases (children, for example, who are sexually or physically abused), but the idea that many adults are pure victims can be counterproductive when it comes to engaging in political action. The issue has to do with the thorny problem of structure versus agency. Does social structure determine the actions of individuals? Or do individuals determine the nature and function of social structures? Thomas Mathiesen (1980) provides an interesting view on the matter that is opposed to Thier’s presentation of the “pure victim.” Since Mathiesen’s strategy is relevant for addressing the nature of capitalism, a long quote is appropriate:
From Law, Society and Political Action: Towards a Strategy under Late Capitalism, pages 242-249:
Earlier in this chapter we pointed out how capitalist production has gradually become characterized by an interweaving of the social classes: in a short-term sense, a pronounced community of fate has developed between them However, this is, to reiterate, in a short-term sense, and in the everyday life situation. In a long-term sense—concerning the very form or mode of production which is prevailing—class interests conflict with each other.
In view of this, it is still more understandable that the representatives of the established system of production wish to maintain and strengthen the distinction between the short-term and the long-term, making these objectives into two questions which must be treated each in its own time, and that the greatest clamour follows when someone refuses to consider one objective without simultaneously considering the other. Refusing to consider one without considering the other has a shattering potential in relation to the interweaving of the social classes. In view of this it is decisively important to insist on and to strengthen this refusal, and to insist on the totality between the short-term and the long-term.
In the third place, the totality which we have discussed concerns a totality between reform and revolution. This is also built into what we have said earlier, but it should again be pointed out explicitly here. In addition, an example is in order. In an interesting section in an article (Hollie, 1976) the Norwegian social worker Erik Hollie discusses what he calls ‘symptom theory’ as an explanatory model for problems of alcoholism and drug addiction. According to the symptom theory, widespread “use of alcohol and narcotics [is regarded as] a symptom that something is wrong in society. The theory maintains that something should be done to the social background causes”. Hollie takes a negative view of the symptom theory in this field. “If this theory wins terrain, this will imply an undermining of the people’s opposition to intoxicating drugs, and a strengthening of those who disseminate the drugs”. He justifies this, among other things, as follows: “The symptom theory makes the user of intoxicating drugs into a victim of society’s development, taking away from him any will he might have. It undermines the self-reliance of the people and creates ideas to the effect that ‘if my situation becomes bad enough I simply have to adjust to the fact that I have alcohol and drug problems’”. The symptom theory, which places the causes of the problems in a structure far away from the everyday life of the person having the problems, and which says that the symptom—the alcohol and the drug problem—‘Cannot be changed without changing this far-away structure, “prevents those injured by drugs from beginning their own struggle”. Now, it is somewhat unclear whether Hollie by “their own struggle” is thinking of the individuals’ personal struggle against the drug, or the individuals’ possible common political struggle for common demands. To the extent that he has the latter type of struggle in mind—and the article as a whole suggests that to a large extent he does—Hollie has in my opinion emphasized something important for political work. In my opinion, Hollie is right in stressing that statements concerning “the necessity of changing the problem producing social conditions” are, if they remain alone, politically pacifying, undermining of the self-reliance of people, and preventive of a political development among people concerning concrete demands and issues of everyday life. Put differently, they prevent a transformation of these demands and issues into political action.
At the same time, however, it is also true that the ‘action theory’ which Hollie presents (the expression is mine, as a counterpart to ‘symptom theory’), leads, if that theory remains alone, to a one-sided reform-oriented policy out of touch with the fundamental conditions which necessitate the use of drugs for an increasing number of people. While Hollie is right in emphasizing that the symptom theory alone is politically pacifying, the action theory alone is obstructive to the political perspective. The action theory is necessary for the mobilization to struggle, the symptom theory (or a refinement of the symptom theory) is necessary for the understanding of the forces one struggles against; neither of the theories is sufficient in itself; both are necessary because both contain elements which together comprise a total truth. Again the combination is implemented this way: the information which a given political action provides about the system which the action opposes is captured and made into common knowledge through continual discussion, so that a continually larger number become more and more alert to the deeper premises of the system.
Let us expand on this with the aid of a somewhat different set of concepts. The totality which we have discussed in this section, concerns a totality in perspective between what the Norwegian sociologist Teije Rod Larsen in an important article has called power and domination. We touched on this discussion earlier, in our treatment of the system-logical character of capitalism, and we return to it here.
By power is here meant “the chance of a man or of a number of men to realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action” (Weber, 1946). Power defined in this way, an aspect of nearly all interhuman relationships, assumes or presupposes that change takes place through decisions of will, which in turn means that action and practice in principle are ‘free’. Against this view stands another conceptualization: given empirical constellations demand given types of exercise of power, if a more or less serious crisis is to be avoided within the system. Change is also seen as following from such demands. Put differently: “. . . actors (agents) orient themselves from and act in accordance with functional imperatives from empirically manifest structures of domination. . ; . This domination is not a mechanical, causally determining entity in relation to action. . . . Domination, as it empirically manifests itself, places specific limits on the freedom of action of industrial enterprises, and directs specific imperatives towards individual enterprises, lines of business, and whole economies, to single capitals and the total capital, so that it (they) is (are) also to junction and survive relatively free of crises, within the system of production itself^ (Larsen, 1976). In brief, against the view that change follows from power, in the sense of decisions of will which are carried out, is the view that change results from demands or compelling imperatives which ‘pour’ out of a structure, and which ‘must’ be followed if total crisis is not to occur. In the article mentioned here, compulsive domination is primarily emphasized in connection with basic economic structures, but the viewpoint may be transferred to, and in, analyses of other structures within the mode of production.
The emphasis on such a structural domination, and on the structural demands or compelling imperatives which the actor must follow if breakdown is to be avoided, constitutes a necessary expansion of our understanding of stability and change in social systems. It is a decisive transcendence of a simplified view which emphasises that stability and change follow from decisions of will on the part of free actors. Stability and change seen only as a consequence of such wilful decisions, leads partly to an idealistic view emphasizing the defective moral character of the actors as the root of all evil, and partly to the view that a given development may simply be reversed when the actors make up their minds to reverse it. The lack of success of many radical political offensives—for example the student rebellion on the West Coast of the United States towards the end of the 60s—may be explained in terms of a reliance on such a simplified political analysis. The emphasis on structural domination makes possible the understanding of one of the main characteristics of the capitalist mode of production, its system-logical character, which we discussed in an earlier part of this chapter.
At the same time, the emphasis on structural demands or compelling imperatives which the actors must follow if breakdown is to be avoided, may become a basis for a demoralization of political issues, and for political passivity, when this emphasis reigns alone. When this happens, the development of society is seen as an unalterable or immovable phenomenon against which even the greatest political exertion is of no avail. It should be added that this view, for the sake of brevity called ‘the domination view’ of the development of society, rarely stands alone, in so far as a larger or smaller action space within the limits of the dominating structure is presupposed, which provides room for change and stability following decisions of will. The problem is, however, that this action space is seen precisely within the limits of the dominating structure; the limits of domination are understood to be insurmountable. It has been expressed as follows, again with reference to the economic level of the mode of production: “To the extent that the capitalist functions as a capitalist, he ‘must’ carry out given types of acts. When man acts as a citizen, he acts inside barriers for the exercise of power which in a functional sense are of insurmountable character” (Larsen, p. 68).
The structural barriers on the exercise of power are, however, insurmountable only as long as a non-dialectical relationship to the exercise of power (in the sense in which we earlier defined dialectics) is maintained). Let me put it differently.
The insurmountability of the structural barriers presupposes (i.e. has as a necessary and sufficient condition) precisely the political demoralization and passivity which follows from the perspective of domination if it reigns alone. In other words, the insurmountability of the structural barriers presupposes a phenomenology, on the part of the suppressed with potential power, which emphasizes the futility of opposition. This phenomenology is itself generated by the domination perspective, if it prevails alone. The compelling imperatives of domination, the insurmountable boundaries of the structure, are, on the contrary, in principle able to be abolished if the main condition for domination—the political passivity, the phenomenology of futility—is abolished in those who are suppressed and also have potential power. In society a series of consciousness-producing agencies are established, the function of which is precisely to maintain the ‘domination perspective’ as a single perspective among the suppressed. Thus the surmountability of domination, which exists in principle, is prevented from being materialized.
This does not mean, if we return to the economic level of the mode of production, that the individual capitalist may act very differently from normal if he wishes to survive. Neither does it mean that the individual worker may act very differently if he wishes to survive. For both, individually, the structural barriers constitute insurmountable boundaries for action: the capitalist must accumulate in order to survive; the worker must sell his labour in order to survive. It does mean, however, that the workers collectively may break the barriers of the structure. In principle and in the end the workers can, if they stand entirely united and ict in unison—nationally and internationally—with one stroke abolish the earlier insurmountable and structural barriers. At this point the very separation or partition between power and domination is abolished; domination is reduced to power and freedom for action is finally attained. The road to this point is obviously very long and winding. The first necessary condition, which is implied in the above, is an abolition of the very phenomenology which emphasizes domination as a single perspective, that is, an abolition of the phenomenology of futility. This phenomenology underscores how the domination of the system is insurmountable not only in the practical situation of today, but in principle, and it therefore, when it carries the day, necessarily lays the foundation for political passivity. This preserves the present structure, and the domination will become precisely that. I emphasize that the abolition of domination as a single perspective is far from a sufficient condition for transcendence of structure, but it is a necessary first condition.
I have emphasized above the importance of the ideological level to maintain the insurmountable barriers of the economic structure. At the same time I have emphasized that abolition of the individualistic ideology is a necessary condition for transcendence, from below, of the barriers of the structure. This viewpoint, which is probably controversial, in reality underlies all political work of a consciousness-raising kind, and gives meaning to this work at the political stage we are today. However, the basis for shaking away the ideological narrowing of consciousness is to be found on the material level: it is through concrete organizing in common, at first about the most concrete matters, that the narrowing individualistic consciousness, which maintains passivity breaks down. Thus the possibilities of commonness or community are perceived, not only in relation to matters inside the structure, but also in relation to goals beyond it. In other words, taking the point of departure in concrete organizing, widening cracks are created in the ideology which in their turn, widen the possibilities of organizing. The fact that the mass media, and many other agencies. Use a great number of splintering measures when faced with such organizing activities, is probably a sign that this road is the correct one.
The crucial point is to find the road fiom concrete organizing activities around the most concrete matters, to collective action through which the separation between power and domination is abolished, and domination reduced to a question of power. In principle, the answer is the same as the one we gave earlier: the road is opened by the structure around the concrete demands being challenged so strongly that it is in fact perceived how the realization of the demands depends on a change of a more basic structure. To continual discussion in which those who were practitioners and those who were theoreticians participate absolutely all the time. What is decisive is the way in which the concrete demands are promoted.
A more precise discussion of this is now possible. A wage demand from prisoners may be promoted in two ways: as a demand concerning a regulation of the pay as far as conditions permit it, or as a clear demand for a significant increase in pay without reservations regardless of the conditions and whether they permit it. A demand for a change in penal legislation on behalf of prisoners may be promoted in two ways: as a demand for change when an alternative has eventually been worked out, or as a clear demand that the change must be put into effect regardless of ‘the alternatives’, in view of the untenable situation at present. A demand for increased furloughs for prisoners may be promoted in two ways: as a demand for an extension of the furloughs as conditions gradually allow it, or as a clear demand for a significant expansion of the furlough system immediately. A demand concerning wage increases from workers in industry, concerning environmental improvements in the workshops, concerning safety measures against accidents at work, etc. may be promoted in the same two ways. The actual issue which is taken up is the same; the way in which it is promoted, and the character of one’s political work in relation to it, implies a decisive difference. The first way does not challenge the structure surrounding the demands. On the contrary, the structure is accepted in that the change is sought to be introduced ‘as far as conditions permit it’, when ‘an alternative has been worked out’, and ‘gradually as conditions allow it’, which is to say up to the boundary of the structure, under the conditions that the structure develops, and as the structure develops. The second way challenges the structure surrounding the concrete demands. The structure is not accepted, but rather the change is demanded ‘without reservations’, ‘regardless of alternatives’, and ‘immediately’, which is to say regardless of the boundaries of the structure, regardless of whether the structure develops, and independently of the degree of development of the structure. The process of defining out is counteracted by continually having as point of departure the concrete demands which preoccupy the group being addressed. The process of defining in is counteracted by the articulation of the demands being continually structure-transcending. References to what conditions permit’, ‘the need for an alternative’, and change ‘as conditions allow it’, are strategies of self-preservation on the part of established structures, and are often used in the sequence which has been mentioned here. References to change without reservations concerning ‘conditions’, regardless of ‘alternatives’, and independently of what conditions may ‘gradually permit’, are the relevant counter-strategies. To the extent that the demands are fulfilled, which will not be the usual thing, a victory has been won on which it is possible to build further. To work in this way leads somewhere. To the extent^that the demands are only partly, or even not at all, fulfilled, and one makes no headway against the structure—which is the usual rule—this may be used in consciousness-raising concerning the necessity of deeper structural changes.
The former procedure makes the demands which are promoted into ‘positive’ reforms: through the acceptance of the structural framework the reform attains a legitimating function in relation to the structure. If the prison authorities, or the purchasers of labour, agree to a certain regulation’ of wages on the basis of such a presentation of a wage claim, this gives the prison authorities or the purchasers of labour increased status. The latter procedure makes the demands which are promoted into ‘negative’ reforms: through the challenging of the structural framework, in which more is demanded than is tolerated by the framework, the reform attains a disclosing or unveiling function in relation to the structure. If the prison authorities, or the purchasers of labour, agree to a certain regulation of wages on the basis of such a presentation of a wage claim, this gives the prison authorities or the purchasers of labour little status. The former procedure thus makes the changes which are promoted, through legitimation, into ‘constructive’ reforms, and a contribution is made to the fortification of the structure, while the latter procedure makes the changes into abolishing reforms (the significance of destroying the structure has been shown).
Thus, totality concerns the union between practice and theory, between the short-term and the long-term, between reform and revolution. This totality is set against the absorbent capitalist social formation, which is crowned by an integrative super-construction and which by virtue of its totality has such a divisive effect on the opponents of the structure: either they are absorbed in (defined in) or they are placed outside (defined out).
Page 231, Thier:
This state of affairs has been so normalized that we’ve come to take it for granted—if not as the way things should be—at least the way they must be.
If profit seems to be a necessary feature of life, and NOII opposes this so-called necessity, what should its attitude be towards such phrases as “companies paying their fair share of taxes,” “fair contracts,” “fair wages,” “decent work,” “decent jobs,” “decent wages” and the like?
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Competition is the mainstay of capitalism. It can’t be made friendlier or softer because it requires an accumulation of capital at any cost, in order to get ahead, or get left behind.
Is it not the other way around? Or is the relationship between competition and the accumulation of capital more complex? Methodologically, Marx dealt with the accumulation of capital, at least initially, in volume 1 of Capital, but he dealt with the competition of capital more in depth in volume 3 of that work. Is the accumulation of capital in the first instance a relation between the capitalist class and the working class and in the second instance a relationship between capitals (competition of capitals)?
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Three: “The point, however, is to change it,” argued Marx.3 And this too is the point of this book. Better understanding the system, as Marx wrote: “to reveal the economic law of motion of modern society” is a critical first step. These laws of motion help us to assess the balance of forces, the relative strength or weakness of the ruling class, and their strategies for increasing their profits and our immiseration.
Thier should provide examples of how knowing “the economic law of motion of modern society” aids us in assessing “the balance of forces, the relative strength or weakness of the ruling class, and their strategies for increasing their profits and our immiseration.”
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Because the system depends on exploitation, the exploited are in a unique position to bring that system down. Workers (sometimes literally, sometimes metaphorically) have our hands on the gears of production. If we collectively withdraw our labor-power, along with it, we withdraw the means to turn a profit. Without profits, the system cannot survive.
Perhaps not, but it has been rare that workers as a whole have collectively withdrawn from production and exchange—a general strike. Furthermore, the act of withdrawing, without the goal of gaining control over the conditions of life, need not lead to anything except economic crisis and a backlash of the “public” suffering. How should this be dealt with? How has it been dealt with?
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Train conductors, Starbucks baristas, teachers, and IT workers—despite differing levels of income, education, and internet savvy—share a common experience of exploitation, and a common enemy in the capitalist class. Whether this shared interest and experience is obscured by cultural propaganda and manipulation or not, does not change the potential for unity.
That may well be so, but those who apparently agree with such a potential may conceive of different strategies. For example, Sam Gindin argues that the creation of radical structures of the workers is necessary—but not a critique of the ideology of existing unions, it would seem. My view, on the other hand, is that radical working-class organizations will unlikely arise without a continuous critique of existing unions and their rhetoric (including claims of recognizing exploitation—while putting such exploitation practically in parentheses—as John Clarke does).
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The extent to which capitalism utilizes profit metrics, but understands nothing of life metrics, has become unambiguously transparent to billions of people around the world.
Is that really the case? If it were, then that would be required is the systematic organization of those who are conscious of such an opposition and the struggle of such organized forces against the class of employers and the various governments that defend their class interest. However, I doubt that that is the case. Many may pay lip service to opposing capitalism but really not do so. That is my interpretation of much of the left here in Toronto (and in Winnipeg).
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The state, too, has confirmed its decidedly partisan role as the “a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.
In what way? Capitalist state theory needs to be developed. Where do we start to analyze the nature of the specifically capitalist state?
In any case, on a practical level, the state has not been “confirmed” in “its decidely partisan role.” Leftists here in Toronto are still calling for the capitalist state to institute public ownership (as if this were socialism). Many seek a refurbished welfare state.
The Abolitionary 