A Worker’s Resistance to the Capitalist Government or State and Its Representatives, Part Two

This is a continuation of a previous post that illustrates how politically biased the capitalist government or state and its representatives (such as social-democratic social workers) are when it comes to determining real situations–especially when a person self-declares as a Marxist.

Just a recap of part of the last post: I filed a complaint with the Manitoba Institute of Registered Workers against a social worker who had written a court-ordered assessment concerning my wife at the time, myself and my daughter, Francesca Alexandra Romani (ne Harris). I am using the initials S.W. for the social worker. Mr. S.W., claimed that my claim that the mother of my daughter was using a belt and a wooden stick to physically abuse her, was “somewhat ridiculous.” Mr. S.W. was much less concerned about determining the truth of this claim (which is in fact true) than with my so-called indoctrination of my daughter in my “Marxist ideology.”

Since the civil trial in April 1999, my daughter complained of the following (as of February 18, 2000): 1. Her mother was using a wooden stick on her buttocks; 2. Her mother used a belt to spank her on the same area; 3. Her mother grabbed Francesca and forced her into the apartment building; 4. Her mother had grabbed Francesca’s throat in the elevator and warned her not to tell me that her mother had hit her; 5. Her mother shoved Francesca to the floor on two separate occasions; 6. Her mother hit Francesca on the head with a book; 7. Her mother pulled Francesca’s hair; 8. Her mother scratched Francesca with a comb.

It should not be forgotten that these incidents occurred since the trial in April, 1999. There were, of course, several other incidents of physical abuse by the mother before that.

This contrasts with Mr. S.W.’s allegation, as noted in the last post, that ” Mr. Harris’ explanation for contacting the Agency [Winnipeg Child and Family Services] was somewhat ridiculous. He said that the child had made some vague indications that she may have been spanked.”

The extent of Mr. S.W.’s political bigotry can be seen in his absurd characterization of my genuine (and true) complaints about Francesca’s mother’s physical abuse of Francesca.

It is interesting to note that in a “$2 million lawsuit brought against the Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto for allegedly conducting a negligent investigation and placing her in an abusive home,” (/Toronto Star, August 24, 2019, A1), the issue is, at least on paper (not necessarily in reality), “to promote the best interests, protection and well-being of children” (A12). To determine the best interests of children cannot be determined independently of determining the truth.

Mr. S.W. was much less concerned about the truthfulness of Mr. Harris’ claim (which is true) than with Mr. Harris’ Marxists ideas.

The political hostility expressed in the assessment is similar to what I have experienced by many social-democratic leftists here in Toronto. This did surprise me at the time, but it no longer does. I have been called a “condescending prick” (by Wayne Dealy, union rep for local 3902 of the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE)–one of the largest unions in Canada. I have been called delusional on Facebook by one of the Facebook friends of another local union rep, Tina Faibish (president of local 552 of the Ontario Public Service Employees Union (OPSEU). I was also called insane by Errol Young (a member of the anti-poverty organization Jane and Finch Association Against Poverty) (JFAAP). I have also experienced a condescending attitude towards my criticisms among the left here.

For those who do attempt to engage in criticism of the power of employers as a class, you can expect such hostility. That hostility may even extend to your family, even if it is indirect and subtle.

Indeed, according to Mr. S.W.:

Page 22 of the assessment: “As noted earlier, Mr. Harris tends to intellectualize and rationalize his own personal problems (within a rigid framework of Marxist ideology), and tends to see them as the inevitable result of living in a so-called bourgeois milieu.”

Mr. Harris is just “intellectualizing” now. All his criticisms need not be taken seriously because he “intellectualizes” his problems. Since Mr. S.W. has no idea what Mr. Harris’ Marxist ideas are, his conclusion is “ridiculous.” Since Mr. S.W. failed to determine the true state of affairs, it would seem that he concocted an “assessment” in order to whitewash Mr. Harris.

Page 9 of the assessment: “Mr. Harris states that he soon began having ‘political problems’ in his workplace. He became embroiled in many disputes with management about working conditions.”

It is interesting to note that Mr. S.W. neglected to point out that Mr. Harris was a union steward (an official representative of a union; a steward’s duty is to “become embroiled in many disputes with management about working conditions.” Mr. S.W., by neglecting to mention this fact, presents Mr. Harris’ “political problems” as purely personal. Why the suppression of this fact?

In addition, Mr. Harris became embroiled in “political problems” by writing articles in the union newsletter, specifically articles on the history of management. Management did not like that. Moreover, Mr. Harris became embroiled in “political problems” by becoming involved in the collective-bargaining process–a process which took over one year. Mr. Harris had to be away from his regular duties as an employee to fulfill this function. His supervisor resented it and harassed him because of it. In addition, Mr. Harris became embroiled in “political problems” by posting articles of interest to union members on the school division bulletin board in the central office.

Page 9: “Mr. Harris subsequently became embroiled in a conflict with his employer over his not being allowed bereavement leave (for the death of his unborn child). Mr. Harris could not resolve this dispute so he quit his employment.”

Two points here: Firstly, Mr. S.W., as his wont, is quite mistaken. Mr. Harris had the legal right to bereavement leave according to the collective agreement (document 22, page 16, clause 15.01). (Note that Mr. Harris is signatory to that document at the end of the document. Mr. Harris was quite familiar with the collective agreement as a member of the negotiating team and as a steward for the board office. He handled several grievances. See document 23.) Mr. Harris exercised that right by filling out a bereavement form, indicating the reason for the request. However, Mr. Harris’ mother-in-law called him from Guatemala the same evening, requesting that Mr. Harris not fly down to Guatemala because Ms. Harris would be returning to Canada within three weeks. The next day, Mr. Harris found out that his supervisor–against whom he as a union steward had filed a union (policy) grievance in December 1991 for breaching the seniority provisions of the collective agreement–had indicated not only that Mr. Harris was going to Guatemala but why. This was a violation of Mr. Harris’ personal life. Mr. Harris did not request that. It was the representative of Mr. Harris’ employer who did this. She specifically stated that the bereavement form was a public document.

Secondly, Mr. S.W. implicitly presents the responsibility for the “dispute” as stemming from Mr. Harris’ own actions. Mr. Harris believes that he told Mr. S.W. (although he cannot be sure) that his supervisor had been harassing him for his Marxist activities. Indeed, in June 1992, Mr. Harris’ immediate supervisor tried to start an argument with him, criticizing his union and his function as a union steward. Mr. Harris tried to avoid arguing since he had a responsibility toward his wife, but his supervisor insisted. Mr. S.W. could never accept the fact, it would seem, that the capitalist system, with its hierarchy of managers, could ever cause any problems. Any individual who complains about the constant abuse of power by managers is apparently to be blamed for “not being able to resolve the dispute.”

According to certain social theories, disputes which are social in nature cannot be resolved by individuals. Mr. S.W.’s methodology is obviously atomistic. All problems can be resolved by individuals at the individual level. Even if it were so, Mr. S.W. would have to explain why Mr. Harris was the one who could not resolve the problem. Of course, Mr. S.W. either did not understand what the problem was, or he suppressed the true nature of the problem to fit his preconceived notion of this “evil” Marxist.

By the way, there were two other library technicians in the school division working at the board office when Mr. Harris started. Both of them quit because of conflicts with the same supervisor. Furthermore, a library clerk was crying because her supervisor (again, the same supervisor as that of Mr. Harris and the two library technicians) had ordered her not to talk in order to meet a “quota” of inputting a certain number of library cards into the computer every day. Such a pleasant atmosphere in which to work. It was only Mr. Harris, the evil Marxist, who could not “resolve” the dispute. The employer’s responsibility in the creation of the dispute in the first place is not even considered.

But then again, Mr. S.W. did not even understand the nature of the dispute–it had nothing to do with Mr. Harris not being allowed to go on bereavement leave. Indeed, Mr. S.W., by presenting it this way, makes it appear that Mr. Harris did not have a legal right to bereavement leave, and that Mr. Harris still persisted trying to “resolve” this dispute in his favour. It is as if Mr. Harris, since he did not get his way of obtaining bereavement leave, quite childishly “quit his employment.”

See some of Mr. Harris’ articles in the union newsletter (appended to a Marxist essay written for a course in Mr. Harris’ masters’ program. The title of the essay is “A Critical Look at Dewey’s Laboratory School” (document 24). See also in the same document some quotes which Mr. Harris posted to the school division bulletin board at the division office where he worked. Management did not appreciate Mr. Harris’ criticisms, of course.)

A lesson to be learned when dealing with social workers, the courts, the police and other representatives of the social system:

Expect the interests of children to be less important than political oppression of Marxists.
Unless Marxists record everything, expect them to either be incapable of understanding the situation which you face, or expect them to distort it, or even to lie. (And even if you record it, they will try to interpret the situation in such a way that tries to show Marxists to be irrational.)
Expect the social-democratic left, liberals and conservatives to blame Marxists for everything and to deny blame to those who are not Marxists.
Expect their implicit assumption of the rationality of the social system to paint your political efforts as irrational.
Do not expect that your efforts at telling the truth will prevail over lies by others since the representatives of the class of employers will assume that the lies of others are the truth and your telling the truth is a lie.

Perhaps there are other lessons to be learned. If so, please indicate what other lessons can be learned from this.

The Radical Left Needs to Call into Question Existing Social Institutions at Every Opportunity, Part One

Before I obtained a so-called permanent teaching position (I will explain in a much later post why I use the word “so-called”), I worked for a number of years as a substitute teacher (with short periods of term teaching positions). I became an executive member of the Winnipeg Teachers’ Association (WTA) (in the province of Manitoba, Canada), representing substitute teachers.

The WTA had an education fund for the executive, where each member, if approved by the executive, could access up to $3,000 for educational purposes. A condition for obtaining such funds was a summary of the educational experience and its publication in the WTA newsletter.

I used this situation as an opportunity to criticize the limitations of the educational experience.

Of course, representatives should not limit themselves to such criticism but rather perform their representative function in order to enhance the democratic nature of the union or association to which they belong. To that end, I and others on the Substitute Teachers’ Committee created a survey for substitute teachers and used the results of such a survey to criticize the policy of the WTA of permitting only permanent teachers the right to apply for permanent positions (substitute teachers paid association dues and consisted of usually 700-900 paying members of around 4000 members, but they did not have the right to apply for permanent positions).

Below is a copy of the draft (written in 2007) as well as the critical summary of my educational experience.

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To the Negotiations Committee
As members of the same organization, all should be treated in the same way unless there are sufficient differential grounds for distinguishing the members and for thus treating them on a differential basis. However, that does not mean that substitute teachers should necessarily all have the same rights as permanent contract teachers.
A basic principle of political philosophy is that all should be treated the same unless there are differential conditions for treating some differently from others. There are differential conditions, at least in the case of substitute teachers who are relatively new. Would it be fair, for instance, that permanent contract teachers, who by definition generally expect to work for the same employer for years, be reduced to the same rights as a beginning substitute teacher? Attachment to a particular employer for an increasing length of time forms the basis for privileging permanent teachers over substitute teachers, just as the principle of seniority does in unions.
However, as substitute teachers are engaged in employment with the same employer for an increasing length of time, the grounds for differential treatment become less and less valid.
Of course, the reported statistics from the survey of substitute teachers do indicate that there is a substantial percentage of substitute teachers who have been employed by the Division for a number of years. Their exclusion from any consideration of whether they can apply for positions is less valid than the exclusion of shorter term substitute teachers. Of course, the exact cut off line is not easy to define, but the issue is first of all whether all substitute teachers should be banned from applying for positions. Perhaps there are counterarguments which justify such exclusion, and I would like to hear such arguments. Lacking such counterarguments, substitute teachers with a certain period of employment with the Division should have the right to apply for positions as they arise, just like permanent contract teachers.
Addressing now the issue of those with a shorter period of employment with the Division, the Division may agree to allow them to apply for positions once the third round of blue sheets have been distributed.
In other words, there would be two sets of substitute teachers, those with sufficient length of service to be able to apply for positions immediately, and those with less service, who would be able to apply for positions on the third round of job postings.
Although this two-tier system of selection may be preferable, it may not be possible during the 2009 round of bargaining; a collective agreement involves two parties, and it may be impossible to negotiate the “best” scenario in any particular year of bargaining. Consequently, there are two alternative proposals: a “bottom-line one,” and a preferred (but perhaps unrealistic) one at this stage. The important point is to have substitute teachers’ concern about the right to apply for job postings addressed.
Proposed “bottom-line clause”: All substitute teachers shall have the right to apply for job postings during the third round of postings of the blue sheets.”
An alternative would be as follows: Substitute teachers who have substituted for the Division for at least ten (10) years shall have the right to apply for job postings. Substitute teachers with less than 10 years of substitute teaching shall have the right to apply for job postings during the third round of postings of the blue sheet.”
Of course, the exact wording is irrelevant at this stage. It is the concept that matters.
Fred, chair, Substitute Teachers’ Committee

The critical summary of my educational experience (

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The Double-Bind of Teachers as Employees
On September 21 [2007], I attended a seminar on Employment Law Essentials. It covered various topics, including the difference between an employee and an independent contractor, pre-employment inquiries, employment standards and workplace harassment policies.
There were two areas of most relevance to teachers: a discussion of the nature of an employee and the issue of the age at which people can become employees.
Let us start with the last issue first. The age at which people can become employees is relevant for teachers since the age at which students can become employees then arises. Generally, it is very difficult for students under the age of 12 to become employees. On the other hand, it is less difficult for students between the ages of 12 and 16 to obtain a permit. Four people must be in agreement if those between 12 and 16 are to become employees: the student, the parent, the principal and the employer. Since being an employee may affect school work, teachers who are concerned about some of their students working as employees may consult with the principal since the latter needs to agree to such employment.
Addressing now the first issue—the nature of an employee—there are four criteria for determining whether a person is an employee or has her or his own business (is an independent contractor): lack of control over the work performed (how, when and where the work is to be performed), the ownership of tools, possibility of loss or gain and the extent to which the person is integrated into the employer’s operations. The criterion of loss or gain is inapplicable to the situation of teachers. The criterion of integration is only used in borderline cases. Hence, the question of the status of teachers is reduced to the two criteria of control and ownership of tools.
In the seminar, we briefly discussed whether teachers are employees. Although teachers may control the order in which the curriculum is presented, it is the Division, generally, which determines standards of performance for teachers. Another aspect of control is whether the employer determines where and when work is done. Teachers work for the Division and not for specific schools. The collective agreement may modify the power of the employer, but it does not fundamentally alter the situation—as teachers in low-enrollment schools may discover when they are transferred to other schools. In terms of control, teachers are employees.
The other criterion for determining who is an employee is the ownership of tools. In the case of teachers, although the latter may personally purchase items for use in the classroom, it is the Division which owns the buildings, the things in the building and so forth. The fact that the Division may represent the vague public because of the payment of taxes does not change the situation.
Since the situation of teachers satisfies the two major criteria for determining whether teachers are employees, it can indeed be concluded that they are employees.
The collective agreement does not change the status of teachers as employees; it modified the conditions of employment—certainly an important characteristic—but it does not fundamentally alter the employer-employee relationships as such. For example, employment standards are such that judges will take into account length of service to an employer when considering notice required, but the judge will not take it into consideration when the issue of dismissal arises. Arbitrators of collective agreements, on the other hand, do take into account length of service when considering the issue of dismissal.
The issue of control is full of interesting sub-issues. One of the issues that were brought up was whether employees who are under the control of employers are extensions of the will of the employer. They are. This situation, however, has major social implications. If employees are extensions of the will of the employer, then employees are means to the ends specified by the employer.
Immanuel Kant, a German philosopher, argued that it is a categorical ethical imperative to treat all human beings as ends in themselves. If we apply the philosophical principle of the unity of the ends in the means and the means in the ends, then to treat human beings as ends in themselves is to have them participate in the process of defining their own ends. They need to be able to contribute to the formation of the ends toward which their activity tends: living democracy rather than formal democracy.
Being an employee, however, which involves being an extension of the will of the employer, clashes with the principle of treating human beings as a unity of both means and ends in the same process. Human life is split, with teachers being extensions of the will of the Division. Their personhood is suspended to the extent that they cannot formulate the ends of their own activity in conjunction with the activity of other teachers.
This clash applies to other employees in other domains, such as waiters and waitresses, bus drivers, factory workers, office workers and so forth. In the specific case of teachers, though, there is an added contradiction. Teachers are supposed to treat students as ends in themselves: the formation of character. To do so, they need to have students learn to unify the ends in the means and the means in the ends. If, however, part of their function is to prepare students for their status as employees, then their educative function clashes with their function within the school system. This is the double bind of teachers: being an employee, on the one hand, and being an educator within an economy dominated by the employer-employee relation on the other.
Are teachers in a double bind? What do other teachers believe?
Fred Harris, executive member

A Worker’s Resistance to the Capitalist Government or State and its Representatives, Part One

The following may not seem appropriate since it is supposed to be a political blog. However, the personal is sometimes political, and the political is sometimes personal. Political lessons can sometimes, therefore, be drawn from personal experiences. It will also serve as an antidote against the illusions of the social-democratic left, who isolate the various forms of injustices and treat them as independent of each other–a typical methodological trick by the social-democratic left.

Indeed, when I was still a teacher at a school, one union rep implied that certain experiences that I outlined had more to do with purely domestic conflicts. Such an isolation of family relations forms part of the typical methodology of social democracy.

For that reason, I am also including a published essay on Dewey’s conception of language and the human life process on my blog, in the section Publications and Writings. It undoubtedly is limited in many ways and may indeed contain errors, but the idea that the human life process as integrating many elements and hence as comprehensive is relevant for understanding the world.

I will copy, little by little, be, a complaint that I filed against a social worker, Mr. S.W., of Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada. There was a court-ordered assessment to be performed concerning the relationship between the parents and Francesca Alexandra Harris, their daughter, in the summer of 1998.

I am not including the name of the social worker since it is possible that he would try to take me to court; despite the documentation that I possess against a report he wrote, it is quite possible that a judge would side with him due to joint political bigotry. I am replacing his name with Mr. S.W. (appropriate given the social-reformist nature of most social workers as well as how the Manitoba Institute of Registered Social Workers handled the complaint). The complaint has to do with my daughter, Francesca Alexandra Romani (ne Harris).

I will first provide the first couple of pages of the complaint, which stimulated me to write the complaint, in order to provide the context of what follows. I then may not follow the order of the complaint since I may want to bring out earlier the more directly political aspect of my experience.

For those who do attempt to engage in criticism of the power of employers as a class, you can expect such hostility. That hostility may even extend to your family, even if it is indirect and subtle.

From the complaint (February 18, 2000):

This is a belated complaint against Mr. S.W., registered social worker. It has been more than a year since the initial court-ordered assessment (document 1) done by Mr. S.W. was completed and provided the court and counsel for Mr. Harris and, Mr. Harris presumes, his ex-wife, Ms. Harris.

What prompts Mr. Harris now to make the complaint is the following: in July of this year his daughter, Francesca Alexandra Harris, complained to him that her mother was using a wooden thing (“paleta” in Spanish) to her on the buttocks. She also complained that her mother used a belt to spank her on the same area.

Mr. Harris confronted Ms. Harris with the allegation when he dropped her of on a Sunday in July. Ms. Harris threatened to call the police (she and Mr. Harris have mutual non-molestation orders against each other). Mr. Harris told his daughter that he would call Child and Family Services and that hopefully someone would put a stop to such forms of punishment. Ms. Harris grabbed his daughter and practically forced her into the apartment block.

The next day Mr. Harris called Child and Family Services; they told Mr. Harris that they would contact Ms. Harris. The following two weeks (Mr. Harris sees his daughter every Wednesday and every alternate weekend) he picked up his daughter on Saturday as usual. His daughter, on Sunday, told him that her mother had grabbed her throat in the elevator the day that Mr. Harris had confronted her mother; the latter told her daughter never to tell Mr. Harris that she had hit her. Ms. Harris’ daughter said that she had cried and that her throat had hurt her.

Mr. Harris informed Child and Family Services once again. In the meantime, when Mr. Harris was talking to his daughter after this, Francesca asked him if he wanted to talk to Ulises (Ulises is Ms. Harris’ boyfriend). Francesca later told Mr. Harris that her mother had shoved her to the floor and told her never to ask that question again. Moreover, his daughter also informed him that her mother had hit her on the head with a book.

Eventually, a social worker, Arla Inglis, interviewed Mr. Harris’ daughter in September at her school. As Mr. Harris understands it, there was no “official” physical abuse in the sense that there were no physical marks. However, there was some apparently verbal confirmation of Mr. Harris’ allegations by Francesca. What exactly Francesca said Mr. Harris does not know, but he did speak to Mr. Orobko, Ms. Inglis’ supervisor, and he led Mr. Harris to understand that although there had been no physical abuse in terms of leaving marks there was nevertheless inappropriate discipline, and Francesca’s mother was advised to desist from punishing Mr. Harris’ daughter in an inappropriate manner.

Since that time, Francesca has told Mr. Harris that her mother had pulled her hair for having dropped some eggs. The weekend of October 9 and 10, when Francesca stayed with Mr. Harris, she told Mr. Harris that her mother once again used a “paleta” (a wooden thing) as well as a belt. On November 6, Francesca told her father that her mother had intentionally scratched her with a comb. There were a few scratch marks just above Francesca’s knee (nothing serious, but the issue was the intent to harm using an implement). Mr. Harris took Francesca to the doctor to verify this after having called Child and Family Services once again because Jacki Davidson, with whom Mr. Harris had been in contact before, in a rather hostile fashion told him that he would have to have physical proof of the allegation. (Arla Inglis more graciously later on told Mr. Harris that he should have taken Francesca to the Child Protection Centre.)

These incidents have led Mr. Harris to open up the question of S.W.’s assessment. Mr. Harris mentioned to Child and Family Services that he had gone to trial, that there had been an assessment, and that Mr. Harris had a copy of the assessment and of the judge’s decision. When requested to provide both, Mr. Harris found himself in the awkward position of not willing to provide the assessment while still wanting to provide the judge’s decision. The reasons will become clear as this complaint proceeds. The social worker accused Mr. Harris, justifiably from her point of view, of wanting to provide a one-sided view of the matter by suppressing relevant documents. Mr. Harris had nothing with which to rebut her objections.

Mr. Harris has spent months compiling this complaint. He finds Mr. S.W’s assessment to be a result of political bigotry because Mr. Harris is a Marxist. Mr. S.W. has done both Mr. Harris and Francesca Harris a disservice. It should be clear that ty the end of this complaint that not only did Mr. S.W let his political prejudices sway his judgement against Mr. Harris but also against Francesca. Francesca is now suffering as a consequence of political persecution perpetrated by Mr. S.W.. She is a victim of his own anti-Marxist proclivities.

The order of the criticism will not be according to Mr. S.W.’s presentation. It has been difficult to provide a complaint because of the large number of lies, distortions, inaccuracies and suppression of relevant facts. The organization will be somewhat logical, but there are many issues that are interrelated.

Comments from John Urkevich, AESES-UM Business Agent, to my Critique of the Grievance and Arbitration Procedure: Letter to the Editor, Inside The Association of Employees Supporting Educational Services (AESES), Vol. 17, No. 4, May 1994

As I wrote in my last post (Critique of the Grievance and Arbitration Procedure: Letter to the Editor, Inside The Association of Employees Supporting Educational Services (AESES), Vol. 17, No. 4, May 1994), I would provide the business agent’s reply to my letter to the editor in the same volume of the union newsletter. Here it is verbatim:

Mr. Harris’ comments are noteworthy in several respects albeit difficult to understand. I believe that Mr. Harris is attempting to convey the message that a collective agreement only goes so far in reducing management’s unbridled right to manage its affairs and its working force and therefore a union, any union, is only as effective as the collective agreement it has to work with on behalf of its membership.

I would agree, as would most, that collective agreements only limit management’s right to manage and that which is not specifically abridged by a collective agreement remains within the employer’s purview. This right, however, is tempered by legislation which dictates that the exercising of management rights must be reasonable, fair, non-arbitrary, non-discriminatory and in good faith. Although arbitrators do not generally accept the argument that because there is a collective agreement, management is restricted to dealing only with those functions as specified in the agreement unless there is union agreement, neither do arbitrators accept the argument that management has an unfettered right to act completely as it wishes, in particular when it comes to severing or detrimentally affecting an employee benefit.

Mr. Harris reiterates the definition of a grievance which is found in our collective agreement but in so doing leaves the impression that such a definition is restrictive. I would suggest that this defines a grievance in its broadest sense.

Arbitration is the final step in the grievance procedure and therefore is part and parcel of the procedure and not an entity of its own. The arbitration of a grievance occurs only if the parties cannot come to a mutually acceptable resolution of the issue either during the process or before a grievance is ever filed. Many of the issue that arise during the life of a collective agreement are resolved without either the necessity of a grievance of arbitration. Depending on the state of the employer/employee relationship, common sense and fairness can prevail without a confrontation.

The reason that management does not file grievances is because the employer/employee relationship is such that the employer acts and the employee reacts. The union’s right to be proactive is curbed by the law which prohibits employees from withholding their services during the term of a collective agreement and specified that all agreements must contain a method of resolving disputes which arise during the term without a work stoppage (grievance procedure). Whenever management takes an action the employee must continue as normal whether or not the employer is correct (there are some exceptions). This is aptly coined as the “work now–grieve later” principle. If this were not the case then I suspect that management grievances would be a fact of life.

I do not agree, as Mr. Harris suggests, that because management’s right is merely restricted by a collective agreement that employees should not voice their concerns or their problems, unless it is certainty that a grievance is winnable. Union members should always check with their union representative any questionable act of management. After all the employer only has control over the how, what, and when, it does not have the right to treat employees in an unjust or undignified manner. Employees are not channel.

I have provided Mr. Urkevich’s response in full without my intervention so that the reader could see the whole response before I begin to analyze the response (an opportunity which I did not have since, as I said, I was no longer a member of the union).

….Mr. Harris is attempting to convey the message that a collective agreement only goes so far in reducing management’s unbridled right to manage its affairs and its working force and therefore a union, any union, is only as effective as the collective agreement it has to work with on behalf of its membership.

I fail to see how anyone could infer from what I wrote that that is the message that I wanted to convey. Unions need to teach their members the limitations of the legal rights of union members as contained in collective agreements–and those legal rights are very limited. That is what I wanted to convey.

Union representatives, in order to “sell” a contract, often exaggerate the fairness of a collective agreement and thereby do their members a disservice because they then teach them the opposite; they imply that, by being “fair,” collective agreements are not very limited instruments for protecting their collective interests. See, for example, reference to a “fair contract” by the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) Local 3902 of the University of Toronto (CUPE 3902, University of Toronto Education Workers).

I would agree, as would most, that collective agreements only limit management’s right to manage and that which is not specifically abridged by a collective agreement remains within the employer’s purview. This right, however, is tempered by legislation which dictates that the exercising of management rights must be reasonable, fair, non-arbitrary, non-discriminatory and in good faith.

Mr. Urkevich, like many union representatives, begs the question. Why does he assume what he needs to prove, namely, that the employer/employee relation can be “reasonable, fair?” In the money circuit of capital, for example, it has been shown that employees are mere means for the benefit of employers (see The Money Circuit of Capital). Indeed, as I wrote in that section:

Immanuel Kant, a German philosopher, argued that, in order to act ethically, it is necessary to treat people never as means only but as ends in themselves: “For, all rational beings stand under the law that each of them is to treat himself and all others never merely as means but always at the same time as ends in themselves” (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. New York: Cambridge University Press, page 41). Human beings need to be treated as ends and not as means. To treat human beings as ends in themselves, it is necessary to have those who engage in realizing the ends also engaged in participating in the formulation of the ends.

If human beings, as employees, are treated as means to others’ ends, then how is such a situation “fair and reasonable”? For the employer, by definition, it is fair and reasonable. Is it for the workers though? Does not Mr. Urkevitch take the point of view of the employer as his standard? Should we? Why?

Is not Mr. Urkevich’s reference to “legistlation which dictates that the exercising of management rights must be reasonable, fair, non-arbitrary, non-discriminatory and in good faith” meant to justify Mr. Urkevitch’s own role as union business agent since, otherwise, Mr. Urkevich would be justifying unreasonable actions, unfair actions, and so forth.

Although arbitrators do not generally accept the argument that because there is a collective agreement, management is restricted to dealing only with those functions as specified in the agreement unless there is union agreement, neither do arbitrators accept the argument that management has an unfettered right to act completely as it wishes, in particular when it comes to severing or detrimentally affecting an employee benefit.

Of course arbitrators would not permit employers to let managers do what they will with employee benefits or, for that matter, employees in general. The treatment has to be consistent with the line of business. However, this leaves management with a very wide latitude of power to determine what can and cannot be done at work.

Whenever management takes an action the employee must continue as normal whether or not the employer is correct (there are some exceptions). This is aptly coined as the “work now–grieve later” principle. If this were not the case then I suspect that management grievances would be a fact of life.

Mr. Urkevitch, like many union representatives, assume without further ado that the employer/employee relation is inherently reasonable. I categorically deny that, and for reason already provided in reference to Kant and the money circuit of capital.

Management has a monopoly of decision-making power except as restricted by the collective agreement (and limited legislation); why employers have such a monopoly of decision-making power Mr. Urkevitch does not even question–undoubtedly like many other trade-union representatives and social-reformists.

Mr. Urkevitch merely repeats what needs to be explained: “Whenever management takes an action the employee must continue as normal…” Why must the employee do so? Because of economic coercion, perhaps? (See “Capitalism needs economic coercion for its job market to function” (Ontario Coalition Against Poverty: OCAP)). It is the economic power of employers compared to employees that shapes legislation in favour of employers?

Mr. Urkevitch, undoubtedly like many union representatives, with a manipulative “if” (“If this were not the case”–but it is not the case–and that makes all the difference in the world for the daily lives of unionized workers–seeks to minimize the importance of the fact that it is mainly unions that file grievances and not management–because management has the power to make the major decisions that effect the lives of millions of workers.

I do not agree, as Mr. Harris suggests, that because management’s right is merely restricted by a collective agreement that employees should not voice their concerns or their problems, unless it is certainty that a grievance is winnable.

This reasoning is pure fantasy. Employees should voice their concern in various ways–even if the grievance is not winnable. Where did I imply that only if the grievance is winnable should workers voice their concern?

After all the employer only has control over the how, what, and when, it does not have the right to treat employees in an unjust or undignified manner. Employees are not chattel.

This last sentence likely sums up the attitude of many union representatives. No, employees are not chattel, that is to say, they are not slaves, owned 24 hours a day. They are not required to work for a particular employer. No one forces them to work for a particular employer.

However, just as with the manipulative use of the word “if” above, Mr. Urkevitch uses the word “only” in order to minimize the importance of how much power management has over the lives of even unionized workers: “the employer only [my emphasis] has control over the how, what, and when….”

Mr. Urkevitch evidently does not think that “control over the how, what, and when” is “unjust or undignified.”

I do. (See above, referring to Kant and the money circuit of capital). Employers, by controlling “the how, what, and when”–control the lives of workers, which is undignified and unjust.

Union representatives, like Mr. Urkevitch, however, obviously believe that it is just. They believe in the justice of the collective agreement, where “the employer only has control over the how, what, and when.”

Union representatives imply, often enough, that there is somehow something fair about collective agreements. No one seems to challenge them to explain what they mean by fair collective agreements.

For instance, here is an example from a relatively recent union representative in Ontario:

Toronto (24 May 2018)…

Warren (Smokey) Thomas, President of the Ontario Public Service Employees Union (OPSEU/NUPGE) said he is hopeful the employer is ready to step up and do what is right for 20,000 of its workers who have suffered for decades under appalling working conditions.

“We’ve heard countless horror stories from our new members about poor pay and job security, no vacation time, they don’t even get sick days,” said Thomas.
“The fact our members overwhelmingly voted to join OPSEU/NUPGE in the largest organizing drive in Canadian history sends a strong message that times are changing. I hope this employer will work with us and make sure our members get a fair contract,” he said.

Of course, unions generally do improve wages and working conditions, but such improvements do not give them the right to declare that any collective agreement is somehow fair. They abuse their position by doing so, and by abusing their position, they open themselves up to legitimate criticism.

Unfortunately, few among the so-called left engage in such criticism. Rather, at best they follow along behind the unions, seeking “openings” here and there to open up discussion rather than openly criticizing all talk of fair contracts or collective agreements. They do a disservice to the regular worker but certainly aid both union representatives–and the class of employers.

One final point: although any particular employee is not obliged to work for any particular employer, what of the class of emloyees in relation to the class of employers? Can the class of employees simply not work for an employer, freely and realistically? If not, what does that make them?

So many questions, but so few answers–by union representatives and, undoubtedly, by many social reformists.

Critique of the Grievance and Arbitration Procedure: Letter to the Editor, Inside The Association of Employees Supporting Educational Services (AESES), Vol. 17, No. 4, May 1994

In a previous post, I provided the current management rights clause between AESES and the University of Manitoba (Management (Employer) Rights, Part Three: Public Sector Collective Agreement, Manitoba). This is a continuation, of sorts.

The title indicates what the content of this post will be about.

In 1994, I worked on a project at Dafoe Library at the University of Manitoba (Canada) for a few months (one of the few positions I had because I was probably blacklisted because of my previous union and radical activity in my workplace in School District No. 57, Prince George, British Columbia). I sent in the following to the union newsletter. Unfortunately, I could not pursue any further the debate since the project had ended–and consequently my union membership.

The following is a verbatim letter to the editor of the AESES newsletter. The next post, probably next week, will be the business agent’s reply to my letter in the same newsletter.

Unions need to instruct members concerning the legal limits of the union’s capabilities, and members need to know what they can legally expect from the union. Unfortunately, from my own observations, many members do not know what the limits of union power are as it presently exists. They do not even have a clear grasp of the grievance and arbitration procedure. The following is thus meant both to inform members of the procedure and to generate some debate over the nature and function of unions.

A grievance is frequently defined as any difference arising from the interpretation, application, administration, or alleged violation of a collective agreement. If a grievance is not resolved in the grievance process, it may end in arbitration (a sort of court which determines whether the grievance is valid). The problem is that most arbitrators in Canada interpret the collective agreement as merely limiting management’s general right to manage work–including the lives of the workers–as it sees fit. With few exceptions, management retains its general right unless specifically restricted in the agreement.

Some union executives may disagree, claiming that the collective agreement expresses the joint and equal will of both parties (management and the union); the collective agreement is a contract like any contract and is binding on the parties. Such a view fails to account for the specific nature of the employment contract. The employment contract entails the control by management of employees’ activities. Indeed, arbitrators differentiate independent contractors from employees primarily (though not exclusively) on the basis of the level of control: an independent contractor is not under the control of an employer, but an employee is. In other words, an employee is a subordinate.

Moreover, if the employment contract were similar to other contracts, both parties would likely claim a breach of the agreement roughly the same number of times. However, the vast majority of grievances are initiated by unions. Why is that? The answer has already been formulated above: management need not initiate grievances because it has the general right to manage work.

However, many issues important to workers which emerge during the term of the collective agreement are not covered by the collective agreement. Given that arbitrators’ authority is restricted to the collective agreement, it is unlikely that workers will win grievances that end in arbitration if no provisions exist in the agreement which restrict management’s general rights To be sure, arbitrators have some leeway in applying arbitral jurisprudence, but they are ultimately restricted by the collective agreement which exists.

Management (Employer) Rights, Part Three: Public Sector Collective Agreement, Manitoba

I worked on a library project at the Dafoe Library at the University of Manitoba (Canada) around 1993. The union to which I belonged was AESES (The Association of Employees Supporting Educational Services). I wrote to the editor of the union newsletter, criticizing the limitations of unions. The business agent of the union responded by assuming that I was criticizing the existence of unions. He defended the union. I wrote back, indicating the limitations of unions in relation to the power of employers. He then responded by implicitly defending the principles of collective agreements; he also misinterpreted some of my views. In another post, I will include the contents of what I wrote and his response.

The working situation was very hierarchical (top-down). This, undoubtedly for the social-democratic left, is inevitable. Democratic work relations for them, implicitly, are impossible. They refuse to confront the reality of dictatorship at work and, by ignoring the issue, they consider it inevitable. How else could they talk about good contracts, fair contracts, decent work or economic justice?

I guess workers who find working for an employer–even when there exists a collective agreement–to be oppressive and exploitative should be taken to task and criticized. Indeed, about a year and a half ago I was explicitly called a condescending prick by a representative of a public union in Toronto, Canada.

Of course, this blog site is meant to criticize the views of the social-reformist left in various ways.

From

COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT
BETWEEN:
THE UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA
– and –
THE ASSOCIATION OF EMPLOYEES
SUPPORTING EDUCATION SERVICES
APRIL 4, 2015 to APRIL 4, 2019

page 10:

ARTICLE 4 EMPLOYER’S RIGHTS
4.1 Nothing in this Collective Agreement is intended nor shall it be construed as
denying or in any manner limiting the right of the Employer to control and
supervise all operations and direct all working forces, including the right to
determine the employee’s ability, skill, competence, and qualifications for the
job, and to hire, discharge, lay-off, suspend, discipline, promote, demote or
transfer an employee, and to control and regulate the use of all equipment and
property and promote efficiency in all operations, provided, however, that in the
exercise of the foregoing Employer’s rights the Employer shall not contravene
the provisions of this Collective Agreement.

4.2 The Parties also agree that the foregoing enumeration of Employer’s rights
shall not be deemed to exclude other functions not specifically set forth,
therefore, the Employer retains all of its other inherent rights.

Unions frequently use the term “fair contracts” in order to “sell” a tentative agreement to their members. They rarely address the legitimacy of the power of employers to direct the lives of its members. In the post following my letter to the editor to the AESES union newsletter,, we will see how one union representative did try to legitimize collective agreements and the power of management.

Do you think that the above employer’s rights clause expresses a democratic way of life at work? Or a dictatorial way of life at work?

A Case of Silent Indoctrination, Part One: The Manitoba History Curricula and Its Lack of History of Employers and Employees

I submitted a longer essay to the popular Canadian educational journal Our Schools Our Selves for publication. It was never published.

The idea for the following has a personal basis: when my daughter was studying grade 11 Canadian history in Manitoba (Manitoba is one of 10 provinces in Canada, with three additional territories), I decided to look at the history curriculum in case I could provide some supports for her studies. In the process, it became evident to me that the entire curriculum left a gaping hole that failed to address my experiences in this world. Thus, I have generally worked for an employer in order to obtain money, which in turn enabled me to buy the things that I needed to live. The Manitoba Canadian history curriculum is devoid of any historical explanation of such an experience.

My experience is hardly unique. How many of those who now are reading this have worked for an employer or are now working for an employer? Is it not a little odd that a course on history fails to explain how and why employers—and their counterpart employees (employers cannot exist without economically dependent employees)–arose?

This is my research question.

Manitoba has a curriculum that does not answer the question of why employers and employees exist. Using the term “employ,” there was a reference to the super-exploitation of Chinese workers by employers. On page I-20 concerning possible inequities in employment. There is no reference to having students inquire about the possible inequity of the employer-employees relationship as such, that is to say, whether that relation necessarily involves inequities that cannot be resolved within the terms of that relation. When using the search term “work” some relevant hits for the history of the working class came up, such as the On-to-Ottawa trek (1935) or the Regina riot (1935), the trade union movement or the Workers’ Unity League, but the reason why employers and employees exist is nowhere to be found.

Using the search term “work,” I came upon a reference on pages II—28 and IV-5 to a possible exploration of the significance of the life of a worker in 1918 Winnipeg in terms of a wider concern about workers’ struggles, economic development or post Second World War events and discontents. There is a—very slight—chance that students would be able to explore the issue of why employers and employees exist, but inquiry could just as easily be carried out without determining why and how they exist.

Using the search term “class,” on page I-8 I found a reference to exclusion of citizenship was partially based on class. (On the same page, using the search term “capital,” I found the only reference to capitalism—that the Canadian economy, though a mixed economy, was mainly a capitalist economy.) On page I-9, it is argued that Canadian citizens continue to face fighting inequality based on class. Does this mean that the authors are referring to the capitalist class and the working class and are arguing that Canadian citizens are fighting to eliminate the employer-employees relation? Not at all. On page II-10, it is noted that trade unionists and socialists rejected the single narrative approach to Canadian history, but so far there is a decided singular attitude towards the employer—employees relation—it is presumed rather than being a subject of inquiry for students of Canadian history. On page II-46, there is a reference to socio-economic class, but what that means is never developed. Social democrats frequently use such a term to refer to level of income, and define the “middle class” as the socio-economic class that is above the poverty line (however defined). This way of defining class does not address the power of employees in relation to the situation of employees. Nothing else of relevance was found using this search term. The results of using the various search term show that students would not be capable of answering the question of why employers and employees exist. The document is a document in indoctrination—a document that implicitly has students accept the employer-employee as natural rather than an historical creation (and that, therefore, has an end).

According to the grade 11 Manitoba history curriculum, then, the issue of how and why employers emerged and how and why employees subordinate their will to employers is irrelevant. Is this silence an expression of social justice? On page II-31 33, there is reference to Chinese workers in 1887 and the fact that they were paid a substantially lower wage than other workers.

Again, the issue of why the wage relation exists on a large scale nowhere is to form a focus for inquiry within the curriculum. Wage work is assumed to be ahistorical through such an omission. That means, implicitly, that some people are born to be employees and some are born to be employers; it is not of course stated, but the assumption is there through the omission of any exploration of the wage relation. Or did workers freely become wage workers? Do not wage workers as a class require that another class control access to the means for them to produce their own lives? Did you freely choose to work for a wage or salary? When did you make this choice?

The reformist left share the same assumptions as the designers of this curriculum. On a listserve for the Toronto Labour Committee (to which I belonged), for example, here in Toronto (the largest city in Canada), the regional coordinator for OPSEU (Ontario Provincial Service Employees Union) and president of GTAC (Greater Toronto Area Council), called for other workers to support striking brewery workers because, according to her, the brewery workers wanted a fair wage and decent work. I responded by agreeing that we should support them. However, when I questioned especially the idea of decent work, , a representative from the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) Local 3902 eventually called me a condescending prick. A member of the Toronto Labour Committee responded that both the representative of CUPE 3902 and I were right and wrong. It is nice to be able to eat your cake and eat it too. The practical head of the Toronto Labour Committee then intervened, but the issue of decent work never got addressed.

The idea that working for an employer is somehow decent work is indoctrination–and the radical left is afraid to challenge such indoctrination.

The head of the Toronto Labour Committee stated that there should be a “discussion” about what decent work means. I doubt that there ever will be such a discussion that will emerge from the so-called radical left since the so-called radical left in Toronto (and probably elsewhere) is too afraid of upsetting its union contacts. It is too close to reformist unions to see that what is needed is a much more critical stance towards unions than what the Toronto Labour Committee displayed if the indoctrination characteristic in schools, in the economy, by unions (see an example of my critique of a management rights clause in collective agreements in Management Rights, Part One: Private Sector Collective Agreement, British Columbia , in courts, and in social services (see my critique of the position of the Ontario Coalition Against Poverty: Basic Income: A Critique of the Ontario Coalition Against Poverty’s Stance ) is to be challenged.