Confessions of a Union Representative Concerning the Real Power of Employers

In the context of the process of passing legislation related to the Westray mining disaster (ultimately diluted to satisfy the interests of employers), a union representative explicitly expressed the reality that workers face when they work for employers. The problem with this explicit admission of the power of employers is that it does not play any real role in the education of the working class. Compare what is said below with union rhetoric about “decent jobs” or a “fair wage.” From Steven Bittle, Still Dying for a Living:
Shaping Corporate Criminal Liability After the Westray Mine Disaster,
doctoral dissertation, page 202:

Another union representative expressed concern [with the proposed government legislation] that unions can be held responsible for workplace accidents, noting that unions and employees have little decision-making control with the organization:

“…basically we wanted the legislation to go after corporate bosses, basically, because
they’re the ones that make the decisions. At the end of the day any decision that’s
made on anything to do with the business comes about as a result of management’s
decision. It doesn’t come about because of a union decision. We wish, but it doesn’t.
They have the ultimate authority to manage, and that authority is only restricted by
terms of a collective agreement, and in very few cases, maybe in terms of regulations or legislation. So we were hoping that it would focus more on criminal liability for those that have the power to make decisions. But in reality what it does is that it will hold anybody accountable if the investigation shows there was any part played in any particular incident by anybody from the janitor right up to the CEO. Now some people will argue, why not? Well normally, in my experience in almost forty years, is that any decision made by the janitor is usually something that is usually handed down from above, right. And there are very few cases where you could actually cite where somebody at that level had any type of malicious intent to do anything to cause harm “(Union representative, Interview 12).

One of the distinguishing features of human beings is our capacity to choose–our capacity to be free, to make decisions. The union representative openly admits that in the context of businesses, it is management that mainly decides and that all that a collective agreement does is restrict the authority of management to decide. Regulation and legislation, in a few cases, also limit that authority. Other than that, management has dictatorial powers at work. In other words, workers are treated as things at work–as objects to be used; they are thing-like objects, without the power to participate equally in decisions that affect their lives.

And the social-reformist left repeatedly refer to “decent jobs” and “fairness.” Even the so-called radical left (see the previous post, Social-Reformist Leftist Activists Share Assumptions with the Right) engage in such rhetoric. How being treated as things can be magically converted into decent jobs and fair wages is beyond me. The religious nature of this rhetoric (most frequently expressed by trade unionists) is obvious by the lack of any critical discussion concerning whether it reflects the experience of the millions (and indeed billions) of workers worldwide.

What do you think of the above honest statement of the reality or situation of even the more privileged section of the working class (for, generally, unionized workers are more privileged) when compared to the rhetoric of “decent work” and “fair wages” or “fairness” as expressed by the social-reformist left (and even the radical left)?

Should we not start discussing these issues openly and honestly? Are we? If we are not, why are we not doing so?

Management Rights, Part Four: Private Sector Collective Agreement, Ontario

The social-democratic left typically is incapable of dealing with the issue of the power of management. There is little or no discussion over such issues despite the existence of the power of the class of employers at various levels of society: economic, political, social and cultural. This silence expresses both the power of the class of employers and the poverty of the social-democratic left.

Indeed, the social-reformist left often uses such phrases as a “decent job,” or “decent work”–as if for most people in a capitalist society there is such a thing. Alternatively, the standard used by the left to judge what constitutes decent work and a decent job assumes the legitimacy of the power of employers.

Such a standard is assumed and not justified, of course, by the social-reformist left. Indeed, I even heard one so-called radical leftist in Toronto claim that the phrase “decent work” expressed a defensive maneuver on the part of the left. Such a view is convenient for those who fear alienating unions.

However, is it in the interests of workers to hide the reality of work that is undignified and involves their treatment as things in one way or another?

In the following clause, should not the members of the union have discussed the clause thoroughly? What is the likelihood that they have? My wager is that they have not done so. If not, should not the union be criticized? Should not the radical left who fail to criticize such unions also be criticized?

 

From

COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT
between
AIR CANADA
And those employees
In the service of
AIR CANADA
As represented by
UNIFOR
LOCAL 2002
Contract No. 31
As modified by the Memorandums of Agreement
dated June 13th 2015
Effective: March 1st 2015, to February 28th 2020

pages 2-3:

ARTICLE 3 RESERVATIONS OF MANAGEMENT
3.01 Subject to the provisions of this Collective Agreement, the control and direction of the working forces including the right to hire, suspend or discharge for cause, dispense with, to advance or set back in
3
classification, to reassign, to transfer or lay off because of lack of work or for other legitimate reasons, is vested solely in the Company.
3.02 These enumerations shall not be deemed to exclude other prerogatives not enumerated, and any of the rights, powers or authority of the Company are retained by the Company except those which are subject to the provisions of this Collective Agreement.

A Case of Silent Indoctrination, Part Two: The Ontario History Curriculum and Its Lack of History of Employers and Employees

This post is a continuation of a previous post on the Manitoba history curriculum (see   A Case of Silent Indoctrination, Part One: The Manitoba History Curricula and Its Lack of History of Employers and Employees). The background to the post is provided in that previous post.

But just a reminder: the research question is: Does the history curriculum (or, if not available, the social-studies curriculum) provide much of an opportunity for students to understand how and why employers (and employees arose)?

The Ontario secondary curriculum that pertains to Canadian history consists of two documents: Canadian and World Studies, grades 9 and 10, and Canadian and World Studies, grades 11 and 12. Both include history as a separate section. No relevant hits that would answer the question came up when I used the search term “employ” for the grades 9 and 10 history curriculum. A few hits referred to employment (access of the latter for women, for example or unemployment), but nothing in the way of an exploration of the historical emergence of the employer-employees relation in Canada. The same applies when I used the search term “work.” A few topics came up (such as the impact of the decline of the manufacturing sector on workers), but no explanation of why workers need to sell their capacity to work to an employer and subordinate their will to the employer.

The grades 11 and 12 history curriculum covers more material, including Canadian, American and world history. Like other curricula, the use of the search term “employ” resulted in hits that had nothing to do with explaining why employers emerged and have the power to dictate to workers at work. Hits deal with the employment of children and women in factories, or unemployment. One reference, however, does provide some possibility for exploring the historical emergence of employers and employees. On page 399, students are asked to “analyse interrelationships between specific groups in various societies around the world during this period [1650-1789] (e.g., between slaves and masters, serfs and lords, apprentices and employers….”

Here there is real potential for students to answer the question. However, it is buried in suggestions for analysis of other class relations rather than being a focal point. To be sure, a comparative approach to class relations may help in clarifying the distinctive nature and historical conditions of the employer-employees relation, but if the study of history is to enable us to understand our current situation better, then the historical conditions for the emergence of the employer-employees relation should be the focus, and differences from other class relations could then provide a contrast to further clarify the distinctive nature of the employer-employees relation in order for students to understand how and why most workers are now employees subject to the dictatorship of employers and how this is different from other forms of class relations. The contrast could also form the point of departure for the exploration of the question of whether another form of class relation will arise if the employer-employees relation no longer exists or whether no classes will exist due to the development of substantially changed technological conditions that no longer require class relations at all.

The curriculum designers were probably quite unconscious of the implications of their inclusion of a reference to employers and to other class relations. Nonetheless, the curriculum, however slightly, does provide an opening for students to explore the issue, but that opening should be a central feature of the history curriculum since it is a central feature of modern capitalist life.

Another limitation of this reference to employers is the connection of the latter to apprentices rather than to employees. The apprenticeship system occurred in guilds at first so that subordinates were to become master artisans and not employees. As capitalist relations developed, however, apprentices saw their chances of becoming a master artisan dwindle, and they saw themselves becoming an employee (and resisted accordingly). An historical focus on the transition from apprenticeship status to the status of being an employee should have been included in order to gain a proper appreciation of the world-historical shift from apprenticeship status to the persistent subordinate status of an employee and the emergence of employers as a distinct, controlling class.

Using the search term “work,” I found little of direct relevance in answering the question although there is some indirect relevance—but insufficient to guide the teacher in developing lesson plans that would help students the modern employer-employees relation. For instance, on page 307 it is suggested to have students compare the lives of working-class children working in industrial cities to children working as slaves on a southern plantation and to compare both to the children of wealthy families. Such a comparison is certainly better than much of what is offered in other history curricula, but it remains mainly static. How and why did children become working-class children, children of slaves or children of wealthy parents? Furthermore, if, as the philosopher of education John Dewey argued, the nature of anything includes its transformation into something else, then the nature of slave society and the nature of capitalist society (which included the working class) involves a consideration of what they are changing into: “Every event as such is passing into other things, in such a way that a later occurrence is an integral part of the character or nature of present existence” (Experience and Nature, London: Allen & Unwin, 1929, p. 111). History is not just about the past but about change and the kind of change that is possible—and the kinds of possibilities that were closed as other paths were taken.

Comparative relations are also suggested on page 356 by having students compare what is called traditional, mixed, agricultural, industrialized or free-market capitalist economies. Again, such a comparative view is better than the other curricula, but what is needed is a focus on the dynamic element—from one changing into the other, and how and why that occurs. Often, the dynamic is reduced to technological change—the mass production and mass use of cars, for instance. Furthermore, as already noted, the focus is not on coming to understand the current economic relations—which is indeed what the focus should be if students are to gain an understanding of the social world around them and to gain collective control over their own lives—which forms an essential element of real education.

The implicit bias (through its lack of focus on the question posed at the beginning of this essay) becomes more explicit on page 441 when the authors write: “Why have some groups been critical of the power of unions?” It is certainly true that some groups have been critical of the power of unions—employers. Nowhere in the document can we find a reference to the following question: “Why have some groups been critical of the power of employers?”

I used the search term “capital,” but there was only the occasional reference to capitalism. On page 332 there is a reference to how capitalism was transforming early societies in the fifteenth century, so there does arise some slight possibility for exploring the question, but the nature of capitalism is left unexplored. The role of the state and violence in establishing capitalism is not mentioned, though. Vague references to capitalism, without any reference to the emergence of a class of employers and a class of workers who subordinated their will to the class of employers, leaves the teacher and students without any real guidepost to explore the reasons why and how employers emerged and why there exists a general market for workers emerged.

Using the search term “class,” I did come across the occasional reference to class differences (for example, on page 304), but the question of the modern significance of class relations and the kind of class relations is left unexplored. On page 414, there is a question concerning the significance of wage labour in China during the Ming dynasty, but the dominance of wage labour in modern capitalist relations (wage labour as the dominant mode of production and exchange implies capitalism and a class of employers), is not explored. An opening for the exploration of the existence of wage labour in Canada and throughout the world is closed by the restricted reference to China in the past.

To sum up: There is some openings for an exploration of the nature and origins of employers and employees in Canada, but in general it is unlikely that most teachers are provided sufficiently strong guidelines to make the topic an integral part of the Canadian history curriculum in Ontario.

In other words, Ontario schools provide limited scope for enlightening students on the nature and origin of employers and employees. Hence, they contribute to the indoctrination of students by largely excluding the topic from explicit consideration.

Comments from John Urkevich, AESES-UM Business Agent, to my Critique of the Grievance and Arbitration Procedure: Letter to the Editor, Inside The Association of Employees Supporting Educational Services (AESES), Vol. 17, No. 4, May 1994

As I wrote in my last post (Critique of the Grievance and Arbitration Procedure: Letter to the Editor, Inside The Association of Employees Supporting Educational Services (AESES), Vol. 17, No. 4, May 1994), I would provide the business agent’s reply to my letter to the editor in the same volume of the union newsletter. Here it is verbatim:

Mr. Harris’ comments are noteworthy in several respects albeit difficult to understand. I  believe that Mr. Harris is attempting to convey the message that a collective agreement only goes so far in reducing management’s unbridled right to manage its affairs and its working force and therefore a union, any union, is only as effective as the collective agreement it has to work with on behalf of its membership.

I would agree, as would most, that collective agreements only limit management’s right to manage and that which is not specifically abridged by a collective agreement remains within the employer’s purview. This right, however, is tempered by legislation which dictates that the exercising of management rights must be reasonable, fair, non-arbitrary, non-discriminatory and in good faith. Although arbitrators do not generally accept the argument that because there is a collective agreement, management is restricted to dealing only with those functions as specified in the agreement unless there is union agreement, neither do arbitrators accept the argument that management has an unfettered right to act completely as it wishes, in particular when it comes to severing or detrimentally affecting an employee benefit.

Mr. Harris reiterates the definition of a grievance which is found in our collective agreement but in so doing leaves the impression that such a definition is restrictive. I would suggest that this defines a grievance in its broadest sense.

Arbitration is the final step in the grievance procedure and therefore is part and parcel of the procedure and not an entity of its own. The arbitration of a grievance occurs only if the parties cannot come to a mutually acceptable resolution of the issue either during the process or before a grievance is ever filed. Many of the issue that arise during the life of a collective agreement are resolved without either the necessity of a grievance of arbitration. Depending on the state of the employer/employee relationship, common sense and fairness can prevail without a confrontation.

The reason that management does not file grievances is because the employer/employee relationship is such that the employer acts and the employee reacts. The union’s right to be proactive is curbed by the law which prohibits employees from withholding their services during the term of a collective agreement and specified that all agreements must contain a method of resolving disputes which arise during the term without a work stoppage (grievance procedure). Whenever management takes an action the employee must continue as normal whether or not the employer is correct (there are some exceptions). This is aptly coined as the “work now–grieve later” principle. If this were not the case then I suspect that management grievances would be a fact of life.

I do not agree, as Mr. Harris suggests, that because management’s right is merely restricted by a collective agreement that employees should not voice their concerns or their problems, unless it is certainty that a grievance is winnable. Union members should always check with their union representative any questionable act of management. After all the employer only has control over the how, what, and when, it does not have the right to treat employees in an unjust or undignified manner. Employees are not channel.

I have provided Mr. Urkevich’s response in full without my intervention so that the reader could see the whole response before I begin to analyze the response (an opportunity which I did not have since, as I said, I was no longer a member of the union).

….Mr. Harris is attempting to convey the message that a collective agreement only goes so far in reducing management’s unbridled right to manage its affairs and its working force and therefore a union, any union, is only as effective as the collective agreement it has to work with on behalf of its membership.

I fail to see how anyone could infer from what I wrote that that is the message that I wanted to convey. Unions need to teach their members the limitations of the legal rights of union members as contained in collective agreements–and those legal rights are very limited. That is what I wanted to convey.

Union representatives, in order to “sell” a contract, often exaggerate the fairness of a collective agreement and thereby do their members a disservice because they then teach them the opposite; they imply that, by being “fair,” collective agreements are not very limited instruments for protecting their collective interests. See, for example, reference to a “fair contract” by the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) Local 3902 of the University of Toronto (CUPE 3902, University of Toronto Education Workers).

I would agree, as would most, that collective agreements only limit management’s right to manage and that which is not specifically abridged by a collective agreement remains within the employer’s purview. This right, however, is tempered by legislation which dictates that the exercising of management rights must be reasonable, fair, non-arbitrary, non-discriminatory and in good faith.

Mr. Urkevich, like many union representatives, begs the question. Why does he assume what he needs to prove, namely, that the employer/employee relation can be “reasonable, fair?” In the money circuit of capital, for example, it has been shown that employees are mere means for the benefit of employers (see  The Money Circuit of Capital). Indeed, as I wrote in that section:

Immanuel Kant, a German philosopher, argued that, in order to act ethically, it is necessary to treat people never as means only but as ends in themselves: “For, all rational beings stand under the law that each of them is to treat himself and all others never merely as means but always at the same time as ends in themselves” (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. New York: Cambridge University Press, page 41). Human beings need to be treated as ends and not as means. To treat human beings as ends in themselves, it is necessary to have those who engage in realizing the ends also engaged in participating in the formulation of the ends.

If human beings, as employees, are treated as means to others’ ends, then how is such a situation “fair and reasonable”? For the employer, by definition, it is fair and reasonable. Is it for the workers though? Does not Mr. Urkevitch take the point of view of the employer as his standard? Should we? Why?

Is not Mr. Urkevich’s reference to “legistlation which dictates that the exercising of management rights must be reasonable, fair, non-arbitrary, non-discriminatory and in good faith” meant to justify Mr. Urkevitch’s own role as union business agent since, otherwise, Mr. Urkevich would be justifying unreasonable actions, unfair actions, and so forth.

Although arbitrators do not generally accept the argument that because there is a collective agreement, management is restricted to dealing only with those functions as specified in the agreement unless there is union agreement, neither do arbitrators accept the argument that management has an unfettered right to act completely as it wishes, in particular when it comes to severing or detrimentally affecting an employee benefit.

Of course arbitrators would not permit employers to let managers do what they will with employee benefits or, for that matter, employees in general. The treatment has to be consistent with the line of business. However, this leaves management with a very wide latitude of power to determine what can and cannot be done at work.

Whenever management takes an action the employee must continue as normal whether or not the employer is correct (there are some exceptions). This is aptly coined as the “work now–grieve later” principle. If this were not the case then I suspect that management grievances would be a fact of life.

Mr. Urkevitch, like many union representatives, assume without further ado that the employer/employee relation is inherently reasonable. I categorically deny that, and for reason already provided in reference to Kant and the money circuit of capital.

Management has a monopoly of decision-making power except as restricted by the collective agreement (and limited legislation); why employers have such a monopoly of decision-making power Mr. Urkevitch does not even question–undoubtedly like many other trade-union representatives and social-reformists.

Mr. Urkevitch merely repeats what needs to be explained: “Whenever management takes an actio the employee must continue as normal…” Why must the employee do so? Because of economic coercion, perhaps? (See “Capitalism needs economic coercion for its job market to function” (Ontario Coalition Against Poverty: OCAP)). It is the economic power of employers compared to employees that shapes legislation in favour of employers?

Mr. Urkevitch, undoubtedly like many union representatives, with a manipulative “if” (“If this were not the case”–but it is not the case–and that makes all the difference in the world for the daily lives of unionized workers–seeks to minimize the importance of the fact that it is mainly unions that file grievances and not management–because management has the power to make the major decisions that effect the lives of millions of workers.

I do not agree, as Mr. Harris suggests, that because management’s right is merely restricted by a collective agreement that employees should not voice their concerns or their problems, unless it is certainty that a grievance is winnable.

This reasoning is pure fantasy. Employees should voice their concern in various ways–even if the grievance is not winnable. Where did I imply that only if the grievance is winnable should workers voice their concern?

After all the employer only has control over the how, what, and when, it does not have the right to treat employees in an unjust or undignified manner. Employees are not channel.

This last sentence likely sums up the attitude of many union representatives. No, employees are not chattel, that is to say, they are not slaves, owned 24 hours a day. They are not required to work for a particular employer. No one forces them to work for a particular employer.

However, just as with the manipulative use of the word “if” above, Mr. Urkevitch uses the word “only” in order to minimize the importance of how much power management has over the lives of even unionized workers: “the employer only [my emphasis] has control over the how, what, and when….”

Mr. Urkevitch evidently does not think that “control over the how, what, and when” is “unjust or undignified.”

I do. (See above, referring to Kant and the money circuit of capital). Employers, by controlling “the how, what, and when”–control the lives of workers, which is undignified and unjust.

Union representatives, like Mr. Urkevitch, however, obviously believe that it is just. They believe in the justice of the collective agreement, where “the employer only has control over the how, what, and when.”

Union representatives imply, often enough, that there is somehow something fair about collective agreements. No one seems to challenge them to explain what they mean by fair collective agreements.

For instance, here is an example from a relatively recent union representative in Ontario:

Toronto (24 May 2018)…

Warren (Smokey) Thomas, President of the Ontario Public Service Employees Union (OPSEU/NUPGE) said he is hopeful the employer is ready to step up and do what is right for 20,000 of its workers who have suffered for decades under appalling working conditions.

“We’ve heard countless horror stories from our new members about poor pay and job security, no vacation time, they don’t even get sick days,” said Thomas.
“The fact our members overwhelmingly voted to join OPSEU/NUPGE in the largest organizing drive in Canadian history sends a strong message that times are changing. I hope this employer will work with us and make sure our members get a fair contract,” he said.

Of course, unions generally do improve wages and working conditions, but such improvements do not give them the right to declare that any collective agreement is somehow fair. They abuse their position by doing so, and by abusing their position, they open themselves up to legitimate criticism.

Unfortunately, few among the so-called left engage in such criticism. Rather, at best they follow along behind the unions, seeking “openings” here and there to open up discussion rather than openly criticizing all talk of fair contracts or collective agreements. They do a disservice to the regular worker but certainly aid both union representatives–and the class of employers.

One final point: although any particular employee is not obliged to work for any particular employer, what of the class of emloyees in relation to the class of employers? Can the class of employees simply not work for an employer, freely and realistically? If not, what does that make them?

So many questions, but so few answers–by union representatives and, undoubtedly, by many social reformists.

 

 

Critique of the Grievance and Arbitration Procedure: Letter to the Editor, Inside The Association of Employees Supporting Educational Services (AESES), Vol. 17, No. 4, May 1994

In a previous post, I provided the current management rights clause between AESES and the University of Manitoba  (Management (Employer) Rights, Part Three: Public Sector Collective Agreement, Manitoba). This is a continuation, of sorts.

The title indicates what the content of this post will be about.

In 1994, I worked on a project at Dafoe Library at the University of Manitoba (Canada) for a few months (one of the few positions I had because I was probably blacklisted because of my previous union and radical activity in my workplace in School District No. 57, Prince George, British Columbia). I sent in the following to the union newsletter. Unfortunately, I could not pursue any further the debate since the project had ended–and consequently my union membership.

The following is a verbatim letter to the editor of the AESES newsletter. The next post, probably next week, will be the business agent’s reply to my letter in the same newsletter.

Unions need to instruct members concerning the legal limits of the union’s capabilities, and members need to know what they can legally expect from the union. Unfortunately, from my own observations, many members do not know what the limits of union power are as it presently exists. They do not even have a clear grasp of the grievance and arbitration procedure. The following is thus meant both to inform members of the procedure and to generate some debate over the nature and function of unions.

A grievance is frequently defined as any difference arising from the interpretation, application, administration, or alleged violation of a collective agreement. If a grievance is not resolved in the grievance process, it may end in arbitration (a sort of court which determines whether the grievance is valid). The problem is that most arbitrators in Canada interpret the collective agreement as merely limiting management’s general right to manage work–including the lives of the workers–as it sees fit. With few exceptions, management retains its general right unless specifically restricted in the agreement.

Some union executives may disagree, claiming that the collective agreement expresses the joint and equal will of both parties (management and the union); the collective agreement is a contract like any contract and is binding on the parties. Such a view fails to account for the specific nature of the employment contract. The employment contract entails the control by management of employees’ activities. Indeed, arbitrators differentiate independent contractors from employees primarily (though not exclusively) on the basis of the level of control: an independent contractor is not under the control of an employer, but an employee is. In other words, an employee is a subordinate.

Moreover, if the employment contract were similar to other contracts, both parties would likely claim a breach of the agreement roughly the same number of times. However, the vast majority of grievances are initiated by unions. Why is that? The answer has already been formulated above: management need not initiate grievances because it has the general right to manage work.

However, many issues important to workers which emerge during the term of the collective agreement are not covered by the collective agreement. Given that arbitrators’ authority is restricted to the collective agreement, it is unlikely that workers will win grievances that end in arbitration if no provisions exist in the agreement which restrict management’s general rights To be sure, arbitrators have some leeway in applying arbitral jurisprudence, but they are ultimately restricted by the collective agreement which exists.

Management (Employer) Rights, Part Three: Public Sector Collective Agreement, Manitoba

I worked on a library project at the Dafoe Library at the University of Manitoba (Canada) around 1993.  The union to which I belonged was AESES (The Association of  Employees Supporting Educational Services). I wrote to the editor of the union newsletter, criticizing the limitations of unions. The business agent of the union responded by assuming that I was criticizing the existence of unions. He defended the union. I wrote  back, indicating the limitations of unions in relation to the power of employers. He then responded by implicitly defending the principles of collective agreements; he also misinterpreted some of my views. In another post, I will include the contents of what I wrote and his response.

The working situation was very hierarchical (top-down). This, undoubtedly for the social-democratic left, is inevitable. Democratic work relations for them, implicitly, are impossible. They refuse to confront the reality of dictatorship  at work and, by ignoring the issue, they consider it inevitable. How else could they talk about good contracts, fair contracts, decent work or economic justice?

I guess workers who find working for an employer–even when there exists a collective agreement–to be oppressive and exploitative should be taken to task and criticized. Indeed, about a year and a half ago I was explicitly called a condescending prick by a representative of a public union in Toronto, Canada.

Of course, this blog site is meant to criticize the views of the social-reformist left in various ways.

From

COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT
BETWEEN:
THE UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA
– and –
THE ASSOCIATION OF EMPLOYEES
SUPPORTING EDUCATION SERVICES
APRIL 4, 2015 to APRIL 4, 2019

page 10:

ARTICLE 4 EMPLOYER’S RIGHTS
4.1 Nothing in this Collective Agreement is intended nor shall it be construed as
denying or in any manner limiting the right of the Employer to control and
supervise all operations and direct all working forces, including the right to
determine the employee’s ability, skill, competence, and qualifications for the
job, and to hire, discharge, lay-off, suspend, discipline, promote, demote or
transfer an employee, and to control and regulate the use of all equipment and
property and promote efficiency in all operations, provided, however, that in the
exercise of the foregoing Employer’s rights the Employer shall not contravene
the provisions of this Collective Agreement.

4.2 The Parties also agree that the foregoing enumeration of Employer’s rights
shall not be deemed to exclude other functions not specifically set forth,
therefore, the Employer retains all of its other inherent rights.

Unions frequently use the term “fair contracts” in order to “sell” a tentative agreement to their members. They rarely address the legitimacy of the power of employers to direct the lives of its members. In the post following my letter to the editor to the AESES union newsletter,, we will see how one union representative did try to legitimize collective agreements and the power of management.

Do you think that the above employer’s rights clause expresses a democratic way of life at work? Or a dictatorial way of life at work?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Management Rights, Part Two: Public Sector Collective Agreement, Ontario

Workers in the public sector are used just as much as means for purposes over which they have little or no control (see The Money Circuit of Capital). The left often denies this implicitly by idealizing the public sector over the private sector. Workers in the public sector, however, are employees, and as employees they are economically dependent on an employer and hence are, economically, coerced into doing the bidding of their employer–as the Ontario Coalition Against Poverty (OCAP) recognizes (although it does not, interestingly enough, pursue the issue. See  “Capitalism needs economic coercion for its job market to function” (Ontario Coalition Against Poverty: OCAP)).

A collective agreement is, in general, better than no collective agreement, but it hardly expresses “economic justice” (to use the ideological expression of a union representative here in Toronto). It limits the power of employers, but since employers still have the power to use workers (employees) for ends over which the workers have little say, the collective agreement simultaneously expresses their subordination and subjugation to the power of management, to a particular employer and to the power of the class of employers.

From

COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT
Between
The Toronto District
School Board (TDSB)
And
The Elementary Teachers’
Federation of Ontario (ETFO or ETT)
September 1, 2014 – August 31, 2019

page 37:

L – A.2.2. All matters and rights not prescribed by this Agreement, shall remain within the sole and exclusive right of the Board to manage its affairs.

This short clause in the collective agreement hides the real power of the Board over the employees of the collective agreement. Since economic coercion is the basic premise of having to work for an employer, the economic dependence of teachers on the Board alters their behavior in a number of ways. For example, in many schools, teachers, when the principal enters the staff lounge, change their behavior or their conversations. Why is that?

Although the principal in the above scenario is theoretically an educational leader, s/he represents the economic power of the employer, and that power is intimidating–unless teachers, like other workers, learn to organize and resist that power in their daily working lives.

Even then, organizing at the local level, ultimately, is no match for the economic power of the employers as a class–unless there is a conscious aim to go beyond such an economic power and to control our lives, along with other workers–in a socialist society.

What is the position of teachers’ representatives concerning the right of management to direct the workforce as it sees fit, subject to the limitations of the collective agreement? Is there any discussion over the right of management to do so? Or is there mere paper phrases, like “economic justice,” or “fairness”, or the most popular these days, “social justice”–without any discussion of why teachers have to subordinate their will to their employer and why other workers have to do the same thing?

In a democratic society, should there not be discussion about why management has the power and rights that it does at work, either implicitly or explicitly?