The Real World of the Rule of Law: Courts as Oppressive Organizations, Part Two: The Case, Not the Truth, is Relevant in Court Proceedings

Introduction

This is a continuation of a previous post (The Real World of the Rule of Law: Courts as Oppressive Organizations, Part One). I explored how judges influence what juries define as “reasonable doubt.” As I indicated in the previous post:

The following series of posts are meant to complement the series of posts on the issue of reforming versus abolishing the police (see for example Reform or Abolition of the Police, Part One or Reform Versus Abolition of the Police, Part 8: The Police and the Political Economy of Capitalism).

The following is mainly a series of quotes from the book by Doreen McBarnet (1983) Conviction: Law, the State and the Construction of Justice as well as short commentaries related to the quotes. I use her book as a way of exposing the real nature of the rule of law and the role of courts in both hiding the real nature and enforcing the real nature of the rule of law.

A note on the limitations of the following: Ms. McBarnet draws on English and Scottish law; the situation here in Canada may be somewhat different. If anyone knows of sources relevant for determining the real operationalization of the rule of law in Canada, please provide them in the comments section.

The social-democratic left here in Toronto have little to say about the role of courts in general in oppressing members of the working class, citizens, immigrants and migrants. There are of course particular criticisms of court decisions, but there is no critique of the systemic oppression of the courts.

The Ideology of Telling the Truth Versus Legal Proof and the Construction of a Case

The common-sense view of courts is that a person is presumed innocent until proven guilty. In the previous post, it was shown that the judge influences what is sufficient evidence to convict.

Another piece of ideology or rhetoric is that witnesses, when they testify, are to provide only the truth and nothing more nor less. From page 12:

Witnesses are simply enjoined to ‘tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth’, a fine
piece of rhetoric, devastatingly naïve and blase, but also extremely powerful. … Indeed when one adds the fact that most trials take place months if not years after the incident in question, and that the court in an adversary system is presented with two conflicting versions of that incident, it becomes incredible that any jury or magistrate can ever feel that what happened has been proved beyond question. Yet in the vast majority of trials it seems they are. The philosophical problem of how one reproduces ‘reality’ thus becomes a sociological one: how is it that in such a situation of ambiguity, conflict, subjectivity, fading or moulded memories, the judges of the facts can so readily find themselves convinced beyond reasonable doubt?

Truth is hardly an issue in courts–despite rhetoric to the contrary. What actually happens (the truth or the incident) and what is presented in court usually diverge substantially.

It is from a legal point of view and not from the point of view of common sense that is important in trials: From pages 16-17:

Adversary advocacy helps solve the philosophical problem of reproducing reality quite simply by not even attempting it. Instead the search for truth is replaced by a contest between caricatures. Advocacy is not by definition about ‘truth’ or ‘reality’ or a quest for them, but about arguing a case. The concept of a case is such a fundamental part of Western legal thought that we may take it for granted, but it is a method of proof with a history of only two or three centuries, and one which provides a neat example of the abstraction which theorists oflaw under capitalism, like Pashukanis (1978), see as an essential element of the legal form. Just as the concept of the legal subject abstracts him from his real social being, so the case abstracts from the complexity of experience, and in doing so it helps solve both the practical and the ideological problems of proof.

The “case” as opposed to the truth is the central aspect of civil and criminal trials. From page 17:

An incident and a case made out about the incident are not the same thing. Conceptions of reality are multifaceted and unbounded; cases are ‘the facts’ as abstracted from this broad amorphous raw material. The good advocate grasps at complex confused reality and constructs a simple clear-cut account of it. A case is thus very much an edited version. But it is not just edited into a minimal account-a microcosm of the incident-it is an account edited with vested interests in mind. Hence the lawyer’s approach ‘that, so far as possible, only that should be revealed which supports his case’ (Napley, 1975, p. 29). Far from being ‘the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth’ a case is a biased construct, manipulating and editing the raw material of the witnesses’ perceptions of an incident into not so much an exhaustively accurate version of what happened as one which is advantageous to one side. In relation to an incident, then, a case is partial in both senses-partisan and incomplete. The good advocate is not concerned with reproducing incidents but producing cases, not with truth but with persuasion.

The editing of an incident arises through the twin legal aspects of proof: relevance and admissibility. From page 15:

… the problem of ‘unbounded reality’ is tackled by the notions of admissibility and relevance.

This situation applies as much to the prosecution as it does to the defense in the case of criminal charges. Despite the rhetoric of the prosecutor being “an impartial minister of justice” (page 19), the prosecutor systematically engages in the construction of a case (rather than determining the truth of an incident) in order to obtain a conviction. Pages 19-20:

… the prosecutor has a duty to give to the defence the names of witnesses whom he does not intend to call but who do have material evidence to offer (Archbold, I979, s. 433). The word ‘material’ is the
key. It indicates that the prosecutor is assumed to present a case selected for conviction rather than one that sets out all of even what he sees as the material facts. Again, the prescription for how and to
what end examination-in-chief should be conducted-‘to adduce relevant and admissible evidence to support the contention of the party who calls the witness’-makes no exception for the prosecuting
counsel (ibid., s. 512).

At the level of practice there is no doubt that prosecutors do act out the normal advocate’s role of arguing a one-sided case:

Presenting prosecutors as representatives of justice rather than as biased individuals who construct a biased case to obtain a conviction is ideological and serves to distort the real nature of legal systems (page 21):

… the notion of the prosecutor as a ‘minister of justice’ not only functions at the ideological level both in the rhetoric of the Bar as to their role, and in general to support the view of a system of justice bending over backwards to ensure the innocent are not convicted, but is also an idea that is put to good practical use by prosecutors in court to support the credibility of their cases as
opposed to the biased nature of the defence’s:

Prosecutor: Ladies and gentlemen, my function is to elicit as much evidence as possible to put before you. My friend’s is to defend his client’s best interests. I act in the public interest. (Case 103)

Representing the prosecutor as the “public’s interest” is hardly itself the truth of the situation; the prosecutor constructs a case just as much as does the defense lawyer. Consequently, the reference to “public interest” serves to hide the truth of the situation. Truth is hardly the central focus of the legal system (but, of course, if you are found lying within the legal system, you may suffer legal repercussions–despite the irrelevance of the truth often enough in legal proceedings). Page 20:

the examples throughout this book are readily supported officially by the Fisher Report on the Confait case, in which three youths-two of whom were mentally subnormal-were convicted of murder on the basis of impossible confessions-impossible, because it was subsequently proved that Confait could not possibly have died as late as the confessions alleged. But ambiguities over the time of death were
filtered out by the police and prosecution in constructing and presenting their case. Fisher (I977) notes at the prosecutor’s courtroom examination of a pathologist on the crucial issue of the time of death:

It might well be that, if Dr C. had been given sight of the other evidence and asked to reconsider his evidence in the light of it, and had been asked the relevant questions in a neutral way instead of being asked to suggest ways in which the period for the time of death could be extended after midnight, the course of the trial would have been different and an acquittal might have resulted. (Fisher, I977, p. 223)

Or again:

… far from trying to make the time of death more precise, those concerned with the investigation and prosecution … made every effort to keep it as vague as possible. The reason for this was that they were concerned to establish a case which rested wholly or mainly on confessions which could not be entirely true unless the time of death was outside the brackets given by [the experts). (Ibid., p. 20)

Of course, most social democrats and social reformers will simply ignore this situation. They either ignore legal oppression altogether, or make vague assertions about “transforming the system” into “a more humane form” (see the first post in this series about such a claim by the social democrat Herman Rosenfeld here in Toronto). Social democrats, rather, rely on such vague phrases as the “rule of law” or “democratizing the law” and similar clichés to justify their reformist views (and, indeed, their lack of practical engagement in trying to change the economic, political and social structure).

But let us continue. The construction of a case rather than determining the truth limits the function of witnesses to respondents to lawyers’ questions (which are, of course, designed to elicit responses to favour their specific construction or version of the case). From page 22:

A further feature of the form of presenting proof is that it is interrogatory. Evidence is not presented directly by witnesses, but indirectly in response to questions by counsel. The rules prohibit leading questions but the very framing of a question, whether leading or not, and the context in which it occurs, set parameters on what can be an acceptable answer. The witness is a respondent, ‘he
is there to answer questions, that is all’ (Cockburn, I952, p. IO ), and the person who asks the questions is structurally very much in a position of control (Atkinson and Drew, I979) and quick to interrupt witnesses or warn them to confine themselves to the essential facts they are being asked about, or indeed merely to answer yes or no.

The construction of a case rather than the determination of the truth in court then presents only a partial contextualization of particular facts–a contextualization that excludes other facts deemed irrelevant to the construction of the case at hand. If witnesses offer facts deemed irrelevant, they may be reminded to confine themselves to answering the question asked of them. Pages 22-23:

Prosecutor [to victim] Did you know him [the defendant] previously?
Witness: Yes we had a scuffle the night before.
Prosecutor [sharply] Mr Sweeney, the question was very simple. Please answer yes or no. Don’t volunteer anything. Understand? (Case g8)

What is often a gray area of unclear and contradictory facts not only becomes presented as clear facts by either lawyer but is often stripped of the meaning given to them by witnesses. From page 23:

The questions ‘should be clear and unambiguous and as short as possible, each raising a single point’ (Walker and Walker, I975, p. 360) so particularising and abstracting the facts relevant for the case from the multiple possible facts of the incident. This style of presentation helps construct an idea of clear-cut proof, by filtering and controlling the information witnesses make available to the court, and so transforming what could emerge as an ambiguous welter of vying and uncertain perceptions into ‘the facts of the case’.

Interrogation means not just filtering potential information but imposing order and meaning upon it by the sequence and context of questions asked-whatever meaning it may have had to the witness, control by questioning can impose the meaning of the questioner. The case thus takes on its own logic within the framework of the ‘facts of the case’, and any other issues mentioned, hinted at or unknown, lose any relevancy to the meaning of the case that they may have had to the meaning of the incident.

It is not only the right (or rather obligation) of a witness to answer only questions posed by the lawyer that leads to the filtering of what happened; the right of the lawyer to sum up the “facts of the case” (and not the witness) can easily lead to a distortion of what the witness is saying. From pages 23-24:

Prosecutor: Weren’t you making as much noise as the others?
Accused: No I was trying to quieten them down.
Prosecutor: You were saying ‘Ssh’ in a whisper?
Accused: No I was saying ‘be quiet or you’ll get into
trouble’.
Prosecutor: And they were making a lot of noise.
Accused: Yes.
Prosecutor: So you had to raise your voice so they’d hear you.
Accused: Well maybe a wee bit.
Prosecutor: So you were shouting and bawling.
Accused: No.
Prosecutor: You just said you were! (Case 19)

The right of the advocate not just to question but to sum up-a right denied to the witnesses themselves-allows still further editing, abstraction, and imputation of meaning to be imposed on what witnesses say.

But, it may be said, the lawyer for the defense at least can do the same thing as the prosecutor (although we have already seen that prosecutors, unlike defense lawyers, use the ideological ploy of claiming to represent the “public interest”). What of the presumed need for the court to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the accused is guilty? In the first post, we have already shown that judges narrow proof of guilt by limiting what counts as sufficient proof of guilt.

Are the so-called legal provisions that protect the accused, such as the presumption of innocence until proven guilty, actually in truth the way they are presented as being? Or are the legal provisions more like fiction? I will pursue the matter in a future post in this series.

By the way, before my experience with a court-ordered assessment of the relationship between my daughter, Francesca, and her parents, on the one hand, and the relationship between the parents, on the other, despite calling myself a Marxist, I was naïve enough to believe that the truth was relevant in court manners. I learned the hard way–and so did my daughter indirectly–just how far from the truth court-constructed cases can be (see the series of posts with the title “A Worker’s Resistance to the Capitalist Government or State and its Representatives,” such as A Worker’s Resistance to the Capitalist Government or State and its Representatives, Part One or A Worker’s Resistance to the Capitalist Government or State and Its Representatives, Part Four). I am no longer that naïve.

Conclusion

The ideology that telling the truth is of prime importance in courts is just that–an ideology. What really happened and what is presented in court can diverge widely. Defense attorneys formulate a case and so too does the prosecution. The case is what is important–not the truth. The rules of evidence, for example, restrict what can be presented, and witnesses are asked questions that the defense or prosecution deems relevant to presenting the “case”–and not the truth.

And yet, on TV programs and in movies we are often presented with the proverbial “Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth?”–and yet the truth is one thing that really is irrelevant at court.

But why does the left not criticize this ideology? Should not the left expose the farcical nature of various social structures, including the legal system? Why is there not discussion about the real nature of legal proceedings? Why is there too often acceptance of the illusion–the ideology–of the rule of law?

What do you think?

A Worker’s Resistance to the Capitalist Government or State and Its Representatives, Part Six: The Stick and the Carrot Tactic

This is a continuation of a previous post that illustrates how politically biased the capitalist government or state and its representatives (such as social-democratic social workers) are when it comes to determining real situations–especially when a person self-declares as a Marxist.

Since the civil trial in April 1999, my daughter complained of the following (as of February 18, 2000): 1. Her mother was using a wooden stick on her buttocks; 2. Her mother used a belt to spank her on the same area; 3. Her mother grabbed Francesca and forced her into the apartment building; 4. Her mother had grabbed Francesca’s throat in the elevator and warned her not to tell me that her mother had hit her; 5. Her mother shoved Francesca to the floor on two separate occasions; 6. Her mother hit Francesca on the head with a book; 7. Her mother pulled Francesca’s hair; 8. Her mother scratched Francesca with a comb.

This contrasts with Mr. S.W.’s allegation, as noted in the last post, that ” Mr. Harris’ explanation for contacting the Agency [Winnipeg Child and Family Services] was somewhat ridiculous. He said that the child had made some vague indications that she may have been spanked.”

Mr. S.W. was much less concerned about the truthfulness of Mr. Harris’ claim (which is true) than with Mr. Harris’ Marxists ideas.

This is the last part of the series in relation to my complaint against the social worker who wrote the court-ordered assessment–but not the end of the series since the saga continued afterwards in other forms.

Mr. S.W. characterized my accusations of physical abuse (and various other accusations) as ridiculous–and false. It could therefore be concluded that not only were my accusations false but also not genuine. How did he characterize the following accusations made by Ms. Harris?

In April, 1996, during a mediation meeting between Mr. Harris and Ms. Harris, Ms. Harris (falsely) accused Mr. Harris of sexually abusing Francesca; apparently, Winnipeg Child and Family Services obliged Ms. Harris to accuse Mr. Harris of this. In November, 1997, again through Winnipeg Child and Family Services, Ms. Harris accused (falsely) Mr. Harris of sexually abusing Francesca.

In 1998, Mr. Harris obtained telephone access rights (in addition, Francesca could sleep over once a week, on the weekend). Ms. Harris, on June 8, 1998, had her lawyer send a letter to Mr. Harris’ lawyer, “explaining” why she refused telephone access–because Mr. Harris had sexually abused Francesca once again.

She refused telephone access–but not physical access. A rather curious fact–but Mr. S.W. omitted the June 8, 1998 letter in his list of documents used. Mr. Harris showed Mr. S.W. Judge Diamond’s order indicating that he had the right to have telephone access every Wednesday.

Note that Mr. S.W. first interviewed Mr. Harris on August 4, 1998. Ms. Harris had not complied with the court order for over two months. Mr. Harris informed Mr. S.W. of this. Is there any mention of this in his assessment? Why the suppression of relevant evidence? Did he query Ms. Harris? Coupled with the letter dated June 8, surely, Mr. S.W., if he had been unbiased, should have inquired further. A parent who does not deny physical access but denies telephone access–how genuine could an accusation of sexual abuse be? Any rational person would have suspected that Ms. Harris’ accusation of sexual abuse was not genuine. What was Mr. S.W’s interpretation of the situation?

From pages 20-21 of Mr. S.W’s court-ordered assessment:

Her [Ms. Harris’] concerns about the possible sexual abuse of her daughter appeared to be genuine. She was able, however, to accept this writer’s opinion that there did not appear to be any evidence of sexual misconduct on the part of Mr. Harris. Ms. Harris was very reasonable when discussing this writer’s opinion on custody, and she was obviously trying to act in the best interests of Francesca. She indicated that she simply wanted the legal issues with Mr. Harris settled so that she can get on with her life.

So, my accusations of physical abuse, according to Mr. S.W., were “ridiculous” and obviously not genuine; they were both false and not genuine. On the other hand, according to Mr. S.W., Ms. Harris’ accusation of sexual abuse (with the help of the Winnipeg Child and Family Services in two instances) was genuine but false.

Here is the carrot to get me to accept the assessment. Despite all the lies and distortions contained in the assessment, the accusation of sexual abuse would be put to rest–and I would gain greater access to see Francesca (and I would be able to take Francesca to Calgary to see her grandmother).

Unfortunately for Mr. S.W., Ms. Harris’ subsequent actions provided further evidence of the biased nature of his assessment. When I read the assessment, I could not believe the number of lies, distortions and omissions contained in the document. Instead of containing an objective inquiry, it expressed the political bias of Mr. S.W. I was faced with either accepting these lies, distortions and omissions, or never seeing Francesca again. I called my lawyer to see if I could have another assessment. He replied that no social worker would contradict what Mr. S.W. wrote. I subsequently called Ms. Harris, indicating that I would never see Francesca again.

However, I did not last very long since I loved Francesca. I called my lawyer, indicating to him what I had said to Ms. Harris. He stated that I should call her back, indicating that I had not abandoned my access rights. I did so. I subsequently went to Ms. Harris’ townhouse to pick up Francesca for her overnight stay over. Ms. Harris refused me access. I went to the police, but since I did not have the court order, they did nothing.

The following week, I had the court order, but Ms. Harris still refused, apparently indicating that the reason why she refused access was because I was a Marxist (so I was told by the police. She probably showed them the assessment by Mr. S.W.). I spent around three hours in the back of the police car while the police tried to gain access. They failed. Ms. Harris was arrested, I believe, for failing to comply with the court order, but there was no further action. She refused access for around three months, until February, 1999, when a judge found her guilty of contempt of court. I then gained access to see Francesca again.

Mr. S.W.’s suppression of the document accusing me of sexual abuse is in itself evidence of Mr. S.W’s bias. If we take into account his claim that Ms. Harris’s accusation was genuine though false, his bias becomes even more evident. His further claim that Ms. Harris wanted to only resolve the legal issues and put them behind her and that she was obviously looking out for the best interests of Francesca is further evidence of his bias. Ms. Harris’ subsequent refusal to provide Mr. Harris with access to Francesca provides even further evidence of the biased nature of the court-ordered assessment.

Given that the refusal of access by Ms. Harris contradicted so blatantly the court-ordered assessment written by Mr. S.W., my lawyer was able to set up a meeting with Mr. S.W. and myself. we were to have another observation of Francesca with me after I had gained access in February. Of course, I knew by then that I had to avoid any political education. I even shook his hand at the end of our meeting (I had to fake it since I felt extreme disdain at deferring to his “authority.”)

The subsequent observation went well, according to him.

However, I was afraid that it would not go well. When Francesca finally saw me again (before the second assessment), she was evidently angry and asked me why I did not want to see her. She also started punching me and acting violently. I did not connect up Francesca’s violent behaviour and what she told me later on because I did not, at the time, believe her (I will explain in another post why I did not initially believe her).

Fortunately, she did not act like that when Mr. S.W. observed our interactions.

Mr. S.W.’s characterization of Ms. Harris as being”very reasonable when discussing this writer’s opinion on custody, and she was obviously trying to act in the best interests of Francesca. She indicated that she simply wanted the legal issues with Mr. Harris settled so that she can get on with her life” was in shambles not only because of Ms. Harris’ refusal to permit access but also because she now insisted that there be a civil trial and that she wanted reduced and supervised access.

The civil trial, held in April 1999 (on the insistence of Francesca’s mother, who now used Mr. S.W.’s initial assessment as a weapon to justify refusing me access and proceeding to civil trial) displayed further just how bias and inaccurate the assessment was.

I was the first to testify under oath. I saw Francesca that night. Ms. Harris testified the following day. She testified, under oath, that I had sexually abused Francesca the day before–the day that I testified. I allegedly had Francesca masturbate me (a fourth false accusation of sexual abuse).

Even Judge Diamond had to recognize that Ms. Harris was lying. She indicated to Ms. Harris’ lawyer that she was lucky that she still would have custody of Francesca.

Mr. S.W.’s assessment of the situation was in shambles–and yet his initial assessment formed part of the “evidence” used to justify Ms. Harris’ continued custody of Francesca. I gained greater access–provided that I took an anger management course (not Ms. Harris) and could take Francesca to Calgary so that she could see her grandmother and that her grandmother could “see” her (my mother was legally blind at the time).

The issue of the physical abuse of Francesca was buried by this political bigot.

Let us now listen to a “radical” leftist here in Toronto, Herman Rosenfeld, about the law in a society dominated by a class of employers:

In reality, though, bourgeois democratic institutions are not simply a façade for a bloody and murderous dictatorship over the poor and colonized. Yes, there are instances of state acts of murder and even terrorism. The liberal democratic state and institutions facilitate private capital accumulation and are structured in ways which seek to repress, diffuse and co-opt alternative political and social movements, but these are mediated by the necessities of legitimating capitalism. The relative power, political ideology and organization of the working class and colonized Indigenous peoples also affect the character of liberal democracy (and in the subordinate strata, there are forms of class differences and other contradictions that also matter).

Apart from the extremely vague nature of this paragraph, its reference to the need for “legitimating capitalism” does not even recognize that part of the nature of legitimating capitalism is, firstly, hiding the real nature of the “liberal democratic state and institutions.” Yes, I obtained some of my goals–preventing Francesca’s mother from ever falsely accusing me of sexually abusing Francesca ever again, gaining greater access to see Francesca and having the right for Francesca and her grandmother to see each other.

But at what cost? Francesca’s mother continued to abuse her physically–and the assessment was used to justify doing nothing about it. The façade of “justice” being done was maintained. Many of the “left”(such as Mr. Rosenfeld) here in Toronto (and undoubtedly elsewhere) persistently idealize the capitalist government or state. The oppressive nature of the capitalist government is subsequently captured by the right, who at least recognize that people often experience the government as oppressive.

Mr. Rosenfeld and similar leftists, however, present such oppression as “instances” rather than as a regular part of the situation of those have dealings with the government.

The Manitoba Registered Institute of Social Workers “inquired” into the situation (the complaint was double spaced and amounted to around 100 pages, with supporting documentation).

They interviewed me, and their questions centered around whether Mr. S.W. had raised his voice towards me or showed any signs of physical threats. The issue of the systematic abuse and bias contained in the court-ordered assessment was never discussed. The Institute rejected my complaint–without any justification other than indicating that Mr. S.W. did not contravene the Institute’s ethical principles.

Such are the ethics of social-democratic social workers and their institutions.

This post ends direct references to my complaint about the court-ordered assessment to the Manitoba Institute of Registered Social Workers. However, after having been convinced of the farcical nature of the legal system and farcical nature of the Manitoba Institute of Registered Social Workers and their ethical principles, I proceeded to file a complaint against the Winnipeg Child and Family Services with the Ombudsman’s office.

Let us see what this office did–or did not do.

A Worker’s Resistance to the Capitalist Government or State and Its Representatives, Part Five

Just a recap of part of the last post: I filed a complaint with the Manitoba Institute of Registered Social Workers against a social worker who had written a court-ordered assessment concerning my wife at the time, myself and my daughter, Francesca Alexandra Romani (ne Harris). I am using the initials S.W. for the social worker. Mr. S.W., claimed that my claim that the mother of my daughter was using a belt and a wooden stick to physically abuse her, was “somewhat ridiculous.” Mr. S.W. was much less concerned about determining the truth of this claim (which is in fact true) than with my so-called indoctrination of my daughter in my “Marxist ideology.”

Mr. S.W. was much less concerned about the truthfulness of Mr. Harris’ claim (which is true) than with Mr. Harris’ Marxists ideas.

Mr. S.W. claimed that I was indoctrinating Francesca in my Marxist ideas. Firstly, I did indicate to Francesca that working for an employer was bad. Objectively, it can be shown that working for an employer is bad; treating human beings as things and as means for purposes undefined by them is bad. Oppressing and exploiting workers is bad–and this must occur necessarily in a society dominated by a class of employers (for exploitation and oppression, see The Money Circuit of Capital ; The Rate of Exploitation of Workers at Magna International Inc., One of the Largest Private Employers in Toronto, Part One ; The Rate of Exploitation of Magna International Inc., One of the Largest Private Employers in Toronto, Part Two, Or: Intensified Oppression and Exploitation ; The Rate of Exploitation of Workers at Air Canada, One of the Largest Private Employers in Canada; more generally, for oppression, see Employers as Dictators, Part One).

From the complaint:

“Indoctrinate” is used several times in the assessment. The term indoctrinate is quite strong. Is Mr. S.W. ready to substantiate such a charge? Apparently not. Mr. Harris, in a meeting with his lawyer and Mr. S.W. in February 1999, requested that Mr. S.W. provide Mr. Harris with some material which indicated that such “indoctrination” would harm his daughter–because Mr. Harris does not want to harm his daughter. He indicated that Mr. S.W. merely had to provide general material on the subject and not so specific material that it related to Marxism as such.

The [civil] trial took place from April 6 to April 8, 1999. Mr. S.W. stated, on the witness stand, that he had told Mr. Harris that he would try to obtain material relevant to whether Mr. Harris’ “indoctrinating” his daughter with Marxist ideas harmed a child. Mr. Harris phoned Mr. S.W. about one week later, asking whether Mr. S.W. had found any material. Mr. S.W. replied that he had not, but that he was still searching. Almost six months later–no word from Mr. S.W. [Almost twenty years later–and still no word from Mr. S.W.]

The charge of indoctrination is quite interesting. On what grounds does Mr. S.W. make it?

Indoctrination tries to narrow the horizon of a person’s awareness of the world and context in which we live. Does this blog testify to such narrowmindedness? If so, how so?

When Francesca and I used to go to the Subway restaurant to have a subway sandwich, I would teach her the productive circuit of capital (since it is more understandable, in that context, than the money circuit of capital). I would point out to her that the worker’s act of placing the meat, the tomatoes, lettuce, green peppers, etc. on the bun was the process of production, or P, which required time. I then pointed out that the product of this act of production was not the property of the worker but the owner of Subway. Next, I pointed out that the worker then sold the subway to us for money (which was not hers/his). Finally, I pointed out that the money was then used to purchase the meat, lettuce, green peppers, bun, etc. as well as hire the worker–to begin the capitalist production anew (in terms of the symbols used in the money circuit of capital, we have: P…C’-M’-(Mp+L)…P).

My daughter probably does not remember this, but she at least was exposed to Marxian theory and to an understanding of the basic process of capitalist production. I doubt that Mr. S.W.–and many social democrats–can say the same.

Some lessons to be drawn, when dealing with social workers, the courts, the police and other representatives of the social system:

Expect the interests of children to be less important than political oppression of Marxists.
Unless Marxists record everything, expect social workers to either be incapable of understanding the situation which you face, or expect them to distort it, or even to lie. (And even if you record it, they will try to interpret the situation in such a way that tries to show Marxists to be irrational.)
Expect accusations of indoctrination from those who are themselves indoctrinated (see my series of posts on silent indoctrination in schools by means of the Canadian history curriculum, for example A Case of Silent Indoctrination, Part One: The Manitoba History Curricula and Its Lack of History of Employers and Employees).
Do not expect that your efforts at telling the truth will prevail over lies by others since the representatives of the class of employers will assume that the lies of others are the truth and that your telling the truth is a lie.
Expect social democrats to be incapable of dealing with the reality of the details of government or state oppression. For example, Herman Rosenfeld, a self-defined Marxist here in Toronto, made the following claim (see https://canadiandimension.com/articles/view/reform-and-transform-police-abolitionism-and-sloppy-thinking):

In reality, though, bourgeois democratic institutions are not simply a façade for a bloody and murderous dictatorship over the poor and colonized. Yes, there are instances of state acts of murder and even terrorism. The liberal democratic state and institutions facilitate private capital accumulation and are structured in ways which seek to repress, diffuse and co-opt alternative political and social movements, but these are mediated by the necessities of legitimating capitalism. The relative power, political ideology and organization of the working class and colonized Indigenous peoples also affect the character of liberal democracy (and in the subordinate strata, there are forms of class differences and other contradictions that also matter). We don’t live in a fascist dictatorship.

No, we do not live in a fascist dictatorship (although I leave open what that means–Mr. Rosenfeld does not enlighten us on that score), but to what extent do many people in “bourgeois democratic institutions” actually experience the oppression that I experienced? Is my case an exception? Mr. Rosenfeld provides no evidence that he even is aware of just how oppressive the government is–which feeds into the popularity of the right since there is denial by the left, on the one hand, of what many people experience and, on the other, the left idealize the public sector.

When Mr. Rosenfeld speaks of “the necessities of legitimating capitalism,” he does not inquire into the extent to which such legitimation is based on the illusion of legitimacy. How many cases of government or state oppression is the public aware of? Should not the left expose such oppression? I sent Mr. Rosenfeld some of the facts of the case surrounding the court-ordered assessment when we were both engaged in providing a workshop for Toronto Pearson airport workers. His response was–silence.

The legitmating function of the capitalist government and state may well, at least in part, be a function of the suppression of many cases of oppression by the “public sector.” That would require inquiry by the left to search for such cases and bring them to light–rather than using such vague terms as “the necessities of legitimating capitalism.” Surely it is one of the tasks of the left to expose such oppression–rather than cover it up with such phrases as “the necessities of legitimating capitalism.”

Perhaps there are other lessons to be learned. If so, please indicate what other lessons can be learned from this.

I will, in the future, write one more post specifically related to my complaint against Mr. S.W. to the Manitoba Institute of Registered Social Workers. That will end my account of that complaint (although there were more than six points to my complaint) –although it will not end the situation that I and my daughter faced in relation to representatives of the capitalist government or state. That situation will be described in additional posts that continue the series in order to illustrate the oppressive nature of the society in which we live.

A Worker’s Resistance to the Capitalist Government or State and Its Representatives, Part Four

Just a recap of part of the last post: I filed a complaint with the Manitoba Institute of Registered Workers against a social worker who had written a court-ordered assessment concerning my wife at the time, myself and my daughter, Francesca Alexandra Romani (ne Harris). I am using the initials S.W. for the social worker. Mr. S.W., claimed that my claim that the mother of my daughter was using a belt and a wooden stick to physically abuse her, was “somewhat ridiculous.” Mr. S.W. was much less concerned about determining the truth of this claim (which is in fact true) than with my so-called indoctrination of my daughter in my “Marxist ideology.” Since the civil trial in April 1999, my daughter complained of the following (as of February 18, 2000): 1. Her mother was using a wooden stick on her buttocks; 2. Her mother used a belt to spank her on the same area; 3. Her mother grabbed Francesca and forced her into the apartment building; 4. Her mother had grabbed Francesca’s throat in the elevator and warned her not to tell me that her mother had hit her; 5. Her mother shoved Francesca to the floor on two separate occasions; 6. Her mother hit Francesca on the head with a book; 7. Her mother pulled Francesca’s hair; 8. Her mother scratched Francesca with a comb.

It should not be forgotten that these incidents occurred since the trial in April, 1999. There were, of course, several other incidents of physical abuse by the mother before that.

Mr. S.W. was much less concerned about the truthfulness of Mr. Harris’ claim (which is true) than with Mr. Harris’ Marxists ideas.

The extent of Mr. S.W.’s political bigotry can be seen, in addition to his absurd characterization of my genuine (and true) complaints about Francesca’s mother’s physical abuse of Francesca and his lying concerning the language issue as outlined in previous posts.

Further evidence of his political bigotry was his lack of concern about the accuracy of characterizing what occurred when Francesca’s mother took Francesca to Guatemala (Francesca’s mother was born in Guatemala). It was (and still is) my belief that Francesca’s mother, although she did not kidnap Francesca in the sense of initially taking Francesca away to Guatemala against my will, did in fact abduct Francesca by remaining in Guatemala for three and half months past the agreed upon time for her return to Canada. I did not know whether I would ever see Francesca again. Mr. S.W. dismissed my contention that Ms. Harris had kidnapped Francesca.

From the court-ordered assessment written by Mr. S.W.

“Page 12: Mr. Harris agreed that his wife and child should accept the offer of free transportation, and Mrs. Harris left for Guatemala.”

The context was (I will provide details in another post) that we had reconciled in February, 1995 after a separation from October 16, 1994.

I agreed to have my wife take my daughter from mid-March until mid-April 1995 to Guatemala; her parents were to pay for the return flight (I was receiving student loan at the time). My wife, however, refused to return to Canada at the agreed-upon time.

This is what Mr. S.W., the political bigot, had to say:

Page 12 of the assessment: “In April of 1995, Mr. Harris states that he received a phone call from his wife saying that she wanted to come to Winnipeg. She then asked him for money for an airline ticket home. He said he became angry at this and told her to obtain her money from her parents. Ms. Harris states that her parents could not raise the money at that time and so she was forced to remain in Guatemala.”

On page 20 of the assessment, Mr. S.W. states the following:

“Ms. Harris presented as honest and forthright.”

Why would Mr. S.W. believe Ms. Harris’ version? She herself admitted that her family was financially stable. On page 6 of the assessment, Mr. S.W. writes, and I added, in the complaint:

Page 6: “She [Ms. Harris] states that her parents earned enough money to provide for financial stability and a relatively good lifestyle.”

Not true historically, but true at a later date, certainly in 1988 when Mr. Harris went to Guatemala to meet them and also at the time of Ms. Harris going to Guatemala in 1995.”

When Ms. Harris’ mother came to Canada in 1997 (this fact was conveniently suppressed by Mr. S.W.–Mr. Harris mentioned that Ms. Harris’ mother came to Canada in 1997–another “silence” on Mr. S.W.’s part that can probably be explained by Mr. S.W.’s political bias), Ms. Harris’ mother stated that there was no economic problem.

There was plenty of evidence to contradict Ms. Harris’ version. The issue was twofold Firstly, did Ms. Harris’ parents likely have sufficient funds to pay for an airline ticket? Secondly, if they did not, would it have been reasonable for her to request that I pay for an airline ticket given our economic situation?

I already have provided some evidence that Ms. Harris’ parents evidently had sufficient funds to pay for an airline ticket. I provided further proof of their economic situation in the complaint. From pages 48-49, where I indicate:

Ms,. Harris and Mr. Harris had agreed beforehand that Ms. Harris’ parents would pay for the flight back. Why did Mr. S.W. not query the obvious contradiction between the claim that Ms. Harris’ family in Guatemala were financially secure and the supposed incapacity of her family to raise sufficient funds to send her and Francesca back to Canada? (Ms. Harris’ father and mother had visited Canada in 1993. Ms. Harris’ parents had gone on a trip to Europe a few years before that. In 1994, Ms. Harris’ mother came to Canada. in 1994. Again, in 1997 she came to Canada. Sometime in late 1997, her sister and brother-in-law–who live beside Mr. Harris’ parents–sent two of their children to Canada for a visit. The same parents sent two of their children this year–they stayed with Ms. Harris in October and November. A family in dire circumstances indeed.

I further indicate, on page 49:

Ms. Harris left Canada for Guatemala via a car. If she did not have the money, why did she not return by car? But Ms. Harris’ behaviour is never “bizarre,” only Mr. Harris’ behaviour.

As I indicated on page 46 of the complaint:

Ms. Harris–by “coincidence”–had the opportunity to go to Guatemala by car.

Mr. S.W.’s remark on pages 11-12 of the assessment and my commentary in the complaint (on page 46):

“About the same time Ms. Harris was offered a free ride to Guatemala by a church pastor whom [sic] was travelling there by car.”

It is interesting to note that Mr. S.W. neglected to mention–Mr. Harris did mention it to Mr. S.W.–that the church pastor was a Guatemalan and a cousin to Ms. Harris (Justo Orellana). An irrelevant fact, it would seem, according to Mr. S.W. since he neglected to mention it (just as he neglected to mention that Ms. Harris’ mother came to Canada in 1997). Why the omission?

Mr. S.W. characterization of Ms. Harris as honest and forthright, on the one hand, and the evidence that her family would have had sufficient money to pay for a return flight contradict each other. What explains such a contradiction? Could it because Mr. S.W. is a political bigot? That Mr. Harris self-identified as a Marxist and therefore must be the opposite of “honest and forthright?” Or that my wife at the time, since she was not a Marxist, must be “honest and forthright.”

The second issue has to do with my own economic situation at the time–something which Mr. S.W. never even considered. Why would he not consider my economic situation at the time when considering what was reasonable? Perhaps because he is a political bigot?

On page 48 of the complaint to the Manitoba Registered Institute of Social Workers (MIRSW), I wrote the following:

It is interesting to note that Mr. S.W. did not even inquire into Mr. Harris’ economic status at the time, in April 1995. Mr. Harris was a student at the Faculty of Education of College universitaire de Saint-Boniface. He had received a student loan.The student loan was from September 1994 until–April 1995. Ms. Harris knew that Mr. Harris did not have the money. Why did Mr. S.W. not (1) not query the reasonableness of Ms. Harris asking Mr. Harris for money when Mr. Harris did not have the money; (2) query the obvious contradiction between the claim that Ms. Harris’ family in Guatemala was financially secure and the supposed incapacity of her family to raise sufficient funds to send her and Francesca back to Canada?

I further wrote, on page 49:

Mr. Harris told Mr. S,W. that when Ms. Harris’ mother was in Canada in 1994, after he had an argument with her concerning who was to be the parent of Francesca, her or him, he overheard her suggest that her daughter go to Guatemala–implying in Mr. Harris’ mind that perhaps she wanted her daughter to return permanently to Guatemala

This double neglect on the part of Mr. S.W–of accurately determining the probability of Ms. Harris’ family being able to provide airfare in April and whether it would be reasonable to request that Mr. Harris provide the funds necessary to purchase airline tickets for Ms. Harris and Francesca–can probably be attributed to his political bigotry.

Needless to say, the kidnapping of Francesca caused me great emotional distress.

The issue of the kidnapping of Francesca becomes more complicated because Ms. Harris did indicate, by telephone, that she would return to Canada on May 13, 1995. She gave me both the flight number and the time, and I showed up at the Winnipeg airport, expecting to see Francesca.

From page 45 of the complaint against Mr. S.W. to the Manitoba Institute of Registered Social Workers (MIRSW):

In early May, 1995, Ms. Harris gave Mr. Harris a flight number and the time. She had already booked her flight. She then told Mr. Harris on the phone, on May 13, that she had cancelled it because she promised her parents that she was going to have Francesca’s birthday in Guatemala (document 20, photo of Francesca on her first birthday. Mr. Harris wants the photo returned.)

Here is Mr. S.W.’s comment:

This writer [Mr. S.W.] asked Mr. Harris why he had not simply got on the phone to find out what had happened. He argued that there was no point in discussing anything with his wife.

My comment in the complaint to the Manitoba Institute of Registered Social Workers:

There seem to be three possibilities here. Either Mr. Harris did not explain himself well enough, or Mr. S.W. did not understand what Mr. Harris had said, or Mr. S.W. distorted what Mr. Harris had said.

Mr. Harris did call his wife on May 13. Mr. Harris begged Ms. Harris to return to Canada. Ms. Harris categorically stated that she was going to have Mr. Harris’ daughter’s birthday in Guatemala, and she refused to return. Mr. Harris threatened to divorce her. She replied that Mr. Harris was always threatening to do that. Mr. Harris replied: “Alla Ud. y alla su familia.” The equivalent is, more or less: “You and your family know what you can do.” Mr. Harris never expected to see his daughter again. As for any point discussing the issue, obviously there was no point in discussing it. Ms. Harris “categorically” refused to return.

Mr. S.W. did not care about the truth. He had evidently already condemned Mr. Harris and judged his claim that Ms. Harris kidnapped Francesca to be an indication of Mr. Harris’ “insecurity” and used his Marxism as an excuse to cover up his own insecurities.

Ms. Harris refused to indicate when or if she would return. When I called again, her father answered, and stated: “Ni siquiera puedes mantener a tu propia hija.” (“You cannot even maintain your own daughter.”) Practically, I guess it is justifiable to kidnap a child if the other parent lacks the funds necessary to “maintain” the child.

As pointed out previously, Mr. S.W.’s characterized me in the following terms (from page 21 of the court-ordered assessment written by Mr. S.W.):

Mr. Harris presented as an emotionally insecure individual who attempted to cover his insecurities through confrontation and intellectualization of his problems.

Mr. S.W. further characterized me in the following terms:

“As noted earlier, Mr. Harris tends to intellectualize and rationalize his own personal problems (within a rigid framework of Marxist ideology), and tends to see them as the inevitable result of living in a so-called bourgeois milieu.”

Ms. Harris did finally return to Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada–on July 31, 1995–three and half months after the agreed-upon date of her return. When I tried to hug Francesca, she began to cry; she did not recognize me.

What lessons can be learned from the above?

Do not expect anti-Marxists to accurately determine the truth.
Expect sloppy inquiry (which is really sloppy thinking since thinking requires inquiry) when it comes to the Marxist’s version of the situation.
Do not expect any sympathy for Marxists–regardless of what the Marxists have experienced.
Expect character assassination and ridicule.
When it comes to the physical abuse of a child, expect anti-Marxists to discount the Marxist’s version and to accuse the Marxist of lying.

Other lessons?