The Rate of Exploitation of Workers of Suncor Energy, One of the Largest Private Employers in Canada

Introduction

In two others posts I presented the twenty largest employers in Toronto according to level of employment (see A Short List of the Largest Employers in Toronto, Ontario, Canada) and the twenty largest employers in Canada according to profit (see A Short List of the Largest Private Employers in Canada, According to Profit). The largest employer, in terms of employment, is the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce.

I have tried to calculate the rate of exploitation of workers of Magna International in an earlier post (see The Rate of Exploitation of Workers at Magna International Inc., One of the Largest Private Employers in Toronto, Part One); Magna International is one of the largest employers in Toronto.

The Nature of the Rate of Exploitation

But what is the rate of exploitation? And why not use the usual rate of profit or the rate of return? The rate of profit is calculated as profit divided by investment. Since employers purchase both the means for work–buildings, computers, office supplies, raw material–and hire workers–we can classify investment into two categories: c, meaning constant capital, or the capital invested in commodities other than workers; and v, or variable capital, the capital invested in the hiring of workers for a certain period of time (wages, salaries and benefits).

The purpose of investment in a capitalist economy is to obtain more money (see The Money Circuit of Capital), and the additional money is surplus value when it is related to its source: workers working for more time than what they cost to produce themselves. The relation between surplus value and variable capital (or wages and salaries) is the rate of surplus value or the rate of exploitation, expressed as a ratio: s/v.

When the surplus is related to both c and v and expressed as a ratio, it is the rate of profit: s/(c+v).

In Marxian economics, you cannot simply use the economic classifications provided by employers and governments since such classifications often hide the nature of the social world in which we live. The rate of profit underestimates the rate of exploitation since the surplus value is related to total investment and not just to the workers. Furthermore, it makes the surplus value appear to derive from both constant capital and variable capital.

I decided to look at the annual report of some of the largest private companies in Toronto and Canada if they are available in order to calculate the rate of exploitation at a more micro level than aggregate rates of surplus value at the national or international level. Politically, this is necessary since social democrats here in Toronto (and undoubtedly elsewhere) vaguely may refer to exploitation–while simultaneously and contradictorily referring to “decent work” and “fair contracts.” Calculating even approximately the rate of exploitation at a more micro level thus has political relevance.

Conclusions First

As usual, I start with the conclusion in order to make readily accessible the results of the calculations for those who are more interested in the results than in how to obtain them. We have the following:

The rate of exploitation or the rate of surplus value=s/v=5,396/3,641=148%.

That means that for every hour worked that produces her/his wage, a worker at works around an additional 89 minutes or 1 hour 29 minutes for free for Suncor Energy. Alternatively, in terms of money, a regular Suncor Energy worker who receives $1 of wage or salary produces $1.48 surplus value or profit for free. 

Assuming either an 8-hour shift or a 12-hour shift:

  1. In an 8- hour work day (480 minutes), a Suncor worker produces her/his wage in about 194 minutes (3 hours 14 minutes) and works 286 minutes (4 hours 46 minutes) for free for Suncor Energy.
  2. In a 12-hour work day (720 minutes), a Suncor worker produces her/his wage in about 290 minutes (4 hours 50 minutes) and works 430 minutes (7 hours 10 minutes) for free for Suncor Energy.

Of course, during the time that the worker produces her/his own wage, s/he is subject to the power of management and hence is also unfree during that time (see The Rate of Exploitation of Magna International Inc., One of the Largest Private Employers in Toronto, Part Two, Or: Intensified Oppression and Exploitation and   Employers as Dictators, Part One).

Do you think that these facts contradict the talk by the left and unionists of “fair wages,” “fair contracts” (see  Fair Contracts (or Fair Collective Agreements): The Ideological Rhetoric of Canadian Unions, Part One for the rhetoric of the largest union in Canada, the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE)) and “decent work?” Do they ignore the reality of life for workers, whether unionized or non-unionized? If exploitation and oppression of workers is a constant in their lives, even if they are only vaguely aware of it, should this situation not be frankly acknowledged by their representatives? Do such representatives do so? If not, why not?  Do workers deserve better than neglecting the social context within which they live and work? Should such problems be addressed head on rather than neglected?

Let us look at the management rights clause of the collective agreement between Suncor Energy Products Partnership and Unifor Local 27, for the period between april 1, 2016 and March 31, 2019.

From pages 4-5 of the collective agreement:

ARTICLE FIVE – MANAGEMENT RIGHTS

5.01 The Union recognizes and acknowledges that management of the operations and direction of the working force are fixed exclusively in the Employer and without restricting the generality of the  foregoing, the Union agrees and acknowledges:

(a) The Employer has, retains and shall possess and exercise all rights and functions, powers, privileges and authority that the Employer possessed prior to the signing of a contract with the Union, excepting only those that are clearly and specifically relinquished or restricted in this Agreement.

(b) That it is the exclusive function of the Employer to maintain order, discipline and efficiency and in connection therewith to make, alter and enforce from time to time reasonable rules and regulations, policies and practices to be observed by its employees.

(c) The Employer’s right to determine the number of employees to be  employed and the right to hire, transfer, assign, promote, demote, retire at age 65, schedule and classify, layoff or recall employees, discipline, suspend or discharge employees for just cause, and the right to plan, direct and control its operations;

(d) The Employer’s right to determine the location and extent of its operations and their commencement, expansion, curtailment or discontinuance; the work to be done; the services to be rendered; to subcontract or transfer work; to establish, change or abolish job classification; to shut down permanently or by day or week or for any other periods; to determine

Not only does the collective agreement give management the right to direct workers’ lives in many, many ways in such a fashion that they produce more value than they themselves cost, leading to the workers working for free for a certain period of time, but even during the time when they produce the value of their own wage, they are subject to the dictates of management (see The Rate of Exploitation of Magna International Inc., One of the Largest Private Employers in Toronto, Part Two, Or: Intensified Oppression and Exploitation).

Ideologues of unions and social democrats or social reformers simply ignore this double situation of workers–of having to work for free and having to work throughout the day under the power of unelected managers (see Employers as Dictators, Part One).

Given this conclusion, how can any collective agreement express in any way the cliches used by many ideologues of unions–such as “fair contracts,” or “decent work?” Is it possible for a collective agreement to be fair from the workers’ point of view? It is certainly possible to be fairer, of course, but no collective agreement questions the right of employers and their representatives (management) to exploit workers and to use them for purposes foreign to their own lives.

Data on Which the Calculation is Based 

The calculation of the rate of exploitation is undoubtedly imperfect, and I invite the reader to correct its gaps. Nonetheless, the lack of any attempt to determine the rate of exploitation at the city level has undoubtedly reinforced social-reformist tendencies.

I first give revenue and expenses figures according to the Suncor Annual Report (2019), and then indicate some needed adjustments so that they accord more with Marxian economics. Amounts are in millions of Canadian dollars, unless otherwise indicated.

Revenues and Other Income (millions of $)

Gross revenues 39 866
Less: Royalties (1 522)
Operating revenues, net of royalties 38 344 [subtracting 1522 from 39 866 gives: 38 344]
Other income (loss) 645
Total revenues 38 989

Expenses
Purchases of crude oil and products 12 562
Operating, selling and general 11 244
Transportation 1 442
Depreciation, depletion, amortization and impairment 10 572
Exploration 256
(Gain) loss on asset exchange and disposal of assets (253)
Financing expenses 633

Total expenses 36 456 [sums up to this when adding all expenses]

(Loss) earnings before Income Taxes 2 533 [add this to 36 456 gives you 38 989, which is unadjusted total revenues]

At the level of expenses, it is necessary to further break down expenses. The second category in Total Expenses, “Operating, selling and general,” needs to be broken down further:

Operating, Selling and General OperatingExpenses

Contract services 4 380
Employee costs 3 641
Materials 869
Energy 1 129
Equipment rentals and leases 345
Travel, marketing and other 880
Total Operating, Selling and General Operating Expenses 11 244

The category “Contract services,” without further information, will be accepted as is–an expense different from “Employee costs.”

On the Suncor website, it does indicate the following: https://www.suncor.com/en-ca/contractors-suppliers-carriers

At Suncor, the term “contractor,” “supplier” and “carrier” refer to any organization, company or individual who provides goods and/or services to Suncor. We use the term “contractor” to indicate a supplier that provides services at one of our sites.

Contractors, suppliers and carriers play a critical role in helping us achieve our business objectives. To work with us, you must pre-qualify prior to performing work or providing services to Suncor.

Some contract services may in fact be a form of employment contract. For example, I worked temporarily for an oil company in Calgary in the late 1980s, labeling and organizing files–and was categorized as an independent contractor , undoubtedly, in order to reduce the costs to the employer since employers do not have to pay unemployment insurance premiums, etc. for independent contractors. However, without further, more detailed information, it is impossible to determine who is a real contractor and who is an employee.

The category of “Employee costs” is key since it represents, on the one hand, the wage costs to the employer and, on the other hand, the value added by Suncor workers to the commodities they produce that is equivalent to their wage. It also represents variable capital, which is used to calculate the rate of exploitation of workers and is related to total surplus value, thereby enabling us to calculate the rate of exploitation.

The category “marketing” cannot be practically separated from “travel” and “other” and therefore is not used to make any adjustments. If “marketing” were a completely separate category, though, both the wages paid for marketing and the constant capital used in marketing would be added to the surplus value produced by Suncor workers. Work performed in the sector that transforms already produced commodities into money (and money into capital) does not produce surplus value (though it may well involve the performance of surplus labour). Since, for the purpose of the particular calculation of the rate of exploitation of Suncor the issue of how to treat marketing is irrelevant since there is insufficient information, I place a short discussion of a possible way to treat marketing in Marxian terms as an appendix for those who are interested in such matters (and such matters may be relevant for other firms with data with more refined categories, such as a separate marketing account).

So far, we have:

(Loss) earnings before Income Taxes 2 533
Employee costs 3 641

Adjustments

Adjustments must be made both at the level of total revenue and at the level of total expenses.

In Marxian theory, it is necessary to question whether some expenses are expenses for both the individual employer and for the class of employers (and fractions of their class, such as those who live on interest); in such a case, the expense is deducted from total revenue. On the other hand, there are expenses that are expenses for the individual employer but are not expenses when looked at from the point of view of the class of employers; in such an instance, they are paid out from the surplus value produced or obtained by workers and are to be included in income before taxes.

Total Revenue Adjustments

At the level of total revenue, the payment of royalties, from the point of view of the individual employer, is an expense (like taxes), but the source for payment of such royalties is the workers directly exploited. It says in the annual report:

Suncor is subject to royalties and taxes imposed by governments in numerous jurisdictions

Consequently, I use the initial “Gross revenues.”

Adjusted total revenue $40,511, or

Gross revenues 39,866 +
Other income (loss) 645.

Accordingly,

Adjusted Earnings before Income Taxes $4,055 (=2,533+1522)

I have accepted “Other income (loss)” as is since there is nothing explicitly obvious that would require adjustments. If someone has further information that would justify making adjustments on the basis of this category (or any category) for that matter, feel free to make suggestions or comments.

Other income (loss)
Risk management and trading activities 155
(Losses) gains on valuation of inventory held for trading purposes (7)
Investment and interest income 89
Insurance proceeds 431
Other (23)
645 [this is the sum of the above.]

The adjusted earnings constitute surplus value, or the value produced by Suncor workers without any equivalent in return. It represents the additional value the workers produce for free.

“Earnings before Income Taxes” will still undergo an adjustment, but to do so, it will be necessary to consider expenses. The amount of calculated surplus value is often not just specified from the adjusted total revenue side; the calculation of total surplus value is also often a function of making adjustments to the calculation of total expenses.

Total Expenses Adjustments

Some adjustments still need to made, based on the subcategory “Financing expenses” under the category “Expenses” (see above).

The category “Financing expenses” is broken down as follows:

Financing expenses
Interest on debt 825
Interest on lease liabilities 172
Capitalized interest at 5.3% (122)
Interest expense 875 [this is calculated by summing first two and subtracting the last one: 825+172-122]
Interest on partnership liability 55
Interest on pension and other post-retirement benefits 59
Accretion 270
Foreign exchange (gain) loss on U.S. dollar denominated debt (624)
Operational foreign exchange and other (2)
633 [=875+55+59+270-624+2]

As explained in another post, interest in many instances can be treated as part of the surplus value produced and therefore added to net income since, although from the point of view of the individual capitalist it is an expense, from the capitalist economy as a whole it is derived from the production of surplus value. The same could be said of all the other categories of interest, with the exception of “capitalized interest,” which I subtract (and which I will explain below).

If we add up the interest considered to be an expense but derived from the surplus value produced by Suncor workers, we have the following:

Interest Charges
Interest on debt 825
Interest on lease liabilities 172
Interest on partnership liability 55
Interest on pension and other post-retirement benefits 59
Total interest charges 1,111

These interest expenses, since they are only expenses from the point of view of Suncor Energy but in reality are paid out from the surplus value produced by Suncor workers, must be added to “Adjusted Earnings before Income Taxes.”

Despite the use of the term “interest” in the term “Capitalized interest,” this category needs to be considered in more detail.

In relation to the category “Capitalized interest,” as I explained in my post on the rate of exploitation of Air Canada workers and Rogers Communications workers:

Some explanation of “interest capitalized” is in order. I have had difficulty in understanding the nature of “Interest capitalized.” As far as I can tell, interest that is normally paid and is an expense for the particular employer is treated, in Marxian economics, as part of surplus value because, at the macro level, it comes from the surplus value produced by the workers.

Interest capitalized seems to be different since the interest charged on money borrowed for the purpose of the construction of fixed assets (with a specific interest rate attached to it) is “capitalized,” or not considered part of interest expenses until the construction is finished and the fixed asset is ready to use. This accounting distinction, however, from the macro point of view, is irrelevant since both interest expenses and interest capitalized are derived from the surplus value produced by workers (or appropriated from them in another industry). Accordingly, both interest expenses and interest capitalized should be added to the amount of “Income before income taxes” category.

In the case of Air Canada, capitalized interest was positive (not in parentheses), and I therefore added it to the amount of surplus value produced by the workers. In the case of Rogers Communication, it is negative (since it is in parentheses). Accordingly, I have subtracted it.  

Accordingly, like Rogers Communication, I treat “Capitalized interest” (as the accountants have done) as an expense for the purposes of calculation because it is negative (in parentheses).

As for the category “Accretion,” I treat it also as a real expense. Accretion is defined (from Wikipedia):

In accounting, an accretion expense is a periodic expense recognized when updating the present value of a balance sheet liability, which has arisen from a company’s obligation to perform a duty in the future, and is being measured by using a discounted cash flows (“DCF”) approach.

I treat the remaining categories as real expenses, but I leave it to others to criticize this (and any other calculation) if it is incorrect.

A word should also be said about the category “Foreign exchange (gain) loss on US dollar denominated debt.” There is no explanation in the annual report for this category.

Searching the Web, I found the following general explanation:

What is a Foreign Exchange Gain/Loss?

A foreign exchange gain/loss occurs when a company buys and/or sells goods and services in a foreign currency, and that currency fluctuates relative to their home currency. It can create differences in value in the monetary assets and liabilities, which must be recognized periodically until they are ultimately settled.

The basic idea seems to be that, due to the changes in exchange rates between the Canadian dollar and the US dollar, there was actually a gain for 2019 (it is in parentheses–if it were a loss, it would not be).

Accordingly, the adjusted “Financing expenses” is:

Capitalized interest (122) (to be treated as an expense)
Accretion 270
Foreign exchange (gain) loss on U.S. dollar denominated debt (624) (to be treated as a gain this is a gain since it is in parentheses and hence a “negative expense”)
Operational foreign exchange and other (2)
Total Adjusted Financing Expenses: -230 (122+270-624+2)

Yes–a negative $230 million. That means that the indicated expenses are actually a gain. It is easier to understand this by personalizing it (when possible). Imagine you have various expenses and a bank account in US dollars. Let us say you are calculating your expenses. Let us say that you have $500 US dollars and $600 in Canadian expenses. If the US dollar increases in value by one half (exaggerating, of course, to make the calculation easier), then you have a net expense of negative $150 Canadian since $500 US dollars=$750 Canadian dollars (500×1.5=750). $600-750=-150.

This result means that there were not, in fact, any real financing expenses in 2019 after interest is treated as surplus value and after taking into account the gain in foreign exchange dominated in US dollar denominated debt. The $230 million, in addition to the $1,111 million in interest, need to be subtracted from “Total expenses” $36 456 million. and added to “Adjusted Earnings before Income Taxes” $4,055 million.

Accordingly,

Adjusted Total Revenue $40,511
Adjusted Total Expenses $35,115 (=36,456-1111-230)

So, with the adjustments in place:

Final Adjusted Earnings before Income Taxes: s=$5,396 million or $5.396 billion
Employee costs: v=$3, 641 million or $3.641 million

The Rate of Exploitation

The rate of exploitation or the rate of surplus value=s/v=5,396/3,641=148%.

That means that for every hour worked that produces her/his wage, a worker at works around an additional 89 minutes or 1 hour 29 minutes for free for Suncor Energy. Alternatively, in terms of money, a regular Suncor Energy worker who receives $1 of wage or salary produces $1.48 surplus value or profit for free. 

The length of the working day at Suncor Energy varies somewhat, but probably less so than for some other employers. According to one collective agreement. the average work week is 40 hours, but it does not specify how that is distributed over the week. From COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT
BETWEEN: SUNCOR ENERGY PRODUCTS PARTNERSHIP and Unifor Local 27. APRIL 1, 2016 TO MARCH 31, 2019, page 15:

ARTICLE FIFTEEN- HOURS OF WORK/OVERTIME/PREMIUM PAY
15.01 The regular work week shall not consist of more than forty-hours (40) per week.

Another collective agreement implies 8-hour and 12-hour work days. From Collective Agreement
Between Suncor Energy Products Partnership, Sarnia Refinery and Sunoco Employees’ Bargaining Association, March 1, 2017 to February 28, 2021, page 22:

Permanent shift changes will not be made which will result in an employee working more than ten (10) consecutive calendar days while on 8-hour shifts or more than six (6) consecutive calendar days while on 12-hour shifts.

According to the Suncor Energy website:

Most unionized jobs at Suncor also result in shift work. The most common shift pattern is a 12-hour shift, working three days and three nights, followed by six days off.

Assuming either an 8-hour shift or a 12-hour shift:

  1. In an 8- hour work day (480 minutes), a Suncor worker produces her/his wage in about 194 minutes (3 hours 14 minutes) and works 286 minutes (4 hours 46 minutes) for free for Suncor Energy.
  2. In a 12-hour work day (720 minutes), a Suncor worker produces her/his wage in about 290 minutes (4 hours 50 minutes) and works 430 minutes (7 hours 10 minutes) for free for Suncor Energy.

Of course, during the time that the worker produces her/his own wage, s/he is subject to the power of management and hence is also unfree during that time (see The Rate of Exploitation of Magna International Inc., One of the Largest Private Employers in Toronto, Part Two, Or: Intensified Oppression and Exploitation and   Employers as Dictators, Part One).

Do you think that these facts contradict the talk by the left and unionists of “fair wages,” “fair contracts” (see  Fair Contracts (or Fair Collective Agreements): The Ideological Rhetoric of Canadian Unions, Part One for the rhetoric of the largest union in Canada, the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE)) and “decent work?” Do they ignore the reality of life for workers, whether unionized or non-unionized? If exploitation and oppression of workers is a constant in their lives, even if they are only vaguely aware of it, should this situation not be frankly acknowledged by their representatives? Do such representatives do so? If not, why not?  Do workers deserve better than neglecting the social context within which they live and work? Should such problems be addressed head on rather than neglected?

Let us look at the management rights clause of the collective agreement between Suncor Energy Products Partnership and Unifor Local 27, for the period between april 1, 2016 and March 31, 2019.

From pages 4-5 of the collective agreement:

ARTICLE FIVE – MANAGEMENT RIGHTS

5.01 The Union recognizes and acknowledges that management of the operations and direction of the working force are fixed exclusively in the Employer and without restricting the generality of the  foregoing, the Union agrees and acknowledges:

(a) The Employer has, retains and shall possess and exercise all rights and functions, powers, privileges and authority that the Employer possessed prior to the signing of a contract with the Union, excepting only those that are clearly and specifically relinquished or restricted in this Agreement.

(b) That it is the exclusive function of the Employer to maintain order, discipline and efficiency and in connection therewith to make, alter and enforce from time to time reasonable rules and regulations, policies and practices to be observed by its employees.

(c) The Employer’s right to determine the number of employees to be  employed and the right to hire, transfer, assign, promote, demote, retire at age 65, schedule and classify, layoff or recall employees, discipline, suspend or discharge employees for just cause, and the right to plan, direct and control its operations;

(d) The Employer’s right to determine the location and extent of its operations and their commencement, expansion, curtailment or discontinuance; the work to be done; the services to be rendered; to subcontract or transfer work; to establish, change or abolish job classification; to shut down permanently or by day or week or for any other periods; to determine

Not only does the collective agreement give management the right to direct workers’ lives in many, many ways in such a fashion that they produce more value than they themselves cost, leading to the workers working for free for a certain period of time, but even during the time when they produce the value of their own wage, they are subject to the dictates of management (see The Rate of Exploitation of Magna International Inc., One of the Largest Private Employers in Toronto, Part Two, Or: Intensified Oppression and Exploitation).

Ideologues of unions and social democrats or social reformers simply ignore this double situation of workers–of having to work for free and having to work throughout the day under the power of unelected managers (see Employers as Dictators, Part One).

Given this conclusion, how can any collective agreement express in any way the cliches used by many ideologues of unions–such as “fair contracts,” or “decent work?” Is it possible for a collective agreement to be fair from the workers’ point of view? It is certainly possible to be fairer, of course, but no collective agreement questions the right of employers and their representatives (management) to exploit workers and to use them for purposes foreign to their own lives.

Appendix

The issue of how to treat marketing workers (sales work in wholesale and retail trade) and the machines, buildings and equipment they use is relevant to calculating the rate of exploitation of workers who produce surplus value (such as Suncor workers), because it complicates the calculation.

From Fred Moseley (1997), “The Rate of Profit and the Future of Capitalism,” pages 23-41, in Review of Radical Political Economics, Volume 29, Number 4, pages 26-27:

Circulation labor is labor related to the exchange of commodities and money, including such functions as buying and selling, accounting, check processing, advertising, debt-credit relations, insurance, legal counsel, and securities exchange. Marx argued that circulation labor does not produce value and surplus-value because exchange is essentially the exchange of equivalent values. Circulation labor only transforms a given amount of value from commodities to money, or vice versa. …

Capitalist enterprises must of course pay unproductive labor to carry out these necessary functions, even though, according to Marx’s theory, these functions do not produce value and surplus-value. Therefore, the costs of this unproductive labor cannot be recovered out of value which it produces. Instead, these unproductive costs are recovered out of the surplus-value produced by productive labor employed in capitalist production.

This means that the source of the money to pay for the workers in marketing is, ultimately, the surplus value produced by Suncor workers (and other workers who produce surplus value). This does not mean that workers in marketing are not exploited; they too undoubtedly perform surplus labour as well–but they do not produce surplus value, which is the surplus performed and transformed into money form by means of the process of buying and selling (whether that occurs simultaneously with the activity as in the case of services or subsequently as, for example, in the production of beer).

The means of trade or selling and buying used in marketing also would probably be calculated as part of surplus value since, although they are a cost from the point of view of the individual capitalist, they are paid out of value produced by Suncor workers and other workers who produce surplus value. From Moseley (1997), page 27:

The rate of profit being analyzed here is by definition equal to the ratio of the amount of profit (P) to the total stock of capital invested (K). According to Marx’ theory, profit, the numerator in the rate of profit, is the difference between the annual flow of surplus-value (S) and the annual flow of unproductive costs (Uf) (almost entirely the wages of unproductive labor, but also includes a small part (about 5%) of the costs of materials and the depreciation costs of buildings, machinery, etc. used in unproductive functions): (1) P = S – Uf.

Or again, in the work by Anwar Shaikh and E. Ahmet Tonak (1994), Measuring the Wealth of Nations: The Political Economy of National Accounts, pages 45-46, when discussing a hypothetical total production of value of $2000, with c=$400, v=$200 and s=$1400, they assume that the total value of $2000 is sold to wholesalers for a price of $1000, and the wholesalers (and, eventually, retailers), mark up the price to consumers to the level of total value of $2000:

From the Marxian point of view, nothing has changed in the production process, so that constant capital C*, variable capital V*, and surplus value S* are unchanged. But whereas the total surplus value S* = $1400 previously accrued entirely to the production sector as profits, it is now divided between the profits of the production sector (Pp = $400) and the trading margin of the trade sector
(TM = Mt + Wt + Pt = $1000).

where TM=trade margin, Mt=intermediate inputs (c for trade, such as building rentals or purchases, sales counters, registers, forklifts, storage facilities, etc.), Wt=wages for trading activities and Pt=profit for trading activities. The value of inputs (c+v) for the sector that produces value is 600, with the distribution between c and v and s as follows: c=400, v=200, s=1400. However, since it is sold only for 1000, the actual s received for the sector that produces surplus value is 400. For the trade sector (indicated by t in parentheses), the distribution of the $1000 in s is c(t)=200, v(t)=400 and s(t)=400.

Note, however, that c(t) and v(t), though expenses from the point of view of the individual trading employer, is paid from the surplus value produced by workers in the production sector.

The Rate of Exploitation of the Workers of Toronto-Dominion Bank (TD Bank), One of the Largest Private Employers in Canada

Introduction

In two others posts I presented the twenty largest employers in Toronto according to level of employment (see A Short List of the Largest Employers in Toronto, Ontario, Canada) and the twenty largest employers in Canada according to profit (see A Short List of the Largest Private Employers in Canada, According to Profit).

I have tried to calculate the rate of exploitation of workers of Magna International in an earlier post (see The Rate of Exploitation of Workers at Magna International Inc., One of the Largest Private Employers in Toronto, Part One); Magna International is one of the largest employers in Toronto. I also calculated the rate of exploitation of workers at the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC) (see ???).

But what is the rate of exploitation? And why not use the usual rate of profit or the rate of return? The rate of profit is calculated as profit divided by investment. Since employers purchase both the means for work–buildings, computers, office supplies, raw material–and hire workers–we can classify investment into two categories: c, meaning constant capital, or the capital invested in commodities other than workers; and v, or variable capital, the capital invested in the hiring of workers for a certain period of time (wages, salaries and benefits).

The purpose of investment in a capitalist economy is to obtain more money (see The Money Circuit of Capital), and the additional money is surplus value when it is related to its source: workers working for more time than what they cost to produce themselves. The relation between surplus value and variable capital (or wages and salaries) is the rate of surplus value or the rate of exploitation, expressed as a ratio: s/v.

When the surplus is related to both c and v and expressed as a ratio, it is the rate of profit: s/(c+v).

In Marxian economics, you cannot simply use the economic classifications provided by employers and governments since such classifications often hide the nature of the social world in which we live. The rate of profit underestimates the rate of exploitation since the surplus value is related to total investment and not just to the workers. Furthermore, it makes the surplus value appear to derive from both constant capital and variable capital.

I decided to look at the annual report of some of the largest private companies in Toronto and Canada if they are available in order to calculate the rate of exploitation at a more micro level than aggregate rates of surplus value at the national or international level. Politically, this is necessary since social democrats here in Toronto (and undoubtedly elsewhere) vaguely may refer to exploitation–while simultaneously and contradictorily referring to “decent work” and “fair contracts.” Calculating even approximately the rate of exploitation at a more micro level thus has political relevance.

Conclusions First

As usual, I start with the conclusion in order to make readily accessible the results of the calculations for those who are more interested in the results than in how to obtain them.

We have the following:

Adjusted income before income taxes=s= $13,570
Adjusted total salaries and employee benefits=v=$10,997

The rate of exploitation or the rate of surplus value of Toronto Dominion Bank workers is =s/v=13,570/10,997=123 percent.

That means that for every hour worked that is equivalent to her/his wage, a worker at TD Bank works around an additional 74 minutes for free for TD Bank. Alternatively, this means that, in terms of money, $1 of wage or salary of a regular TD Bank worker results in $1.23 surplus value or profit for free (calculated on the basis of the procedure outlined in the post on the rate of exploitation of Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce bank workers).

It also means the following (I use minutes as well as hours):

  1. For a 6.5 hour working day (390 minutes), TD Bank workers spend 174 minutes (2 hours 54 minutes) to obtain their wage for the day, and they spend 216 minutes (3 hours 36 minutes) in obtaining a surplus value or profit for TD Bank.
  2. For a 7.5 hour working day (450 minutes), TD Bank workers spend 201 minutes (3 hours 21 minutes) to obtain their wage for the day, and they spend 249 minutes (4 hours 9 minutes) in obtaining a surplus value or profit for TD Bank.
  3. For an 8-hour working day (480 minutes), TD Bank workers spend 214 minutes (3 hours 34 minutes) to obtain their wage for the day, and they spend 266 minutes (4 hours 26 minutes) in obtaining a surplus value or profit for TD Bank.
  4. For an 8.5 hour working day (510 minutes), TD Bank workers spend 228 minutes (3 hours 48 minutes) to obtain their wage for the day, and they spend 282 minutes (4 hours 42 minutes) in obtaining a surplus value or profit for TD Bank.
  5. For a 9-hour working day (540 minutes), TD Bank workers spend 241 minutes (4 hours 1 minute) to obtain their wage for the day, and they spend 299 minutes (4 hours 59 minutes) in obtaining a surplus value or profit for TD Bank.
  6. For a 10-hour working day (600 minutes), TD Bank workers spend 268 minutes (4 hours 28 minutes) to obtain their wage for the day, and they spend 332 minutes (5 hours 32 minutes) in obtaining a surplus value or profit for TD Bank.
  7. For a 17-hour working day (1020 minutes), TD Bank workers spend 455 minutes (7 hours 35 minutes) to obtain their wage for the day, and they spend 565 minutes (9 hours 25 minutes) in obtaining a surplus value or profit for TD Bank.

TD Bank workers do not belong to a union. Would their becoming unionized turn their situation into one where they had a “fair contract” and “decent work?” I think not. Unions can limit exploitation and can control some aspects of their working lives, but in principle workers are things to be used by employers even with unions. This does not mean that a non-unionized environment is the same as a unionized environment. With unions that are independent of particular employers, that is to say, are real unions, there is an opportunity for workers to develop organizations of resistance against the power of particular employers.

The ideology of unions–that somehow they can produce a “fair contract” and “decent work”–needs, though, to be constantly criticized. Workers deserve better than the acceptance of such ideology by the left.

Data on Which the Calculation Is Based

The annual report has both statistics on revenue and expenses, but there are also reported statistics in the annual report modified by an adjustment that is specific to the Toronto Dominion Bank; the adjustment in the annual report is not a standard adjustment. I have omitted any reference to such an adjustment since it would probably make the posts on the rate of exploitation in other posts less comparable.

The calculation of the rate of exploitation is undoubtedly imperfect, and I invite the reader to correct its gaps.

In millions of Canadian dollars:

page 15:

(millions of Canadian dollars, except where noted) 2019
Results of operations
Total revenues $ 41,065
Provision for credit losses $3,029
Insurance claims and related expenses $2,787
Non-interest expenses $22,020
Income before income taxes and equity in net income of an investment in TD Ameritrade $13,229

Page 23:

NON-INTEREST EXPENSES

Salaries and employee benefits
Salaries $ 6,879
Incentive compensation 2,724
Pension and other employee benefits 1,641
Total salaries and employee benefits 11,244

Occupancy
Rent 944
Depreciation and impairment losses 405
Other 486
Total occupancy 1,835

Equipment
Rent 245
Depreciation and impairment losses 200
Other 720
Total equipment 1,165

Amortization of other intangibles 800
Marketing and business development 769
Restructuring charges 175
Brokerage-related fees 336
Professional and advisory services 1,322
Other expenses 4,374 }

Total expenses $ 22,020

Adjustments

In Marxian theory, it is necessary to question whether some expenses are expenses for both the individual employer and for the class of employers (and fractions of their class, such as those who live on interest); in such a case, the expense is deducted from total revenue. On the other hand, there are expenses that are expenses for the individual employer but are not expenses when looked at from the point of view of the class of employers; in such an instance, they are paid out from the surplus value produced or obtained by workers and are to be included in income before taxes.

Before entering into the issue of adjustments according to Marxian theory, however, it is necessary to address one of the categories that I did not include in the above calculation. It is a reference to Income before income taxes and equity in net income of an investment in TD Ameritrade,” which is equal to the $13.229 billion reported above. The inclusion of the term “equity” seems to refer to assets, but the following led me to believe that it was referring to net income rather than to assets as such (https://seekingalpha.com/news/3507506-td-bank-expects-230m-net-income-from-td-ameritrade-in-q4):

TD Bank expects ~$230M net income from TD Ameritrade in Q4

TD Bank Group (NYSE:TDexpects TD Ameritrade’s fiscal Q4 net earnings to translate to ~C$301M (~US$230M) reported equity in net income of an investment in fiscal Q4.

I therefore leave the category “Income before income taxes and equity in net income of an investment in TD Ameritrade” as is, except that I shorten it now to just “Income before income taxes.”

In the annual report, the category of “Non-interest expense” is subtracted from total revenue, to yield the category “Income before income taxes.” However, to calculate the rate of exploitation according to the principles of Marxian economics, it is necessary to make certain adjustments. To that end, we need to look in more detail at the category “Non-interest expense.”

In the category “Salary and employee benefits,” there is the subcategory “Incentive compensation.” A one-page TD document indicates what this involves for all employees:

TD’s Approach to Compensation

TD provides employees with a comprehensive total rewards package that includes a combination of base salary, incentive compensation, benefits, and retirement and savings plan

Further, for executives:

Executive Compensation

We have a balanced approach to executive compensation that is intended to attract, retain and motivate high-performing executives to create sustainable value for shareholders over the long term. … This compensation is tied to the bank’s share price and promotes decision-making that is in
the best long-term interests of the bank and its stakeholders.

There is thus additional compensation called incentive compensation, but the issue is whether such additional compensation is a result of workers being exploited or exploiting workers.

As I wrote in the post on the exploitation of Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC) workers:

Most employees, whether executive or not, seem to be eligible to some support of bonus as a function of performance. However, the gap between executive pay and the pay of regular employees has widened over the years, so it is reasonable to infer that the category “Performance-based compensation” is divided into two parts: one part is a function of the number of hours worked by regular employees as well as the intensity of that work; the other is based on the extent to which bank managers and senior executives are successful in exploiting those regular employees.

Without further information, it is impossible to determine the proportion that is derived from exploiting bank workers and being exploited. I will assume, as I did in the case of the CIBC, that 10 percent of the “Incentive compensation” originates from the exploitation of TD bank workers. This 10 percent is equal to $247 million and must be subtracted from the subcategory “Total salaries and employee benefits” and added to the category “Income before income taxes.”

Another expense category is also relevant for making adjustments–the category “Rent.” The rent of buildings, like the rent of equipment, is an expense both at the level of the firm and at the level of the economy as a whole. However, in the case of occupancy, rent also includes the capitalized value of land, and this capitalized value of land is derived from surplus value (see Jorden Sandemose (2018), Class and Property in Marx’s Economic Thought: Exploring the Basis for Capitalism). Again, without further information, it is impossible to tell or determine the proportion that is paid for the rental of buildings and the rental of land. I will assume that 10 percent of rent is due to the exclusive ownership of land (a non-produced means of production). This 10 percent is equal to $94 million and must be subtracted from the subcategory and added to the category “Income before income taxes.”

Adding $94 million to $247 million gives $341 million.

“Income before income tax” must thus be increased by $341 million, and “Total salaries and employee benefits” must be decreased by $247 million.

This gives us the following:

Adjusted Results

Adjusted income before income taxes $13,570
Adjusted total salaries and employee benefits $10,997

The Rate of Exploitation of TD Bank Workers

To calculate the rate of surplus value, we need to relate “Income before income taxes” to “Total salaries and employee benefits.” So, with the adjustments in place:, s=13,570; v=10,997. The rate of exploitation or the rate of surplus value=s/v=13,570/10,997=123 percent.

That means that for every hour worked that produces her/his wage, a worker at TD Bank works around an additional 74 minutes for free for TD Bank.

According to a few people who have worked at TD Bank, the length of the working day is:

I worked 7.5 hrs each day, some overtime is required. but not so often.

I normally am scheduled to work 8 1/2 hours a day Monday to Thursday. On fridays i am scheduled for 6 1/2.

It depends on the activity but can vary from 10 hours to 17+ hours

8 hours a day

Nine hours

I will calculate the division of the working day from the shortest to the longest in the above quotes accordingly. I use minutes rather than hours.

  1. For a 6.5 hour working day (390 minutes), TD Bank workers spend 174 minutes (2 hours 54 minutes) to obtain their wage for the day, and they spend 216 minutes (3 hours 36 minutes) in obtaining a surplus value or profit for TD Bank.
  2. For a 7.5 hour working day (450 minutes), TD Bank workers spend 201 minutes (3 hours 21 minutes) to obtain their wage for the day, and they spend 249 minutes (4 hours 9 minutes) in obtaining a surplus value or profit for TD Bank.
  3. For an 8-hour working day (480 minutes), TD Bank workers spend 214 minutes (3 hours 34 minutes) to obtain their wage for the day, and they spend 266 minutes (4 hours 26 minutes) in obtaining a surplus value or profit for TD Bank.
  4. For an 8.5 hour working day (510 minutes), TD Bank workers spend 228 minutes (3 hours 48 minutes) to obtain their wage for the day, and they spend 282 minutes (4 hours 42 minutes) in obtaining a surplus value or profit for TD Bank.
  5. For a 9-hour working day (540minutes), TD Bank workers spend 241 minutes (4 hours 1 minute) to obtain their wage for the day, and they spend 299 minutes (4 hours 59 minutes) in obtaining a surplus value or profit for TD Bank.
  6. For a 10-hour working day (600 minutes), TD Bank workers spend 268 minutes (4 hours 28 minutes) to obtain their wage for the day, and they spend 332 minutes (5 hours 32 minutes) in obtaining a surplus value or profit for TD Bank.
  7. For a 17-hour working day (1020 minutes), TD Bank workers spend 455 minutes (7 hours 35 minutes) to obtain their wage for the day, and they spend 565 minutes (9 hours 25 minutes) in obtaining a surplus value or profit for TD Bank.

It should be noted that I have used the verb “obtain” rather than “produce.” In Marxian economics, bank workers, as well as sales workers do not produce surplus value but rather transfer the surplus value already produced. This does not mean that these workers are not exploited capitalistically; they are used impersonally by the employer to obtain surplus value and a profit. Furthermore, things produced by others are used by employers such as TD Bank to control their working lives in order to obtain surplus value or profit.

TD Bank workers do not belong to a union. Would their becoming unionized turn their situation into one where they had a “fair contract” and “decent work?” I think not. Unions can limit exploitation and can control some aspects of their working lives, but in principle workers are things to be used by employers even with unions. This does not mean that a non-unionized environment is the same as a unionized environment. With unions that are independent of particular employers, that is to say, are real unions, there is an opportunity for workers to develop organizations of resistance against the power of particular employers.

The ideology of unions–that somehow they can produce a “fair contract” and “decent work”–needs, though, to be constantly criticized. Workers deserve better than the acceptance of such ideology by the left.

The Rate of Exploitation of the Workers of Rogers Communications Inc., One of the Largest Private Employers in Toronto

Introduction

In two others posts I presented the twenty largest employers in Toronto according to level of employment (see A Short List of the Largest Employers in Toronto, Ontario, Canada) and the twenty largest employers in Canada according to profit (see A Short List of the Largest Private Employers in Canada, According to Profit). 

I have tried to calculate the rate of exploitation of workers of Magna International in an earlier post (see The Rate of Exploitation of Workers at Magna International Inc., One of the Largest Private Employers in Toronto, Part One); Magna International is one of the largest employers in Toronto. I also calculated the rate of exploitation for Air Canada workers and the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC) workers. 

The Nature of the Rate of Exploitation

But what is the rate of exploitation? And why not use the usual rate of profit or the rate of return? The rate of profit is calculated as profit divided by investment. Since employers purchase both the means for work–buildings, computers, office supplies, raw material–and hire workers–we can classify investment into two categories: c, meaning constant capital, or the capital invested in commodities other than workers; and v, or variable capital, the capital invested in the hiring of workers for a certain period of time (wages, salaries and benefits).

The purpose of investment in a capitalist economy is to obtain more money (see The Money Circuit of Capital), and the additional money is surplus value when it is related to its source: workers working for more time than what they cost to produce themselves. The relation between surplus value and variable capital (or wages and salaries) is the rate of surplus value or the rate of exploitation, expressed as a ratio: s/v.

When the surplus is related to both c and v and expressed as a ratio, it is the rate of profit: s/(c+v).

In Marxian economics, you cannot simply use the economic classifications provided by employers and governments since such classifications often hide the nature of the social world in which we live. The rate of profit underestimates the rate of exploitation since the surplus value is related to total investment and not just to the workers. Furthermore, it makes the surplus value appear to derive from both constant capital and variable capital.

I decided to look at the annual report of some of the largest private companies in Toronto and Canada if they are available in order to calculate the rate of exploitation at a more micro level than aggregate rates of surplus value at the national or international level. Politically, this is necessary since social democrats here in Toronto (and undoubtedly elsewhere) vaguely may refer to exploitation–while simultaneously and contradictorily referring to “decent work” and “fair contracts.” Calculating even approximately the rate of exploitation at a more micro level thus has political relevance.

Conclusions First

As usual, I start with the conclusion in order to make readily accessible the results of the calculations for those who are more interested in the results than in how to obtain them.

Income before income tax expense s=$3.773 billion or $3773.5 million and
Employee salaries, benefits, and stock-based compensation v=$1.8045 billion or $1804.5 million

The rate of exploitation or the rate of surplus value=s/v=3773.5/1804.5=209%.

That means that for every hour worked that produces her/his wage, a worker at Rogers Communications works around an additional 125 minutes or 2 hours 5 minutes for free for Rogers Communications. Alternatively, in terms of money, $1 of wage or salary of a regular Rogers Communications worker produces $2.09 surplus value or profit for free. 

  1. In a 4.5-hour work day (270 minutes), the worker produces her/his wage in about 87 minutes (1 hour 27 minutes) and works 183 minutes (3 hours 3 minutes) for free for Rogers Communication.
  2. In a 7.5-hour work day (450 minutes), the worker produces her/his wage in about 146 minutes (2 hours 26 minutes) and works 304 minutes (5 hours 4 minutes) for free for Rogers Communications.
  3. In an 8-hour work day (480 minutes). the worker produces her/his wage in about 155 minutes (2 hours 35 minutes) and works 325 minutes (5 hours 25 minutes) for free for Rogers Communications.
  4. In an 10-hour work day (600 minutes). the worker produces her/his wage in about 194 minutes (3 hours 14 minutes) and works 406 minutes (6 hours 46 minutes) for free for Rogers Communications.

Of course, during the time that the worker produces her/his own wage, s/he is subject to the power of management and hence is also unfree during that time (see The Rate of Exploitation of Magna International Inc., One of the Largest Private Employers in Toronto, Part Two, Or: Intensified Oppression and Exploitation and   Employers as Dictators, Part One).

Do you think that these facts contradict the talk by the left and unionists of “fair wages,” “fair contracts” (see  Fair Contracts (or Fair Collective Agreements): The Ideological Rhetoric of Canadian Unions, Part One for the rhetoric of the largest union in Canada, the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE)) and “decent work?” Do they ignore the reality of life for workers, whether unionized or non-unionized? If exploitation and oppression of workers is a constant in their lives, even if they are only vaguely aware of it, should this situation not be frankly acknowledged by their representatives? Do such representatives do so? If not, why not?  Do workers deserve better than neglecting the social context within which they live and work? Should such problems be addressed head on rather than neglected? 

Data on Which the Calculation Is Based

The calculation of the rate of exploitation is undoubtedly imperfect, and I invite the reader to correct its gaps. Nonetheless, the lack of any attempt to determine the rate of exploitation at the city level has undoubtedly reinforced social-reformist tendencies.

Now, the calculation:

In millions of Canadian dollars:

The data are taken from Rogers Communications Inc. Annual Report.

Total revenue 15,073

Operating Expenses

Operating Costs

Cost of equipment sales 2,254
Merchandise for resale 242
Other external purchases 4,360
Employee salaries, benefits, and stock-based compensation 2,005

Total operating costs 8,861
Depreciation and amortization 2,488
Restructuring, acquisition and other 139

Total operating expenses 11,488
Finance costs 840

Interest on borrowings  746
Interest on post-employment benefits liability  11
Interest on lease liabilities  61
Capitalized interest (19)
Loss on repayment of long-term debt 19
(Gain) loss on foreign exchange (79)
Change in fair value of derivative instruments 80
Other 21

Total finance costs 840
Other income  (10)
Income before income tax expense 2,755

Total revenue therefore=11,488+840-10+12,318+2,755=15,073 (as above)

To calculate the rate of surplus value, the key categories are “Employee salaries, benefits, and stock-based compensation,” which is equivalent to wages/salaries (=v) and “Income before income tax expense” (surplus value (s) or profit).

Adjustments

In Marxian theory, it is necessary to question whether some expenses are expenses for both the individual employer and for the class of employers (and fractions of their class, such as those who live on interest); in such a case, the expense is deducted from total revenue. On the other hand, there are expenses that are expenses for the individual employer but are not expenses when looked at from the point of view of the class of employers; in such an instance, they are paid out from the surplus value produced or obtained by workers and are to be included in income before taxes.

Adjustment of Stock-Based Compensation

The subcategory “stock-based compensation” in the category “Employee salaries, benefits, and stock-based compensation” includes two further subcategories (sub-sub categories, so to speak): 1. Options to purchase Class B Non-Voting Shares on a one-for-one basis (granted to employees, directors, and officers) and 2. Performance options (granted to certain key executives). It may seem unnecessary to adjust for the second sub-sub category since there were ” nil performance-based options” in 2019. However, there are at least two reasons for making adjustments. Firstly, payment for some of the stock-based compensation is due to stock-based compensation acquired in previous years: “These options vest on a graded basis over four years provided that certain targeted stock prices are met on or after each anniversary date. As at December 31, 2019, we had 1,068,776 performance options outstanding.”

Secondly, some of the stock options  in the first sub-sub category are based on “performance-based options” on the part of middle and senior management: “We granted 180,896 performance-based RSUs [restricted share units] to certain key executives in 2019.” 

I use the following logic from my post on the rate of exploitation of Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Workers to justify shifting 10 percent of the amount from the category ” (I change the wording slightly to make the quote apply to Rogers Communications workers): 

Most employees, whether executive or not, seem to be eligible to some support of bonus as a function of performance. However, the gap between executive pay and the pay of regular employees has widened over the years, so it is reasonable to infer that the category “Stock-based compensation” is divided into two parts: one part is a function of the number of hours worked as well as the intensity of that work by regular employees; the other is based on the extent to which managers and senior executives are successful in exploiting those regular employees. 

It is impossible to determine the proportion of stock options that form part of salaries and bonuses that represent the exploitation of Rogers Communications regular workers. 

It is probably reasonable to assume that a minimum of 10 percent of the “Stock-based compensation” comes from the exploitation by middle and senior Rogers Communications executives of regular workers.

It would be necessary to have more detailed information to determine whether more or less of the money obtained in this category were distributed between regular bank workers and management executives. If regular bank workers received more, then the rate of exploitation would be less than the rate calculated below. If management executives received more, then the rate of exploitation would be more than the rate calculated below.

On the assumption of 10 percent, this means that 10 percent of the total “Stock-based compensation is reduced by 10 percent, or $200.5 million dollars, and that amount is added to “Income before income tax expense.” This gives, so far: 

Employee salaries, benefits, and stock-based compensation $1804.5 billion
Income before income tax expense $2955.5 billion

Adjustment of Finance Costs

Another adjustment relates to interest. As I indicated in my post about the rate of exploitation of workers at Magna International:

An adjustment should probably be the treatment of the payment of interest: despite being an expense from the point of view of the individual capitalist, it probably forms part of the surplus value. It should be added to “Income before income tax expense.”

As for the category “Interest on post-employment benefits liability,” from the point of view of Rogers Communications, it is an expense or cost because, presumably, Rogers Communications had to borrow money (and pay interest) to meet its financial obligations to its retired workers; this interest comes from the surplus value produced by the workers and is therefore included as part of profit.

I treat the category “Interest on lease liabilities” like other interest categories: it is paid out of the surplus value produced by Rogers Communications workers.

The interest charges so far that must be subtracted from “Finance costs” and added to “Income before income tax expense” is $818 million. 

That leaves $22 million for Finance Costs so far. 

As I explained on my post on the rate of exploitation of Air Canada workers:

Some explanation of “interest capitalized” is in order. I have had difficulty in understanding the nature of “Interest capitalized.” As far as I can tell, interest that is normally paid and is an expense for the particular employer is treated, in Marxian economics, as part of surplus value because, at the macro level, it comes from the surplus value produced by the workers.

Interest capitalized seems to be different since the interest charged on money borrowed for the purpose of the construction of fixed assets (with a specific interest rate attached to it) is “capitalized,” or not considered part of interest expenses until the construction is finished and the fixed asset is ready to use. This accounting distinction, however, from the macro point of view, is irrelevant since both interest expenses and interest capitalized are derived from the surplus value produced by workers (or appropriated from them in another industry). Accordingly, both interest expenses and interest capitalized should be added to the amount of “Income before income taxes” category.

In the case of Air Canada, capitalized interest was positive (not in parentheses), and I therefore added it to the amount of surplus value produced by the workers. In the case of Rogers Communication, it is negative (since it is in parentheses). Accordingly, I have subtracted it from “Finance Costs” (as the accountants have done). Whether that it is legitimate I will leave for those who more adequately understand modern accounting principles and their relation to Marxian economics. I have found no guidance in the literature so far to aid me in dealing with such issues. 

The three categories, “Loss on repayment of long-term debt,” “(Gain) loss on foreign exchange,” and
“Change in fair value of derivative instruments” seem to have nothing directly to do with interest payments and therefore I leave them as part of “Finance Costs.”

Since the category “Other” remains unspecified, I also leave it as part of “Finance Costs.”

Accordingly, adjusted Finance Costs are:

Adjusted Finance Costs

Loss on repayment of long-term debt 19
(Gain) loss on foreign exchange (79)
Change in fair value of derivative instruments 80
Capitalized interest (19)
Other 21

Total finance costs 22

The category “Other income” is somewhat misleading since, in a note, the category is really “Other (income) expense.” The subcategories are as follows: 

Losses from associates and joint ventures 18 
Other investment income (35) 
Total other income (10)

The $10 million is actually additional investment income, but since it is placed in an expense category, it is put into parentheses. Normally, when an amount is placed in parentheses, it is subtracted, but since it is additional income rather than an expense, it is added. It therefore is already accounted for in the original “Income before income tax expense,” it is already accounted for. 

The remaining 818 in so-called finance costs (which are hidden surplus value) are transferred to the adjusted “Income before income tax expense” category, so that the adjustment for the total of the category is 2,955.5.+818=3773.5. 

So, with the adjustments in place:

Income before income tax expense s=$3.773 billion or $3773.5 million and
Employee salaries, benefits, and stock-based compensation v=$1.8045 billion or $1804.5 million

The Rate of Exploitation

The rate of exploitation or the rate of surplus value=s/v=3773.5/1804.5=209%.

That means that for every hour worked that produces her/his wage, a worker at Rogers Communications works around an additional 125 minutes or 2 hours 5 minutes for free for Rogers Communications. Alternatively, in terms of money, $1 of wage or salary of a regular Rogers Communications worker produces $2.09 surplus value or profit for free. 

The length of the working day at Rogers Communications, like most places, varies. Here are a sample of working days from the Internet:

  1. 7 days a week. 32 hours a week.
  2. Varying 8hr shifts depending on dept. two paid 15 minutes break and 30mins unpaid lunch
  3. 37.5 a week
  4. 7.5 to 8 hrs
  5. 8 – 10 hours per day depending on projects etc. There is a great deal of flexibility in how you work
  1. In a 4.5-hour work day (270 minutes), the worker produces her/his wage in about 87 minutes (1 hour 27 minutes) and works 183 minutes (3 hours 3 minutes) for free for Rogers Communication.
  2. In a 7.5-hour work day (450 minutes), the worker produces her/his wage in about 146 minutes (2 hours 26 minutes) and works 304 minutes (5 hours 4 minutes) for free for Rogers Communications.
  3. In an 8-hour work day (480 minutes). the worker produces her/his wage in about 155 minutes (2 hours 35 minutes) and works 325 minutes (5 hours 25 minutes) for free for Rogers Communications.
  4. In an 10-hour work day (600 minutes). the worker produces her/his wage in about 194 minutes (3 hours 14 minutes) and works 406 minutes (6 hours 46 minutes) for free for Rogers Communications.

Of course, during the time that the worker produces her/his own wage, s/he is subject to the power of management and hence is also unfree during that time (see The Rate of Exploitation of Magna International Inc., One of the Largest Private Employers in Toronto, Part Two, Or: Intensified Oppression and Exploitation and   Employers as Dictators, Part One).

Do you think that these facts contradict the talk by the left and unionists of “fair wages,” “fair contracts” (see  Fair Contracts (or Fair Collective Agreements): The Ideological Rhetoric of Canadian Unions, Part One for the rhetoric of the largest union in Canada, the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE)) and “decent work?” Do they ignore the reality of life for workers, whether unionized or non-unionized? If exploitation and oppression of workers is a constant in their lives, even if they are only vaguely aware of it, should this situation not be frankly acknowledged by their representatives? Do such representatives do so? If not, why not?  Do workers deserve better than neglecting the social context within which they live and work? Should such problems be addressed head on rather than neglected? 

The Rate of Exploitation of the Workers of the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC), One of the Largest Private Employers in Toronto and in Canada

Introduction

In two others posts I presented the twenty largest employers in Toronto according to level of employment (see A Short List of the Largest Employers in Toronto, Ontario, Canada) and the twenty largest employers in Canada according to profit (see A Short List of the Largest Private Employers in Canada, According to Profit). The largest employer, in terms of employment, is the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce.

I have tried to calculate the rate of exploitation of workers of Magna International in an earlier post (see The Rate of Exploitation of Workers at Magna International Inc., One of the Largest Private Employers in Toronto, Part One); Magna International is one of the largest employers in Toronto.

The Nature of the Rate of Exploitation

But what is the rate of exploitation? And why not use the usual rate of profit or the rate of return? The rate of profit is calculated as profit divided by investment. Since employers purchase both the means for work–buildings, computers, office supplies, raw material–and hire workers–we can classify investment into two categories: c, meaning constant capital, or the capital invested in commodities other than workers; and v, or variable capital, the capital invested in the hiring of workers for a certain period of time (wages, salaries and benefits).

The purpose of investment in a capitalist economy is to obtain more money (see The Money Circuit of Capital), and the additional money is surplus value when it is related to its source: workers working for more time than what they cost to produce themselves. The relation between surplus value and variable capital (or wages and salaries) is the rate of surplus value or the rate of exploitation, expressed as a ratio: s/v.

When the surplus is related to both c and v and expressed as a ratio, it is the rate of profit: s/(c+v).

In Marxian economics, you cannot simply use the economic classifications provided by employers and governments since such classifications often hide the nature of the social world in which we live. The rate of profit underestimates the rate of exploitation since the surplus value is related to total investment and not just to the workers. Furthermore, it makes the surplus value appear to derive from both constant capital and variable capital.

I decided to look at the annual report of some of the largest private companies in Toronto and Canada if they are available in order to calculate the rate of exploitation at a more micro level than aggregate rates of surplus value at the national or international level. Politically, this is necessary since social democrats here in Toronto (and undoubtedly elsewhere) vaguely may refer to exploitation–while simultaneously and contradictorily referring to “decent work” and “fair contracts.” Calculating even approximately the rate of exploitation at a more micro level thus has political relevance.

Conclusions First

As usual, I start with the conclusion in order to make readily accessible the results of the calculations for those who are more interested in the results than in how to obtain them.

We have the following:

Income before income taxes: $6,656=s
Employee compensation and benefits: $5,539=v

The rate of exploitation or the rate of surplus value is s/v; therefore, s/v is 6,656/5,539=120 percent.

This means that, for every hour worked that enables her/his to obtain a wage, a CIBC worker works 72 minutes (or 1 hour 12 minutes) for free for CIBC. Alternatively, in terms of money, $1 of wage or salary of a regular bank worker results in $1.20  surplus value or profit for free.

  1. in a 5.75 hour working day, CIBC workers spend 157 minutes (2 hours 37 minutes) to obtain their wage for the day, and they spend 188 minutes (3 hours 8 minutes) in obtaining a surplus value or profit for CIBC.
  2. For a six-hour working day, follow the same procedures as above, but replace 345 by 360: result: in a 6-hour working day, CIBC workers spend 164 minutes to obtain their wage for the day, and they spend 196 minutes in obtaining a surplus value or profit for CIBC.
  3. 7-hour working day: 420 minutes: in a 7-hour working day, CIBC workers spend 191 minutes to obtain their wage for the day, and they spend 229 minutes in obtaining a surplus value or profit for CIBC.
  4. 7.5-hour working day: 450 minutes: in a 7,5-hour working day, CIBC workers spend 205 minutes to obtain their wage for the day, and they spend 245 minutes in obtaining a surplus value or profit for CIBC.
  5. 8-hour working day: 480 minutes: in an 8-hour working day, CIBC workers spend 218 minutes to obtain their wage for the day, and they spend 262 minutes in obtaining a surplus value or profit for CIBC.
  6. 10-hour working day: 600 minutes: in a 10-hour working day, CIBC workers spend 273 minutes to obtain their wage for the day, and they spend 327 minutes in obtaining a surplus value or profit for CIBC.

CIBC workers do not belong to a union. Would their becoming unionized turn their situation into one where they had a “fair contract” and “decent work?” I think not. Unions can limit exploitation and can control some aspects of their working lives, but in principle workers are things to be used by employers even with unions. This does not mean that a non-unionized environment is the same as a unionized environment. With unions that are independent of particular employers, that is to say, are real unions, there is an opportunity for workers to develop organizations of resistance against the power of particular employers.

The ideology of unions–that somehow they can produce a “fair contract” and “decent work”–needs, though, to be constantly criticized. Workers deserve better than the acceptance of such ideology by the left.

Data on Which the Calculation Is Based

Now, the calculation:

In millions of Canadian dollars:

Revenue:  $18,611

Net interest income $ 10,551
Non-interest income $8,060

Provision for credit losses $1,286
Non-interest expenses $10,856

Employee Compensation and Benefits:

Salaries: $3,081
Performance-based compensation: $1,873
Benefits: $772

Total employee compensation: $5,726

Other expenses:

Occupancy costs:  $892
Computer, software and office equipment: $1,874
Communications: $303
Advertising and business development: $359
Professional fees: $226
Business and capital taxes: $110
Other: $1,366

Total other expenses: $5,130

Income before income taxes (Revenue minus provision for losses minus non-interest expenses): $6,469 ($18,611-$1,286-$10,856=$6,469).

Adjustments

In Marxian theory, it is necessary to question whether some expenses are expenses for both the individual employer and for the class of employers (and fractions of their class, such as those who live on interest); in such a case, the expense is deducted from total revenue. On the other hand, there are expenses that are expenses for the individual employer but are not expenses when looked at from the point of view of the class of employers; in such an instance, they are paid out from the surplus value produced or obtained by workers and are to be included in income before taxes.

It is necessary, however, to make adjustments on the revenue side; From  https://www.payscale.com/research/CA/Employer=Canadian_Imperial_Bank_of_Commerce_(CIBC)/Bonus :

How much does Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC) pay in bonuses?

Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC) pays an average of C$4,962 in annual employee bonuses. Bonus pay at Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC) ranges from C$1,014 to C$30,521 annually among employees who report receiving a bonus. Employees with the title Information Technology (IT) Director earn the highest bonuses with an average annual bonus of C$30,521. Employees with the title Customer Service Representative (CSR) earn the lowest bonuses with an average annual bonus of C$1,014.

Although there is no direct evidence to indicate whether such bonuses form part of “Performance-based compensation,” there is indirect evidence.

Bloomberg notes the following (https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/canada-s-bankers-face-the-bleakest-bonus-year-in-almost-a-decade-1.1358606):

The Canadian banks pay bonuses based on performance, with most of the variable compensation going to capital-markets employees such as investment bankers, research analysts and those in sales and trading. …

Senior investment bankers will see a 10 per cent decline in compensation from last year, hurt by fewer financings and a decline in mergers-and-acquisitions activity, according to Vlaad & Co. Junior investment bankers will see little change in their payouts following three years of increases, while those in sales, trading and research will see compensation fall 15  per cent to 25  per cent, and fixed-income employees will face a similar decline, the firm said.

Most employees, whether executive or not, seem to be eligible to some support of bonus as a function of performance. However, the gap between executive pay and the pay of regular employees has widened over the years, so it is reasonable to infer that the category “Performance-based compensation” is divided into two parts: one part is a function of the number of hours worked by regular employees as well as the intensity of that work; the other is based on the extent to which bank managers and senior executives are successful in exploiting those regular employees. Evidence for such exploitation is indirect, via the level of compensation of some senior executives. For example, Victor Dodig, president and CEO,  received $9,017,000 in total compensation in 2019 (salary, $1,000,000; share-based awards, $4,806,420; option-based awards, $1,201,560; Non-equity GPS awards, $1,501,950; Pension value, $505,000; all other compensation, $2,250) (CIBC Proxy Circular 2020, page 79).

It is impossible to determine the proportion of bonuses that form part of salaries and bonuses that represent the exploitation of bank workers. Some facts may, however, be relevant. From   https://www.comparably.com/companies/cibc/executive-salaries:

The average CIBC executive compensation is $270,917 a year. The median estimated compensation for executives at CIBC including base salary and bonus is $253,828, or $122 per hour. At CIBC, the lowest compensated [executive] makes $52,000.

It is probable that even middle-level bank executives receive some surplus value or profit through the exploitation of regular bank workers. This means that part of their compensation is a function of how much work regular bank workers work for nothing or for free.

Given that the level of income for top executives is far beyond the level of income of even the lowest executive, as well as the fact that the average executive compensation is almost five times the level of the lowest executive (not even taking into account additional compensations for senior executives), it is probably reasonable to assume that a minimum of 10 percent of the “Performance-based compensation” comes from the exploitation by senior bank executives of regular workers.

It would be necessary to have more detailed information to determine whether more or less of the money obtained in this category were distributed between regular bank workers and management executives. If regular bank workers received more, then the rate of exploitation would be less than the rate calculated below. If management executives received more, then the rate of exploitation would be more than the rate calculated below.

On the assumption of 10 percent, though, this means that 10 percent of the total of “Performance-based compensation, ” is reduced by 10 percent, or $187,300,000, and that amount is added to “Income before income taxes.” As a consequence, we have the following:

Adjusted Results

Income before income taxes: $6,656=s
Employee compensation and benefits: $5,539=v

The Rate of Exploitation of CIBC Workers

The rate of exploitation or the rate of surplus value is s/v; therefore, s/v is 6,656/5,539=120 percent.

This means that, in terms of money, $1 of wage or salary of a regular bank worker results in $1.20 cn surplus value or profit for free (calculated as follows–you can skip this calculation if not interested in how the result was obtained). Alternatively, for every hour worked, a CIBC worker works 72 minutes (or 1 hour 12 minutes) for free for CIBC.

  1. s/v=1.2
  2. multiplying  s/v and 1.2 by v (multiplying both sides by v does not change the equation), we have (s timesv)/v=1.2v;
  3. Dividing v by itself in the left-hand part of the equation in 2 above results in 1 (any number divided by itself except 0 is equal to 1, and any number multiplied by 1 is the same number), so we have: s=1.2v
  4. We can use this equation to calculate the division of the working day into time required to obtain the equivalent of the wage for workers at CIBC and the time they provide free of charge to obtain surplus value for CIBC.

According to a few people who have worked at CIBC, the length of the working day is:

8 hours a day

Work hours are manageable and flexible. The company is accommodating with every schedule.

They vary – just like it does anywhere.

8 hours in a day, 1 hour for break and lunch.

8-10 hours

I work 7.5 hours each day.

6 – 5.75 hours a day, 4 days a week. for the last 1.5 years

Evidently, the length of the working day varies for workers at CIBC. I will calculate the division of the working day from the shortest to the longest in the above quotes accordingly. I use minutes rather than hours. I provide more detail for the calculation for the first one so that others can more easily calculate similar rates in the cities where they live.

  1. A 5.75- hour working day: 345 minutes;
  2. We can use this information to create an equation:
  3. v+s=345;
  4. We also have the equation s=1.2v from above;
  5. We can therefore replace, in equation 3 above, s by 1.2v since they are the same.
  6. We now have: v+1.2v=345;
  7. From 6, we have 2.2v=345
  8. Dividing both sides by 2.2 does not change the equation, so the result is: v=345/2.2=157 minutes (rounded to the nearest minute).
  9. Since v+s=345, we have 157+s=345;
  10. Subtracting 157from both sides does not change the equation, so now we have s=345-157=188 minutes
  11. So, in a 5.75 hour working day, CIBC workers spend 157 minutes (2 hours 37 minutes) to obtain their wage for the day, and they spend 188 minutes (3 hours 8 minutes) in obtaining a surplus value or profit for CIBC.
  12. For a six-hour working day, follow the same procedures as above, but replace 345 by 360: result: in a 6-hour working day, CIBC workers spend 164 minutes to obtain their wage for the day, and they spend 196 minutes in obtaining a surplus value or profit for CIBC.
  13. 7-hour working day: 420 minutes:i n a 7-hour working day, CIBC workers spend 191 minutes to obtain their wage for the day, and they spend 229 minutes in obtaining a surplus value or profit for CIBC.
  14. 7.5-hour working day: 450 minutes: in a 7,5-hour working day, CIBC workers spend 205 minutes to obtain their wage for the day, and they spend 245 minutes in obtaining a surplus value or profit for CIBC.
  15. 8-hour working day: 480 minutes: in an 8-hour working day, CIBC workers spend 218 minutes to obtain their wage for the day, and they spend 262 minutes in obtaining a surplus value or profit for CIBC.
  16. 10-hour working day: 600 minutes: in a 10-hour working day, CIBC workers spend 273 minutes to obtain their wage for the day, and they spend 327 minutes in obtaining a surplus value or profit for CIBC.

It should be noted that I have used the verb “obtain” rather than “produce.” In Marxian economics, bank workers, as well as sales workers do not produce surplus value but rather transfer the surplus value already produced. This does not mean that these workers are not exploited capitalistically; they are used impersonally by the employer to obtain surplus value and a profit. Furthermore, things produced by others are used by employers such as CIBC to control their working lives in order to obtain surplus value or profit. (I leave the issue of how banks exploit workers as consumers to others more competent to deal with the issue; the point here is to focus on the exploitation of bank workers as workers and not as consumers.)

CIBC workers do not belong to a union. Would their becoming unionized turn their situation into one where they had a “fair contract” and “decent work?” I think not. Unions can limit exploitation and can control some aspects of their working lives, but in principle workers are things to be used by employers even with unions. This does not mean that a non-unionized environment is the same as a unionized environment. With unions that are independent of particular employers, that is to say, are real unions, there is an opportunity for workers to develop organizations of resistance against the power of particular employers.

The ideology of unions–that somehow they can produce a “fair contract” and “decent work”–needs, though, to be constantly criticized. Workers deserve better than the acceptance of such ideology by the left.

The Rate of Exploitation of Workers at Air Canada, One of the Largest Private Employers in Canada

The following applies to Air Canada workers before the COVID-19. The situation undoubtedly has changed since then since the airline industry has suffered disproportionately an economic crisis relative to some other industries (such as food production).

In another post, I presented the twenty largest employers in Canada according to level of profit (see A Short List of the Largest Private Employers in Canada, According to Profit). One of those employers is Air Canada, a privatized airline company (that used to be under public ownership).

I have tried to calculate the rate of exploitation of workers of Magna International in an earlier post (see The Rate of Exploitation of Workers at Magna International Inc., One of the Largest Private Employers in Toronto, Part One); Magna International is one of the largest employers in Toronto.

I decided to look at the annual report of some of the largest private companies in Toronto and Canada if they are available in order to calculate the rate of exploitation at a more micro level than aggregate rates of surplus value at the national or international level. Politically, this is necessary since social democrats here in Toronto (and undoubtedly elsewhere) vaguely may refer to exploitation–while simultaneously and contradictorily referring to “decent work” and “fair contracts.” Calculating even approximately the rate of exploitation at a more micro level thus has political relevance.

Conclusions First

I am going to begin with a conclusion, and then explain what it means and how it is calculated so that the reader understands where I am headed in the calculations:

For every hour worked that produces her/his wage, a worker at Air Canada works around an additional 42 minutes for free for Air Canada.

In a 6-hour work day, the worker produces her/his wage in about 3.5 hours and works 2.5 hours for free for Air Canada. Of course, during the time that the worker produces her/his own wage, s/he is subject to the power of management and hence is  also unfree (see, for instance, Management Rights, Part Four: Private Sector Collective Agreement, Ontario and Employers as Dictators, Part One).

In an 8-hour work day, the worker produces her/his wage in about 5 hours 36 minutes and works for 2 hours and 24 minutes free for Air Canada.

In a 12-hour day, the worker produces her/his wage in about 8 hours 24 minutes and works for free for 3 hours 36 minutes for Air Canada.

Of course, social democrats refer to this situation, in one way or another, as “fair.” They do so by using such terms as “fair contract,” “free collective bargaining,” “fairness,” “economic justice,” “good contract,” “decent work,” “companies paying their fair share of taxes” and similar rhetoric. Such rhetoric, rather than enlightening workers about their situation, actually hide it. The working class deserves better than this ideology.

The Nature of the Rate of Exploitation

But what is the rate of exploitation? And why not use the usual rate of profit or the rate of return? The rate of profit is calculated as profit divided by investment. Since employers purchase both the means for work–buildings, computers, office supplies, raw material–and hire workers–we can classify investment into two categories: c, meaning constant capital, or the capital invested in commodities other than workers; and v, or variable capital, the capital invested in the hiring of workers for a certain period of time (wages, salaries and benefits).

The purpose of investment in a capitalist economy is to obtain more money (see The Money Circuit of Capital), and the additional money is surplus value when it is related to its source: workers working for more time than what they cost to produce themselves. The relation between surplus value and variable capital (or wages and salaries) is the rate of surplus value or the rate of exploitation, expressed as a ratio: s/v.

When the surplus is related to both c and v and expressed as a ratio, it is the rate of profit: s/(c+v).

In Marxian economics, you cannot simply use the economic classifications provided by employers and governments since such classifications often hide the nature of the social world in which we live. The rate of profit underestimates the rate of exploitation since the surplus value is related to total investment and not just to the workers. Furthermore, it makes the surplus value appear to derive from both constant capital and variable capital.

How I Calculated the Rate of Exploitation of Air Canada Workers

I calculated the conclusion as follows:

The income statement is broken into the following categories for 2019 (in millions of Canadian  dollars) :

Total revenue: $19,131
Total operating expenses: $17,481

Wages, salaries and benefits: $3,184
Aircraft fuel: $3,862
Regional airlines expense:

Aircraft fuel: $485
Other: $1,95

Depreciation and amortization: $1,986

Aircraft maintenance: $1,004

Airport and navigation fees: $990

Sales and distribution costs: $874

Ground package costs: $627

Catering and onboard services: $445

Communications and information technology: $397

Other: $1,671

Operating income: $1,650
Non-operating income (expense) [if it is income according to standard accounting practices, it has no parentheses; if it is an expense, it is within parentheses and needs to be subtracted–but see below): $125

Foreign exchange gain (loss): $499
Interest income: $164
Interest expense: ($515)
Interest capitalized: $35
Net financing expense relating to employee benefits: ($39)
Gain (loss) on financial instruments recorded at fair value: $23
Gain on debt settlements and modifications: $6
Gain (loss) on disposal of assets: $13
Other: ($61)

Income before income taxes: $1,775 (adding operating income and non-operating income (expense) together)

Some explanation of “interest capitalized” is in order. I have had difficulty in understanding the nature of “Interest capitalized.” As far as I can tell, interest that is normally paid and is an expense for the particular employer is treated, in Marxian economics, as part of surplus value because, at the macro level, it comes from the surplus value produced by the workers. Interest capitalized seems to be different since the interest charged on money borrowed for the purpose of the construction of fixed assets (with a specific interest rate attached to it) is “capitalized,” or not considered part of interest expenses until the construction is finished and the fixed asset is ready to use. This accounting distinction, however, from the macro point of view, is irrelevant since both interest expenses and interest capitalized are derived from the surplus value produced by workers (or appropriated from them in another industry). Accordingly, both interest expenses and interest capitalized should be added to the amount of “Income before income taxes” category.

The adjusted “Income before income taxes” therefore is: ($1775 +$515)=$2,290 (interest capitalization has already been added to income so there is no need to add it here).

Another necessary adjustment relates to the category and amount “Net financing expense relating to employee benefits: ($39)”. Pension-related expenses should probably form part of wages and hence should be shifted to “operating expenses.” This shift does not change the surplus value produced nor the “Income before income taxes” category; it just changes the distribution of expenses, from “Non-operating income (expense) to “Total operating expenses” by way of increasing the category “Wages, salaries and benefits” by $39; the category “Wages, salaries and benefits” are therefore $3,223.

The final calculations with adjustments before determining the rate of surplus value are:

Total revenue: $19,131
Total operating expenses: $17,520
Operating income: $1611
Non-operating income: $640
Income before income taxes: $2251

To calculate the rate of surplus value, we need to relate “Income before income taxes” to “Wages, salaries and benefits.” So, with the adjustments in place:, s=2251; v=3223. The rate of exploitation or the rate of surplus value=s/v=2251/3223=70%.

That means that for every hour worked that produces her/his wage, a worker at Air Canada works around an additional 42 minutes for free for Air Canada.

In a 6-hour work day, the worker produces her/his wage in about 3.5 hours and works 2.5 hours for free for Air Canada. Of course, during the time that the worker produces her/his own wage, s/he is subject to the power of management and hence is unfree (see, for instance, Management Rights, Part Four: Private Sector Collective Agreement, Ontario  and   Employers as Dictators, Part One).

In an 8-hour work day, the worker produces her/his wage in about 5 hours 36 minutes and works for 2 hours and 24 minutes free for Air Canada.

In a 12-hour day, the worker produces her/his wage in about 8 hours 24 minutes and works for free for 3 hours 36 minutes for Air Canada.

I have used the lengths of the working day as 6, 8 and 12 because the length of the working day varies. According to one source:

As a customer service agent, you ll work from 3:00 am, 4:00 am and 5:00 am morning shifts, or 11:00 am, 12:00 pm, 2:00 pm. Afternoon shifts. Not sure about night shifts as I never work any of them. Part time is 6 hrs per day and full time can be 8-16 hrs. per day. You can exchange shifts, give away shifts, trade, pick or even parcial shifts. That part helps a lot when you need a day or 2 off.

Social-Democratic Rhetoric Neglects the Wider Context that Reveals the Exploitation of Workers

Of course, social democrats refer to this situation, in one way or another, as “fair.” They do so by using such terms as “fair contract,” “free collective bargaining,” “fairness,” “economic justice,” “good contract,” “decent work,” “companies paying their fair share of taxes” and similar rhetoric. Such rhetoric, rather than enlightening workers about their situation, actually hides it. The working class deserves better than this ideology.

By neglecting the fact of exploitation, other social democrats draw incorrect political conclusions. Thus, there are social democrats who try to claim that we need to reform the police rather than abolish it (see, for example, Reform versus Abolition of Police, Part Two) because workers have property. Some workers in the more developed capitalist countries do indeed have property (and fewer, of course, in the less developed capitalist countries), but they obtain that property by being exploited in the first place. If they understood that, would they support the police, whose main function is to protect the power of the employer to exploit them (and, only secondarily, to protect them and their own property)?

If the above calculations can be improved in any way, please comment on the above. I have been unable to find many guideposts about how to calculate the rate of exploitation or the rate of surplus value at the level of particular companies.

Unions and the Coronavirus Pandemic: A Critique of a Social-Democratic View, Part Two

This is a continuation of commentary on an article written by Professor Tufs (geography professor, York University, Toronto, Ontario, Canada) (see https://socialistproject.ca/2020/05/covid19-and-actually-existing-unions/).

In my last post, I pointed out that Professor Tuft’s reference to Sam Gindin’s call for restructured and more radical unions is inadequate. Rather than addressing directly the issue of the inadequacy of modern-day unions in addressing the problems which workers face, Professor Tuft shuffles off the issue to Mr. Gindin. This shift permits Professor Tuft to focus almost exclusively on the creation of stop-gap measures to address the possible crisis in unions as a result of the pandemic.

Let us now turn to his discussion of reformed unions. He points out that many unions are not created by the members themselves in any real sense of the workers organizing themselves into  a fighting unit that functions to protect the common interests of its members I take it that that is what he means by the following:

There is also the reality that the current structures of the labour movement are limited. Rank-and-file members are not mobilized to self-organize.

Such a criticism needs elaboration, but Professor Tuft fails to do so. The very nature of modern unions (at least in Canada and the United States) as organizations whose primary function is to negotiate collective agreements, sets limits to the self-organizing capacity of unions–as long as they accept the model of “free collective bargaining” as somehow beyond criticism. Unions could develop the capacity to see collective bargaining and collective agreements as merely contracts forced upon them due to the inevitable power imbalance between the working class and the class of employers rather than somehow being “fair,” and they could also come to see such expressions as “decent work” as ideological in the bad sense of the word–of covering up the reality of the exploitation and oppression of workers.

By being vague, Professor Tuft fails to specify what he means by self-organize, and he thereby permits himself the luxury of not confronting the general limitations of unions, of collective bargaining and collective agreements. To openly call into question the center around which modern unions revolve–collective bargaining and collective agreements–would threaten the interests of many representatives of modern unions and thereby expose Professor Tuft to insults and ridicule by the social-reformist left.

Professor Tuft mentions another limitation of unions–they address mainly only the interests of their immediate employed members and not the unemployed. He mentions the construction trades as an exception:

 But there is the larger problem that labour organizations are simply not oriented toward the unemployed. Some unions such as the building trades maintain relationships with unemployed workers through hiring-hall ‘lists’. But this is an exception.

Professor Tuft fails to show how the lack of orientation towards the unemployed by unions is a larger problem. Rather, the lack of orientation towards the unemployed is interrelated with the focus on collective bargaining and the collective agreement.  Since unions focus on collective bargaining and collective agreements, and since unemployed workers have limited or no rights under such agreements (such as call-back rights), workers covered by a collective agreement who lose their job generally “vanish” or cease to exist as far as unions are practically concerned. The issue of unions not being oriented towards the unemployed is thus linked to the issue of their focus being collective bargaining and the collective agreement.

To be sure, workers in construction unions do not vanish from the union; they form part of a list to be hired. Professor Tufts does not explore this exception at all to determine whether it overcomes the limitations of traditional unions. (My brother, by the way, worked as a construction labourer in Calgary and a few other places in Alberta, Canada, when he was younger, and he evidently found the work not only difficult but exhausting.)

The construction industry is seasonal , and therefore many workers have only temporary jobs. Once their work for a particular employed has ended, they form part of a list to be hired by a pool of employers in the construction industry. The reason why the relation of the laid off member to the union is maintained, therefore, is because the worker is potentially employable by many different employers.

The hiring-hall list converts unions in the construction industry into, in some ways, a temporary job agency. From Michael Duke, Luke Bergmann, Genevieve Ames (2010), “Competition and the Limits of Solidarity among Unionized Construction Workers,” in Anthropology of Work Review, Volume 31, Number 2, page 85:

…the union serves as a job broker between workers and employers. In this capacity, union representatives from a given Local receive notice of job openings at particular job sites, and are tasked with providing those employers with workers from the union’s membership roster. The duration of these jobs varies widely, from 1 or 2 days to more or less permanent employment, resulting in many workers facing a continual struggle to receive a steady paycheck, and a continuous jockeying among members for jobs.

In addition to the seasonal nature of construction work, there is the additional but related fact that workers in the construction industry often work for a number of employers during a year and not just one employer. Construction workers go from periods of employment with one employer to periods of unemployment and then periods of employment with, possibly, a different employer.

There is, however, a major difference between this function as performed by construction unions and temporary agencies. Construction unions try to smooth out the distribution of work so as to make the system fairer as a whole for the construction workers in the union. Page 89:

There is little doubt that the hiring list benefits job seekers by reducing the influence of
favoritism, connections, and other influences that privilege some workers over others, and by spreading the risk of joblessness more or less equally among those on its roles.

Like most features of worker organizations in a capitalist society, though, the hiring-hall list is a double-edged sword. Being on the list is an expression of being unemployed, and in particular being at the bottom of the list expresses the likelihood of being unemployed for a longer period of time than many workers can afford. Page 89:

At the same time, the list represents a potent symbol of this alienation for these workers, in
that it provides a constant reminder of the temporary nature of their employment, and of the ephemeral quality of relationships on the job site.More centrally, the list represents for members the limits of union solidarity, the loss of a common stake in work and job security, and, ultimately, the alienation of laborers from the work they produce and the relationships that develop through that work.

A hiring-hall list does indeed maintain a relationship between workers and the union even when there is no specific employment relationship–but because the union functions in part as a temporary work agency, it also functions in part as an oppressive mechanism. A union that overcomes one of the limitations of collective bargaining–being connected to the union only by being connected to an employer (or set of employers in the case of more centralized bargaining)–often involves contradictions in other areas (such as the oppressive function of a temporary hiring agent).

Therefore, even when unions expand their functions to those beyond collective bargaining and collective agreements, they become involved in further contradictions that they cannot resolve. They are limited institutions for the self-organization of the working class. These limitations should be admitted and addressed.

Nevertheless, the issue of the unemployed not being organized by unions is certainly important. Employed and unemployed workers form, in general, part of one and the same working class.

Employed workers are united (temporally, during the working day) with the means of their work (buildings, machines, tables, floors, raw material, computers, and so forth). After work, they too , like their unemployed counterparts, become separated not only physically but also socially from those means (they do not own and control them).

The unemployed are separated physically and socially from all means of production for a shorter or longer period of time. Of course, some who work for employers may become unemployed, and some who are unemployed may become employed again. There is a often a change of who is employed and who is unemployed, due in great part to the changing needs of employers and, to some extent, the changing needs of workers (workers are not tied to a specific employer but can quit and try to find another employer to hire them).

Both groups of workers form part of the working class as class. As members of a class, those who work for a particular employer also are working for the class of employers.  No particular worker can work at any particular activity for any length of time without other workers producing both the means of production (machines, computers, phones, raw material, pens, pencils, tables and so forth) with which the worker works. In other words, there is a division of labour, where other workers are working for other employers in a system of interdependence. (Such interdependence has recently been experienced by some workers because of the coronavirus epidemic–as some workers stopped working, so too did others since they depended on other workers for the resources or means of production required to produce in their particular sphere). Or, as Thomas Hodgskin (1825), in his Labour Defended Against the Claims of Capital, remarked (page 45):

If we push our inquiries still further, all that we can learn is, that there are other men in existence who are preparing those things we need, while we are preparing those which they need.

The source of the active army of labour, at least in Canada, is the continued births of children within Canadian borders, on the one hand, and immigrants on the other.

The workers themselves, or the active army of workers of the class of employers, however, are subject to various levels of precariousness, some more and some less since changes in technology, rates of accumulation, taxes, state expenditures and its composition, intensity of work and so forth  can change employment levels. The precise composition of the active army of workers can of course also vary according to kinds and degrees of racism, sexism and so forth prevalent in and outside work.

In the world, there are “around 1.65 billion in the active labor army” (R. Jamil Jonna and John Bellamy Foster (April, 2016), “Marx’s Theory of Working-Class Precariousness – And Its Relevance Today,” in Monthly Review, page 38). 

The active army of labour is always subject to more or less unstable working conditions since the workers do not control the machines, buildings, resources, raw materials and so forth that they use, but are rather subject to the immediate control of particular managers and employers and, ultimately, to the control of the pressures of the world market.

The same could be said of the unemployed: they too are subject to varying levels of precariousness and subject to varying connections to particular employers and to the class of employers in general.

There are, in general, four kinds of groups that constitute the unemployed or the reserve army of labour: floating, latent, stagnant and pauperized. From R. Jamil Jonna and John Bellamy Foster, page 26:

… the floating population consisted of workers who had a connection – if a precarious one – to the active labor army, with a recent history of employment; they constituted those who would likely be the first to be re-hired in an expansion.

A section of the unemployed that has more precarious roots in the working class is the latent surplus population. From page 26:

The next layer of the reserve army, in Marx’s description, is the latent surplus population. For the most part this refers to the (self-sustaining) segments of the agricultural (or rural) population. This population served as a vast source of potential labor for capitalist industry (hence, “latent”).

In Canada, one of the sources for this form of unemployment is probably overseas in the form of the The Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP). From the Canadian government’s website:

The Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP) allows Canadian employers to hire foreign nationals to fill temporary labour and skill shortages when qualified Canadian citizens or permanent residents are not available.

In other countries, similarly, the temporary immigrant population also form part of the latent reserve army of labour. Many students can now be considered to form part of the latent reserve army of labour.

In earlier times, women also formed part of the latent part of the reserve army of labour; employers eventually hired women, for example, for weapons factories during the Second World War. (My mother worked in a weapons factory in Toronto during  part of the War.)

The third form of the unemployed or the reserve army of labour is the stagnant group: it is a very precarious section of the reserve army of labour, characterized by very low wages and superexploitation. Some workers in short-term positions, some workers for temporary agencies, day workers, workers in the informal economy and the like constitute this layer of the reserve army of labour, which is subject to very irregular work. Even some substitute teachers may form part of this group since they are effectively shut out of obtaining a permanent position as teachers and often have no hiring rights at all (as is (or was) the case for substitute teachers as members of the Winnipeg Teachers’ Association, or WTA).

Finally, the pauperized layer of the reserve army of labour constitutes the lowest layer of the reserve army of labour, which includes those incapable of working for an employer, those who live from social assistance (and who, occasionally, can be obliged to work if they are to continue to receive social assistance), those who live from petty thefts and the like. Part of those workers in the informal economy (including children) form part of this layer, including those who try to sell small amounts of commodities at an individual level.

The distribution of the active and reserve army of labour (with their various layers) can be seen from the following (page 38):

In 2013, according to International Labour Organization (ILO, 2015b) figures, the global reserve army consisted of some 2.3 billion people, compared to around 1.65 billion in the active labor army, many of whom are precariously unemployed. The number of officially unemployed at that time (corresponding roughly to Marx’s floating population) was 200 million workers. Some 1.5 billion workers were classified as “vulnerably employed” (related to Marx’s stagnant population), made up of workers working “on their own account” (informal workers and rural subsistence workers) and “contributing family workers” (domestic labor). Another 600 million individuals between the prime working ages of 25-54 were classified as economically inactive. This is a heterogeneous category but undoubtedly consists preponderantly of those of prime working age who are a part of the pauperized population.

Unions, indeed, are limited since their focus is mainly on the organized sections of the active army–although we should not forget that unions have, in various ways, fought, indirectly if not directly, for the interests of various layers of the unemployed at specific periods in their history in the form of a national pension system, part of a pension system based on the duration of residence in Canada (Old Age Security), rather than on length of employment and level of contribution, medicare and so forth.

Professor Tuft’s  reference to the need for an organization dedicated to addressing the needs of the unemployed in the face of a possible decrease in the power of organized unions makes some sense–but it made sense even before the pandemic since unions often tooted the mere organization of workers into a union (and the effective enforcement of a collective agreement) as sufficient for ensuring “decent work,” a “fair contract,” “fairness” and the like.

With the emergence of the pandemic and the likely decrease in the working effectiveness of unions to protect the immediate interests of their members, on the one hand, and the increase in the need for stop-gap measures as more workers remain unemployed for a longer period of time, a gap arises that can be filled by former union representatives who also may well lose their jobs. According to Professor Tufts:

Most important, union representatives know the workers that will require a range of labour market adjustment services such as: assessment of the mental and physical health impacts of COVID-19; help with navigating emergency assistance, the CERB, and EI bureaucracies; assistance with resume writing; ensuring licenses and certifications are maintained during unemployment; counsel for workers considering early retirement; and guidance for workers considering re-training options. If the pandemic reoccurs in waves, as some have predicted, workers will shift in and out of employment and require training in COVID-19 health and safety measures. Who is going to do this work?

The federal government has allocated $350-million to help keep afloat the not-for-profit agencies providing needed services. These funds should be expanded and target labour organizations to deliver labour market adjustment services to unemployed workers. Economically, it makes sense as union communications infrastructure and staff can be efficiently deployed to assist workers. The social benefit of providing successful labour market adjustment and support is self-evident as it reduces hardship and the period of unemployment.

This solution seems to be reasonable  in the face of the likely increased instability of both the active army of workers and the reserve army of labour in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic, on the one hand, and the likely decreased power of unions on the other. This situation will, of course, vary between sectors of the economy and over time; in other words, some groups of the active working class will be more subject to increased precariousness as will some groups of the reserve army when compared to their situation before the pandemic and when compared to other groups of workers in the active army or in the reserve army.

Professor Tuft’s solution is to call for Workers’ Resource Centres  to address the problem of the unemployed. Such centres would link active workers with unemployed workers and the community:

Politically and practically, resource centres make sense. ‘Actually existing’ unions have been in decline for decades. Serving all working people and entire communities rather than just employed members is fundamental to making unions relevant during the crisis. It also gives union staff work to do during a slow recovery that might preserve some institutional integrity that will be needed to fight inevitable workplace restructuring and austerity. As sectors recover, unions will be crucial in advocating for sufficient staffing levels and new COVID-19 related health and safety protocols.

This solution is certainly worthy of consideration–but of course it is hardly sufficient. The present-day workers’ action centres are entirely reformist and aim to address the immediate needs of workers without taking into consideration their long-term needs.

Professor Tuft then shifts to wishful thinking: such resource centres might serve as transitional organizations for a “green economy”:

A workers’ resource centre approach is admittedly full of contradictions and compromises. But we need realistic options for presently insufficient unions to survive in the short-term and meet workers material needs. Indeed, such efforts should be seen as part of building capacities for more transformative demands and actions. This may very well include expanding resource centre mandates in the future to administrate ‘just-transition’ supports for workers as economies adapt to green production. COVID-19 is a potentially transformative event for organized labour, but a sober analysis of what is possible to meet the needs of unemployed workers at this moment is required alongside aspirational calls.

He pays lip service to the “contradictions and compromises” that such workers’ resource centres would experience since funding for such centres would likely come from government coffers by way of funding community organizations and other non-governmental organizations:

It would not cost the government a great deal as these services will, in any case, need to be delivered by community organizations.

Professor Tuft implies that such organizations could somehow be self-organizations of the working class. What is more likely is that they will become at best reformist organizations like their trade union counterparts or, worse, even more restricted in their functions because of their dependence on the government for their continued functioning. Such a situation is hardly an expression of self-organization. Professor Tufts, like his social-reformist comrades, fails to address the limitations that workers’ resource centres would likely face that would prevent them from being institutions of self-organization. Professor Tufts, then, like his social-democratic or social reformist comrades, fails to address the limitations of such institutions.

Furthermore, the idea that such centres could be the stepping stone to “green production” is wishful thinking since a really green economy could only arise through the abolition of a society characterized by the class power of employers and the infinite increase of money–at the expense of human beings and this planet (see  The British Labour Party’s 2019 Manifesto: More Social Democracy and More Social Reformism, Part One).

Professor Tuft’s proposal for workers’ resource centres, from his point of view, then, undoubtedly express a “realistic option” for the self-organization of workers.

From my point of view, by contrast, his proposal will foster illusions of the self-organization of the working class while, in reality, perpetuating the exploitation and oppression of the working class by employers. His proposal is only realistic for social reformers and not for workers who reject the legitimacy of working for any employer.

It is necessary to link the interests of the unemployed and the employed by creating a common goal of controlling their life process through controlling the conditions of that life process–which is currently owned and controlled by the class of employers and protected by a government responsive to the need to reproduce itself in and through the protection of such forms of property and control. That common goal cannot arise without critiquing workers’ organizations that may have some independence from the class of employers locally or at the micro level but that operate at the macro level to confine the class struggle to limits set by the structural economic, political and social conditions characteristic of a society dominated by a class of employers.

The Rate of Exploitation of Magna International Inc., One of the Largest Private Employers in Toronto, Part Two, Or: Intensified Oppression and Exploitation

As I argued in the last post on this topic  (see  The Rate of Exploitation of Workers at Magna International Inc., One of the Largest Private Employers in Toronto, Part One), Christopher Arthur, in his The New Dialectic and Marx’s Capital, claims that there are two forms of exploitation (pages 55-56):

It is obvious here that this exploitation time to which I refer comprises the whole of the working day, not just the so-called ‘surplus labour time’. It is not the case in reality that the workers first supply themselves and then check into the factory to work the extra. On the contrary, the accounting of necessary and surplus labour time is the outcome of the struggle at the point of production over exploitation; and the unremitting pressure of capital’s representatives on the workforce is present the whole day from the first minute. Since capital ‘takes charge’ of production, the ‘pumping out’ of surplus labour cannot be distinguished on the ground from the pumping out of labour generally because during the whole working day its use value is exploited. So there is a conceptual distinction hidden here, between exploitation in this sense, and the sense in which exploitation is identified with only the extension of the working day beyond its necessary part.

I would be inclined to reverse Marx’s emphasis when he said: ‘Capital is not only command over labour, as Adam Smith thought. It is essentially command over unpaid labour.’48 Instead I would write: ‘Capital is not only command over unpaid labour, as Karl Marx thought. It is essentially command over labour, i.e. of the entire working day.’ (Of course Marx knew perfectly well that it is only because capital acquires ‘command over labour’ that this ‘coercive relation . . . compels the working class to do more work than would be required by the narrow circle of its own needs’.)

… My view allows for a ‘traditional’ measure of exploitation if we distinguish
two kinds of exploitation. Exploitation in production is in effect not dissimilar
to alienation in that it involves the subjection of workers to alien purposes;
it goes on throughout the day. Exploitation in distribution arises from
the discrepancy between the new wealth created and the return to those
exploited in production.

Arthur has a point: too often those who refers to Marx’s theory of exploitation emphasize surplus production and surplus value while neglecting to note how workers experience the situation: they do not produce their wage first independently of the employer or her/his representatives (forewomen/men, supervisors and managers) and then produce a surplus. The time that they spend producing their wage or salary is subject to the power and will of the employer–and not just the surplus labour and surplus time that the workers provide for free. This fact is too often neglected.

Nonetheless, there is a good reason for distinguishing the time that workers require to produce  their own wage or salary an the surplus time that they devote free of charge to employers: this has to do with the accumulation of capital.

I referred to this situation in an earlier post when criticizing the views of the social democrat David Bush (see Basic Income: A Critique of the Social-Reformist Left’s Assumptions and Analysis: Part Two).

Essentially, the question needs to be asked: Where does the investment funds come from that Magna International (or any other capitalist employer) uses to purchase c (constant capital, or the machines, raw material, desks, buildings, etc.) and v (the variable capital, or the labour power or capacity that workers sell to the employer)? From the surplus produced by workers in former years and, eventually, an “original investment” that does not come from the exploitation of workers by capitalist employers. (How this “original investment” arose is an historical question which Marx addressed in part 8 of Capital, volume 1: “The Secret of Primitive Accumulation.).

I quoted from Marx in the earlier post:

From Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, volume 1, pages 727-728:

Let us now return to our example. It is the old story: Abraham begat Isaac, Isaac begat Jacob and so on. The original capital of £10,000 brings in a surplus-value of £2,000, which is capitalized. The new capital of £2,000 brings in a surplus-value of £400, and this too is capitalized, transformed into a second additional capital, which in its turn produces a further surplus-value of £80. And the process continues in this way.

We leave out of account here the portion of the surplus-value consumed by the capitalist. We are also not interested, for the moment, in whether the additional capital is joined on to the original capital, or separated from it so that it can valorize itself independently. Nor are we concerned whether the same capitalist employs it who originally accumulated it, or whether he hands it over to others. All we must remember is this: by the side of the newly formed capital, the original capital continues to reproduce itself and to produce surplus-value, and this is true of all accumulated capital in relation to the additional capital engendered by it. The original capital was formed by the advance of £10,000. Where did its owner get it from? ‘From his own labour and that of his forefathers’, is the unanimous answer of the spokesmen of political economy.4 And, in fact, their assumption appears to be the only one consonant with the laws of commodity production. But it is quite otherwise with regard to the additional capital of £2,000. We know perfectly well how that originated. There is not one single atom of its value that does not owe its existence to unpaid labour. The means of production with which the additional labour-power is incorporated, as well as the necessaries with which the workers are sustained, are nothing but component parts of the surplus product, parts of the tribute annually exacted from the working class by the capitalist class. Even if the latter uses a portion of that tribute to purchase the additional labour-power at its full price, so that equivalent is exchanged for equivalent, the whole thing still remains the age-old activity of the conqueror, who buys commodities from the conquered with the money he has stolen from them.

If the additional capital employs the person who produced it, this producer must not only continue to valorize the value of the original capital, but must buy back the fruits of his previous labour with more labour than they cost. If we view this as a transaction between the capitalist class and the working class, it makes no difference that additional workers are employed by means of the unpaid labour of the previously employed workers. The capitalist may even convert the additional capital into a machine that throws the producers of that capital out of work, and replaces them with a few children. In every case, the working class creates by the surplus labour of one year the capital destined to employ additional labour in the following year.5 And this is what is called creating capital out of capital.

The accumulation of the first additional capital of £2,000 presupposes that a value of £10,000 exists, advanced by the capitalist, and belonging to him by virtue of his ‘original labour’. The second additional capital of £400 presupposes, on the contrary,
only the prior accumulation of the £2,000, of which the £400 is the capitalized surplus-value. The ownership of past unpaid labour is thenceforth the sole condition for the appropriation ofliving unpaid labour on a constantly increasing scale. The more the capitalist has accumulated, the more is he able to accumulate. The surplus-value that makes up additional capital no. 1 is the result of the purchase of labour-power with part of the original capital, a purchase which conformed to the laws of commodity exchange and which, from a legal standpoint, presupposes nothing
beyond the worker’s power to dispose freely of his own capacities, and the money-owner’s or commodity-owner’s power to dispose freely of the values that belong to him; equally, additional capital no. 2 is merely the result of additional capital no. 1, and is therefore a consequence of the relations described above; hence each individual transaction continues to conform to the laws of commodity exchange, with the capitalist always buying labour power and the worker always selling it at what we shall assume is its real value. It is quite evident from this that the laws of appropriation or of private property, laws based on the production and circulation of commodities, become changed into their direct opposite through their own internal and inexorable dialectic. The exchange of equivalents, the original operation with which we started, is now turned round in such a way that there is only an apparent exchange, since, firstly, the capital which is exchanged for
labour-power is itself merely a portion of the product of the labour of others which has been appropriated without an equivalent; and, secondly, this capital must not only be replaced by its producer, the worker, but replaced together with an added surplus. The relation of exchange between capitalist and worker becomes a mere semblance belonging only to the process of circulation, it becomes a mere form, which is alien to the content of the transaction itself, and merely mystifies it. The constant sale and purchase of labour power is the form; the content is the constant appropriation by the capitalist, without equivalent, of a portion of the labour of others which has already been objectified, and his repeated exchange of this labour for a greater quantity of the living labour of others.

The immediate exchange between workers and employers is an exchange of equivalents, so that workers receive the value of their cost of production. However, when considering the larger context of previous production, then the immediate exchange between employer and workers is a semblance or appearance. The employer uses a part of the surplus produced by the workers in a previous round as means of production (machines, raw material, buildings, etc.) and another part (socially as money and physically as means of consumption, such as food, clothing, shelter) to further employ them (in addition to the initial investment).

As “costs,” the workers’ previous products are used against them to further exploit them.

Of course, the workers’ previous products are not only used to further exploit them but to further control their lives even when they are producing the equivalent value of their own wage. In other words, when we consider the accumulation process, the power of capital–produced by workers–has increased and is used to intensify the weight of the control of their past labour over their present lives.

That is why we need to distinguish the concept of exploitation as the production of surplus value from the concept of oppression, which is what occurs during the control of workers during the time they reproduce their own wage–that is to say, during the time in which workers produce an equivalent in value for their own wage.

Although Arthur recognizes that, when considering accumulation of capital in time, the wage that is paid in the present year is influenced by the previous rounds of the accumulation of surplus value, he does not consider the importance of this situation for the changing level of power that private employers (capitalists) have over workers. It is not just a question of the workers lacking power of controlling their work during the time that they reproduce the value of their wage; it is also the degree to which employers have the past power produced by workers at their disposal in the present (via the production of previous rounds of surplus value and their investment).

To call both parts of the oppression experienced in capitalist society “exploitation” would confuse the issue of the increasing power of capitalists or private employers over worker by means of the increasing power of past investment over the present lives of workers.

In the case of Magna International, the rate of exploitation, as noted in the previous post on this topic, is 79%. That means that in an 8-hour work day, Magna workers produce their wage in 4.5 hours, and they work for free for 3.5 hours. However, in addition to working for free for 3.5 hours for Magna International, and being subject to the control of the supervisors and managers, they are also subject to such control during the 4.5 hours that they produce their own wage.

The social-democratic left have little to say about either the exploitation of such workers or about the control of workers not only during this time but also during the time when they produce their wage. If Magna workers belong to an independent union (one that can engage in collective bargaining independently of the particular employer), then for the social-democratic left, such workers have decent work and have “fair contracts,” “fair collective agreements,” “fair wages,” and other such expressions.

My position has always been that both the exploitation of workers and the time when workers produce the value of their own wage, since they are both subject to the power of employers, involve treating human beings as things to be used for inhuman purposes (see  The Money Circuit of Capital) need to criticized and abolished. Given the social-democratic rhetoric of fairness and decent work, is there really any wonder that I was insulted by them in Toronto?

What do you think of workers at Magna International being exploited? What do you think of the time during which they produce the value of their wage? What do you think about whether the power of employers to exploit such workers and to control their lives during that time and during the time they produce their wage? Is either justified? What of the increasing power of the accumulated capital–and therefore the collective power of employers–over the present life of workers?

 

The Rate of Exploitation of Workers at Magna International Inc., One of the Largest Private Employers in Toronto, Part One

In another post, I presented the twenty largest employers in Toronto according to level of employment (see A Short List of the Largest Employers in Toronto, Ontario, Canada). One of those employers is Magna International Inc., a multinational corporation whose workers produce automobile supplies for inputs into car manufacturing.

This is a first attempt at calculating the rate of exploitation of one of the largest private employers in Toronto, Magna . It is undoubtedly imperfect in many ways, and I invite the reader to correct its gaps. Nonetheless, the lack of any attempt to determine the rate of exploitation at the city level by has undoubtedly reinforced social-reformist tendencies.

I am going to begin with a conclusion, and then explain what it means and how it is calculated so that the reader understands where I am headed in the calculations:

That means that for every hour worked that produces her/his wage, a worker at Magna International works around an additional 47 minutes for free for Magna International. In an 8-hour work day, the worker produces her/his wage in about 4.5 hours, and the remaining 3.5 hours works for free for Magna. In a 10-hour work day (both work days seem possible at Magna International—see https://www.indeed.com/cmp/Magna-International-Inc/faq/how-are-the-working-hours-at-magna-international-inc?quid=1at7gf6rrak7i9ff)–the worker produces her/his wage in about 5.6 hours and the remaining 4.4 hours works for free for Magna International.

But: What is the rate of exploitation? And why not use the usual rate of profit or the rate of return? The rate of profit is calculated as profit divided by investment. Since employers purchase both the means for work–buildings, computers, office supplies, raw material–and workers–we can classify investment into two categories: c, meaning constant capital, or the capital invested in commodities other than workers; and v, or variable capital, the capital invested in the hiring of workers for a certain period of time (wages and salaries).

The purpose of investment in a capitalist economy is to obtain more money (see The Money Circuit of Capital), and the additional money is surplus value when it is related to its source: workers working for more time than what they cost to produce themselves. The relation between surplus value and variable capital (or wages and salaries) is the rate of surplus value or the rate of exploitation, expressed as a ratio: s/v.

When the surplus is related to both c and v and expressed as a ratio, it is the rate of profit: s/(c+v).

In Marxian economics, you cannot simply use the economic classifications provided by employers and governments since such classifications often hide the nature of the social world in which we live. The rate of profit underestimates the rate of exploitation since the surplus value is related to total investment and not just to the workers. Furthermore, it makes the surplus value appear to derive from both constant capital and variable capital.

I decided to look at the annual report of some of the largest private companies in Toronto if they are available in order to calculate the rate of exploitation at a more local level. I begin with one company and invite others to provide criticisms or suggestions for improvement.

I have used some of the ideas from Thomas Ittelson (2019), A Visual Guide to Financial Statements: Overview for Non-Financial Managers and Investors, and Antonios Patidis (2016), “A Micro-Approach for Testing Marx’s LTRPF:Evidence from Greece, 2000 and 2009,” Review of Political Economy. Patidis “utilises data taken directly from company reports and accounts” in order to determine whether the rate of profit falls in the major corporations in Greece. My purpose, however, is not, initially at least, in determining whether the rate of profit has fallen but rather what the rate of exploitation is in diverse companies in Toronto.

I also asked Michael Roberts how to calculate the rate of exploitation; he graciously sent me a couple of articles (one of which I read). After that, I sent him the above, and he commented that it looked good.

Again, the following undoubtedly contains many limitations, but I will leave that for further discussion, should the issue arise.

The income statement is broken into the following categories for 2019 (in millions of US dollars): (pages 5, 36):

Sales $39,431
Costs and Expenses $37,208

Cost of goods sold $34,022

Material $24,585

Direct labour $2,815

Overhead $6,622

Depreciation and amortization $1,345

Selling, general and administrative $1,697

Interest expense, net $82

Other expense, net $240

Equity income ($178) [If you add up all the numbers–34,022; 1,345; … 82, then you get 37,286; if you subtract 178 from that, you get 37,208–the same amount as “Costs and expenses.” That is why the 178 is in parentheses–it is necessary to subtract it from expenses since it is really income. 

Income from operations before taxes: $2,223 (profit or surplus value) 

A couple of adjustments are probably necessary. On page 37, there is a reference to pension benefits. I assume that this category belongs to “direct labour” since it forms part of the deferred wages of workers that is paid in the current year (but then again, it is unclear whether the category of direct labour includes this, but since it is subtracted from net income, this leads me to believe that it is not included in that category). This should be added to direct labour. Hence, direct labour would be: 2,815+47=2,862, “Costs and expenses” would be $37, 255 “Costs of goods sold”would be $34,069, and “Income from operations before taxes” should be adjusted downward accordingly.

A second adjustment should probably be the treatment of the payment of interest; despite being an expense from the point of view of the individual capitalist, it probably forms part of the surplus value. Hence, it should be added to “Income from operations before taxes.” Adjusting “Income from operations before taxes,” we have 2,223-47+82=2,258.

So, with the adjustments in place: s=2,258; v=2,862. The rate of exploitation or the rate of surplus value=s/v=2,258/2,862=79%.

That means that for every hour worked that produces her/his wage, a worker at Magna International works around an additional 47 minutes for free for Magna International. In an 8-hour work day, the worker produces her/his wage in about 4.5 hours, and the remaining 3.5 hours works for free for Magna. In a 10-hour work day (both work days seem possible at Magna International—see https://www.indeed.com/cmp/Magna-International-Inc/faq/how-are-the-working-hours-at-magna-international-inc?quid=1at7gf6rrak7i9ff)–the worker produces her/his wage in about 5.6 hours and the remaining 4.4 hours works for free for Magna International.

This is not, however, the end of the story. Christopher Arthur, in his book The New Dialectic and Marx’s Capital,  argues that there are two kinds of exploitation, one that occurs during the production of the wage by the workers (since they are subject to control by employers during that time), and the other kind of exploitation outlined above, where workers work for free for the employer. This issue, however, will be addressed in a follow-up post.

Basic Income: A Critique of the Social-Reformist Left’s Assumptions and Analysis: Part Two

This is a continuation of my last post. In this post, I will address Mr. Bush’s confused analysis of relations at work and in exchange in a situation dominated by a class of employers, which he confusedly analyzes in his April 26, 2017 article published on the Socialist Project website (Basic Income and the Left: The Political and Economic Problems).

As I noted in my previous post, I will show that Mr. Bush, on the one hand, uses Karl Marx’s theory of surplus value for conservative purposes and, on the other, that he fails to connect Marx’s theory of “costs” to Marx’s theory of surplus value–a connection that has radical implications. Such implications, at the practical level, permit us “to focus on strategies that can help us build the power we need to achieve economic justice and dignity for all”–that really go beyond the class power of employers rather than the pseudo-radicalism offered by Mr. Bush’s “messy business of material reality.”

In the section of that article, entitled “The BI and the Logic of Capitalism,” Mr. Bush has the following to say:

Capitalism operates on the extraction of surplus labour from workers. Workers sell their potential to work on the labour market and employers put them to work, paying them a wage that is less than the value they produce with their labour. This surplus labour is ultimately the source of profits. Capitalism needs workers. Much of the history of capitalism centres around the creation of a working class that is more or less reliant on selling its labour power for a wage in order to live.

If workers in large enough numbers are able to sit outside of the labour market and sustain their basic needs, capitalism would cease to function. BI naively assumes that capitalists and the state would not respond politically and economically to the changing market condition of labour. The logic of capitalism would push capitalists to, at the very least, raise wages and increase prices on goods and services. The ultimate goal would be to compel workers back into the labour market, and make them dependent on selling their labour power in order to live.

It is fascinating to see how a social reformist tries to turn  a radical social theory into a conservative one that agrees with his own reformist conclusions. Let us look more closely at this “analysis.”

Firstly, Mr. Bush simply draws a false conclusion: “BI naively assumes that capitalists and the state would not respond politically and economically to the changing market condition of labour.” Some versions of BI may naively assume that, but certainly not a radical version of basic income (see a previous post  A Radical Basic Income as a Radical Reform). Mr. Bush simply wants to exclude all consideration of radical basic income policies that go beyond the present system of capitalist system consciously. He likely does so because he wants to draw reformist conclusions from Marx’s radical social theory.

Secondly, let us now turn to how capitalism operates. Mr. Bush claims that the essence of capitalism is the extraction of surplus labour from workers that is greater than the wage that the workers receive. For example, if workers at a brewery work for seven hours a day, and they receive a wage of $35 an hour, then if for every hour they produce a value of $70 an hour, they are exploited 100 percent. If they produce a value of $105 an hour they are exploited 150 percent, and so on. The point is that if there is to be a profit, the workers must produce more than the cost of their own wage, or the $35 an hour.

The problem with this view is that it is only a partial truth, or a one-sided view of what Mr. Bush calls “the messy business of material reality.” Mr. Bush evidently prides himself in being practical, and yet he fails to link up his reference to costs (referred to in my previous post) and the theory of surplus value.

Workers are costs to employers, and the worker receives the cost of what is required to produce “their potential to work” as Mr. Bush says. They receive, apparently, their full value, in exchange, for their wage. They certainly do so when considered only in the immediate exchange between the employer and the workers. Mr. Bush, however, excludes from consideration the question of time and prior conditions.

I will provide a long quote from Karl Marx since Mr. Bush, without referencing him, provides Mr. Bush with the theory of surplus value–but Mr. Bush omits any consideration of Marx’s theory of costs  as it relates to wages–conveniently for Mr. Bush. From Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, volume 1, pages 727-730:

Let us now return to our example. It is the old story: Abraham begat Isaac, Isaac begat Jacob and so on. The original capital of £10,000 brings in a surplus-value of £2,000, which is capitalized. The new capital of £2,000 brings in a surplus-value of £400, and this too is capitalized, transformed into a second additional capital, which in its turn produces a further surplus-value of £80. And the process continues in this way.

We leave out of account here the portion of the surplus-value consumed by the capitalist. We are also not interested, for the moment, in whether the additional capital is joined on to the original capital, or separated from it so that it can valorize itself independently. Nor are we concerned whether the same capitalist employs it who originally accumulated it, or whether he hands it over to others. All we must remember is this: by the side of the newly formed capital, the original capital continues to reproduce
itself and to produce surplus-value, and this is true of all accumulated capital in relation to the additional capital engendered by it.

The original capital was formed by the advance of £10,000. Where did its owner get it from? ‘From his own labour and that of his forefathers’, is the unanimous answer of the spokesmen of political economy.4 And, in fact, their assumption appears to be the only one consonant with the laws of commodity production.

But it is quite otherwise with regard to the additional capital of £2,000. We know perfectly well how that originated. There is not one single atom of its value that does not owe its existence to unpaid labour. The means of production with which the additional labour-power is incorporated, as well as the necessaries with which the workers are sustained, are nothing but component parts of the surplus product, parts of the tribute annually exacted from the working class by the capitalist class. Even if the latter uses a portion of that tribute to purchase the additional labour-power at its full price, so that equivalent is exchanged for equivalent, the whole thing still remains the age-old activity of the conqueror, who buys commodities from the conquered with the money he has stolen from them.

If the additional capital employs the person who produced it, this producer must not only continue to valorize the value of the original capital, but must buy back the fruits of his previous labour with more labour than they cost. If we view this as a transaction between the capitalist class and the working class, it makes no difference that additional workers are employed by means of the unpaid labour of the previously employed workers. The capitalist may even convert the additional capital into a machine that throws the producers of that capital out of work, and replaces them with a few children. In every case, the working class creates by the surplus labour of one year the capital destined to employ additional labour in the following year.5 And this is what is called creating capital out of capital.

The accumulation of the first additional capital of £2,000 presupposes that a value of £10,000 exists, advanced by the capitalist, and belonging to him by virtue of his ‘original labour’. The second additional capital of £400 presupposes, on the contrary, only the prior accumulation of the £2,000, of which the £400 is the capitalized surplus-value. The ownership of past unpaid labour is thenceforth the sole condition for the appropriation of living unpaid labour on a constantly increasing scale. The more the capitalist has accumulated, the more is he able to accumulate.

The surplus-value that makes up additional capital no. 1 is the result of the purchase of labour-power with part of the original capital, a purchase which conformed to the laws of commodity exchange and which, from a legal standpoint, presupposes nothing beyond the worker’s power to dispose freely of his own capacities, and the money-owner’s or commodity-owner’s power to dispose freely of the values that belong to him; equally, additional capital no. 2 is merely the result of additional capital no. 1, and is therefore a consequence of the relations described above; hence each individual transaction continues to conform to the laws of commodity exchange, with the capitalist always buying labour power and the worker always selling it at what we shall assume is its real value. It is quite evident from this that the laws of appropriation or of private property, laws based on the production and circulation of commodities, become changed into their direct opposite through their own internal and inexorable dialectic. The exchange of equivalents, the original operation with which we started, is now turned round in such a way that there is only an apparent exchange, since, firstly, the capital which is exchanged for labour-power is itself merely a portion of the product of the labour of others which has been appropriated without an equivalent; and, secondly, this capital must not only be replaced by its producer, the worker, but replaced together with an added surplus. The relation of exchange between capitalist and worker becomes a mere semblance belonging only to the process of circulation, it becomes a mere form, which is alien to the content of the transaction itself, and merely mystifies it. The constant sale and purchase of labour power is the form; the content is the constant appropriation by the capitalist, without equivalent, of a portion of the labour of others which has already been objectified, and his repeated exchange of this labour for a greater quantity of the living labour of others.

The immediate exchange between workers and employers is an exchange of equivalents, so that workers receive the value of their cost of production. However, when considering the larger context of previous production, then the immediate exchange between employer and workers is a semblance. The employer uses a part of the surplus produced by the workers in a previous round as means of production (machines, raw material, buildings, etc.) and another part (socially as money and physically as means of consumption, such as food, clothing, shelter) to further employ them (in addition to the initial investment).

As “costs,” the workers’ previous products are used against them to further exploit them. Mr. Bush entirely ignores this fact. He ignores the wider context. He ignores “the messy business of material reality.” Why is that? Mr. Bush is really quite arrogant. He pretends to be a very practical person, but he is in reality a very impractical person since he disregards the wider context when engaging in practice. Is this not folly?

Furthermore, even when considering the present costs, what is a cost for the employer and what is a cost for the workers do not coincide–that is one of the implications of the concept of surplus value. As George McCarthy (2018) writes in his book Marx and Social Justice Ethics and Natural Law in the Critique of Political Economy, note 50, page 354:

Not understanding the relationship between constant and variable capital in the production process, the bourgeois economists are unable to understand either the rate of surplus value or the rate of profit. Variable capital thus should include both wages and surplus value. However, when viewed only from the perspective of costs, the concept of surplus value disappears

Referring to surplus labour, on the one hand, and then idealizing “costs” as if it were a neutral concept on the other illustrates the confusion of Mr. Bush. Costs for employers and costs for workers by no means coincide.

In a previous post (Intelligent Activity According to John Dewey: Its Political Implications for the Left), I wrote the following:

The lack of such discussion among most workers shows the extent to which those who call for “practice” and believe that they are eminently practical are eminently impractical; they neglect one of the fundamental conditions for practical intelligence: taking into account the social context when acting. To neglect the social context when acting is to act unintelligently.

What exactly is the aim of those who engage in “practice” among the left? Is there any real discussion about the aims? Or is there simply a rush to engage in one “practice” after another without really engaging in any attempt to unify in a consistent fashion the various actions? If so, is that acting intelligently? Or is it acting unintelligently?

Mr. Bush proposes, practically, that the working class engage in unintelligent activity. More colloquially expressed, he proposes (even if he is unaware of this) that the working class act stupidly.

This is hardly in the interests of the working class.

I strongly suggest that Mr. Bush alter radically his theory and practice.

Unfortunately, there is already evidence that he will not do so. On Facebook, he and I engaged in in a short debate over the issue of whether the fight for $15 and an hour (and various employment reforms) should be paired with the concept of fairness (as indeed it was in Ontario). Mr. Bush explicitly stated that it was fair. I argued that such reforms indeed should be defended–while criticizing any concept of fairness.

My prediction for Mr. Bush’s future is that he will end up with a similar attitude to Mr. Urkevitch (see an earlier post,   Comments from John Urkevich, AESES-UM Business Agent, to my Critique of the Grievance and Arbitration Procedure: Letter to the Editor, Inside The Association of Employees Supporting Educational Services (AESES), Vol. 17, No. 4, May 1994). He will become a staunch defender of practice within the status quo of the employer-employee relation–like Mr. Urkevitch and many other union representatives.

It should be remembered that Mr. Bush is seen by many in Toronto, the largest city in Canada, as a practical leftist, a socialist and a good trade-unionist. That his views have not received any critical scrutiny illustrates the dominance of social-reformist leftism in Canada and the need for the creation of a more critical  but also practical leftism in Canada in general and Toronto in particular.

Basic Income: A Critique of the Social-Reformist Left’s Assumptions and Analysis: Part One

Introduction

I am dividing the post into two parts, with the first part devoted to more concrete concerns, and the second part to more theoretical concerns.

David Bush, in an April 26, 2017 article published on the Socialist Project website (Basic Income and the Left: The Political and Economic Problems), argues that the proposal for a basic income is unrealistic in terms of capitalist relations. Like the later pamphlet by the Ontario Coalition Against Poverty (OCAP) (Basic Income in the Neoliberal Age) (Toronto: 2017), he does not consider the basic income proposal strategically worthwhile since it cannot be realized within capitalist relations.

As I argued in an earlier post (Basic Income: A Critique of the Ontario Coalition Against Poverty’s Stance), proposing a basic income that contradicts what even OCAP recognizes is economic coercion is a strategy that calls into question the power of employers as a class and hence economic coercion. David Bush, though, considers that the debate among the left does not take “material reality” into account. He says the following:

Instead of a concrete debate about the economic and political aspects of BI, it is discussed as an ideal separated from the messy business of material reality.

Mr. Bush is going to give the idealist left a lesson in the “messy business of material reality.” What is material reality for Mr. Bush?

Mr. Bush obviously believes that he is a realist–he can deal with “the messy business of material reality”–whereas the radical left are idealists. He says the following:

The strategy of those advocating BI centres on crafting policies in a vacuum and hoping governments enact them.

This romantic idealism has stymied serious analysis of the policy from the Left. Taking a step back and looking at the economic and political logic of BI, I hope to show that however well-meaning the policy is, it is economically flawed and a politically dangerous demand for the Left to adopt.

Mr. Bush is a grass roots organizer and practitioner, and because of this he believes that he has a better grasp of the “messy business of material reality”–whereas the radical left, romantic idealists that they are, are unrealistic.

Let us now look at the beginning of this “serious analysis of the policy from the Left.” But just a point: Some who advocate a basic income have no illusion that governments in their present structure will institute a policy that will eliminate economic coercion; such governments, rather, thrive on economic coercion and will not institute a policy that will undercut their own existence.

Costing Basic Income–An Employer Approach

The title of Mr. Bush’s next section is “Costing BI.”

Mr. Bush then refers to three models of basic income. He then makes the following astounding assertion:

The first question we should ask is, what are the basic costs of these models? Looking at Ontario, Michal Rozworski has pointed out the cost of the universal model, even when set at a low rate, is exorbitant.

This is a good example of Mr. Bush’s way of dealing with the “messy business of material reality.” We are not to question the fact of costs; we are to assume that costs are somehow sacred and propose policies only on the basis of costs within the structure of the power of the employers as a class. Mr. Bush’s “first question” assumes that we are to measure a policy on the basis of money–this is his way of dealing with the “messy business of material reality.”

In other words, Mr. Bush does not inquire into why things in our society have a price and in fact why human beings have a price–they simply do. We are then supposed to be “realistic” by accepting this “fact” (and it is a fact) rather than investigating the conditions and implications of this fact for human life and welfare. See The Money Circuit of Capital for the social implications of measuring human beings and our life process in term of money (costs). I will further criticize this approach in the next section.

This jump into costs is related to the inadequacy of Mr. Bush’s next section (entitled The BI and the Logic of Capitalism). The inadequacy of this section will be addressed in the subsequent post (part two).

However, in relation to  OCAP’s pamphlet on basic income, Mr. Bush’s analysis is inferior: at least OCAP managed to express part of the truth of the fact of measuring human life and human welfare in terms of “costs.” In the OCAP pamphlet, it is written:  “Capitalism needs economic coercion for its job market to function” (page 6). If economic coercion is characteristic of the job market, then the left should adopt a policy that short-circuits this economic coercion–such as a radical basic income policy (see an earlier post,  A Radical Basic Income as a Radical Reform).

By treating human beings as “costs” (purchasable with money), Mr. Bush assumes that economic coercion is inevitable without connecting the dots. By nonchalantly accepting costs as a fact of life and a so-called necessary part of the world–part of the “messy business of material reality” (actually part of the messy business of capitalist reality), Mr. Bush becomes an ideologue of employers without realizing it.

Mr. Bush continues this illogic of treating human beings as costs; the reader will be spared any further reference to this “messy business of material reality.”

In the subsequent post, I will pursue Mr. Bush’s illogic by looking at his next section, entitled “The BI [Basic Income] and the Logic of Capitalism.” It will be shown that Mr. Bush fails to connect up treating people as costs with what he thinks is Karl Marx’s theory of surplus value.

However, I will not wait until the next post to expose Mr. Bush’s real intent.

He gives his own position away when he states the following:

Rather than raising the rates for social assistance, increasing the minimum wage or spending more on social services the government is touting its BI experiment.

These reforms are what Mr, Bush is really after. The basic income experiment as proposed by the Liberal government and even right-wing parties and governments would interfere with these reforms. The real alternative is “raising the rates for social assistance, increasing the minimum wage or spending more on social services.” These reforms are all–within the context of economic coercion and economic blackmail, are they not? There is nothing wrong with fighting for reforms–workers need to improve their lives, but why not improve their lives but not having any illusions about the fairness of such reforms? Why not propose some reforms that do definitely exceed the power of employers and the government to meet them? Mr. Bush is really a social democrat who wants social reform while assuming the eternal nature of the power of employers as a class.

Mr. Bush further gives himself away as a social reformist who accepts the inevitability of the power of employers as a class when he says:

The very same forces that make it difficult to win improvements in current social programs….

That is what Mr. Bush really calls dealing with the “messy business of material reality.” The only viable strategy is–improvements in social programs. Forget about eliminating the economic blackmail characteristic of the power of employers as a class. Forget about trying to develop policies and strategies that address the root of “material reality” characterized by economic coercion and economic blackmail. We need to fight–for social reforms only; everything else is idealistic nonsense. Such is the way in which Mr. Bush deals with the “messy business of material reality.”

Mr. Bush, like other social-democratic reformists, then refers to dignity for all without explaining how this is to be achieved within the context of the class power of employers:

Burying the idea of BI as a viable strategy to respond to inequalities and injustices of capitalism allows us to focus on strategies that can help us build the power we need to achieve economic justice and dignity for all.

Mr. Bush, like other social-reformist leftists, has no intention of really questioning the power of employers as a class. Social reform, and more social reform, and more social reform–that is all they have to offer.

Perhaps Mr. Bush can explain how “economic justice and dignity for all” is possible in conditions characterized by “economic coercion?” By the money circuit of capital? By treating human beings systematically and necessarily as means rather than ends?

I prefer the analysis of Tony Smith, in his book Beyond Liberal Egalitarianism: Marx and Normative Social Theory in the Twenty-First Century (Leiden: Brill, 2017, pages 342-343) to Mr. Bush’s reformist rhetoric:

The abolition of labour markets, that is, the abolition of wage labour as
a social form, would contribute greatly to overcoming the ‘bifurcation of the
political’. It is also required if we are to ever attain a world in which the [sic] ‘all persons are equal, so far as the importance of their basic interests are concerned’.3
To accomplish this, the production and distribution of goods and services could
be undertaken by worker co-operatives, with managers democratically elected
by, and accountable to, those over whom they exercise authority.

Smith refers specifically to a demand for a basic income that goes beyond anything that the class power of employers could satisfy (page 346):

It is not the mere presence of markets that establishes the alien power of
capital. What makes capitalist market societies so different from pre-capitalist
societies with markets is the society-wide compulsion to place the accumulation
of surplus value above all other ends. The democratising of decisions regarding
the levels and priorities of new investments, combined with full employment
and basic income guarantees that are not feasible in capitalism, removes the
compulsion.

Note that Smith does not limit the proposal to only a basic income that is not “feasible in capitalism.” Mr. Bush, by contrast, will always propose policies that are feasible within capitalism. This is his way of dealing with the “messy business of material reality.”

Rather than concluding on a purely negative note, however, it should be recognized that Mr. Bush at least should be commended in putting into writing and publicly his beliefs. How else can errors and hence corrections arise? Many of the social-democratic left here in Toronto (and I suspect elsewhere) hide behind their “practice” and are unwilling to come out publicly to expose their beliefs to criticism. Mr. Bush should be commended for having the courage for publicly declaring his beliefs.

Given the inadequate nature of Mr. Bush’s views, he should modify his beliefs and thereby change his practice. If he (and other social reformers) should, however, persist in their dogmas, both theoretically and practically, then of course they should be thoroughly criticized.

In my next post, I will show that Mr. Bush, on the one hand, uses Karl Marx’s theory of surplus value for conservative purposes and, on the other, that he fails to connect Marx’s theory of “costs” to Marx’s theory of surplus value–a connection that has radical implications. Such implications, at the practical level, permit us “to focus on strategies that can help us build the power we need to achieve economic justice and dignity for all”–that really go beyond the class power of employers rather than the pseudo-radicalism offered by Mr. Bush’s “messy business of material reality.”