The Rate of Exploitation of Workers at Bombardier, 2018, One of the Largest Private Employers in Quebec and in Toronto, Ontario: Or: How Unionized Jobs are Not Decent or Good

Introduction

In two others posts I presented a list of some of the largest employers in Toronto according to level of employment (see A Short List of the Largest Employers in Toronto, Ontario, Canada)  and Quebec (see  A Short List of the Largest Employers in Quebec According to the Number of Employees). 

I have tried to calculate the rate of exploitation of workers in various companies for these two areas, including  Air Canada  (The Rate of Exploitation of Workers at Air Canada, One of the Largest Private Employers in Canada) and the Royal Bank of Canada (Banque Royale du Canada)  (The Rate of Exploitation of the Workers of the Royal Bank of Canada (RBC), One of the Largest Private Employers in Toronto and in Canada). 

Bombardier, the aircraft manufacturer, is also on both lists for Toronto and Quebec. I will calculate the rate of exploitation for this capitalist company not only for this reason. In the documentary Company Town, one worke Jennifer Akkermanr, who was going to lose her job at the General Motors (GM) plant in Oshawa when it was to close on December 18, 2019) indicated that she liked her job when working for GM but that she was going to work for Bombardier. I calculated, using fairly rough data, the rate of exploitation of GM workers in order to show that workers who claim that they enjoy their jobs at GM, in effect (even if they are unconscious of it) are claiming that they enjoy their exploitative jobs at GM. 

I thought it appropriate to calculate the rate of exploitation of Bombardier workers to see to what extent the rates of exploitation of workers at GM and at Bombardier differed, if at all. 

I used data from 2018 rather than 2019 to calculate the rate of exploitation of Bombardier workers because, in 2019, there seemed to be no calculable rate of exploitation since in 2019 there was an actual profit loss. Unless there are specific reasons for including abnormal years, it is better to calculate the rate of exploitation using more normal data. Besides, any company that operates at a constant loss by failing to exploit workers will cease to exist after a certain period of time.

Of course, if the rate of exploitation is calculated for a number of years, then losses need to be included. I have not found any books or articles that deal with how to handle such losses in calculating the rate of exploitation for such a year. It is, in any case, probably better to include such years in a multi-year calculation of the rate of exploitation in order to gain a more accurate view of the rate of exploitation in the medium- and long-term. Perhaps some readers can provide suggestions on how to do so. 

The Nature of the Rate of Exploitation

But what is the rate of exploitation? And why not use the usual rate of profit or the rate of return? The rate of profit is calculated as profit divided by investment. Since employers purchase both the means for work–buildings, computers, office supplies, raw material–and hire workers–we can classify investment into two categories: c, meaning constant capital, or the capital invested in commodities other than workers; and v, or variable capital, the capital invested in the hiring of workers for a certain period of time (wages, salaries and benefits).

The purpose of investment in a capitalist economy is to obtain more money (see The Money Circuit of Capital), and the additional money is surplus value when it is related to its source: workers working for more time than what they cost to produce themselves. The relation between surplus value and variable capital (or wages and salaries) is the rate of surplus value or the rate of exploitation, expressed as a ratio: s/v.

When the surplus is related to both c and v and expressed as a ratio, it is the rate of profit: s/(c+v).

In Marxian economics, you cannot simply use the economic classifications provided by employers and governments since such classifications often hide the nature of the social world in which we live. The rate of profit underestimates the rate of exploitation since the surplus value is related to total investment and not just to the workers. Furthermore, it makes the surplus value appear to derive from both constant capital and variable capital.

I decided to look at the annual report of some of the largest private companies in Toronto and Canada if they are available in order to calculate the rate of exploitation at a more micro level than aggregate rates of surplus value at the national or international level. Politically, this is necessary since social democrats here in Toronto (and undoubtedly elsewhere) vaguely may refer to exploitation–while simultaneously and contradictorily referring to “decent work” and “fair contracts.” Calculating even approximately the rate of exploitation at a more micro level thus has political relevance.

Conclusions First

As usual, I start with the conclusion in order to make readily accessible the results of the calculations for those who are more interested in the results than in how to obtain them.

Surplus value (s) or Adjusted EBIT $969 million
Variable capital (v) or Adjusted Employee benefit costs $5,432 billion

To calculate the rate of surplus value, we need to divide “Surplus value (s) or Adjusted EBIT” by “Variable capital (v) or Adjusted Employee benefit costs.” 

So, with the adjustments in place, the rate of exploitation or the rate of surplus value=s/v=969/5,432=18%. 

That means that for every hour worked that produces her/his wage, a worker at Bombardier works around an additional 11 minutes for free for Bombardier.

In an 8-hour (480 minutes) work day, the worker produces her/his wage in 6 hours 47 minutes (407 minutes) and works 1 hour 13 minutes (73 minutes) for free for Bombardier. Of course, during the time that the worker produces her/his own wage, s/he is subject to the power of management and hence is unfree (see, for instance, Management Rights, Part Four: Private Sector Collective Agreement, Ontario and Employers as Dictators, Part One).

In an 8.67 hour or 8-hour 40 minutes (520 minutes) work day, the worker produces her/his wage in 7 hours 38 minutes (458 minutes) and works 1 hour 19minutes (79 minutes) for free for Bombardier.

In a 9-hour (540 minutes) work day, the worker produces her/his wage in 7 hours 38 minutes (458 minutes) and works 1 hour 22 minutes (82 minutes) for free for Bombardier.

In an 10-hour (600 minutes) work day, the worker produces her/his wage in 8 hours 28 minutes (508 minutes) and works 1 hour 32 minutes (92  minutes) for free for Bombardier.

In a 10.67 -hour or 10-hour 40 minutes (640 minutes) work day, the worker produces her/his wage in 9 hours 2 minutes (542 minutes) and works 1 hour 38 minutes (98  minutes) for free for Bombardier.

In a 12-hour (720 minutes) work day, the worker produces her/his wage in 7 hours 21 minutes (610 minutes) and works 1 hour 50  minutes (110 minutes) for free for Bombardier.

Again, the rate of exploitation measures the extent to which workers work for free, producing all the surplus value and hence all the profit for employers. However, even during the time when they work to produce their own wage, they are hardly free. They are subject to the power and dictates of their employer during that time as well. 

Do you think that these facts contradict the talk by the left and unionists of “”fair contracts” (see  Fair Contracts (or Fair Collective Agreements): The Ideological Rhetoric of Canadian Unions, Part One and  Fair Contracts or Collective Agreements: The Ideological Rhetoric of Canadian Unions, Part Three: Unifor (Largest Private Union in Canada) for this rhetoric of the largest unions in Canada, the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) and  Unifor) , “fair wages” and “decent work?” Do they ignore the reality of life for workers, whether unionized or non-unionized? If exploitation and oppression of workers is a constant in workers’ lives, even if they are only vaguely aware of it, should this situation not be frankly acknowledged by their representatives? Do such representatives do so? Do the left? If not, why not?  Do workers deserve better than neglecting the social context within which they live and work? Should such problems be addressed head on rather than neglected? 

Even if workers were not exploited, they would still be oppressed since they are used as things (means) for purposes which they as a collectivity do not define (see The Money Circuit of Capital). Does that express something fair? Management rights clauses (implied or explicit in collective agreements give management as representative of employers–and as a minority–the power to dictate to workers what to do, when to do it, how to do it and so forth–and is not the imposition of the will of a minority over the majority a dictatorship? (See  Employers as Dictators, Part One). Is that fair? Do union reps ever explain how a collective agreement somehow expresses something fair? Is that fair?

Is the following an example of what union reps mean by a “fair contract?”

COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT (2019-2022) BETWEEN Bombardier Inc. hereinafter referred to as “the Employer” AND Unifor

ARTICLE 3 MANAGEMENT RIGHTS

3.01 No provision of the Collective Agreement shall be interpreted as limiting the Employer in any way in the exercise of its management functions. These functions are performed in a manner consistent with all the provisions of this Agreement. It is the function of the Employer to administer and manage the company and lead the workforce. Without restricting the generality of the foregoing, its rights and functions include:

a) The responsibility for the management, operation, extension and curtailment of business and operations; the authority to direct, transfer, promote, demote, discipline and discharge employees for proper cause; the right to organize and supervise the work to be performed by the employees, to direct them in the course of their work, to maintain discipline, order and efficiency, to determine the products to be manufactured and their design, the methods, processes and means of manufacturing and operating, the type and location of machines and tools to be used, to determine production standards and the type and quality of materials to be used in manufacturing. Notwithstanding the above, these rights and functions do not prevent any employee who considers himself to have been unfairly treated to lodge a grievance in accordance with the provisions stated in this Agreement

Should workers not be discussing why management has these rights? Should workers not be discussing whether an unelected management should have such rights? Should workers not be discussing how to organize to abolish this dictatorship? Should workers not be criticizing any union rep who claims that a collective agreement somehow expresses a “fair contract?” A “good contract?” A “decent job?” A “good job?” All other such platitudes? 

Comparison of the Rate of Exploitation of Bombardier Workers to the Rate of Exploitation of Other Workers

The rate of exploitation of Bombardier workers is quite low relative to other workers (see the comparison of the rate of exploitaiton of various sets of workers in The Rate of Exploitation of Workers at WestJet Airlines Ltd.). Although there are other factors or determinants in establishing whether a private-sector employer is viable or not, a relatively low rate of exploitation is certainly one possible indication of its possible bankruptcy; there is little wonder that in 2019 Bombardier faced a loss of profit. Its efforts to restructure itself as a consequence undoubtedly involved possible attempts to increase the rate of exploitation. Perhaps a comparison of the 2018 rate and the 2022 or 2023 rate of exploitation would be appropriate at some point to see if such restructuring is reflected in an increased rate of exploitation. 

In relation to the rate of exploitation of General Motors (GM) workers, Bombardier workers are exploited less since the rate of exploitation of GM workers is 40 percent. Does that mean that Bombardier workers experience substantially more freedom than GM workers? Hardly. From the point of view of the continued existence of the workers at a certain standard of living (it does not mean that the standard of living that they receive is adequate). Higher rates of exploitation mean, among other things, that the need to work for a certain relative proportion of the working day is relatively unnecessary when compared to another set of workers in order to produce the value of the workers’ consumer goods (means of consumption). 

A low rate of exploitation means that the particular employer may be threatened with bankruptcy–and hence the workers may be threatened with unemployment. From Nick Potts (2009), “Trying to Help Rescue Value for Everyone,” in pages 177-199, Critique: Journal of
Socialist Theory, Volume 37, Issue Number 2, 177-19  page 192: 

Clearly if exploitation were to drop too low a crisis of profitability would occur.

This is hardly in their own immediate or short-term interests since they, in general need to work for an employer if they are to continue to live at a certain standard of living, This is a dilemma which private-sector workers and unions face (and, indirectly, public-sector workers and their unions) since attempts to change working conditions (such as the level of intensity or the length of the working day)  and pay may well have negative effects on the rate of exploitaiton and the rate of profit, leading to bankruptcy. Workers cannot resolve such dilemmas without challenging the class power of employers–and unions cannot either, despite all the chatter of “fair contracts,” “decent wages,” “good jobs,” “decent work,” and other such cliches. 

On the other hand, a high rate of exploitation does not mean that workers’s immediate interests are somehow met. In addition to having a greater proportion of labour or work going to the employer relative to the worker, the higher rate of exploitation may imply greater unemployment for workers since the issue of how this high rate of exploitation is achieved arises. If it arises due to massive increases in investment in constant capital relative to variable capital (and thereby increased in the productivity of labour), it may well occur that workers may become unemployed as the proportion of relative investment in c crowds out investment in v. 

Nonetheless, in the short term, a higher rate of exploitation in a particular company may initially result in somewhat stable employment as the company may be able to compete more effectively against other capitalist companies. To that extent, Jennifer Akkerman’s reference to ‘loving her job’ may contain a grain of truth–short-term employment stability. 

Alternatively, if the higher rate of exploitation occurs more or less throughout the economy, the workers who produce consumer goods (such as cars and trucks, as do GM workers), may find themselves unemployed as the commodities they produce remain unsold. 

It is ironic that it may be in the workers’ short-term interests to want a high rate of exploitation in order to achieve some form of employment stability; that this may clash with their long-term interests does not change the situation. The dilemma of not being exploited at all and being unemployed, of being highly exploited with some employment stabiity and being little exploited (but still oppressed) with the threat of unemployment hanging over workers’ heads hardly makes for a “good job” or “fair contracts.” 

It is time to challenge unions that persistently present, unconsciously if not concsiously, claims that they can somehow achieve any fair settlement, whether wages or working conditions, and whether through legislation or through collective bargaining and the resulting collective agreement. Thus, should not leftists persistently criticize such views as the following (

https://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/unifor-reaches-tentative-agreement-with-bombardier-aviation-851709617.html):

TORONTOJuly 30, 2021 /CNW/ – Unifor Local 112 and 673 have reached a tentative agreement with Bombardier Aviation. “I would like to congratulate the Local 112 and 673 bargaining teams for their hard work and dedication throughout these negotiations,” said Jerry Dias, Unifor National President. “Reaching a settlement with Bombardier brings us one step closer to resolving the labour dispute at Downsview. Our union can now focus all of its efforts on reaching an agreement with De Havilland.”

The three-year agreements cover approximately 1,500 union members employed by Bombardier Aviation at the Downsview plant.

“We could not have reached a fair settlement that addresses the union’s key priorities at Bombardier without the support and solidarity of our members throughout the bargaining process and on the picket lines,” said Scott McIlmoyle, Unifor Local 112 President. [my emphasis]

Have you ever read any justification by union reps for such terms as a “fair settlement,” “fair contract,” “fair collective agreement,” ‘fair wages,” and so forth? If not, why not? 

Should not union reps be obliged to answer such questions? 

Data on Which the Calculation Is Based

The calculation of the rate of exploitation is undoubtedly imperfect, and I invite the reader to correct its gaps. Nonetheless, the lack of any attempt to determine the rate of exploitation at the city level has undoubtedly reinforced social-reformist tendencies.

In the case of Bombardier, I have had some difficulty in reconciling numbers related to interest. I will show this below. 

But first, let us look at the general calculation: 

Surplus Value (Profit)

EBIT: Earnings before interest and taxes (or: Profitability: Revenues-Costs or Expenses) 
Revenues$ 16,236
Cost of sales 13,958
Gross margin 2,278 [16,236-13,958]
SG&A (Selling, General and Administrative Expenses) 1,156
R&D (Research and Development) 217
Share of income of joint ventures and associates (66)
Other expense (income)  (58)
EBIT before Special Items (Earnings before Interest and taxes) (2) 1,029 [2,278-1156-217+66+58=1029]
Special items 28
EBIT 1001 (1029-28=1001) 

Non-adjustment of EBT by Excluding Special Items from the Calculation

Clarification of the nature of the category “Special Items” in the Annual Report is as follows: 

Special items

Special items comprise items which do not reflect our core performance or where their separate presentation will assist users in understanding our results for the period. Such items include, among others, the impact of restructuring charges and significant impairment charges and reversals.

There exists several items in this category. To go over each item and decide whether it should be excluded or included (without further information) seems an exercise for those with accounting skills–I invite them to provide a rational for including any or all of the items; I exclude the category in its entirety from the calculation. 

Consequently, so far the EBIT is 1,001. Now, particular employers treat the need to pay interest as an expense–which it is from the point of view of the particular employer. Accordingly, there is an additional category: EBT, or Earnings Before Taxes: 

EBT (Earnings before taxes)
Interest
Financing expense 712
Financing income (106) [This is actual income received and hence is in parentheses since it is not really an expense but the opposite and must be subtracted from “Financing expense”.)
Net financing expense 606 (712-106=606)
EBT (Earnings before taxes) (EBIT (1001)-Net financing expense (606)) 395

Adjustments

I will treat, theoretically, the two categories “Financing expense” and “Financing income” separately, and only then will I make the necessary adjustements. 

Financing Expense

In Marxian theory, it is necessary to question whether some expenses are expenses for both the individual employer and for the class of employers (and fractions of their class, such as those who live on interest). When they are expenses at the macro level of the class of employers and not just at the micro level of the particular employer, the expense is deducted from total revenue. On the other hand, there are expenses that are expenses for the individual employer but are not expenses when looked at from the point of view of the class of employers; in such an instance, they are paid out from the surplus value produced or obtained by workers and are to be included in income before taxes.

For example, interest is such a category. 

As I wrote in another post: 

As explained in another post, interest in many instances can be treated as part of the surplus value produced and therefore added to net income since, although from the point of view of the individual capitalist it is an expense, from the capitalist economy as a whole it is derived from the production of surplus value. 

Accordingly, it is EBIT and not EBT that should form the basis for determining the surplus value produced since interest is derived from surplus value–although it is an expense from the point of view of the particular employer. 

Financing Income 

The category “Financing Income” is income that is a result of, among other things, investment in securities. Since, as I explained in the post on the rate of exploitation of General Motors workers,

Since the idea of calculating the rate of exploitation of particular employers is to determine the extent to which the particular employer exploits its workers, income derived from the exploitation of workers other than its workers should be excluded.

Accordingly, the amount included in this category does indeed need to be subtracted from EBIT since it is surplus value arising from the exploitation of workers other than Bombardier workers. 

Temporary Adjusted Earnings Before Income Taxes 895 (1001-106)

Further adjustments of EBIT must await the calculation of variable capital, or the total cost of producing the commodity labour power, or the capacity of labour power.

Variable Capital

Presumably, the following data form part of the category “Cost of Sales.” 

EMPLOYEE BENEFIT COSTS
Wages, salaries and other employee benefits $ 4,919 
Retirement benefits 464 
Share-based expense 74
Restructuring, severance and other involuntary termination costs 46 
Total $ 5,503

To explain the nature of the category “Share-based expenses.” it is first necessary to indicate the word form of the acronyms PSU, RSU and DSU:

PSU Performance share unit
RSU Restricted share unit
DSU Deferred share unit

The annual report indicates the nature of these: 

SHARE-BASED PLANS

PSU, DSU and RSU plans
The Board of Directors of the Corporation approved a PSU and a RSU plan under which PSUs and RSUs may be granted to executives and other designated employees. The PSUs and the RSUs give recipients the right, upon vesting, to receive a certain number of the Corporation’s Class B Shares (subordinate voting). The RSUs also give certain recipients the right to receive a cash payment equal to the value of the RSUs. The Board of Directors of the Corporation has also approved a DSU plan under which DSUs may be granted to senior officers. The DSU plan is similar to the PSU plan, except that their exercise can only occur upon retirement or termination of employment. 

It seems clear that the money allocated to the category is limited to select employees–unlike some annual reports, where it was unclear whether regular workers had access to share-based programs or not (see for example The Rate of Exploitation of Workers at WestJet Airlines Ltd.). The reasoning for including some (if not all) of it as part of surplus value is that this compensation is not mainly for the coordination of the work of others but for the exploitation of others–it is pure surplus value. 

If it was unclear whether the category was limited to those who exploit other workers, I merely calculated 10 percent of the total as forming surplus value, leaving 90 percent to form part of variable capital. In the case of Bombardier, though, the total amount of 74 million seems to be earmarked exclusively for key employees who exploit other workers. 

Accordingly, it is necessary to subtract 74 from “Employee benefit costs” and add it to EBIT: 

Adjusted EBIT or Surplus Value (Profit) 969 (895+74)
Temporarily Adjusted Employee benefit costs (variable capital, v) 5,429 (5,503-74)

Further Adjustment of Variable Capital (Wages and Benefits)

There is a list of items in the category “Other expense (income).” One of the items needs to be shifted to be included in the calculation of variable capital:

“Severance and other involuntary termination costs (including changes in estimates)” 3.

Since the shift is within the general category of “Expenses,” it does not affect the calculation of surplus value and hence profit; the category “Cost of sales” would increase by 3, from 13,958 to 13,961, and the category “Other expense (income)  (58)” would decrease by 3, from (58) to 55, with the result that the EBIT would not change. 

However, it does affect the calculation of variable capital and hence the rate of surplus value or the rate of exploitation. We now have sufficient information to calculate the rate of exploitation or the rate of surplus value.

Final Calculation (Based on Adjustments) of Surplus Value, Variable Capital (Salaries or Wages and Benefits) and the Rate of Surplus Value 

The result of all of these adjustments is: 

Surplus value (s) or Adjusted EBIT $969 million
Variable capital (v) or Adjusted Employee benefit costs $5,432 billion

To calculate the rate of surplus value, we need to divide “Surplus value (s) or Adjusted EBIT” by “Variable capital (v) or Adjusted Employee benefit costs.” 

So, with the adjustments in place, the rate of exploitation or the rate of surplus value=s/v=969/5,432=18%. 

That means that for every hour worked that produces her/his wage, a worker at Bombardier works around an additional 11 minutes for free for Bombardier.

In an 8-hour (480 minutes) work day, the worker produces her/his wage in 6 hours 47 minutes (407 minutes) and works 1 hour 13 minutes (73 minutes) for free for Bombardier. Of course, during the time that the worker produces her/his own wage, s/he is subject to the power of management and hence is unfree (see, for instance, Management Rights, Part Four: Private Sector Collective Agreement, Ontario  and   Employers as Dictators, Part One).

In an 8.67 hour or 8-hour 40 minutes (520 minutes) work day, the worker produces her/his wage in 7 hours 38 minutes (458 minutes) and works 1 hour 19minutes (79 minutes) for free for Bombardier.

In a 9-hour (540 minutes) work day, the worker produces her/his wage in 7 hours 38 minutes (458 minutes) and works 1 hour 22 minutes (82 minutes) for free for Bombardier.

In an 10-hour (600 minutes) work day, the worker produces her/his wage in 8 hours 28 minutes (508 minutes) and works 1 hour 32 minutes (92  minutes) for free for Bombardier.

In a 10.67 -hour or 10-hour 40 minutes (640 minutes) work day, the worker produces her/his wage in 9 hours 2 minutes (542 minutes) and works 1 hour 38 minutes (98  minutes) for free for Bombardier
In a 12-hour (720 minutes) work day, the worker produces her/his wage in 7 hours 21 minutes (610 minutes) and works 1 hour 50  minutes (110 minutes) for free for Bombardier.

I have used the lengths of the working day as 8, 8.67, 9, 10, 10.67 and 12  because the length of the working day varies. According to different sources:

Working hours are 8:00am – 4:40pm

12hr shifts

The hours that I worked were from 7:00 am to 7:00 pm Friday Saturday & Sunday and possibly coming in 2 hours early on Saturday & Sunday and or possibly staying late Friday thru Sunday depending whether or not we had a customer who had to leave early or late in the evening.

8-9 hours per day.

8 to 10 hours a day

I worked eight hours a day

The 2019-2022 collective agreement between Bombardier and Unifor Local 62 states:

ARTICLE 14 WORK SCHEDULES

14.01 The Employer determines the use of the different work schedules provided in article 14.08 according to the operational needs.

14.02 Unless otherwise stipulated in this Agreement, the normal work week is forty (40) hours.

14.03 The work week for employees on the first (1st) shift (schedule 1-A and 1-B) is of forty (40) hours distributed on five (5) consecutive days of eight (8) hours from Monday to Friday

The work week for employees on the first (1st) shift (schedule 1-C and D) is of forty (40) hours distributed over four (4) consecutive days of ten (10) hours from Monday to Thursday or Tuesday to Friday

… 

14.05 The work week for employees on the third (3rd) shift (schedule 3) is of thirty-six (36) hours, distributed on four (4) consecutive nights of nine (9) hours from Monday night to Friday morning, paid as forty (40) hours.

… 

14.06 The work week for employees on the weekend day shift (schedule 4-A et 4-B) is of thirty-six (36) hours, distributed on three (3) consecutive days of twelve (12) hours, as follows: Saturday, Sunday and Friday Saturday, Sunday and Monday, paid for forty-two (42) hours.

… 

14.07 The work week for employees on the weekend night shift (schedule 5) if of thirty-two (32) hours, distributed on three (3) consecutive evenings as follows: twelve (12) hours on Saturday and Sunday, and eight (8) hours on Friday [32 hours divided by 3=10.67 hours or 10 hours 40 minutes]. The employees are paid for forty (40) hours including the night premium.

Political Considerations and Conclusion 

Again, the rate of exploitation measures the extent to which workers work for free, producing all the surplus value and hence all the profit for employers. However, even during the time when they work to produce their own wage, they are hardly free. They are subject to the power and dictates of their employer during that time as well. 

Do you think that these facts contradict the talk by the left and unionists of “fair wages,” “fair contracts” (see  Fair Contracts (or Fair Collective Agreements): The Ideological Rhetoric of Canadian Unions, Part One for the rhetoric of the largest union in Canada, the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE)) and “decent work?” Do they ignore the reality of life for workers, whether unionized or non-unionized? If exploitation and oppression of workers is a constant in their lives, even if they are only vaguely aware of it, should this situation not be frankly acknowledged by their representatives? Do such representatives do so? If not, why not?  Do workers deserve better than neglecting the social context within which they live and work? Should such problems be addressed head on rather than neglected? 

Even if workers were not exploited, they would still be oppressed since they are used as things (means) for purposes which they as a collectivity do not define (see The Money Circuit of Capital). Does that express something fair? Management rights clauses (implied or explicit in collective agreements give management as representative of employers–and as a minority–the power to dictate to workers what to do, when to do it, how to do it and so forth–and is not the imposition of the will of a minority over the majority a dictatorship? (See  Employers as Dictators, Part One). Is that fair? Do union reps ever explain how a collective agreement somehow expresses something fair? Is that fair?

Is the following an example of what union reps mean by a “fair contract?”

COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT (2019-2022) BETWEEN Bombardier Inc. hereinafter referred to as “the Employer” AND Unifor

ARTICLE 3 MANAGEMENT RIGHTS

3.01 No provision of the Collective Agreement shall be interpreted as limiting the Employer in any way in the exercise of its management functions. These functions are performed in a manner consistent with all the provisions of this Agreement. It is the function of the Employer to administer and manage the company and lead the workforce. Without restricting the generality of the foregoing, its rights and functions include:

a) The responsibility for the management, operation, extension and curtailment of business and operations; the authority to direct, transfer, promote, demote, discipline and discharge employees for proper cause; the right to organize and supervise the work to be performed by the employees, to direct them in the course of their work, to maintain discipline, order and efficiency, to determine the products to be manufactured and their design, the methods, processes and means of manufacturing and operating, the type and location of machines and tools to be used, to determine production standards and the type and quality of materials to be used in manufacturing. Notwithstanding the above, these rights and functions do not prevent any employee who considers himself to have been unfairly treated to lodge a grievance in accordance with the provisions stated in this Agreement

Should workers not be discussing why management has these rights? Should workers not be discussing whether an unelected management should have such rights? Should workers not be discussing how to organize to abolish this dictatorship? Should workers not be criticizing any union rep who claims that a collective agreement somehow expresses a “fair contract?” A “good contract?” A “decent job?” A “good job?” All other such platitudes? 

The collective agreement fosters the illusion that the workers are paid for the whole working day. Workers may indeed receive more wages under certain circumstances, but that means that the cost of production of their capacity for working for an employer increases (perhaps due to an accelerated use of their labour power). This consideration, however, is irrelevant here since the total wages, salaries and benefits is what matters, and any increase in v due to such considerations are included in the data.

Comparison of Rates of Exploitation 

The rate of exploitation of Bombardier workers is quite low relative to other workers (see the comparison of the rate of exploitaiton of various sets of workers in The Rate of Exploitation of Workers at WestJet Airlines Ltd.). Although there are other factors or determinants in establishing whether a private-sector employer is viable or not, a relatively low rate of exploitation is certainly one possible indication of its possible bankruptcy; there is little wonder that in 2019 Bombardier faced a loss of profit. Its efforts to restructure itself as a consequence undoubtedly involved possible attempts to increase the rate of exploitation. Perhaps a comparison of the 2018 rate and the 2022 or 2023 rate of exploitation would be appropriate at some point to see if such restructuring is reflected in an increased rate of exploitation. 

In relation to the rate of exploitation of General Motors (GM) workers, Bombardier workers are exploited less since the rate of exploitation of GM workers is 40 percent. Does that mean that Bombardier workers experience substantially more freedom than GM workers? Hardly. Higher rates of exploitation mean that the need to work for a certain length of the working day is relatively unnecessary when compared to another set of workers from the point of view of the continued existence of the workers at a certain standard of living (it does not mean that the standard of living that they receive is adequate). 

A low rate of exploitation means that the particular employer may be threatened with bankruptcy–and hence the workers may be threatened with unemployment. From Nick Potts (2009), “Trying to Help Rescue Value for Everyone,” in pages 177-199, Critique: Journal of Socialist Theory, Volume 37, Issue Number 2, page 192: 

Clearly if exploitation were to drop too low a crisis of profitability would occur.

This is hardly in their own immediate or short-term interests since they, in general need to work for an employer if they are to continue to live at a certain standard of living, This is a dilemma which private-sector workers and unions face (and, indirectly, public-sector workers and their unions) since attempts to change working conditions (such as the level of intensity or the length of the working day)  and pay may well have negative effects on the rate of exploitaiton and the rate of profit, leading to bankruptcy. Workers cannot resolve such dilemmas without challenging the class power of employers–and unions cannot either, despite all the chatter of “fair contracts,” “decent wages,” “good jobs,” “decent work,” and other such cliches. 

On the other hand, a high rate of exploitation does not mean that workers’s immediate interests are somehow met. In addition to having a greater proportion of labour or work going to the employer relative to the worker, the higher rate of exploitation may imply greater unemployment for workers since the issue of how this high rate of exploitation is achieved arises. If it arises due to massive increases in investment in constant capital relative to variable capital (and thereby increased in the productivity of labour), it may well occur that workers may become unemployed as the proportion of relative investment in c crowds out investment in v. 

Nonetheless, in the short term, a higher rate of exploitation in a particular company may initially result in somewhat stable employment as the company may be able to compete more effectively against other capitalist companies. To that extent, Jennifer Akkerman’s reference to ‘loving her job’ may contain a grain of truth–short-term employment stability. 

Alternatively, if the higher rate of exploitation occurs more or less throughout the economy, the workers who produce consumer goods (such as cars and trucks, as do GM workers), may find themselves unemployed as the commodities they produce remain unsold.

From Guglielmo Carchedi and Michael Roberts, “The Long Roots of the Present Crisis: Keynesians, Austerians, and Marx’s Law,” in World in Crisis: A Global Analysis of Marx’s Law of Profitability. Edited by Carchedit and Roberts: 

The question is whether an increase in the rate of profit due to a sufficiently high rate of exploitation is a step toward recovery.

A recovery presupposes the rise in the new value generated within the context of a rising ARP [average rate of profit]. A pro-capital distribution of value within the context of a falling ARP can revive the ARP, but this does not denote a recovery. This higher profitability hides the decreasing production of value and surplus value—that is, it hides the deterioration of the economy.

A more detailed way to approach this is is by considering the two basic sectors of the economy. Sector 1 produces means of production [Bombardier primarily belongs to this sector since it produces jets] , and sector 2 produces means of consumption [GM primarly produces in this sector–although a smaller proporition of vehicle production undoubtedly serves as means of production as well]. If one or both sectors innovate, usually the OCC rises and the ARP falls. All sectors realize tendentially the same, but lower, rate of profit. The capitalists might react to the lower ARP by lowering the level of wages, that is, by increasing the rate of exploitation across the board. This upsets the initial tendential equalization of the profit rates. But this equalization presupposes full realization [full sale of the commodities produced], which is impossible if stopping or reversing the fall in the ARP is to be achieved by raising the rate of exploitation.

Suppose wages are reduced by the same percentage, Δ symbol for a change in something], both in sector 1 and in sector 2, represented by the equation –Δv1 = –Δv2 [the percentage change decrease in variable capital is the same in both sectors 1 and 2]. Then, sector 1 gains Δs1 (corresponding to the fall in wages, –Δs1 [sic–which means that the quoter quotes exactly as written despite a possible error in the original: this should be the negative percentage change in v1]) [the percentage change increase in surplus value in sector 1 . Sector 2 on the one hand gains Δs2 (corresponding to the fall in wages, –Δv2) but on the other loses –(Δs1 + Δs2), the loss due to the unsold means of consumption to the workers both of sector 1 and of sector 2 [sector 2 loses because the levels of v1 and v2 have decreased with the result that they cannot purchase means of consumption equal to their loss]. On balance, sector 2 loses –Δs1, which is sector 1’s gain. Means of consumption for a value of Δs1 are unsold. This is overproduction in sector 2.

The ARP is unchanged (what is lost by one sector is gained by the other), but the two rates of profit differ: that in sector 1 has risen by Δs1, while that in sector 2 has fallen by the same quantity. The greater the fall in wages, the greater the fall of profitability in sector 2. This spells crisis in sector 2. Sector 1’s rate of profit rises. But this is not a sign of recovery in that sector. Sector 1’s rate of profit rises not because more value and surplus value is produced in it, but because surplus value is appropriated from sector 2 within the context of a hidden fall in the ARP. Wage cuts can, at most, postpone the crisis.

(I have some doubts about the theoretical accuracy of the above quote. The assumption of equal percentage increases in s and equal percentage decreases in v seems to assume a 100 percent rate of exploitation; if, however, the rate of exploitation is, say, 400 percent, s:v=4:1, so if s is 100, v is 25. If s increases in percentage terms by 25% to 125, a decrease in percentage terms of v by 25 percent is 6.25 (25 percent of 25 is 6.25). I will leave the issue to those who are better equipped in mathematics to determine its accuracy. Perhaps others can enlighten us by providing critical commentary.)

It is ironic that it may be in the workers’ short-term interests to want a high rate of exploitation in order to achieve some form of employment stability; that this may clash with their long-term interests does not change the situation. The dilemma of not being exploited at all and being unemployed, of being highly exploited with some employment stabiity and being little exploited (but still oppressed) with the threat of unemployment hanging over workers’ heads hardly makes for a “good job” or “fair contracts.” 

Conclusion

It is time to challenge unions that persistently present, unconsciously if not concsiously, claims that they can somehow achieve any fair settlement, whether wages or working conditions, and whether through legislation or through collective bargaining and the resulting collective agreement. Thus, should not leftists persistently criticize such views as the following (

https://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/unifor-reaches-tentative-agreement-with-bombardier-aviation-851709617.html):

TORONTOJuly 30, 2021 /CNW/ – Unifor Local 112 and 673 have reached a tentative agreement with Bombardier Aviation. “I would like to congratulate the Local 112 and 673 bargaining teams for their hard work and dedication throughout these negotiations,” said Jerry Dias, Unifor National President. “Reaching a settlement with Bombardier brings us one step closer to resolving the labour dispute at Downsview. Our union can now focus all of its efforts on reaching an agreement with De Havilland.”

The three-year agreements cover approximately 1,500 union members employed by Bombardier Aviation at the Downsview plant.

“We could not have reached a fair settlement that addresses the union’s key priorities at Bombardier without the support and solidarity of our members throughout the bargaining process and on the picket lines,” said Scott McIlmoyle, Unifor Local 112 President. [my emphasis]

Have you ever read any justification by union reps for such terms as a “fair settlement,” “fair contract,” “fair collective agreement,” ‘fair wages,” and so forth? If not, why not? 

Should not union reps be obliged to answer such questions? 


Company Town: A Critical Review of a Documentary on the Closing of the Oshawa Plant by General Motors (GM), Part One: Colin James, President of Unifor Local 222

Introduction

The documentary (https://gem.cbc.ca/media/cbc-docs-pov/s04e05?cmp=sch-company%20town)  presents the situation in Oshawa, Ontario, where General Motors (GM) decided to close its plant. GM had operated in Oshawa for  around a century. On November 16, 2018, GM announced that it was closing the plant, throwing around 2,500 direct workers out of work and affecting thousands more indirectly (through the elimination of demand for parts as well as the multiplier effect the closing would have on the demand for workers in Oshawa locally and Ontario regionally). The factory closed on December 18, 2019. 

Colin James was president of Local 222 of Unifor, the union that represented the workers at GM; Unifor is the largest Canadian union of workers in the private sector. 

Before the shutdown, we read such things as the following: 

  1. From  https://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/unifor-lands-gm-truck-program-in-auto-parts-sector-621777743.html, dated May 9, 2017: 

Unifor Lands GM Truck Program in Auto Parts Sector


NEWS PROVIDED BY

Unifor 

May 09, 2017, 14:18 ET

… 

“The new contract addresses needs for the workers, the company and the community. This demonstrates the power of the union to secure a future for good jobs in Canada,” said President of Local 222 Colin James.

2. From   https://www.hrreporter.com/focus-areas/labour-relations/unifor-delivers-strike-mandate-to-lear-corporation-in-ajax-ont/296101, dated April 24, 2018: 

“Unifor is seeking to eliminate the current pay disparity in the seat-manufacturing sector,” said Colin James, Unifor local president. “It’s our hope that a strike can be avoided, but the clock is running out for the employer to come to the table with a fair offer.” [my emphasis] 

3. After the announcement by GM that it was closing the Oshawa plant, we read the following (from https://www.unifor.org/news/all-news/more-200-unifor-activists-storm-canadian-auto-show  , dated February 17, 2019 ): 

More than 200 Unifor activists storm Canadian Auto Show

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TORONTO – Visitors to the Canadian Auto Show in Toronto this weekend were greeted by Unifor members and encouraged to join Unifor’s campaign to boycott GM vehicles made in Mexico.

More than 200 workers and retirees from the Oshawa Assembly Plant, and feeder plants Lear, Inteva and other Unifor units showed up at the Metro Toronto Convention Centre Saturday wearing #SaveOshawaGM t-shirts.

“I am so proud of these fearless activists who will stop at nothing in the fight to convince GM it is not too late to reverse its plans for the Oshawa plant,” said Jerry Dias, Unifor National President.

“Sell here? Build here!” chanted the group of Unifor workers and retirees, as they raised awareness in the middle of GM’s display. “We will not give up and we will not be intimidated by GM or anyone else.

That is why we held a mini rally right where GM would take notice, in the heart of the auto show,” said Colin James, President, Local 222.

Activists also handed out leaflets that explain how to support the union’s efforts to stop the closure of the Oshawa Assembly plant and save 24 thousand good Canadian jobs. [my emphasis]

Canadian consumers are urged to pledge to boycott all GM vehicles made in Mexico but signing up at SaveOshawaGM.

More photos are available here on Unifor Canada’s Facebook Album.

For more information, please contact Unifor Director of Communications Natalie Clancy at Natalie.Clancy@unifor.org or 416-707-5794 (cell).

 

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Although Mr. James does not explicitly express the view that the Oshawa jobs are “good jobs,” it is probable that he accepts such a view–given the context and the other statements that he has made. 

4. From  https://www.unifor.org/news/all-news/unifor-members-take-action-gm-headquarters-oshawa , dated  January 23, 2019  : 

“The solidarity shown today proves once again, Unifor members are united in our resistance to corporate greed,” said Colin James, President of Unifor Local 222. [my emphasis] “This union is a family. We are fiercely united in our support of one another, and of the Oshawa auto community.”

The idea of resistance to “corporate greed” sounds very radical. However, is it not in the very nature of GM, like any other private employer, to pursue–more money? Is not  The Money Circuit of Capital  an accurate description of the general purpose and movement of investment by employers? Is not capitalist greed inherent in the nature  of present society? 

What Mr. James seems to object to is not this normal greed but the apparently abnormal greed that involves the closing down of the Oshawa plant. Otherwise, why would he not have complained about “corporate greed” earlier? He apparently does not object to normal corporate greed, but only corporate greed that leads to the shutting down of factories. Indeed, in the documentary, Mr. James stated that when he found out about the closing by watching CP24, he was stunned.

To be fair to Mr. James, he might have meant that it was the way he found out that stunned him. If, however, he meant that he was stunned because of the actual closing of the factory, then it would seem that he failed to understand the nature of capitalist operations–despite being a union representative for workers who work for a capitalist organization. Closure of operations occur all the time if they are not considered sufficiently profitable. (I quit the brewery in Calgary, where I worked, in 1983. It closed down in 1994, and it remains closed to this day.) 

5. From  https://www.unifor.org/news/all-news/auto-parts-workers-hold-solidarity-rally-and-picnic-oshawa  , dated August 15, 2019: 

Auto parts workers hold solidarity rally and picnic in Oshawa

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On August 10, hundreds of members of Unifor Locals 222, 444, and 1090 as well as members of the general public, gathered at Memorial Park in Oshawa for a rally and picnic in solidarity with independent auto parts supplier workers facing plant closures and ongoing negotiations of restructuring agreements.

The family-friendly event featured live music, entertainment, and a public address from Unifor Local 222 President Colin James, Unifor Ontario Regional Director Naureen Rizvi, Oshawa Member of Provincial Parliament Jennifer French, and Ontario Federation of Labour President Chris Buckley.

“This rally brought together Unifor members, elected officials, and the public in solidarity with the 1,700 women and men who deserve fair and just severance [my emphasis] for their years of hard work and sacrifice,” said Colin James, Unifor Local 222 President. “All of us need to come together and stay strong as we use every tool available to us to get the best possible deal for auto parts supplier workers.”

We of course should not criticize any effort to obtain “the best possible deal for auto parts supplier workers”–or for other workers, for that matter. In the case of job loss, the situation can be devastating for many workers.

However, what is “fair and just severance?” Why does GM have the right to separate GM workers from the use of the factory? Is not the right of GM to do that unfair? If so, how can Mr. James talk of “fair and just severance?” Is this not to take the right of GM to make the decision to stop production (based on the criterion of profitability) as “fair and just?” Why not question this right and criticize its fairness? 

But this is just what unions fail to do. They assume that the employer-employee relation is somehow “fair and just,” and that contracts or “deals” can somehow make everything all right. Tell that to the thousands of workers, some of whom probably lost their jobs for almost two years (GM announced on November 4, 2020 that it would be reopening the plant, but the first Silverado truck rolled off the line on November 10, 2021). 

I will deal with Jerry Dias, the president of Unifor national, in another post. 

Conclusion

Employers generally have the right to shut down plants (or offices) whenever and wherever they want. You rarely–ever?–here union reps criticize this general right. Rather, they, like Colin James, only express criticism when the potentiality to close down becomes put into effect. In the meantime, they talk of “good jobs,” “fair contracts,” “decent wages” and such like rhetoric that hides on the one hand the power of employers to make decisions unilaterally–like dictators– and, on the other hand, the fact that workers are used as means for goals external to their own purposes. 

What do you think? Do you think unions in their daily operations represent the general interests of workers? Or should unions be criticized for accepting too much of the economic, political and social system? 

 

Class Harmony and Social Reformism: The United Way as a Reformist Organization, Part One

This is the first of a two-part post. The first post will look at some of the limitations of the United Way (a charitable organization) as expressed on its website. The second post will look at some of the limitations of the United Way as expressed in one of its publications, Rebalancing the Opportunity Equation. The authors are Mihaela Dinca-Panaitescu, Laura McDonough, Dylan Simone, Ben Johnson, Stephanie Procyk, Michelynn Laflèch and Alan Walks. For the purposes of the two posts, I will refer to the publication as United Way’s publication.

According to The United Way website:

UWCs [United Way Centraide] in Canada focus on ensuring people move from a life of poverty, to one of possibility; that communities are built to sustain healthy people; and that kids can be all that they can be.  Together with many agencies and partners, we improve lives, locally.  As part of an international network, UWCC links with the United Way Worldwide to share best practices and build capacity in 44 member countries, investing over $5 Billion US per year.

The United Way is part of an extensive international organization.

In another part of the website, it further says:

OUR MOVEMENT

United Way is a federated network of over 80 local United Way Centraide offices serving more than 5,000 communities across Canada, each registered as its own non-profit organization and governed by an independent volunteer-led local Board of Directors. Locally and nationally, our goal is the same – to create opportunities for a better life for everyone in our communities.

Who could object to creating “opportunities for a better life for everyone in our communities?”

There is nothing wrong in aiming to improve people’s lives. In fact, it is admirable. The problem is whether such aims are linked, directly or indirectly, with other aims that limit people’s improvement in their lives.

The United Way does just that–it limits people’s improvements in their lives by assuming explicitly and implicitly improvement must occur while leaving the general economic structure (the economy, if you like) intact. In other words, it assumes that social reform is not only possible but is in fact the only possibility.

This can be seen through its donors and through its publications. Let us take a look first at its donors.

At first sight, it would appear that the United Way/Centraide (in French) Canada would be more favourable to workers. On its “Our Partners” web page, it explicitly mentions, in a separate subsection, Labour:

United Way and the Canadian Labour Congress have been partners since 1988 – working together to strengthen communities across Canada. The partnership developed around a common interest: ensuring that workers and working families have the support they need to succeed.

Unions across Canada are longstanding and generous contributors to United Way campaigns, encouraging members to volunteer and give. But the partnership goes much deeper than just financial support. Labour representatives advocate for those in need in their communities. They serve on United Way boards and committees, and offer programs like cooperative housing, childcare and other services.

Each year, United Way partners with unions across the country to improve lives in local communities. In 2016, Canadian Labour Congress President Hassan Yussuff endorsed the national partnership and our continued commitment to working together.

Of course, since the Canadian Labour Congress is essentially a reformist organization that fails to challenge the power of employers as a class (see  The Canadian Labour Congress’s Idealization of the Collective-Bargaining Process), its support of the United Way already indicates a possible limitation on the nature of the United Way (but that issue will be for a later post).

On the same web page, however, there is explicitly an indication that there is a limitation to reformist efforts:

THANKS A MILLION

United Way is honoured to work with Canada’s leading corporations, employers and labour organizations in communities across the country. Thanks to their remarkable generosity, and that of their employees and members, we are improving lives locally from coast to coast to coast.

Compromise is undoubtedly necessary even if you do not want to do so; asymmetrical power relations oblige workers and their representatives to make compromises with employers and their representatives all the time. However, making compromises and presenting those compromises as not compromises is often a trick of social reformists or social democrats.

By saying that “United Way is honored [my emphasis] to work with Canada’s leading corporations, employers….,” the United Way already has compromised to the point where it is legitimating the power of employers as a class.

On the same web page, there is a link to those organizations that have donated at least $10 million and $1+ million. The 2018 $10 million donors are:

  1. BMO [Bank of Montreal] Financial Group
  2. Canadian Labour Congress (CLC)
  3. CIBC (Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce)
  4. Government of Canada Workplace Charitable Campaign
  5. Royal Bank of Canada
  6. ScotiaBank
  7. TD Bank Group.

The $1+ million donors forms a list of 80 organizations, some of which are labour unions–and of course many capitalist companies and government employers.

Ten of the twenty most profitable capitalist companies in Canada (see A Short List of the Largest Private Employers in Canada, According to Profit) are on the list of the the $10 million and $1+ million donors:

  1. BCE [Bell Canada Enterprises]
  2. BMO
  3. Canadian Natural Resources
  4. CIBC
  5. Manulife
  6. Power Financial [which appears to be a subsidiary of Power Corporation]
  7. Royal Bank of Canada
  8. ScotiaBank
  9. Sun Life
  10. TD Bank Group

In fact, there are 11 of the largest private employers who have donated at least $1 million to the United Way since the Great West Life Co. is a subsidiary of Power Corporation of Canada.

Given the nature of the donors, how is it an honour to receive such money from such employers and to “work with Canada’s leading corporations, employers….?” Is it an honour to have such corporations treat “their” workers as things to be used for the purpose of obtaining a profit (see The Money Circuit of Capital)? How is this an honour? How is it an honour for the Unite Way to receive money from such companies given that such companies exploit and oppress their workers (see for example  The Rate of Exploitation of Workers at Bell Canada Enterprises (BCE), One of the Largest Private Employers in Toronto, The Rate of Exploitation of the Workers of the Bank of Montreal (BMO), One of the Largest Private Employers in Canada and The Rate of Exploitation of the Workers of the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC), One of the Largest Private Employers in Toronto and in Canada).

Not only do such employers use “their” workers as things for the purpose of obtaining as much profit as possible, they also dictate to workers on a daily basis (see, for example, Employers as Dictators, Part One). Such organizations take from workers, use them and then use a small portion of the money as a donation to “help” those in poverty (defined according to the level of income–itself a limited way of defining poverty)–people who are in poverty because of the economic structure in which we live.

How is this honourable?

There are other problems with the social-democratic rhetoric of the United Way’s website, but such problems will be addressed in the next post in this series in relation to one of its publications, as noted above: Rebalancing the Opportunity Equation.

Critical Education Articles Placed in the Teacher Staff Lounge While I Was a Teacher, Part Sixteen: The Mechanistic Learning in Schools Versus a Democratic and Living Way of Learning

This is a continuation of a series of posts on summaries of articles, mainly on education.

When I was a French teacher at Ashern Central School, in Ashern, Manitoba, Canada, I started to place critiques, mainly (although not entirely) of the current school system. At first, I merely printed off the articles, but then I started to provide a summary of the article along with the article. I placed the summaries along with the articles in a binder (and, eventually, binders), and I placed the binder in the staff lounge.

As chair of the Equity and Justice Committee for Lakeshore Teachers’ Association of the Manitoba Teachers’ Society (MTS), I also sent the articles and summary to the Ning of the MTS (a ning is “an online platform for people and organizations to create custom social networks”).

As I pointed out in a previous post, it is necessary for the radical left to use every opportunity to question the legitimacy of existing institutions.

The attached article for the ESJ Ning is prefaced by the following:
Hello everyone,
Attached is another article I sent to the ESJ Ning. I introduced it with the following:

Richard Gibboney, author of the article,” Intelligence by Design: Thorndike versus Dewey”, argues that Thorndike’s mechanistic views on education won out over Dewey’s humanistic views. As a consequence,  the vast majority of reforms over the past half a century have not improved schools.

Thorndike’s mechanistic views of education have been implemented in schools. The author implies that teachers’ own work has been deskilled in the process. Experts are able to define what to teach, how to teach and how to assess independently of the interaction of the teacher, on the one hand, and children and adolescents on the other.

The author is certainly correct to point out that Dewey was concerned that schooling lead to the formation of democratic relations, but democracy was to be a way of life and not merely a political form of governance. The democratic way of life was to be intimately connected to the democratic control of basic processes vital for human life, such as the production of food, clothing and shelter.

Learning in schools, as the author affirms, was for Dewey to be a process of developing an attitude to learning—being motivated to learn as varying conditions warrant it (an evolutionary view); such learning could not be captured through “tests.” Thorndike, by contrast, considered learning to be subject-bound and tested within narrow limits—a feature characteristic of most modern schools.

Gibboney draws the contrast in the following manner: Thorndike considered education in the form or image of the machine whereas Dewey considered education in the form or image of life. Since modern schools have opted for Thorndike over Dewey, they have reduced the educational process to a machine process rather than a living process. For Thorndike, all quality could be reduced to quantity—and the modern school system reduces all human life to purely quantitative terms as well (see the post Critical Education Articles Placed in the Teacher Staff Lounge While I Was a Teacher, Part Fifteen: Progressive Versus Regressive Grading Systems in Schools).  

Thorndike relied on a mechanistic stimulus-response schema to explain human behaviour whereas Dewey argued that a child’s or adolescent’s aims contributed to what constituted a stimulus and thus had to be taken into account in formulating a theory of learning and putting it into practice.

Thorndike implied that tests were objective and certain; Dewey, on the other hand, considered problems to arise from uncertainty and, although solutions may be sought and realized, they were always subject to revision—an essential characteristic of the scientific method.

The author considers an evaluation of school reforms in light of two criteria, derived from Dewey’s theory and not Thorndike’s theory: 1. Do the reforms contribute to a democratic education; 2. Do the reforms lead to practice that is more intelligent by the teacher on the one hand, and children and adolescents on the other. Gibboney found only six reforms in the last half of the twentieth century that satisfy these two criteria.

Most reforms in the second half of the twentieth century have led, in fact, to a weakening of the democratic ethos even when they contributed to the intelligence of teachers, on the one hand, and children and adolescents on the other—defined in narrow, curricular terms, of course. Thorndike’s mechanistic view of education has predominated throughout schools in the last half of the twentieth century.

Gibboney—rightly—castigates teacher organizations for having remained complacent about the attack on the democratic curriculum in schools. They have largely ignored such an attack.

They have also, he implies, bought into the ideological rhetoric that school reform alone will address the needs of children and adolescents and will ensure equality of opportunity. It is poverty that leads to school failure, and no school reform will be able to compensate for the effect of poverty on school outcomes. What is needed, rather than curriculuar reform, in the first instance, is a concerted assault on child poverty.

Gibboney, however, does not really address how child poverty is to be attacked. Surely, it will require sustained struggle against those in power: internally, ranging from senior bureaucrats in the school system to principals who define learning in terms of the modern school system and, externally, ranging from elected representatives who espouse rhetoric of ending child poverty but do little to address the issue to those within the modern economic structure, who command the mass of labour of others at work—employers and their representatives.

 The rhetoric of the importance of children and adolescents is rampant in school circles. The reality is otherwise. When judged on the basis of addressing child poverty, children and adolescents are not important.

Should not those who are concerned with equity and social justice face the fact that micro solutions to macro problems will not work? Should we not be organizing to end child poverty? Should we not be struggling against those in power who oppose such a goal? Should we not fight for an end to child poverty and for a democratic way of life?

Or should we acquiesce and have the Thorndike’s of the world win out over a Deweyan vision—as occurred in the second half of the twentieth century?

What does equity and social justice demand?

 

Fair Contracts, Decent Work and Other Social-democratic or Social-reformist Clichés: The Case of the Amazon Labour Union

Introduction

The relatively recent organizing of Amazon workers into the Amazon Labour Union (ALU) is presented by the social-democratic or reformist left as an astounding success. Certainly, the organization of Amazon workers into a formal union is noteworthy because of, on the one hand, the increasing importance of such “gig” workers in a society dominated by a class of employers and, on the other, the explicit anti-union tactics of such employers as Amazon.

It can also be said that workers can learn an important lesson when faced with the difficulty of organizing in the face of an explicit anti-union employer: the actual organizing of workers in a workplace by the same workers in that workplace constitutes an inside advantage when compared to organizing from the outside by professional union organizers. As Jordan House and Paul Gray note (from https://socialistproject.ca/2022/04/amazon-workers-form-a-union/):

One of the reasons why Amazon workers in Staten Island were so successful is because they formed an independent, grassroots organization to unionize their particular workplace. Other efforts have been led by already established unions, like the RWDSU in Bessemer, Ala., or the Teamsters in Nisku, Alta.

Union organizing is ultimately about relationships and trust. Organizers from within a workplace don’t have to develop relationships from scratch the same way organizers from outside an organization do. ALU organizers emphasized that they “didn’t come from somewhere else to organize JFK8; we literally work there.”

This stands in stark contrast to the campaigns in Alabama and Alberta. In the latter case, the secretary treasurer of the Teamsters Local 362 acknowledged that “we didn’t have anybody on the inside” in the Nisku facility.

Independent, grassroots unions are able to avoid some of the baggage of more established unions. While the ALU faced specific criticisms by Amazon and its union-avoidance consultants, these largely revolved around the ALU’s upstart status. As Amazon’s anti-ALU website states, “the ALU has no track record that you can use to judge whether their representation would be worth it to you or not.”

The ALU also developed tactics that are much more effective when workers on the inside are organizing. For example, ALU worker-organizers researched Amazon’s union-avoidance consultants by scouring Labor Department reports and warehouse lists of third-party vendors. Then, in one-on-one conversations with their co-workers, they shared their research on how these consultants, whose typical rate is $3,200 (US) per day, “get rich ‘convincing poor people to stay poor’.”

The stark contrast between what Amazon was willing to pay these consultants and worker salaries persuaded many to support the ALU. These workers also organized their co-workers to fearlessly challenge anti-union talking points at the captive audience meetings, which inspired other, more cautious co-workers to do the same.

Despite the odds, the ALU succeeded where some of North America’s largest and established private sector unions have failed. The ALU has proven that one of the most powerful anti-union companies in North America can be unionized. This doesn’t mean that the already established unions can’t beat Amazon, but as the ALU has made clear, inside workers have to take the lead. 

Idealization of Unionizing 

Despite the benefits of insider organizing, the authors do not provide any critical distancing concerning the ideology expressed by both those involved in the union-organizing drive and those who defend such unions uncritically. For example, on the ALU website ( https://www.amazonlaborunion.org/), we read the following: 

How do contract negotiations work?

Negotiations are led by the ALU Bargaining Committee, made up of workers from each shift and department. We need intelligent, strong-minded workers to step forward to help negotiate a fair contract for all workers. We do all of the work, we should have a say in our working conditions. [my emphasis]
Although it is understandable that a new union, which has faced major opposition from an anti-union employer, should emphasize winning a union-organizing drive, this does not justify the use of the ideological cliche of a “fair contract.” This misleads the workers into a false sense of what collective bargaining and collective agreements can and cannot achieve. 

Another example: this time from a liberal/social-democratic point of view. From The Atlantic   https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/04/amazon-labor-union/629550/      

The egalitarian potential of the labor movement, by contrast, is very real. Unions can unite workers across ethnic, racial, religious, and linguistic barriers with a common interest in decent wages, safe working conditions, and protection from exploitation. Unions do not erase political disagreements among workers, but they model a world where those disagreements can be resolved in the name of the greater good. [my emphasis]

It is kind of difficult to achieve “decent wages”  and “protection from exploitation” when exploitation and oppression are necessary characteristics of working for an employer (see for example The Money Circuit of Capital, The Rate of Exploitation of Workers at Magna International Inc., One of the Largest Private Employers in Toronto, Part One  and The Rate of Exploitation of Magna International Inc., One of the Largest Private Employers in Toronto, Part Two, Or: Intensified Oppression and Exploitation).

Better wages are often possible when unionized, of course. Similarly, unionized workplaces provide safer working conditions, but safe working conditions when working for an employers is a will-o’-the-wisp (see the money circuit of capital above as well as such posts as Economics for Social Democrats–but not for the Working Class, Part Four: Is There Such a Thing as a Responsible Employer in Relation to the Health of Workers? or Working for an Employer May Be Dangerous to Your Health, Part Seven: The National Day of Mourning in Canada and the Social Causes of Injury, Disease and Death  or Economics for Social Democrats–but not for the Working Class, Part Three: The Health and Safety of Workers and an Economy Dominated by a Class of Employers Are at Loggerheads). 

In a recent debate on the Marxmail listserve (  https://groups.io/g/marxmail/topic/the_social_democratic_left/96265876?p=,,,20,0,0,0::recentpostdate/sticky,,,20,2,0,96265876,previd%3D1674045053168565529,nextid%3D1673790420258174809&previd=1674045053168565529&nextid=1673790420258174809 )with Marv Gandall, Gandall wrote the following: 

“You’re not suggesting that the Amazon and other fledgling unions try to organize and strike deals with their powerful employers outside of the legally sanctioned industrial relations regime, and that is is only the “reformists” (including on this list!) who are holding them back, are you? That does seem to be the practical implications of your abundant theorizing.”

I responded: 

Hardly. Gandall cannot draw logical conclusions since his premises are faulty.

The Amazon Union should not bullshit workers about the collective-bargaining process and the resulting collective agreement to be fair. It should explicitly try to have open discussions about the limitations of the collective-bargaining process and the limitations of collective agreements. It should try to have discussions about why almost all grievances against the collective agreement arise from the union side. It should foster its members to question why that is the case. It should refer to the management right clauses in many collective agreements and what the implications of that is for the lives of workers.

I must say: Gandall’s response is certainly what I would expect from social democrats—they fail to address whether collective bargaining only limits the power of management while also legitimating it—a double-edged sword (but social democrats only recognize one edge—the positive side of collective agreements) and what, if anything, is to be done about the undemocratic economic coercion and economic blackmail that characterizes the employer-employee relation.

Perhaps Gandall can enlighten us about what he and others would do about management rights? About the continued exploitation and oppression of even unionized workers? About using workers as means for purposes undefined by them? About the dictatorship at workers by employers despite the existence of “free collective bargaining” and collective agreements? And many, many other features of an exploitative and oppressive society—which social democrats deny, of course.

Of course, unionized workers may have other ideas—than union bureaucrats and their ideological representatives.

Conclusion

The need to defend workers’ immediate interests against vicious anti-union employers such as Amazon through rank-and-file organizing certainly should be defended. However, such organizing has fallen into the trap as bureuacratic unions–it has idealized the nature of the contract or collective agreement rather than presenting it as a necessary but temporary truce in the long-term class struggle against the class of employers.

Guilty Until Proven Innocent: The Real Assumption of Some Bureaucratic Tribunals, Part Five

It is supposed to be a fundamental principle of criminal law that a person is presumed innocent until proven otherwise by the State (government). This is the ideology or the rhetoric (which much of the left have swallowed). The reality is otherwise. In reality, the administrative apparatus of various organizations of the government and semi-governmental organizations assume that you are guilty first and that you have to prove your innocence; otherwise, you suffer negative consequences.

An example is the requirements that the Ontario College of Teachers imposed on me in order for me to qualify as a teacher in the province of Ontario after I moved from the province of Manitoba. To qualify as a teacher in Ontario, you must gain the approval of the Ontario College of Teachers (OCT). The OCT website explains what this organization does:

ABOUT THE COLLEGE

The Ontario College of Teachers licenses, governs and regulates Ontario’s teaching profession in the public interest. It was created by the Ontario College of Teachers Act to:

  • issue, suspend and revoke teaching certificates
  • set ethical standards and standards of practice
  • investigate and hear concerns and complaints about members
  • accredit teacher education programs and courses.

All publically funded school teachers and administrators in Ontario must be certified by us and be members of the College.

OUR COUNCIL

The College is currently transitioning to a new governance model. A Transition Supervisory Officer (TSO) has been appointed to help the College with the changes. The TSO acts in place of Council during the transition period. 

Once established, the new College Council, statutory and regulatory committees, will be established through a competency-based selection process. All committees will include an equal number of Ontario Certified Teachers and members of the public.  

OUR LEADERSHIP

Our executive team includes the Registrar and Chief Executive Officer, the Deputy Registrar and four Directors overseeing:

  • Corporate and Council Services
  • Investigations and Hearings
  • Membership Services
  • Standards of Practice and Accreditation.

To qualify as a teacher in Ontario, among other things, you have to answer a questionnaire. On the questionnaire, there are questions concerning arrest–and since I was arrested by the RCMP (the Royal Canadian Mounted Police)  (but never convicted), I was obliged to prove my innocence in various ways.

I sent, along with my explanation, a table that I had constructed concerning my experiences (and the experiences of my daughter, Francesca) with the child welfare organization Winnipeg Child and Family Services (CFS), located in Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada. The table that I constructed about events is a revised version (always subject to change as I gather further evidence). I will post the table gradually, in the section Publications and Writings on this blog.

I outlined in earlier posts in this series that I had to justify myself via a questionnaire on the Ontario College of Teachers website (see for example Guilty Until Proven Innocent: The Real Assumption of Some Bureaucratic Tribunals, Part One). Below is a reply by the Ontario College of Teachers, specifying the conditions that I must satisfy in order to be granted a teaching certificate in Ontario–despite never having been convicted of any crime.

July 2, 2014.                                                                                                                 Application No. 653493

Fred Harris
3250 Keele Street
Toronto, ON M3M 3C5

Dear Mr. Harris, 

Re: Your Application for Certification and Membership

Thank you for your application to the Ontario College of Teachers. I note on your application that you answered yes to several questions within the Declaration portion of the application. I have reviewed the explanations that you provided on your application as well as the related documentation you submitted.

Please provide me with the following additional information: 

  • Copies of reports from the Children’s Aid Society related to any investigation of you, as well as any reports from Anishinaable Child and Family Services related to you, especially the information from the agency’s worker, Daryl [should be Darrell] Shorting. I probably made this mistake in spelling.]
  • Copies of police reports from Ashern RCMP, regarding the charges you cited in your application. As you provided no information in your application re these charges and the criminal record check report received at the College is negative, please also provide me with court documents that arose from the charges indicating the disposition of the charges.
  • Please arrange to have sent, directly to my attention, letters of reference from at least three individuals who have known you for at least five years, yet are not related to you, who are aware of the charges and incidents declared on your application and can attest to your suitability to be licensed as a teacher. These individuals should be professionals such as a doctor, lawyer, teacher, spiritual leader or employer. Please ensure the letters are sent to me directly from the referees and that they indicate in the letter their awareness of the charges and incidents.
  • Please provide me with your written, signed authorization to discuss your file with a representative of the Human Resources department in the Lakeshore School Division, Manitoba, regarding your statement that you were not fired from the school division but placed under “intensive supervision.” 
  • Please provide me with your written signed authorization to discuss your file with the principal who completed the clinical supervision.

Once I have received the additional information, I will review your file. More information may be required. Please contact me at 416-961-8800, ext. 398 if you have any questions.

Sincerely,

Linda Zaks-Walker
Director of Membership Services 

There are a nunber of noteable things to observe about the above. Firstly, nformation from the Winnipeg Child and Family Services in general indicates definite bias–and yet this is what I had to provide (see the post A Personal Example of the Oppressive Nature of  Public Welfare Services for a table of my dealings with the Winnipeg Child and Family Services).

Secondly, why would she request information from Darrell Shorting? Mr. Shorting evidently considered it appropriate to judge me beforehand as guilty without a trial (why else would he claim that he knew what I had done–choked my daughter and threw her to the ground?) Furthermore, why would she expect me to have any information from Mr. Shoring? I received no information from him other than his judgement and his threat that if I did not inform the principal that I was under investigation by the Ashinaable Child and Family Services, he would inform them. Finally, and ironically, as I wrote in another post:

(As an aside, it may be that Darrell Shorting is the same person who complained about how children in First Nations communities should be kept in their own communities rather than shipped to Winnipeg under the “protection” of Winnipeg Child and Family Services (https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/cfs-is-new-residential-school-system-says-former-cfs-investigator-1.2788730 ). If so, then Mr. Shorting saw fit to falsely accuse me of choking Francesca and throwing her to the ground and contributing to Francesca’s legal separation from me. Mr. Darrell, Shorting, as the article shows, was a former CFS abuse investigator for Aninshinaabe CFS.) 

Thirdly, reference to the RCMP indicates that this institution, for bureaucratic organizations such as the Ontario College of Teachers, is beyond reproach. The “official” judgement of the RCMP is more important than anything I wrote or provided as evidence of the oppressive nature of its function. 

Fourthly, the requirement that I had to have three references that attested to my suitability to teach assumes once again that I, a citizen, am less worthy than others because I was charged (but never convicted). The fact that the charges were dropped without any explanation is irrelevant for the Ontario College of Teachers. The RCMP proceeds to charge me, and then drops the charges several months later–and yet I still had to prove my “innocence.” This is the real world of “law,”, not the fantasy world of so-called socialists like Herman Rosenfeld, who talk of “transforming the police” without even inquiring into the real nature of the police and the courts.   

Fifthly, letters of reference from “professionals” indicates another bias; workers who are less than “professionals” are implicitly considered unworthy of providing adequate, accurate and relevant information. Such arrogance and bias. 

Sixthly, a possible letter of reference from an “employer” indicates another bias–to be an employer is to be elevated beyond reproach–as if the view of an employer were tantamount to a statement of the truth whereas the statement of, say, a custodian, were expected to be a lie. 

Seventhly, although I hardly had any problem with the Ontario College of Teachers dicussing my file with the principal, Neil MacNeil (I have written several posts that contain Mr. MacNeil’s clincial evaluation and my critical response–see for example A Principal’s Evaluation of My Teaching Basic French, or: How to Oppress a Worker Through Performance Evaluation, Part One   ), it is instructive that it wanted to consult with the principal–in this context, a representative of the employer. 

After having jumped through the many hoops required, I was–finally–“allowed” to teach in Ontario. I simply did not bother to do so since working as a teacher for any particular employer necessarily involves oppression in one form or another–and even more so initially as a substitute teacher. I was able to do so since I was receiving disability benefits from the Manitoba Teachers’ Society Disability Benefits program–something like a guaranteed basic income for those who are “disabled.”

Conclusions

In effect, despite never having been convicted and never having been fired, I had to prove in fact that I was “worthy” of being a teacher in Ontario.

The social-democratic left generally ignore such oppressive experiences. Its idealization of “public education” and “public ownership” simply neglects the oppressive nature of much public education and much public organizations. By doing so, it of course plays into the hands of the right.

Why do the social-democratic left ignore such oppressive experiences? Is there really any wonder why there is a disconnect between regular people and the social-democratic left? Is there really any wonder why some would vote for the right?

The Rate of Exploitation of General Motors Workers

I thought it would be politically relevant to try to estimate the rate of exploitation of General Motors (GM) workers for 2019 (since annual reports starting in 2020 would distort the picture because of the pandemic). I say politically relevant because of the closure of the GM Oshawa plant on December 18, 2019 and the subsequent making of the document Company Town, which dealt with the coming closure, the attitude of Jerry Dias, president of Unifor (the union that represents the workers at Oshawa) and the consequences of the closing of the factory.

However, GM annual reports (like many annual reports based in the United States), provide insufficient information to calculate the rate of exploitation. For example, there are no data on wages and salaries paid out (although there are for benefits).

Nonetheless, I searched for substitutes for the data. Undoubtedly, such calculations will be even more imperfect than the rates of exploitation I calculated for various large employers in Canada. It will undoubtedly only include bare statistics, without much refinement and with few adjustments. Still, such estimates may provide a ballpark figure of the extent of exploitation.

I invite others to criticize the data used and the manner of determining the rate of exploitation–by providing more accurate data and a more accurate manner of determining the rate of exploitation.

Where possible, I provide the website addresses where I found the information if the information is not drawn from the Annual Report.

The Nature of the Rate of Exploitation

But what is the rate of exploitation? And why not use the usual rate of profit or the rate of return? The rate of profit is calculated as profit divided by investment. Since employers purchase both the means for work–buildings, computers, office supplies, raw material–and hire workers–we can classify investment into two categories: c, meaning constant capital, or the capital invested in commodities other than workers; and v, or variable capital, the capital invested in the hiring of workers for a certain period of time (wages, salaries and benefits).

The purpose of investment in a capitalist economy is to obtain more money (see The Money Circuit of Capital), and the additional money is surplus value when it is related to its source: workers working for more time than what they cost to produce themselves. The relation between surplus value and variable capital (or wages and salaries) is the rate of surplus value or the rate of exploitation, expressed as a ratio: s/v.

When the surplus is related to both c and v and expressed as a ratio, it is the rate of profit: s/(c+v).

In Marxian economics, you cannot simply use the economic classifications provided by employers and governments since such classifications often hide the nature of the social world in which we live. The rate of profit underestimates the rate of exploitation since the surplus value is related to total investment and not just to the workers. Furthermore, it makes the surplus value appear to derive from both constant capital and variable capital.

I decided to look at the annual report of some of the largest private companies (if they are available) in order to calculate the rate of exploitation at a more micro level than aggregate rates of surplus value at the national or international level. Politically, this is necessary since social democrats here in Toronto (and undoubtedly elsewhere) vaguely may refer to exploitation–while simultaneously and contradictorily referring to “decent work” and “fair contracts.” Calculating even approximately the rate of exploitation at a more micro level thus has political relevance.

Conclusions First

As usual, I start with the conclusion in order to make readily accessible the results of the calculations for those who are more interested in the results than in how to obtain them.

We now have sufficient information to calculate the rate of exploitation of GM workers.

Adjusted Income before income taxes: $7.383 billion=s
Total wages and benefits $18.597 billion=v

To calculate the rate of surplus value or the rate of exploitaiton (they are the same thing), we need to divide “Adjusted Income before income taxes” (s) by “Total wages and benefits” (v).

So, with the adjustments in place, the rate of exploitation or the rate of surplus value=s/v=7.383/18.5976=40%.

That means that for every hour worked that produces her/his wage, a worker at GM works around an additional 24 minutes for free for GM.

In a 7-hour (420-minute) work day , the GM worker produces her/his wage in about 300 (5 hours) and works 120 minutes (2 hours) for free for GM. Of course, during the time that the worker produces her/his own wage, s/he is subject to the power of management and hence is unfree (see, for instance, Management Rights, Part Four: Private Sector Collective Agreement, Ontario  and   Employers as Dictators, Part One).

In an 8-hour (480 minute-work day), a GM worker produces her/his wage in 343 minutes (5 hours 43 minutes) and works for 137 minutes (2 hours 17 minutes) free for GM.

In an 9-hour (540-minute) day, a GM worker produces her/his wage in 386 minutes (6 hours 26 minutes) and works for free for 154 minutes (2 hours 34 minutes) for GM.

In a 10-hour (600-minute) day, a GM worker produces her/his wage in 429 minutes (7 hours 9 minutes and works for free for 171 minutes (2 hours 51 minutes) for GM.

In a 11-hour (660-minute) day, a GM worker produces her/his wage in 471 minutes (7 hours 51 minutes) and works for free for 189 minutes (3 hours 9 minutes) for GM.

In a 12-hour (720-minute) day, a GM worker produces her/his wage in 514 minutes (8 hours 34 minutes) and works for free for 206 minutes (3 hours 26 minutes) for GM.

Of course, during these times that the worker works to obtain an equivalent of her/his own wage, s/he is subject to the power of management and hence is also unfree during that time (see The Rate of Exploitation of Magna International Inc., One of the Largest Private Employers in Toronto, Part Two, Or: Intensified Oppression and Exploitation and   Employers as Dictators, Part One).

Many GM workers in the United States (and in Canada) belong to a union. The Annual Report states:

At December 31, 2019 approximately 48,000 (50%) of our U.S. employees were represented by unions, a majority of which were represented by the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agriculture Implement Workers of America (UAW).

Despite belonging to a union, the GM workers are exploited–but to a relatively low extent–much lower than many other union workers. The highest calculated rate of exploitation so far has been Rogers Communications’ workers, at 209 percent (see the comparative rates in the post The Rate of Exploitation of Workers at WestJet Airlines Ltd.). Why that is would be a good area for research.

Political Questions

Do you think that these facts contradict the talk by the left and unionists of “fair wages,” “fair contracts” (see  Fair Contracts or Collective Agreements: The Ideological Rhetoric of Canadian Unions, Part Three: Unifor (Largest Private Union in Canada) for the rhetoric of the largest Unifor as the largest private-sector union in Canada, and “decent work?” Do they ignore the reality of life for workers, whether unionized or non-unionized?

What of the following, drawn from the November 5, 2020 collective agrement between General Motors of Canada Company and Unifor Local No 199 St. Catharines, Local No. 222 Oshawa and Local No. 636 Woodstock? Page 7:

Section IV

Management

(4) The Union recognizes the right of the Company to hire, promote, transfer, demote and lay off and to suspend, discharge or otherwise discipline employees for just cause subject to the right of any employee to lodge a grievance in the manner and to the extent as herein provided.

The Union further recognizes the right of the Company to operate and manage its business in all respects, to maintain order and efficiency in its plants, and to determine the location of its plants, the products to be manufactured, the scheduling of its production and its methods, processes, and means of manufacturing. The Union further acknowledges that the Company has the right to make and alter, from time to time, rules and regulations to be observed by employees, which rules and regulations shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement.

This power of management is not mentioned at all in the National Unifor Bargaining Report. Like most union bargaining reports, it omits all negative aspects of working for General Motors (including being exploited and oppressed):

HIGHLIGHTS
• $1.1B to $1.4B in investments
• General wage increases
• $7,250 Productivity and Quality Bonus
• Inflation Protection Bonuses
• Improved New Hire Program
• Skilled Trades Adjustment
• Benefit improvements
• Three-year term
• Lump sum payment for pre-1994 retirees

A written summary also omits the continued power of GM management to exploit and oppress workers (page 1):

JOINT MESSAGE TO ALL GENERAL MOTORS MEMBERS

SECURING A MADE IN CANADA FUTURE

If there is a lesson learned from 2020 Auto Talks, it is that the future of Canada’s auto sector is bright and on a clear forward path.

Thanks to the hard work and determination of the Unifor-GM Master Bargaining Committee, we are proud to present a new collective agreement that follows the economic pattern negotiated at both Ford and FCA. This agreement includes a 5 per cent increase to hourly wages, a 4 per cent lump sum payment in 2021, along with $11,250 in bonuses.

The deal makes major improvements to the New Hire Program, including an accelerated path to full rate, and returns key benefits like the Legal Services Plan and the afternoon (5%) and midnight (10%) shift premium.

Skilled trades workers will see their 20% wage differential restored, new apprentices hired, and the pre-apprenticeship program re-instated for future hires. The new agreement also includes significant improvements to the benefits plan, modest (but still important) pension improvements, along with health and safety gains, retirement allowances and equity gains including 10 days of paid domestic violence leave and a new Racial Justice Advocate.

Along with these contractual improvements are commitments by the company to maintain and expand work at current Unifor facilities. GM will continue V6 engine and 6-speed transmission production over the life of the contract, and forecasted beyond.

Also, in a stand-alone letter GM has committed to explore new potential product programs and investment opportunities for St. Catharines, with input from them union[my emphasis. When I formed part of a negotiating team for Operating Engineers Local 858, in Prince George, British Columbia, the management team were able to shuffle off many items on the negotiating table by referring to a “consultation process” between the union and management–in effect eliminating such items for negotiations. The verb “explore” and the noun “input” are euphemisms for the right of management to simply do what it wants, with the proviso that it “consults” the union.] 

St. Catharines is well regarded as a leader in the GM powertrain division and will receive $109 million to in-source new transmission work for the Corvette, adding jobs, and make
upgrades to the small block V8 engine program. GM will continue V6 engine and 6-speed transmission production over the life of the contract, and further commits to seek out new
programs that sustain the facility over the long term.

The Woodstock PDC will receive $500,000 in additional upgrades. Aftermarket parts work at Oshawa will also continue, maintaining hundreds of jobs.

In addition, and pending ratification, GM has committed to invest up to $1.3 billion to restart pickup truck assembly at the Oshawa Assembly Complex, with an expected two-shift operation in the first half of 2022 (and the potential for a third).

These “highlights” teach the workers nothing about the limitations of collective bargaining and  collective agreements. They are designed to hide the concentration of major decision-making power in the hands of General Motors (such as the “right of the Company to determine the location of its plants” and the lack of such power by unionized workers.

The same could be said of the Local 222 Bargaining Report, which recommended voting for the collective agreement without any explicit indications of its limitation as indicated in the management rights clause of the collective agreement. Thus, the Report indicates among other things, the following (page 3):

Commitment to settling the 2020 GM/Unifor Master Agreement and Oshawa Local Agreement
•The production allocation is for the current life cycle. Currently, there is no future product commitment but the Company has expressed that the life cycle will be a minimum of three (3) years and that is well into the new Collective Agreement 2023.

•There will be no retirement incentives offered at the Oshawa Assembly Plant during the current life cycle of the product. In the event of a permanent reduction in force, the new hires at the Oshawa Assembly Plant will be laid off. Any employees hired prior to the 2020 Collective Agreement will flow back into the Oshawa OEM Stamped Products and Service Operation based upon Seniority.

Of course, workers have to subordinate their will to the will of employers in a society dominated by a class of employers, and so no union representatives can overcome this limitation; such a limitation is a class limitation, and it is at this level that such limitations need to be addressed. However, the class level is hardly a level that excludes the particular sections of the working class. Those particular sections are included in that general level, so at the local, regional or national level, the class issue can certainly be indicated and not simply ignored–which is what union reps do often enough these days. At the least, they could explicitly indicate the limitations of the collective-bargaining process and the collective agreements that result from that process.  Better yet, they could not only include such limitations, but they could point to ways in which such limitations might be overcome through regional, national and international tactics and stragegies. Most modern union reps, however, have no intention of doing so; indeed, they are likely unaware of the need to do so.

Data on Which the Calculation Is Based

The calculation of the rate of exploitation is undoubtedly imperfect, and I invite the reader to correct its gaps. Nonetheless, the lack of any attempt to determine the rate of exploitation at the city level has undoubtedly reinforced social-reformist tendencies. (in millions of U.S. dollars)

Total net sales and revenue  137,237

Total costs and expenses 131,756

Operating income 5,481 [137,237-131,756=5481]

Adjustments of Surplus Value (Profit)

It is necessary to make some adjustments to this since the annual report also refers to the following additional categories:

Automotive interest expense 782
Interest income and other non-operating income, net  1,469
Equity income (Note 8) 1,268

Starting with the category “Automotive interest expense,” it is necessary to make an adjustment.  It is necessary to add 782 (Automotive interest expense) to “Operating income” since (as I explained in another post):

In Marxian theory, it is necessary to question whether some expenses are expenses for both the individual employer and for the class of employers (and fractions of their class, such as those who live on interest); in such a case, the expense is deducted from total revenue. On the other hand, there are expenses that are expenses for the individual employer but are not expenses when looked at from the point of view of the class of employers; in such an instance, they are paid out from the surplus value produced or obtained by workers and are to be included in income before taxes.

Accordingly:

Temporarily adjusted income before taxes 5,481+782=6,263

Moving to the next category, “Interest income and other non-operating income, net,” since the idea of calculating the rate of exploitation of particular employers is to determine the extent to which the particular employer exploits its workers, income derived from the exploitation of workers other than its workers should be excluded. I did not think this through or consider this when I calculated the rate of exploitation of some other employers (such as Air Canada); I may or may not recalculate the rate of exploitation of such employers in the future–that depends on how much time I have to dedicate to writing other posts and engaging in my own research as well as my own personal commitments to my daughter and wife.

In the particular case of General Motors, I will exclude such income from the calculation since the income is derived from workers other than the workers of GM.

The last category, “Equity income,” seems to reflect net surplus value after expenses are subtracted from revenue. Note 8 elaborates:

Note 8. Equity in Net Assets of Nonconsolidated Affiliates

Nonconsolidated affiliates are entities in which we maintain an equity ownership interest and for which we use the equity method of accounting due to our ability to exert significant influence over decisions relating to their operating and fmancial affairs. Revenue and expenses of our joint ventures are not consolidated into our financial statements; rather, our proportionate share of the earnings of each joint venture is reflected as Equity income.

Since “Equity income” reflects the “proportionate share of the earnings of each joint venture,” it constitutes the net result of GM exploiting workers in joint ventures. Accordingly, it is necessary to make an adjustment. It is necessary to add 1,268 to Income before income taxes. The final adjustment is:

Adjusted income before taxes 7,531

Wages and Salaries (v)

Although there are statistics in the annual report for employee benefits, there are no statistics in it for wages or salaries.

I failed to find any direct information of total salaries, wages and benefits on the Net. The best that I could do was to find data about the total number of employees and then try to find data on the average wage/salary as well as average benefits and multiply the sum of the average wage/salary and benefits by the total number of employees.
To improve such calculations, I invite Sam Gindin, former research director to the Canadian Auto Workers (now Unifor) or Jim Stanford, former economist for the same union, to provide more accurate data (perhaps insider data?).
In 2019, there were 164,000 employees:
Employees At December 31, 2019 we employed approximately 95,000 (58%) hourly employees and approximately 69,000(42%) salaried employees.
This is consistent with the following:
This number, as I argued above, needs to be multiplied by the average cost of a GM worker, including benefits.  According to some, the average cost to use a GM worker in 2019 was about $63 US an hour. From   https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/trending/Fic7Dwvvxuh14hs9rmjwJw2, dated January 15, 2020:
GM’s average hourly labor costs are estimated to be … $63 in 2019.
I assume that this includes benefits. This amount is less than the amount estimated in 2006 (or perhaps 2009–it is unclear). From
Average Hourly Compensation 2006 (US Wages and Benefits)
Last updated on: 1/21/2009 6:47:00 AM PST
“The calculations show, accurately enough, that for every hour a unionized worker puts in, one of the Big Three really does spend about $73 on compensation. So the number isn’t made up. But it is the combination of three very different categories.

The first category is simply cash payments, which is what many people imagine when they hear the word ‘compensation.’ It includes wages, overtime and vacation pay, and comes to about $40 an hour. (The numbers vary a bit by company and year. That’s why $73 is sometimes $70 or $77.)

The second category is fringe benefits, like health insurance and pensions. These benefits have real value, even if they don’t show up on a weekly paycheck. At the Big Three, the benefits amount to $15 an hour or so.

Add the two together, and you get the true hourly compensation of Detroit’s unionized work force: roughly $55 an hour. It’s a little more than twice as much as the typical American worker makes, benefits included. The more relevant comparison, though, is probably to Honda;s or Toyota’s (nonunionized) workers. They make in the neighborhood of $45 an hour, and most of the gap stems from their less generous benefits.

The third category is the cost of benefits for retirees. These are essentially fixed costs that have no relation to how many vehicles the companies make. But they are a real cost, so the companies add them into the mix — dividing those costs by the total hours of the current work force, to get a figure of $15 or so — and end up at roughly $70 an hour.”

As to be expected, the estimated $63 an hour ($US) is certainly much higher than the estimated hourly wage of American auto workers. From Automotive Industry Labour Market Analysis: Wage Report (Canadian Skills Training and Employment Coalition, Prism Economics and Analysis, and the Automotive Policy Research Centre, October 2019), page 30:
Research done by the Center for Automotive Research (CAR) found that nominal wages for U.S. workers in the auto manufacturing sector increased by just over 6% from $28.49 in 2002 to $30.20 in 2018 but real wages fell by 23.5% (as cited in Haglund, 2019).

Think tank says UAW deals increased automakers’ labor costs

New contracts between the United Auto Workers union and Detroit’s three automakers substantially increased the cost gap between Detroit and foreign automakers with U.S. factories

ByThe Associated Press
January 15, 2020, 3:40 PM

Total labor costs include wages, health care, pensions and other expenses.

Center Vice President Kristin Dziczek calculated that GM’s labor costs would rise from $63 per hour before the new contract to $71.

GM’s average hourly labor costs are estimated to be $71 in 2023, up 12.7% from $63 in 2019 and up 29.1% from $55 in 2015, Dziczek said during a Jan. 15 webcast. Ford’s hourly labor costs would be $69 in 2023, up 13.1% from $61 in 2019 and up 21.1% from $57 in 2015. Fiat Chrysler’s costs would go up to $66 in 2023, up 20% from $55 in 2019 and up 40.4% from $47 in 2015.
Given the above, $63 an hour seems to be the average cost of a GM employee whereever s/he works. There will be no adjustments for this category despite the above calculated reduction of 173.5 from “Tranformation activities” due to some of that category involving separation benefits received by workers since, presumably, the $63 an hour includes such separation benefits.

Jim Stanford’s Disagreement with the Estimate of $63 an Hour Cost of Variable Capital V)

However, Jim Stanford would dispute such an hourly cost since he disputes the hourly cost of $75 (see How Much do Autoworkers REALLY Make? Surprise: It’s NOT $75 Per Hour!  http://unifor584retirees.ca/caw_retirees/pdf/hourly_labour_costs_09.pdf). He argues that workers receive between $43 and $44 hour.
Before I delve into this issue, let me preface it with the purpose of calculating the rate of exploitation. It is supposed to determine the proportion of hours worked that produce the value of the wage received by the workers in relation to the hours worked for no compensation and thus free for the employer. The wage is a composite of the actual wage rate and benefits and cannot be limited to the given wage rate.
Generally, the rate of exploitation is a class phenomenon, and the value of labour power or variable capital (v) and surplus value as its components are also class phenomenon. As Ben Fine states, in relation to the value of labour power, pages 104-105:
… for Marx the value of labour power is the consequence of an exchange between capital and labour, confronting each other as the two major economic classes. It is not simply the wage earned on the labour-market by one individual as opposed to another. …
the value of labour power is a more complex concept than the wage rate or earnings
of the typical worker.
Some of the costs of variable capital for employers are class costs, or the costs to the class of employers and apply across the board to all employers (or at least to a section of employers in a particular industry). Workers may not individually receive them, but some workers do; which workers depends on various conditions, such as the level of unemployment, the age of the workers, their health and so on. They need to be included in the value of labour power or variable capital even if no specific set of workers receive them as a benefit since they are costs for the employer being an employer of any set of workers whatsoever.
Stanford, however, excludes several categories which is included in the above $63 an hour–a category called “All-in Active Hourly Labour Cost.” The subcategories of this category and the corresponding amounts are: 
Overtime and shift premiums $3
Cost per hour worked of paid time off $8-9
Impact on hourly cost of layoffs & downtime $1-3
Cost per hour worked of SUB $1-3
Statutory taxes $3-4
Overtime and shfit premiums
Stanford excludes this subcategory from his calculation on the basis of the following:
Occasionally companies will require their workers to stay overtime, beyond normal working hours. Overtime is worked ins response to surges in consumer demand, to make up for production problems or bottlenecks, or in some cases because employers have decided it’s cheaper to work its existing staff extra hours than to hire new workers. In every case, it is the employer’s choice when overtime is worked.
Workers required to work overtime are paid a wage premium (usually 50%) for those hours. To a large extent (depending on the specific hours involved), overtime pay is mandated by labour law (although a labour contract can require overtime to be paid in some circumstances when it is not legally required).

In addition, in the auto industry and other manufacturing settings, it is standard practice to pay a shift premium for workers who staff evening and night shifts. (In CAW-represented auto plants, there is a 5% premium paid for evening shifts, and a 10% premium for overnight shifts, to reflect the added stress on family life of those working hours.)

Is the overtime premium part of one’s “hourly wage”? Few Canadians would conceive it that way – although those working overtime certainly appreciate the extra money. And remember: overtime is
something that occurs because employers desire it. 
According to Statistics Canada, in 2007 (most recent data), auto assembly workers in Canada worked an average of about 3.5 hours of overtime per week. This increased total average wage payments (weighted across all hours worked in the year) by around $2. Shift premiums added, on average, about another dollar per hour.
This argument is unconvincing. Overtime is supposed to not constitute compensation, he implies,  because it is not voluntary. Being voluntary or involuntary has nothing directly to do with the cost of workers. How workers conceive overtime also hardly determines whether it is a cost. As for shift premiums, the same logic applies; they too are costs. Stanford never indicates what overtime payments and shift premiums objectively are.
We can, however, get some idea of what they are by referring to the value of labour power as subject to a normal working day under average conditions. Since overtime work in effect extends the working day beyond the norm, it involves abnormal consumption of the labour power of workers. As Marc Linder (2000) argues ( “Moments are the elements of profit”: overtime and the deregulation of working hours under the Fair Labor Standards Act, pages 5-6):
Marx also furnished a general framework for understanding struggles over the length of the workday or workweek. On the surface, this struggle centers on the conflict between the buyer and the seller of a commodity which generates special problems because, unlike the situation with a general run-of-the-mill commodity, the body and mind of the human seller of labor power cannot be separated from its daily use by the buyer. Since the law of exchange of commodities, however, does not recognize any special rules for this particular exchange, the capitalist buyer tries to extract the greatest possible profit from the use of the worker’s labor power for the day’s or week’s worth he has bought. The question then becomes: how long is a workday or workweek? Since the human seller lives beyond the day, he must make sure that he sells his only commodity for a price high enough to enable him to reappear at work the next day with his labor power in a condition of strength and health that meets the standards set by his competitors. But the worker as a rational labor market participant must also exercise sufficient foresight to husband his only economic asset for a lifetime—or at least the standard working life of his type of labor. If the daily value of his commodity equals its lifetime value divided by 30 years or approximately 10,000 workdays, then he must make sure that overlong workdays and workweeks do not force him to expend so much additional energy that he uses up 1/5,000 or 1/3,333
of his lifetime supply for only 1/10,000 of its lifetime value. For this reason socialist unions regarded eight-hour laws as “life lengthening” acts.The worker therefore regards such overwork as crossing the line from the capitalist’s rightful use to plundering of his labor power and, as such, a breach of their contract and of the law of the exchange of commodities. His demand for a workday or workweek of normal length—defined by its compatibility with a healthy 30-year worklife—is as rightful as the capitalist’s demand that the worker work as long as possible each day and week. Because the capitalist is not a slaveholder, he has no (capital-) invested interest in the length of the worklife of his individual employees: “A quick succession of unhealthy and short-lived generations will keep the labour market as well supplied as a series of vigorous and long-lived generations.” Thus as long as the employer can find equivalent replacements in the labor market when he needs them, this private contractual dispute cannot be resolved between individual buyer and seller. The resulting “antinomy” of right against right27 must, Marx argued, be decided by “the respective powers of the combatants.” But since “in its merely economic action capital is the stronger side,” a class-wide settlement of the hours issue was possible only through “general political action,” which meant “legislative interference” under pressure from the working class.2* Consequently, the normalization of the workday and workweek appears historically as a struggle between the “aggregate capitalist, i.e., the class of capitalists, and the aggregate worker, or the working class.”
Overtime and shift work can be conceived as compensatory costs for abnormal consumption of workers–but they are costs of hiring workers, exploiting them and oppressing them.
Cost per hour worked of paid time off 
Stanford has the following to say on the matter in order to justify excluding this subcategory:
Now here is where it starts to get more complicated. “All-in hourly labour cost,” in the auto industry, is not calculated by dividing total compensation by the number of normal working hours in a year (as we have done above: 40 hours per week
times 52 weeks in a year equals 2080 working hours in a year).
Let us pause here. What Stanford calls “normal working hours” is not the statistic that can be used to calculate the rate of exploitation since it is not the number of actual hours worked. It is the actual hours worked that produces the equivalent of the total compensation received by workers that is relevant–and not some “normal working hours” that no workers actually work.
From Anwar Shaikh and E. Ahmet Tonak (1994), From Measuring the wealth of nations: The political economy of national accounts, page 178: 

By definition, Marxian labor value added is simply the number of hours worked by productive workers
Let us continue with Stanford’s views.
Instead, all-in hourly labour costs are calculated over a much smaller base of hours. Total
compensation costs are divided by the numbers of hours actually worked in a year. Actual hours worked, the denominator of this fraction, differs from the number of standard working hours in a year (2080) for several reasons:
  • Paid time off (for vacation and holidays)
  • Sick leave (CAW autoworkers do not receive any pay during the first days of
    an illness, after which they are compensated under a sickness and accident
    insurance scheme)
  • Time not worked due to layoffs or downtimeIt is simple mathematics that the lower is the number of hours actually worked,
    the higher is the apparent “all-in hourly labour cost.”

    The CAW has placed great emphasis over the years on negotiating more paid time off, as a deliberate strategy to try to protect employment levels against the effects of technological change and productivity growth, and to provide for needed time away from the physical and mental stresses of assembly line work. However, in recent contracts the amount of paid time off has been reduced by 80 hours per year (in the face of intense cost-cutting pressure from the employers). Today a CAW production worker with maximum seniority (over 20 years) qualifies for 6 weeks of paid time off (for vacation, scheduled mandatory vacation or “SPA,” and personal leave). A new hire qualifies for 2 weeks (the legal minimum). A worker with 5 or more years seniority qualifies for 4 weeks.

    Holidays (including regular statutory holidays and a week-long Christmas shutdown) reduce working time by another 15 days per year.

    Paid time off can be considered a form of compensation. It can also be considered a basic human and labour right – one that workers have fought for over the centuries, and that is essential to the quality of life of working people and their families. Of the paid time off received by CAW autoworkers, about half is required by law. The rest reflects additional time negotiated by the union. I doubt, however, that many Canadians consider their paid time off as part of their hourly wage. They conceptualize it separately, as time. Someone who earns $15 per hour, but is allowed to take a total of five weeks off per year (3 weeks vacation, and 10 days of statutory holidays), actually earns $16.60 for each hour they work (assuming they had no other time off the job for illness or layoff). But I have never heard someone adjust their hourly pay in that manner to reflect their entitlement (legal and otherwise) to paid time off.

    According to the methodology of all-in hourly labour cost, paid time off (since it reduces the denominator over which all-in labour costs are calculated) directly increases all-in hourly labour costs. Each week of paid time off (including the two weeks of vacation required per year under Canadian law, and the roughly two weeks of statutory holidays also required by Canadian law) translates into a roughly 2% increase in hourly labour cost.

Again, his argument is unconvincing. Although undoubtedly, for example, workers who receive a minimum wage, unionized workers and other workers are unlikely to conceive of paid holidays as part of their compensation, this hardly means that the paid holidays and vacaction do not form part of their compensation. Stanford himself admits this: “Paid time off can be considered a form of compensation.” Actual hours worked and the total amount of compensation received by workers are the relevant statistics for determining variable capital costs and not imputed hours worked during holidays and vacation (when workers are not subject to the direct power of employers).
Furthermore, even some union reps in the auto industry conceived vacation pay and other fringe benefits as part of the compensation package. From Frank Lovell (May-June 1968), “The Reuther-Meany Split,” in pages 36-58, International Socialist Review, page 51:
Reuther accurately reported the new wage scales as follows:”The average production worker will receive a 20-cents-an-hour wage increase upon his return to work plus a three per cent annual wage increase in the second and third years of the contract. These wage increases, together with the impact of the ‘roll up’ factor, will amount to an average of 58 cents an hour over the three-year period of the contract.”The average skilled trades worker will receive a 50-cent-an-hour wage increase upon his return to work plus a three per cent annual wage incrase in the second and third years of the contract. These wage increases, together with the impact of the ‘roll up’ factor, will amount to an average of $1.02 an hour over the three-year period of the contract.” (“Roll up” consists of increases in wage-related fringe benefits such as holiday pay, vacation pay, shift premiums, etc.[my emphasis]

Let us look at vacation pay and holiday pay. Essentially, it means that workers receive payment without having to work for their employer during that specific time. The amount of labour performed is thereby reduced to that extent than otherwise would be the case, with a flow of money (and indirectly commodities) going to the workers. The wage is not reproduced during that time, and no surplus value is produced either since no labour is performed.
Holiday pay and vacation pay are tied to work performed because those who do not work for the particular employer simply do not receive such holiday pay and (more obviously) vacation pay– but this condition seems too often to be overlooked. The payment of holiday pay and vacation pay is tied to the need for the worker to have actually worked for the particular employer.
The payment is tied to labour having been  performed, but not from any labour performed during the holiday or vacation. Since the workers receive the money and not the employer, the money represents the equivalent of higher wages and less surplus value available for the employer.
There is no logical reason why, when calculating the rate of exploitation, vacation pay, sick leave pay and holiday pay should not be included in the calculation.
The issue is not clear cut, but some Marxian works also include vacation pay, etc. as forms of compensation. From Edward Wolff (1987), Growth, accumulation, and unproductive activity: An analysis of the postwar U.S. economy, pages 61-62: 

Mean real labor compensation seems the most direct measure of the costs of reproducing labor power. Employee compensation is the sum of wages, salaries, and tips; fringe benefits such as health insurance, pension contributions, vacation pay, and the like;
Shaikh and Tonak also consider them to form part of compensation. From page 304: 
We use employee compensation (EC) because it includes wages and salaries of employees as well as employer contributions to social security. This is the appropriate base for estimates of variable capital, since it represents the total cost of labor power to the capitalist.
They reiterate their view on page 322:
Employee compensation being the sum of supplements and wages and salaries.
Impact on hourly cost of layoffs & downtime
Stanford reasons as follows in order to exclude this subcategory from the determination of the costs of employing workers:
The Impact of Downtime and Layoffs Even more far-fetched is the notion that time away from work resulting from illness, layoff, or plant shutdown should also be reflected in your “hourly wage.” Time off due to illness or layoff is not a contractual benefit; it is clearly beyond the control of both workers and their union. Suppose that workers are laid off for 8 weeks in a year because of slow sales. This reduces annual hours worked by 320 hours. That’s a reduction of as much as 20% in hours worked (after adjusting for paid time off) – causing a corresponding increase in the apparent hourly cost of fixed annual benefits (like the pensions, health premiums, and other benefits listed above). Based on the level of benefits described earlier, this amount of downtime (not unusual given recent experience) would add $3 per hour to all-in costs. A longer six-month layoff would add over $10 to the all-in hourly cost!
This seems like a double penalty: first workers experience the income loss and insecurity of being laid off for significant amounts of time. And then they are “charged,” in the form of a higher apparent “wage,” for the fact that they didn’t work for the complete year.
Differences in the number of hours worked account for a significant portion of differences in the all-in hourly labour costs between different companies. Chrysler Canada’s all-in labour cost calculation for 2008 (which has been widely debated in the course of current restructuring discussions) was based on a very low average level of hours worked per worker that year (just 1550 hours). That was significantly lower than the number of hours worked per worker at GM and Ford that year – and far, far lower than average hours worked at Toyota and Honda plants (which until recently have been running flat out). This difference in assumed hours worked accounts for about $2 per hour in all-in labour cost differences between Chrysler and the other two North American producers in Canada. And it accounts for $4 or more per hour of the all-in hourly labour cost differences between Chrysler and the non-union Canadian facilities.
Is a worker really “more expensive” because he or she didn’t work the full year, due to downtime associated with slow sales? Not really. This is not an issue of compensation. This is an issue of capacity utilization – a variable which is clearly a responsibility of management to optimize, and is beyond the control of workers and their union.
The hours not worked do not involve exploitation, and the hours not worked do involve payment without being under the direct control of the employer due to fixed costs, such as health insurance premiums. They are like vacation pay, holiday pay and sick-leave pay.
As for the decrease in hours worked, of course, if the number of hours decreases, with fixed benefit costs, the cost per hour employed will increase for the capitalists in general. This was seen indirectly when I calculated the rate of exploitation of Magna Internaitonal workers for 2020, during the pandemic (The Rate of Exploitation of Workers at Magna International Inc., One of the Largest Private Employers in Toronto, Part Three, Updated, 2020). As I wrote in that post:
The substantial decrease in the rate of exploitation is likely due to the treatment of workers as “fixed costs” as the pandemic forced employers to retain workers despite the relatively extra costs associated with it (partly offset by federal, provincial and municipal supports).
The substantial decrease in the rate of exploitation for Magna International workers was likely largely due to a decrease in the production of surplus value, although there was also a decrease in the costs of workers for Magna International:
2020: So, with the adjustments in place: s=1081; v=2,509. The rate of exploitation or the rate of surplus value=s/v=1081/2,509=43%.2019: So, with the adjustments in place: s=2,258; v=2,862. The rate of exploitation or the rate of surplus value=s/v=2,258/2,862=79%.

Surplus value decreased by 1,177, or 52 percent ((1081-2258)/2258×100); variable capital decreased by 353, or ((2509-2862)/2862×100)=12 percent.
The substantial decrease in the rate of exploitation for Magna International workers is likely due to the fixed costs associated with keeping them on payroll while not exploiting them (because they did not work or perform labour).
Stanford’s justification or logic for discounting the increased costs of workers per hour worked seems to be: because the relation of payments to workers and hours actually worked is independent of the workers and their unions, these increased costs should not be calculated that way, he reasons:
Time off due to illness or layoff is not a contractual benefit; it is clearly beyond the control of both workers and their union.
The rate of exploitation is hardly to be calculated on the basis of what workers and their unions are able to control. The issue is: What does it cost for the workers to produce the value of the labour power or the capacity of workers to perform work relative to the value they produce for free?
I reject Stanford’s reason for excluding this subcategory.
Cost per hour worked of SUB $1-3
Standord reasons as follows for rejecting this subcategory:
Over the years auto unions have negotiated a range of income security programs to protect against the effects of the layoffs (which are regularly incurred in the auto industry due to market swings, new model launches, and other factors inherent to the auto industry). These are called supplementary unemployment benefits (SUB), and they top up the benefits received from public unemployment insurance programs.SUB costs are incorporated into all-in labour cost by attributing them to the hours which were actually worked (by those workers who were not laid off). Are SUB benefits a form of compensation? Yes, in a form. But it is not compensation received by the workers who are still working. SUB benefits are received by the workers who are laid-off (as a partial compensation for the cost they incur as a result of the lay-off). And by far the best way to reduce labour costs, in this context, is to put autoworkers back to work: they enjoy more income and security, the company pays out less SUB costs, and the cost per hour worked of all other benefits declines by several dollars.
Because of the extensive downtime experienced in most auto plants in recent years, SUB and related programs can add $3 or more to all-in hourly labour costs in CAW facilities.
The Canadian government website reads:

Supplemental Unemployment Benefit Program

Overview

Employers can use a Supplemental Unemployment Benefit (SUB) plan to increase their employees’ weekly earnings when they are unemployed due to a temporary stoppage of work, training, illness, injury or quarantine.

It is certainly true that those who continue to be exploited directly by GM do not receive the benefits of SUB-but exploitation is hardly just an affair of temporary changes in the distribution of work such that only those workers who happen to have seniority are exploited throughout the year. Layoffs in the auto industry have occurred often enough for unions to attempt to address the issue. From Robert Albritton (2022), A Japanese Approach to Stages of Capitalist Development: What Comes Next?:
For this reason, the continuation of even the partial commodification of labour-power, requires that the labour market be supported by all sorts of protections, guarantees, and stabilizing mechanisms. The auto industry in general took the lead in this respect with “productivity deals” that ensured wage increases in line with productivity increases and with “supplementary unemployment benefits” (SUBS) that protected worker’s income during the annual lay-offs in the auto industry, and with pension plans, early retirement, medical benefits, etc.
Unions obliged GM to pay laid off GM workers (not fired GM workers) a top-up to unemployment benefits. This is a condition for GM to exploit the collective labour of the particular bargaining unit and forms part of the cost of employing GM workers. To exclude this cost from variable capital would exclude the flow of additional money (and commodities) that temporarily unemployed workers receive from GM. Since variable capital is supposed to measure the amount of labour required to produce the equivalent of labour power as a commodity available on the market, and SUB is a condition for such availability in this situation, it should be included as part of variable capital that GM pays.
One historian has interpreted SUB as resulting in a “greater share of the pie” going to workers. From David Noble (1984), Forces of Production: A Social History of Industrial Automation, page 253:
Reuther embraced wholeheartedly the tempo of technology and the gospel of growth, and sought to halt job erosion through industrial expansion which would presumably raise the level of aggregate demand for labor. At the same time, he strove to secure for workers a larger share of the expanding pie, through guaranteed wage agreements and so-called progress-sharing agreements (as with American Motors), and to ease the plight of displaced workers, through supplementary unemployment benefits, advance notification clauses, and company-financed retraining programs (as with General Motors). [my emphasis]
I also reject Stanford’s reason for excluding this subcategory; SUB forms part of the costs of production of GM workers.
Statutory taxes $3-4
Stanford notes the following:

The all-in hourly labour cost methodology also considers various employmentrelated
taxes paid by employers to governments. In Canada, these statutory
costs include four major items:

  • Employer CPP premiums (up to a maximum of about $2050 per year
  • Employer EI premiums (up to a maximum of about $1000 per year)
  • Employer Health Tax (equal to about 2% of earnings)
  • WSIB premiums (variable rates, usually about 3% of earnings)These government payments amount to around $3-4 per normal working hour in
    Canadian auto plants.
He makes the following comment to justify excluding them from the cost of workers to GM:
These tax payments, while they fund important public programs, obviously do not
constitute compensation for workers.
If by compensation is meant “not received in the current year,” then it is true. However, costs in the present for employers can be deferred revenue for workers; in the case of the Canadian Pension Plan (CPP), Canadian employers must pay the same amount paid by employees, up to a maximum of contributions per year. I fail to see why this should not be included in the cost of variable capital to GM. Furthermore, if pension benefits paid out by GM or deferred government pension benefits are excluded from the current year, when would they ever be included in the calculation of the value of labour power?
Unemployment insurance is a little more difficult to assess (in Canada, the Canadian government euphemestically calls it employment insurance). Some if not the majority of GM workers may not access unemployment insurance benefits at all during their life. It may not ever therefore be a deferred form of revenue for them. However, it should be remembered that GM workers can access unemployment insurance if they are laid off (and they also can receive SUB) and thus the same logic applies as the subcategory for SUB.
(By the way, the unemployment insurance that workers receive should also be included in the calculation of variable capital, but this would require more detailed information about the absolute amounts, the number of GM workers laid off, the average period of time laid off and other data which I doubt is readily available. Perhaps those with more skill or with better access to data could provide details.)
Furthermore, the nature of insurance in general is such that payments or costs may not result in any flow back in the form of services rendered. How many reading this post have purchased insurance of one form or another (such as car insurance or travel insurance) only not to use it? It is a cost that may never be recouped and is grounded in the nature of the capitalist society–which is subject to unemployment in various sectors at different times. Costs paid by employers associated with unemployment insurance is a charge on the class of employers for funding former workers who have had their relationship to any particular employer severed (or who severed it themselves by quitting–although here in Canada workers must prove “just cause” for quitting in order to be eligible and must not have been fired for “just cause”).
For GM workers who are never laid off, unemployment insurance is obviously not a form of compensation for any GM worker–but it is still a cost of reproducing the value of labour power as a commodity (if not the particular set of workers called GM employees). It is part of the cost for GM of being able to exploit this particular set of workers.
The Employer Health Tax, according to the Ontario government website, is:

The Employer Health Tax (EHT) is a payroll tax on remuneration (for example, salaries, wages, bonuses, taxable benefits, stock options etc.) that employers in Ontario provide to current and former employees.

The purpose of this tax is to assist in providing the government with revenue to fund health care in Ontario.

The provision of certain services by the government without workers having to pay for them constitute part of the “social wage” of workers. In this particular case, sufficiently large employers are forced to pay for part of those services (smaller capitalist firms are exempt). These costs for the employer are necessary to ensure a certain level of health services and health of workers. I fail to see why they should not be considered part of the necessary costs that Ontario employers must pay if they are to exploit Ontario employees.
An indirect argument for including the EHT in the calculation of variable capital is provided by Wolff (cited above), page 78:
One further refinement should be added. Not only private consumption but also publicly provided consumption is required to reproduce the labor force. In particular, part of the government’s expenditures on education, health, fire protection, roads, and the like
contributes directly to the welfare of workers. Thus, in order to correctly estimate the necessary consumption of workers, government expenditures on productive goods and services, Gp, must be distributed among the beneficiaries of the expenditures.
As for Workers’ Compensation premiums paid by GM, although Shaikh and Tonak (1994) do not directly address this specific category, they do generally include “employer contributions to social security” in their calculation of the value of labour power. Page 108:
for wages we use “employee compensation” (EC), which includes wages and salaries of employees as well as employer contributions to social security. Employee compensation is the appropriate measure upon which to base our estimates of variable capital, since it represents the total cost of labor power to the capitalist.
Rodrigo Finkelstein (2015) more specifically argues that workers’ compensation premiums constitute the exchange value of workers’ injuries,”The Commodity Form of Safety Information,” in pages 610-623, triple C, Volume 13, Number 2, page 622:
Through injuries, diseases and deaths, workers transfer to the premium the value they themselves lose during the labour process by the destruction of their own use-value. Workers’ use-value—i.e. labour-power—uure [sic–this term indicates that something is quoted exactly as written despite it likely being an error]-appears in the value of every commodity as the premium.
Like shift premiums and overtime, workers’ compensation premiums can be conceived as compensation for accelerated use of workers’ labour power; unlike shift premiums and overtime, the money is not appropriated directly by individual workers but is mediated through a bureuacratic appropriation and distribution process that pools the accelerated use of  workers’ labour power at the provincial level in Canada.
(These premiums should not, however, be considered the accurate costs of accelerated use of the labour power of workers. Premiums are based on claimed employer-dictated work-related diseases, injuries and deaths, but actual employer-dictated work-related diseases, injuries and deaths is much higher (see Working and Living in a Society Dominated by a Class of Employers May Be Dangerous to Your Health).
It should come as no surprise that Stanford ignores workers’ compensation as a cost. Firstly, he considers the view that what is healthy for “the economy” is somehow also healthy for workers. This correspondence may to a certain extent arise because capitalists, ultimately, must rely on human bodies if they are to exploit them, and unhealthy bodies may be detrimental to their exploitation.
On the other hand, there obviously is a counter-tendency for employers to create working conditions that are dangerous for workers in one way or another (see my critique of Stanford’s attempt to treat the capitalist economy as if it were an economy primarily based on the production of products that workers, citizens, immigrants and migrants need–rather than a capitalist economy designed to obtain as much surplus value as possible–at the expense of workers in the posts Economics for Social Democrats–but not for the Working Class, Part Three: The Health and Safety of Workers and an Economy Dominated by a Class of Employers Are at Loggerheads and Economics for Social Democrats–but not for the Working Class, Part Four: Is There Such a Thing as a Responsible Employer in Relation to the Health of Workers?).
Stanford’s analysis of the real cost of the value of labour power matches his economics for social democrats. His economics of capitalism for “everyone” (the main title of a book he wrote) is really an economics for social reformists–and is hardly expressive of the interests of the working class.
Stanford’s dismissal of workers’ compensation premiums as part of the cost of the value of labour power reflects his social-democratic views.  Workers’ compensation premiums are linked to the determination of the value of the loss of various parts of the body, for example–equating money and the loss of human body parts. As Nate Holdren (2020),in Injury Impoverished: Workplace Accidents, Capitalism, and the Law in the Progressive Era remarks, page 5:
I remarked that it felt a little creepy that my hand had a dollar value. The lawyer laughed and agreed that it was creepy. He told me that there were tables that listed the value of all the different body parts. …  I repeated that it was a creepy idea that my body parts in particular had a dollar value, and that in general there were tables written down with the value of body parts calculated in advance. The lawyer replied that a lot of people got hurt at work and that the injuries and the payments for them were all a regular process.That meeting with the lawyer is where I first encountered what I now think of as the “tyranny of the table,” but it is both more and less than  tyranny. What I mean by the tyranny of the table is that within compensation laws human lives and human suffering have the fixed monetary values ascribed – no more than that, and not subject to discussion. What doesn’t fit into the values of the table? Nearly everything. All of the elements of a human being other than our paychecks.
Behind the numbers lie real human beings, with histories linked to other human beings in various ways. Workers’ compensation itself hides this reality behind the numbers, and Stanford’s cavalier dismissal of the payment of premiums by employers as part of the cost of the value of labour power reflects his own dismissal of the real and necessary experiences of many workers working for employers–and the diseases and injuries they experience that they suffer–and the deaths (the ending of any possibility of further human experience or any possibility of further human progress).
In Stanford’s haste at being a “progressive economist,” (he is the founder of the Progressive Economic Forum), he dismisses too hastily various costs that are relevant for characterizing the experience of workers in a capitalist society (such as the premiums paid to the Workers’ Compensation Board).
Although this post is about the rate of exploitation, it should never be forgotten that this rate of exploitation is linked to real people being used as things for the benefit of employers, with real negative consequences for members of the working class. Holdren points out how workers who work for an employer are often under the threat of being injured in one way or another, and if they are, their lives are often changed forever, page 1:
Nettie Blom worked in the laundry of a hotel in Yellowstone Park. On June 30, 1900, Blom was operating a machine called a mangle, which used steam-heated and steam-powered metal rollers to iron flat linens. The wet cloth stuck to her hand for a moment too long, and she was pulled into the machine. Blom’s hand was crushed and burnt. When a co-worker managed to free her from the machine, Blom’s hand looked like “boiled meat.” Three of her co-workers fainted at the sight. Blom suffered terrible pain and lost the use of her hand due to her injuries.
Stanford’s dismissal of workers’ compensation premiums as part of the value of labour power also hides the shift from what Holdren calls the tyranny of the trial to the tyrranny of the tables. The (unlikely) possibility of workers suing and winning a case against their employer constituted part of the tyranny of the trial historically, but gradually governments shifted the issue of health and safety compensation from the courts to government bureaucracies–Worker’s Compensaiton Boards. This shift from the workers’ financial point of view had the advantage that compensation would be forthcoming for proven injuries, disease or death–but it had the major disadvantage of eliminating any exposure of the real human damage and suffering that is so often connected to workplace injuries, diseases and death–an exposure that was at least minimally possible during a trial. In its place arose what Holdren calls the “tyranny of the table,” which depersonalized human injury and suffering at work. This is an important issue that the social-democratic left simply ignore or sidestep through the use of such euphemisms as “decent work,” “decent jobs,” “fair contracts” and the like. It is appropriate here to quote Holdren here more extensively about some of the implications of what the paying of premiums has involved for silencing workers’ grievances. Pages 115-118:
MORAL THINNING AND IMPOVERISHED INJURYIn order to standardize payments and thus create predictability for employers, compensation laws removed from the law arguments about injustice and narration of the individual effects of injury. This loss of deliberation changed the ethical grammar of the law, so to speak, deepening the eclipse of recognition, further impoverishing injury. The human meaning of injury had no place in the law. I call this phenomenon moral thinning: from murder to statistics. Non-financial harms also had no place under compensation laws. Pain and loss became newly worthless as the law provided no more space for people to narrate what it meant to lose a limb or a family member in an industrial accident. Injured wage earners became conceptually disembedded from their social and interpersonal contexts.

There is an element of moral thinning involved whenever the commodification of persons begins to occur, because commodification must ignore differences and particularities, setting aside whatever is unique or nonequivalent about them. Commodification tramples on singularity. This makes no difference when singularity makes no difference: the uniqueness of my morning cup of coffee does not matter; what matters is its instrumental use in my struggle toward wakefulness. The uniqueness of human beings, however, does matter: the reduction of human beings to abstract instrumental objects should trouble us. Recognition and commodification co-exist at best uneasily.

The moral thinning of injury under the tyranny of the table is more apparent when juxtaposed to the tyranny of the trial. Despite the many limits of the court-based system of employee injury law, that system did allow some space for fragments of the experiential truths of injury, which made possible elements of justice as recognition. As historian Kimberly Welch has put it, “[s]torytelling is omnipresent in human discourse.. . . Telling stories in court is an attempt to organize, interpret, and direct the world in which one lives, and the stories told in adversarial processes signal the narrator’s interpretation of how the world ought to operate.” The contending oughts embedded in legal stories made courts into places of normative deliberation, places where the contest of stories had explicitly moral and political stakes.

Access to that site of deliberation, and the recognition that came through that access, is likely part of what working-class people wanted from the court-based system of employee injury law. As historian James Schmidt has put it, injured plaintiffs and their families “came to court with a desire to talk about the miseries that had befallen them.” That telling intersected with other actors in court to produce what Schmidt calls “judicial morality plays.” Going to court was one kind of ritual through which people processed and, in important respects, produced the meaning of what Schmidt rightly calls industrial violence. There was, then, some space for this ritual use of law under the tyranny of the trial. With compensation laws, employee injury law was deritualized, no longer made available to working-class people in the same way.

To be clear, compensation laws never said that no other framework for valuing human beings existed in society, but these laws did not allow any other such framework to touch the legal response to employee injury. In the court system multiple systems of valuation could intersect, while under compensation laws non-pecuniary valuations of people, their experiences, their relationships, and their bodies had no legal space. The point is absolutely not to celebrate the tyranny of the trial, but to use the courts’ narrative and value plurality to highlight the moral thinning of injury under the tyranny of the table. In the court-based system of injury law at least it was possible to pose the questions of whether or not an injury was a wrong, and what it meant in the lives of the persons affected. There was no more space for these questions or for the answering stories of injury and its effects under the tyranny of the table.

Workers’ compensation premiums serve in part to hide the viciousness of a society dominated by a class of employers–a viciousness hidden by such social-democratic phrases as “decent jobs,” “decent work,” “fair contracts” and other euphemisms accepted by many on the so-called left these days. After all, they imply, working for an employer is not really all that bad; such is the moral thinning of social democrats these days. This is a class cost–Stanford’s dismissal of it notwithstadning.
Returning to the issue of the cost of workers, this cost of $63, of course, is probably less since GM workers in other parts of the world (such as in Mexico) would receive substantially less. However, without access to such detailed statistics, I will assume that the $63 per hour is still the average hourly wage for GM workers; perhaps Mr. Stanford (and Mr. Gindin) could provide more detailed statistics. Such statistics would be most welcome. 
Given a wage of $63 U.S. an hour, and given an estimated 1,800 hours of actual work per employee (see page 2 of Stanford’s article), and given 164,000 employees, the result is:

Total wages and benefits: $18.5976 billion

Calculation of the Rate of Exploitation

We now have sufficient information to calculate the rate of exploitation of GM workers (in billions of U.S. dollars)

Adjusted Income before income taxes: $7.383 billion=s
Total wages and benefits $18.5976 billion=v

To calculate the rate of surplus value or the rate of exploitaiton (they are the same thing), we need to divide “Adjusted Income before income taxes” (s) by “Total wages and benefits” (v).

So, with the adjustments in place, the rate of exploitation or the rate of surplus value=s/v=7.383/18.5976=40%.

That means that for every hour worked that produces her/his wage, a worker at GM works around an additional 24 minutes for free for GM.

In a 7-hour (420-minute) work day , the GM worker produces her/his wage in about 300 (5 hours) and works 120 minutes (2 hours) for free for GM. Of course, during the time that the worker produces her/his own wage, s/he is subject to the power of management and hence is unfree (see, for instance, Management Rights, Part Four: Private Sector Collective Agreement, Ontario  and   Employers as Dictators, Part One).

In an 8-hour (480 minute-work day), a GM worker produces her/his wage in 343 minutes (5 hours 43 minutes) and works for 137 minutes (2 hours 17 minutes) free for GM.

In an 9-hour (540-minute) day, a GM worker produces her/his wage in 386 minutes (6 hours 26 minutes) and works for free for 154 minutes (2 hours 34 minutes) for GM.

In a 10-hour (600-minute) day, a GM worker produces her/his wage in 429 minutes (7 hours 9 minutes and works for free for 171 minutes (2 hours 51 minutes) for GM.

In a 11-hour (660-minute) day, a GM worker produces her/his wage in 471 minutes (7 hours 51 minutes) and works for free for 189 minutes (3 hours 9 minutes) for GM.

In a 12-hour (720-minute) day, a GM worker produces her/his wage in 514 minutes (8 hours 34 minutes) and works for free for 206 minutes (3 hours 26 minutes) for GM.

I calculated the division between v and s according to the following:

I have used the lengths of the working day (and the corresponding division between v and s) as 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 and because the length of the working day varies. According to one source:

8 hours is normal. Many will average 7 or 9 per day.

8 hours per, except for the new models introduction period.The working hours varies depending upon the targeted productions orders.

Salaried, so come in between 6 and 9, leave within 8 or 10 hours.

Typical from 7:00am to 6:00 pm M-F with weekend work typical.
One week work over 70 hours

The hours where long 10-12 sometimes

I organized the division of the working day into v and s from the shortest working day to the longest.

Of course, during these times that the worker works to obtain an equivalent of her/his own wage, s/he is subject to the power of management and hence is also unfree during that time (see The Rate of Exploitation of Magna International Inc., One of the Largest Private Employers in Toronto, Part Two, Or: Intensified Oppression and Exploitation and   Employers as Dictators, Part One).

Many GM workers in the United States (and in Canada) belong to a union. The Annual Report states:

At December 31, 2019 approximately 48,000 (50%) of our U.S. employees were represented by unions, a majority of which were represented by the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agriculture Implement Workers of America (UAW).

Despite belonging to a union, the GM workers are exploited–but to a relatively low extent–much lower than many other union workers. The highest calculated rate of exploitation so far has been Rogers Communications’ workers, at 209 percent (see the comparative rates in the post The Rate of Exploitation of Workers at WestJet Airlines Ltd.). Why that is would be a good area for research.

Political Questions

Do you think that these facts contradict the talk by the left and unionists of “fair wages,” “fair contracts” (see  Fair Contracts or Collective Agreements: The Ideological Rhetoric of Canadian Unions, Part Three: Unifor (Largest Private Union in Canada) for the rhetoric of the largest Unifor as the largest private-sector union in Canada, and “decent work?” Do they ignore the reality of life for workers, whether unionized or non-unionized?

What of the following, drawn from the November 5, 2020 collective agrement between General Motors of Canada Company and Unifor Local No 199 St. Catharines, Local No. 222 Oshawa and Local No. 636 Woodstock? Page 7:

Section IV

Management

(4) The Union recognizes the right of the Company to hire, promote, transfer, demote and lay off and to suspend, discharge or otherwise discipline employees for just cause subject to the right of any employee to lodge a grievance in the manner and to the extent as herein provided.

The Union further recognizes the right of the Company to operate and manage its business in all respects, to maintain order and efficiency in its plants, and to determine the location of its plants, the products to be manufactured, the scheduling of its production and its methods, processes, and means of manufacturing. The Union further acknowledges that the Company has the right to make and alter, from time to time, rules and regulations to be observed by employees, which rules and regulations shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement.

This power of management is not mentioned at all in the National Unifor Bargaining Report. Like most union bargaining reports, it omits all negative aspects of working for General Motors (including being exploited and oppressed):

HIGHLIGHTS
• $1.1B to $1.4B in investments
• General wage increases
• $7,250 Productivity and Quality Bonus
• Inflation Protection Bonuses
• Improved New Hire Program
• Skilled Trades Adjustment
• Benefit improvements
• Three-year term
• Lump sum payment for pre-1994 retirees

A written summary also omits the continued power of GM management to exploit and oppress workers (page 1):

JOINT MESSAGE TO ALL GENERAL MOTORS MEMBERS

SECURING A MADE IN CANADA FUTURE

If there is a lesson learned from 2020 Auto Talks, it is that the future of Canada’s auto sector is bright and on a clear forward path.

Thanks to the hard work and determination of the Unifor-GM Master Bargaining Committee, we are proud to present a new collective agreement that follows the economic pattern negotiated at both Ford and FCA. This agreement includes a 5 per cent increase to hourly wages, a 4 per cent lump sum payment in 2021, along with $11,250 in bonuses.

The deal makes major improvements to the New Hire Program, including an accelerated path to full rate, and returns key benefits like the Legal Services Plan and the afternoon (5%) and midnight (10%) shift premium.

Skilled trades workers will see their 20% wage differential restored, new apprentices hired, and the pre-apprenticeship program re-instated for future hires. The new agreement also includes significant improvements to the benefits plan, modest (but still important) pension improvements, along with health and safety gains, retirement allowances and equity gains including 10 days of paid domestic violence leave and a new Racial Justice Advocate.

Along with these contractual improvements are commitments by the company to maintain and expand work at current Unifor facilities. GM will continue V6 engine and 6-speed transmission production over the life of the contract, and forecasted beyond.

Also, in a stand-alone letter GM has committed to explore new potential product programs and investment opportunities for St. Catharines, with input from them union[my emphasis. When I formed part of a negotiating team for Operating Engineers Local 858, in Prince George, British Columbia, the management team were able to shuffle off many items on the negotiating table by referring to a “consultation process” between the union and management–in effect eliminating such items for negotiations. The verb “explore” and the noun “input” are euphemisms for the right of management to simply do what it wants, with the proviso that it “consult” the union.] 

St. Catharines is well regarded as a leader in the GM powertrain division and will receive $109 million to in-source new transmission work for the Corvette, adding jobs, and make
upgrades to the small block V8 engine program. GM will continue V6 engine and 6-speed transmission production over the life of the contract, and further commits to seek out new
programs that sustain the facility over the long term.

The Woodstock PDC will receive $500,000 in additional upgrades. Aftermarket parts work at Oshawa will also continue, maintaining hundreds of jobs.

In addition, and pending ratification, GM has committed to invest up to $1.3 billion to restart pickup truck assembly at the Oshawa Assembly Complex, with an expected two-shift operation in the first half of 2022 (and the potential for a third).

These “highlights” teach the workers nothing about the limitations of collective bargaining and  collective agreements. They are designed to hide the concentration of major decision-making power in the hands of General Motors (such as the “and the lack of such power (such as the “right of the Company to determine the location of its plants.”

The same could be said of the Local 222 Bargaining Report, which recommended voting for the collective agreement without any explicit indications of its limitation as indicated in the management rights clause of the collective agreement. Thus, the Report indicates among other things, the following (page 3):

Commitment to settling the 2020 GM/Unifor Master Agreement and Oshawa Local Agreement

•The production allocation is for the current life cycle. Currently, there is no future product commitment but the Company has expressed that the life cycle will be a minimum of three (3) years and that is well into the new Collective Agreement 2023.

•There will be no retirement incentives offered at the Oshawa Assembly Plant during the current life cycle of the product. In the event of a permanent reduction in force, the new hires at the Oshawa Assembly Plant will be laid off. Any employees hired prior to the 2020 Collective Agreement will flow back into the Oshawa OEM Stamped Products and Service Operation based upon Seniority.

Of course, workers have to subordinate their will to the will of employers in a society dominated by a class of employers, and so no union representatives can overcome this limitation; such a limitation is a class limitation, and it is at this level that such limitations need to be addressed. However, the class level is hardly some level that excludes the particular sections of the working class. Those particular sections are included in that general level, so at the local, regional or national level, the class issue can certainly be indicated and not simply ignored–which is what union reps do often enough these days. At the least, they could explicitly indicate the limitations of the collective-bargaining process and the collective agreements that result from that process.  Better yet, they could not only include such limitations, but they could point to ways in which such limitations might be overcome through regional, national and international tactics and stragegies. Most modern union reps, however, have no intention of doing so; indeed, they are likely unaware of the need to do so.

What do you think? Are union reps looking after the needs of the working class? If not, what can be done about it?

A Principal’s Evaluation of My Teaching Basic French, or: How to Oppress a Worker Through Performance Evaluation, Part Four

The following is the fourth of several posts that provide a verbatim reply (with a somewhat different order) to a “clinical evaluation” (a performance evaluation of my teaching) made by the principal of Ashern Central School (Ashern, Manitoba, Canada), Neil MacNeil, in the fall of 2011 when I was teaching grades 6, 7 and 8 French.

I provided Mr. MacNeil’s assessment grade by grade in separate posts, followed by my reflections (response).  In other words, the performance evaluation of the three grades was distributed over three posts.

Four further posts follow that include performance evaluation criteria in Domain I (Professional Responsibilities), Domain II (Educational Environments), Domain III (Teaching and Learning) and Domain IV (Professional Relationships). It also includes my “Teacher’s response.” 

This post deals with the performance evaluation criteria of Domain I (Professional Responsibilities).

When I refer to “see above” in some of the posts, it refers to previous posts in this series, such as   A Principal’s Evaluation of My Teaching Basic French, or: How to Oppress a Worker Through Performance Evaluation, Part One.

The radical left should expose both what management does and how it does it. Discussion of the situation that various kinds of employees face need to be openly discussed, but to do that it is necessary to expose, in a transparent way, managerial behaviour.

Lakeshore School Division

Teacher Clinical Evaluation Report

Teacher: Fred Harris
School: Ashern Central School
Subject/Grade: MY French; ELA Trans. Focus 30S; SY Support

The teacher and administrator will review Administrative Regulations and Procedures Evaluation Process-Professional Staff (2.3)

Re: “Domain 1: Professional Responsibilities

1a Demonstrating knowledge of curriculum content and pedagogy

1b. Demonstrating knowledge of students

1c. Selecting appropriate instructional goals

1d. Demonstrating knowledge of resources

1e. Effective Instructional Design

1f. Assessment of Student Learning

1g. Maintaining accurate records

Administrator’s Comments

Fred has a strong command of the French language, in both written and verbal communication. This series of observations did not indicate his level of knowledge of the curricula set out by Manitoba Education. The instructional goals identified during the observations did correlate with goals set out in these curricula, however.

The pedagogy to which Fred ascribes (at least as according to our conversations) presupposes a level of motivation to learn and pursue a second language which he identifies as being lacking in most of his students. This has repeatedly been identified by Fred as an issue – that his students do not value the learning of French, and that it is therefore almost futile to be attempting to force them to learn the language. I have not identified any means by which Fred has successfully fostered an appropriate level of motivation in spite of the factors he’s identified as limiting this motivation. So, we are left with a situation where he believes that the students do not (for the most part) want to learn French, where he’s been unsuccessful in changing that situation, and where he therefore believes that their learning is necessarily restricted.

Earlier this year, it was made clear to Fred that a key element that appeared to be lacking was the formation of effective, empathetic relationships with the students in his classes. He has attempted to rectify this by engaging in question and answer sessions with them at the beginning of the class, wherein students ask him a question, he translates the question into French, and then responds in both French and English. It is not evident that this has led to a more effective relationship between Fred and his students. It is also not evident that this simple “exposure” to spoken French is leading to any learning of the language, as the dialogue from the students’ perspective is entirely in English – the spoken French, by Fred, seems to be ignored. To the extent that Fred has demonstrated a knowledge of his students, as persons and as learners, it would seem that the view is largely negative. For example, when we held our postconference after the 3rd observation (grade 8 French), and I asked Fred about the 5 girls who comprised this class, he described to me in turn why each of them was not an effective learner in his class. When I went further by asking how this situation had come about, he went back to the experience of earlier years, where he identified two other students (since discontinued in French) who had “poisoned” the other students’ attitudes toward French and toward himself.

At the beginning of this process, individual lessons were based upon the completion of identified tasks. Fred has resisted the notion that specific learning goals for students should be clarified and shared with students, but has begun to take some steps in this direction. As stated earlier, there is no evidence (and none identified by Fred during our postconferences) that the questioning back and forth between Fred and the students at the beginning of classes has led to any learning by the students. Although learning goals have begun to be identified, it has not been observed that any significant movement toward attaining these goals has been made during observed classes. For example, the second observation (grade 7) was meant to increase student competence in using possessive adjectives. As an observer, it was not clear that students understood this to be the lesson’s focus, nor did they demonstrate any increased competence or confidence in the use of the adjectives or any other aspect of using the French language.

Fred has not indicated any significant understanding of either the importance of formative assessment during a class, nor of how to effectively carry out the process. When I’ve questioned how Fred would know whether students are progressing effectively in their use of French, Fred has repeatedly referred to the subsequent use of summative assessments (at some future date) as indicating this progress. No means of encouraging or facilitating student self or peer assessment is present either. A significant emphasis within the MY French curricula is to facilitate an appreciation of French culture and language in students’ affective domain. When this has been raised, Fred has appealed (as previously noted) to the obstacles in the way of increasing this appreciation of French, and has not been able to supply any means by which this is being increased. Indeed, there appears to be a significant decline in students’ attitudes toward their French lessons from the grade 6 to the grade 8 levels in Fred’s classes. In the grade 6 class, some students are smiling, spontaneous and enthusiastic. This declines in the grade 7 class, and in grade 8 there were no smiles, and what seemed to be a complete lack of spontaneity and enthusiasm.

Teacher’s Reflections 

Re: “The pedagogy to which Fred ascribes (at least as according to our conversations) presupposes a level of motivation to learn and pursue a second language which he identifies as being lacking in most of his students.”

I believe that I have already addressed this issue.

Re: “This has repeatedly been identified by Fred as an issue – that his students do not value the learning of French, and that it is therefore almost futile to be attempting to force them to learn the language.”

I certainly view the forcing of learning French language to children many of whose lives at home are probably characterized by poverty to be oppressive and relatively meaningless for many of them—as I experienced when I was growing up.

Re: “I have not identified any means by which Fred has successfully fostered an appropriate level of motivation in spite of the factors he’s identified as limiting this motivation. So, we are left with a situation where he believes that the students do not (for the most part) want to learn French, where he’s been unsuccessful in changing that situation, and where he therefore believes that their learning is necessarily restricted.”

I have addressed this issue above.

Re: “Earlier this year, it was made clear to Fred that a key element that appeared to be lacking was the formation of effective, empathetic relationships with the students in his classes.”

I have displayed considerable empathy in trying to see the behaviour in the context of many students’ lives; I certainly do not consider throwing an airplane to be outrageous behaviour. To claim that I lacked empathy with students is an unfortunate misreading of situations.

Re: “He has attempted to rectify this by engaging in question and answer sessions with them at the beginning of the class, wherein students ask him a question, he translates the question into French, and then responds in both French and English. It is not evident that this has led to a more effective relationship between Fred and his students. It is also not evident that this simple “exposure” to spoken French is leading to any learning of the language, as the dialogue from the students’ perspective is entirely in English – the spoken French, by Fred, seems to be ignored. To the extent that Fred has demonstrated a knowledge of his students, as persons and as learners, it would seem that the view is largely negative. For example, when we held our postconference after the 3rd observation (grade 8 French), and I asked Fred about the 5 girls who comprised this class, he described to me in turn why each of them was not an effective learner in his class. When I went further by asking how this situation had come about, he went back to the experience of earlier years, where he identified two other students (since discontinued in French) who had “poisoned” the other students’ attitudes toward French and toward himself.”

Note the exclusive reliance on the relation to the grade 8 class as an example. An example implies something typical, and the situation with the grade 8 class is atypical.

I had tried, with the grade 8 class, the method of asking and answering questions, but they did not respond well.

Re: “At the beginning of this process, individual lessons were based upon the completion of identified tasks. Fred has resisted the notion that specific learning goals for students should be clarified and shared with students, but has begun to take some steps in this direction.”

I have already addressed  above the issue of tasks (from a Deweyan perspective, concrete goals for students) and learning goals (from a Deweyan perspective, the means towards concrete goals).

As stated earlier, there is no evidence (and none identified by Fred during our postconferences) that the questioning back and forth between Fred and the students at the beginning of classes has led to any learning by the students.”

See above.

Although learning goals have begun to be identified, it has not been observed that any significant movement toward attaining these goals has been made during observed classes. For example, the second observation (grade 7) was meant to increase student competence in using possessive adjectives. As an observer, it was not clear that students understood this to be the lesson’s focus, nor did they demonstrate any increased competence or confidence in the use of the adjectives or any other aspect of using the French language.”

See above.

Re: Fred has not indicated any significant understanding of either the importance of formative assessment during a class, nor of how to effectively carry out the process. When I’ve questioned how Fred would know whether students are progressing effectively in their use of French, Fred has repeatedly referred to the subsequent use of summative assessments (at some future date) as indicating this progress.”

I certainly agree that my formative assessment skills can be honed—like any other skill. To claim, however, that I fail to understand the importance of formative assessment a complete lack of understanding of my position and provides further evidence of the preformed conclusions of the administrator about my beliefs. In the University Laboratory School (also known as the Dewey School), as far as I have been able to determine, there was nothing but formative assessment. This feature of the school caused some difficulties when the students were to prepare for college entrance, but provision was made for addressing the issue:

The oldest members of this united group (who normally would have been classified as Group XII) were given special tutoring and review courses in preparation for their college board examinations, which were complicating the program. Had the group consisted solely of those who had followed the consecutively developing program of the school, and had it not been hampered by the demands of college entrance examinations, the various courses for the oldest children doubtless would have followed a far different and more logical plan, hints of which appear in the records” (Camp & Edwards, 1936/1966, p. 237).

Since the Dewey School was designed to be an experimental school, where hypotheses were formulated about the best conditions for learning, tested and modified, depending on the circumstances. Since no summative assessment was performed until the later years, and only then for the purpose of preparing the students for entry into college, it can be inferred that formative assessment was an ideal ground for learning.

On the other hand, the principal simply did not bother to delve deeper into my beliefs. His evident disdain for my beliefs and his evident drawing of conclusions without any process of objective inquiry prevented him from understanding what we share in common.

Furthermore, the implied claim that I do not understand the importance of the present moment rather than the future misses entirely my position.

From my dissertation:

Dewey, by contrast, considers that the prehistoric pattern of mind still functions, though in modified form, in present conditions and that it has some positive attributes. One of the major positive attributes for Dewey is the capacity to focus on the present situation. For Dewey, the present is where the life process centers, and the past and future are relative to the living present. The past divorced from the present is dead, and the future divorced from the present is fantasy.1

Dewey gives the example of hunting in prehistoric times (1902/1976e). He outlines what differentiates it from other modes of living or acting. It is much less concerned with the mediation process or the objective side of the relationship between human beings and their environment. Its focus has more to do with the subjective side of the life process, and the subjective side, or the animate term of the life process, is always a living present. The concerns of prehistoric peoples are largely related to the personal side and not to the impersonal side of the life process. The rhythm of life is characterized by a tension that is personally felt; the stages of the life process focus on the personal at the expense of the objective. This mode of the life process is characterized by the drama, where superficiality in the treatment of phenomena is compensated by the degree of intensity of the emotions and the sharpness of attention in the use of the senses for the purpose of enhancing the personal side, such as increased acquisition and display of skills.

This personal aspect of the life process is preserved in the modern life process in the form of the “pursuit of truth, plot interest, business adventure and speculation, to all intense and active forms of amusement, to gambling and the `sporting life’” (1902/1976e, 45). Educationally, Dewey uses the hunting occupation as a model by which to criticize various theories and practices that purport to be educational but which violate the principle of the life process centering on the present and its potentialities and possibilities. In chapter five of Democracy and education (1916/1980a), for example, Dewey refers to education as preparation. This way of defining education is still prevalent in modern schools—preparation for obtaining a job, for further studies and so forth. The activity engaged in by the child is supposed to be useful in the future rather than functional now. Since the use of a structure is an integral part in the formation of the structure—function mediates structure—then the separation of the formation of the structure from its use in the vague future leads to ineffective and distorted structures that do not effectively contribute to the living present, either now or in the future.

Education needs to be preparation for confrontation of the present situation, which includes the past as relevant to the identification of the nature of the present problematic situation and to the future as the hypothesized solution to the present situation. The present, however, is still the focus since it is only the tension within the present life process that converts the past into something relevant or meaningful to the present, and the future potentialities of present conditions are likewise only meaningful in relation to the present life process:

Men are engaged neither in mechanical transposition of the conditions they have inherited, nor yet in simply preparing for something to come after. They have their own problems to solve; their own adaptations to make. They face the future, but for the sake of the present, not the future. In using what has come to them as an inheritance from the past they are compelled to modify it to meet their own needs, and this process creates a new present in which the process continues. (1938/1986, 238)

When the potentialities of the present situation are divorced from the formation of structures, then something external to the present must be attached to present behaviour—rewards and punishment. There is little wonder that Skinner’s concept of reinforcement, which focuses on the provision of an external reward having little to do with the activity, forms an essential component of the school system—the latter operates on an impoverished notion of education as preparation.

For Dewey, then, prehistoric life has something to teach us—the importance of the present as the locus for the relevance of the past and the future. Education is not preparation for some possible experience in the vague future. Freire’s philosophy, it is true, escapes some of the problems associated with defining education as preparation by incorporating some of the present problems of the peasants into the curriculum, but Freire’s abstraction from the life process a such prevents him from appreciating the positive aspect of prehistoric life and from incorporating those positive aspects into his educational philosophy and practice.

The Deweyan educational model incorporates the appreciation for the present living process whereas the Freirean model, though not excluding it, does not integrate it in the form of an appreciation of prehistoric life. Freire’s model, despite the emphasis on subjectivity, ironically, veers more towards the objective moment by treating prehistoric life as a stage to be overcome rather than a stage that is one-sided and that hence requires to be balanced by a more stable process of control of the objective conditions for human experience.”

On the other hand, I do recognize that there is often a conflict between formative and summative assessment. Summative assessment is important at the public level, for other institutions, for example, as well as for scholarships (in Deweyan terms, it is education for preparation—which Dewey adamantly criticized). There is a conflict between the importance of formative assessment, which is designed for improving learning, and summative assessment, which is designed for other purposes. The different purposes easily come into conflict.

I am in total agreement with the principal concerning the importance of formative assessment in the process of learning.

Re: “No means of encouraging or facilitating student self or peer assessment is present either.”

Agreed. It is something that I should incorporate into the process.

Re: “A significant emphasis within the MY French curricula is to facilitate an appreciation of French culture and language in students’ affective domain. When this has been raised, Fred has appealed (as previously noted) to the obstacles in the way of increasing this appreciation of French, and has not been able to supply any means by which this is being increased.”

I have addressed the issue of culture above and an appreciation of French in relation to the students’ own language.

Re: “Indeed, there appears to be a significant decline in students’ attitudes toward their French lessons from the grade 6 to the grade 8 levels in Fred’s classes. In the grade 6 class, some students are smiling, spontaneous and enthusiastic. This declines in the grade 7 class, and in grade 8 there were no smiles, and what seemed to be a complete lack of spontaneity and enthusiasm.”

The administrator’s characterization of the level of motivation as progressively lacking as grades increase is not my reading of the situation. I would say that the grade 6s are more motivated to learn than the grade 8s, with the grade 7s more motivated than the grade 6s or grade 8s.

Once Again on the General Strike that Almost Was in Ontario, Canada, Part Two: Sam Gindin’s Analysis

Introduction

For some of the context of the strike, see a couple of earlier posts (The Case of the Possible General Strike of Ontario Unionized Workers: Critique of Conservative Radicalism or Radical Conservatism and The CUPE Education Workers Strike: A Lesson on the Nature of the Public Sector). 

A few more leftists have made commentary on the initial strike of 55,000 education workers and the possibility of a general strike in Ontario. I looked at the debate between Adam King and Abdul Malik and in the online newsletter Passage  https://readpassage.com/should-cupe-have-kept-education-workers-on-strike/) in my last post.  Then there is Sam Gindin’s analysis on the Socialist Project’s website  https://socialistproject.ca/2022/12/education-workers-lead-but-come-up-short/. I will now look at his article. 

The title of his article–Education Workers Lead But Come Up Short: What Lessons for Labour?–indicates that workers and the left can and should draw lessons from the strike. His article is organized as follows (using his headings as guides): 

Introduction
Threats of Fines and Legislation
Context: When a Strike is More Than a Strike
Organize, Organize, Organize!
General Strike?
Why Didn’t CUPE Stay on Strike?
Did the Education Workers Win or Lose?

Gindin then lists and explains a number of points. In his own words: 

Of the various indicators of whether labour is, at long last, turning the corner, four challenges/tests seem especially pivotal.

1. Organizing
2. Coordination
3. Addressing Class
4. Union Transformation
5. Politics

Introduction

In the introduction, Gindin rightly emphasizes the unique nature of the situation which the education workers faced. Unlike the typical scenario of the government legislating striking workers back to work and union reps grumbling about its anti-democratic nature but complying with the legislation–and the workers also complying with the legislation–Ford passed the legisaltion before the workers even went out on strike: 

The divergence from earlier experiences began with the way the Ford administration tried to end the strike. Rather than wait until the strike was actually on, Ford used his parliamentary majority to pass legislation that criminalized the right of these workers to strike even before they actually went out (in the infamous Bill 28, Keeping Students in Class Act). With inflation running just under 7%, the legislation imposed a collective agreement offering 2.5% for workers earning under $43,000 annually and 1.5% for those earning above that princely sum. (The distinction the government made between low-paid and less low-paid workers was perhaps intended to push 1.5% as the standard for future collective bargaining in the public sector with the additional sum for lower-paid workers an ‘exceptional’ add-on for this sector alone.)

Threats and Fines

In the section on Threats of Fines and Legislation, Gindin points out to the second difference from the typical union scenario–the use of the notwithstanding clause, which reverberated not only within the union movement but beyond it: 

and, in addition, [the Ford government] invoked the notwithstanding clause to prevent a legal challenge to such legilsation.

Gindin then points out that the workers (not the union reps) did not follow the typical script: they refused to comply with the legislation and walked off the job: 

The main break with past collective bargaining came next. Unlike earlier labour responses, the education workers rejected the script. Across the province, school custodians, maintenance workers, education assistants, early childhood educators, lunchroom and safety monitors, librarians, and office staff ignored the legislation and walked out.

The audacity of the education workers galvanized the larger labour movement against Ford’s authoritarian over-reaction. On the ensuing weekend, after the first day of the strike, rumours spread of an imminent escalation of the conflict. A press conference was called for Monday morning (Nov. 6) where unions leaders were to announce a ‘general strike’. What was so recently unthinkable – a province-wide shut-down – seemed to have become an actual possibility.

This led to Ford backtracking and to an improved wage offer at the bargaining table: 

With this, the government’s once definitive ‘final offer’ also became flexible. In response to the union’s demand to ’put more money on the table’ Ford conceded that the government would indeed increase the wage offer if the workers ended the strike and returned to the bargaining table. The union complied and on November 20, the two sides announced a tentative agreement. It included monetary gains, though short of workers’ hopes, but no gains on staffing. More than two weeks later, 76% of members voted on the tentative agreement with 73% voting for ratification (it’s unclear why ratification took more than two weeks).

Context: When a Strike is More Than a Strike

In the section “Context: When a Strike is More Than a Strike,” Gindin outlines why Ford acted as he did and why the wildcat strike likely happened whereas it had not happened earlier for many years among other workers: 

Like other public sector workers, the education workers had suffered under the 1% cap on wages in their last agreement. Over the past decade (2012-2021), their real wages had fallen by some 10% as prices increased by 19% while wage increases were under 9%. Moreover, while all workers have been hard hit over this period, Ontario’s education workers’ wages fell further behind the province’s broader public sector, where average wages had increased by 12.2%. Federally regulated workplaces had seen their wages increase by 18.6%, municipal unions by 19.1%, and private sector workers by 20.3%.

The education workers’ 1% wage cap had expired with the end of their previous collective agreement, ‘freeing’ CUPE to bargain without that cap – the first major agreement to be in that position. This set the stage for the face-off with the government. For the Ford administration the demands of the education workers were not just about one sub-sector but a Trojan Horse for gains across the public sector. They had to be aggressively contained.

He then claims that CUPE OSBCU faced, however, definite obstacles to engaging in a fight with the Ford government; it was only one union that faced the Ford government head on despite the significance for the public sector; he also claims that the significance for privat-sector bargaining was less directly affected: 

This morphed a ‘normal’ conflict with a set of employers (the school boards) into what was essentially a political strike against the government. The dilemma for the union was that in spite of the conflict’s significance for the entire public sector (and less directly, for private sector bargaining), the battle was being led and fought by only a sub-sector of the union movement.

This underestimates union reps’ perceived threat that the use of preemptive legislation and the use of the notwithstanding clause by Ford threatened their own economic, political and ideological interests, as I argued in an earlier post on this topic (see  The Case of the Possible General Strike of Ontario Unionized Workers: Critique of Conservative Radicalism or Radical Conservatism). To quote from that post: 

Union bureaucrats themselves realized the potential threat to their ideology of free collective bargaining so often expressed by them. At the press conference, we hear the following from Mark Hancock: 

National Secretary Treasurer, Candace Renick [of CUPE], Fred Hahn, the Ontario division president, and many CUPE leaders from all across the country. Friends who have joined him from the labour movement today up front. We have leadership from the Canadian Labour Congress, the Ontario Federation of Labour, ATU Canada, the Elementary Teachers Federation of Ontario, the Ontario English Catholic Teachers Association, the Ontario Secondary Schools Teacher Federation, the AEFO, the United Steel Workers, UFCW, Unifor, the Ontario Building Trades, the United Association of Plumbers and Pipefitters, the Sheet Metal Workers, Unite Here, IATSE, the National Union of Public and General Employees, the Public Service Alliance of Canada, the Canadian Union of Postal Workers, the Ontario Public Service Employees Union, the Ontario Nurses Association, SEIU Health Care, the Canadian Office and Professional Employees Union, the Society of United Professionals, the Toronto and York Regional Labour Council. Today we represent millions of private and public sector workers all across the country.

This is an unprecedented gathering of labour leaders because the attack against workers’ rights that we’ve seen from this government—the attack on the rights of all Canadians which has been unprecedented. Bill 28 was a direct threat to workers’ rights and to the Charter rights of all Canadians. It invoked the notwithstanding clause to undermine some of our most fundamental rights. That regressive attack on workers united the labour movement like never before.

Gindin, like his ally Herman Rosenfeld, underestimaes the extent to which Ford’s move threatened the interests of not only public-sector unions but also private-sector unions. This underestimation then permits him to neglect the potentiality of uniting the union movement and workers in unions due to the pecularities of that situation–a peculiarity which Malik rightly emphasizes: 

Continuing to organize is important, but the massive groundswell of support and mobilization is already dwindling. I believe it’s doubtful we’ll see this degree of action again anytime soon, and we’re all worse off for it.

Gindin’s pessimism is reinforced by his view that only sporadic lights of hope have emerged in unions’ fights in recent years: 

Further militating against the aspirations of the education workers was that the prevailing mood of labour as a whole was characterized by a dispiriting passivity. It is true that there were some hints of a reawakening within the labour movement. OPSEU’s (Ontario Public Sector Union) college strike and ATU’s (Amalgamated Transit Union) GO bus strike had generated some optimism. So too did progressive changes in union leadership in OPSEU, Unifor, and the Toronto elementary teachers. But the grumbling across unions over the 1% caps on wages included little or no substantive resistance. Strikes in the public and also private sectors were at an ebb. Tentative agreements were rarely rejected. Wildcats were almost unheard of.

Gindin’s pessimism reminds me of of-quoted remark by Marx. From The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, in Marx-Engels Collected Works, Volume 33, page 103: 

Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given
and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living.

Yes, let us be cautious when the situation warrants it, but the situation which not only the education workers faced but also the entire Canadian working class faced because of Ford’s authoritarian actions hardly warranted a conservative stance. By looking towards the past rather than the potential of the present and thus the future, Gindin, like his fellow conservative radical Rosenfeld, thereby urges the gradual approach of step-by-step organization–without any consideration of possible situations that may potentially accelerate organization and class consciousness. 

In addition, Gindin, like Rosenfeld, underestimates the potential the situation had for unifying the labour movement not only in Ontario but also in Canada since Ford’s use of the withstanding clause had the potential to threaten the collective-bargaining process across Canada if other premiers used it to prevent legal challenges to their own anti-labour legislation. Gindin, like Rosenfeld, positions himself as a radical conservative or a conservative radical by failing to take into account the potentialities of the situation. 

On the other hand, we certainly need to look at the limitations of past leftist actions in contributing to limitations on the potentials of unique situations. Gindin and his ally Rosenfeld, as well as the left here in Toronto in general, have done nothing to undermine the idealization of collective bargaining and collective agreements. Gindin, for example, justified unions’ use of the ideological phrase “decent work” in the context of working for employers because unions were acting defensively–as if unionized settings consitute decent work when workers are still used as means or things for    employers’  own purposes–see The Money Circuit of Capital for the objective situation of workers in both the private and public sectors). Bullshitting the workers with such rhetoric is hardly in the class interests of workers–and yet Gindin justifies such rhetoric. Go figure. 

What is needed when such potentially radical situations are not on the horizon is to undermine union rhetoric by exposing, on the one hand, the actual relations of workers to their employers and, on the other hand, exposing and underming directly the union rhetoric of “decent jobs,” “fair contracts,” and other such euphemisms that hide the reality of class oppression and class exploitation. 

Gindin also refers to parents as players in the scenario.Undoubtedly, parents are a player in determining the level of public support for such a strike: 

Of concern as well to the union was the likely response of parents. Parents had experienced the negative impact of COVID on their kids’ education and with their kids at home, they faced interruptions in their own work. Even though the union had prioritized its concern for kids and their parents in its emphasis on improving badly-needed school services, and there had been very impressive organizing among parents by the Ontario Parents Action Network, Ford would no doubt try to position himself as the defender of in-school learning against its ‘disrupters’.

Gindin probably underesitmates the level of parent support for the striking education workers; at the picket line and the rally that I attended on November 4, there were a number of parents who had signs that supported the workers. The use of the notwithstanding clause probably angered not just unionized workers and represenatives but also parents. 

Organize, Organize, Organize!

In the section “Organize, Organize, Organize!,” Gindin argues that the education workers’ strike was largely successful in beating back Ford’s authoritarian legislation because of the eight-month lead in organizing workers up to the strike, using Jane McAlevey’s model of organizing. Although McAlevey’s organizing model is certainly innovative, focusing on using organic leaders who are the recognized leaders at the workplace (and not necessarily union or political activists) as well as “structured tests” as mini-tests to determine whether there is indeed power to back up demands). 

This emphasis on the need to engage in “deep organizing” is certainly relevant, but as I pointed out in my critiques of McAlevey’s books (see my review “Review: Jane McAlevey’s No shortcuts: Organizing for power in the new gilded age,” in the section “Publications and Writings” on this blog and the posts Review of Jane McAlevey’s “A Collective Bargain: Unions, Organizing, and the Fight for Democracy”: Two Steps Backward and One Step Forward, Part One  and  Review of Jane McAlevey’s “A Collective Bargain: Unions, Organizing, and the Fight for Democracy”: Two Steps Backward and One Step Forward, Part Two), McAlevey’s approach does little to address the larger class problem of the class power of employers–and such power concentrated in the government or state. 

General Strike?

The next section addresses the issue of whether a general strike was a viable option. Unfortunately, Gindin then hands over the ball to his ally, Herman Rosenfeld, by referring to an article written by Rosenfeld, who argues that a general stike was not realistically on the table: 

These are hopeful sentiments. But we need to be sober about the state of the labour movement and what it takes to pull off even a partially successful general strike (see especially the account by Herman Rosenfeld). If we credit the pre-strike organizing by education workers for their illegal walk-out, a corollary is that since labour as a whole generally has done so little of such organizing, it could not have successfully pulled off much of a general strike. The above optimism over what might emerge from a general strike does not tell us how to actually achieve a general strike.

As I have argued against Rosenfeld’s position in another post, I refer the reader to that post (    ). 

Gindin provides further arguments that it would have been unrealistic to call for a general strike under existing circumstances: 

Consider. The teachers, as noted earlier, were not supportive of the education workers’ disruption of classes and this didn’t bode well for other sectors walking out. Would public sector workers who suffered the 1% cap without their own unions putting up much of a fight take the sudden call for a general strike seriously? Ditto private sector workers, whose unions often defended and even sold concessions such as two-tier wages to their members. Moreover, would we expect – or even want – workers to go on a general strike when they haven’t been consulted, the strategy hasn’t been debated, no education has occurred, and no larger plan articulated?

Firstly, were teachers not supportive, or were teachers’ unions not supportive? Gindin assumes there is an identity between the two. Whether there were such an identity would have to be proven, not assumed. Secondly, even if teachers themselves opposed supporting the striking workers, would other “public sector workers who suffered the 1% cap without their own unions putting up much of a fight take the sudden call for a general strike seriously?” That would have remained to have been seen. Given Ford’s authoritarian fist of using the notwithstanding clause, they may or may not have done so; this would have been a test to see who had more power. Even if the other public-sector workers were not organized on the basis of McAlevey’s approach, they could at least have been partially organized in order to support a general strike. We will never know, of course. But there could have been partial mobilization in support of a general strike that could have provided further pressure on the Ford government and not, as Gindin implies, some long-drawn out process that requires the step-by-step gradualism that he and his ally Rosenfeld evidently advocate.

Furthermore, this would have been an appropriate occasion for bringing up explicitly the issue of the adequacy of “free collective bargaining” and what union reps mean by that. Gindin remains silent over this issue. 

Of course, strategy should be debated–but part of what is interesting about the situation is the open-endedness of the situation, as even Mark Hancock, the president of CUPE National stated: 

I think part of it is: Nobody really knew. That was the beauty of what’s happened over the last number of days leading into the legislation being enacted that…this grew a movement of its own in some ways. And you heard very clearly from private-sector unions and public-sector unions that everybody was very serious on that. And what that looked like on Saturday at the rally and on Monday, I think we had a pretty good idea. But beyond that I have no idea. This has got legs of its own.

For Gindin, like Rosenfeld, what is needed is–debate, debate and more debate! and not the translation of even imperfect debates into action (and even then, the debate must occur within limits deemed relevant by Gindin–see below concerning his belief that it is irrelevant to debate whether union rhetoric that unionized work is decent).. Like his fellow ally, Rosenfeld, his approach reminds me of one part in the Monty Python’s The Life of Brian, where a woman indicates that Brian is going to be crucified  (see   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=55fqjw2J1vI ). Chatter, chatter and more chatter. 

Gindin also opposes the advocacy of a general strike because it was unclear what the term meant: 

Nor was it even clear what the union leaders intended by a ‘general strike’. Did they mean an indefinite strike or – more likely – a one, perhaps two-day strike which, though of consequence would essentially amount to another protest rather than a fundamental challenge to authority (protests had preceded the talk of a general strike; they were spirited and not insignificant, but far from overwhelming).

Note the downplaying of around 10,000 workers and supporters at the picket line/rally on November 4 in the context of the head of a government legislating workers back to work before they even had begun a strike and using the notwithstanding clause to prevent any legal challenge to such legislation. For Gindin, it would seem, only if hundreds of thousands of workers were organized and out on the streets should any realistic talk of a general strike be attempted.  Let us not risk anything; let us be 99 percent certain of victoy before we act. Gindin, apparently idealizes the Days of Action in the 1990s, when about 200,000 people in Toronto alone participated in a city general strike that formed part of a rolling provincial general strike (shifting from one city to another, such as from London or Hamilton–see the interview with Gindin (https://podcasts.apple.com/ca/podcast/so-you-want-to-have-a-general-strike-feat-sam-gindin/id1472061764?i=1000463838625). 

If there were 200,000 Sam Gindin’s in Toronto participating in a strike, I doubt that the Ford government would have to worry; even if organized, they would seek a very slow, very cautious path that would not upset the status quo–except perhaps in 200,000 years. 

Gindin’s cautious attitude also reminds me of a parliamentary attitude towards mass actions–despite Gindin’s own undoubtedly sincere acknowledgement of the importance of mass action. From Johannes Agnoli, Collected Works, Volume 2, page 70 (my loose translation): 

… exactly herein lies the point of divergence between attempted communism and  conformist social democracy. There will surely be many comrades at the base and in the top committees, who (without knowing that they are therewith repeating the watchword of narrow-minded German conservatism) will say: We will make no experiments, we will not stake our organization and our methods of struggle,  which are well tried and function well, in favour of a new path whose outcome  we do not know. The German social democrats had already proclaimed, when faced with the rise of Nazism: “Let’s not risk too much in order not to lose everything.” Yet one day comrades will in fact begin to think about a somewhat currious phenomenon, that the organizations and methods tried and tested by history in the western capitalist countries have not only never led in any particular case to revolution but also have not not even been good enough to stop the counter-revolution. [Werner Bonfeld, in “Constitutional Norm versus Constitutional Reality in Germany:  A Review Article on Johannes Agnoli’s Die Transformation der Demokratie und andere Schriften zur Kritik der Politik
(The Transformation of Democracy and other writings on the Critique of Politics),” in pages 65-88, Capital & Class, Volume 16, Issue No. 1, page 66). By “counter-revolution” Agnoli means, as Werner Bonefeld explains, “Agnoli understands the political integration, and thus reformulation, of social struggles for social emancipation as being bound up with a merely political emancipation which characterises the constitution of power in bourgeois societies.”

Gindin fails to take into account the effective nature of the capitalist state in co-opting or integrating  social movements in general and union movements in particular into the capitalist system (backed up, when necessary, by the iron fist of the police and, at times, the military). 

Thomas Mathiesen saw this danger to which Gindin is blind. Mathiesen calls the state absorbent when it has a refined capacity for neutralizing radical and revolutionary movements and demands. Mathiesen calls being co-opted “being defined in” and being shuffled to the side as irrelevant extremists “being defined out.” He calls “finished” the impossibility of contributing to the overcoming of the economic, political and social structures that characterize the dominance of the class of employers. From Mathiesen (1980), Law, Society and Political action: Towards a Strategy Under Late Capitalism ,page 252:

The strongly absorbent late capitalist society has in fact managed, by the process of defining in, to absorb large parts of the Left into political work of a structure maintaining kind, while at the same time, through the process of defining out, it has managed to neutralize the remaining part of the Left as so-called extremists. By an interchange of the forces which define in and define out, on the one hand, and internal organizational reactions to these forces on the other, the parties of the Left have to a large degree either become ossified organizations which are defined in, or ossified organizations which are defined out. In any case they are, in our sense, finished.

On the other hand, Gindin does accurately assess the union reps’ likely response to Ford’s backing down over Bill 28: 

In any case, the proposed general strike wasn’t actually over the workers’ demands, but the Premier’s especially authoritarian legislation. Once that law was repealed, so too was talk of a general strike. And based on what we saw in the media and heard from other channels, while the labour leadership was rightly proud of getting Ford to step back, it seemed quite universally relieved that their threat of a total provincial walk-out would not be tested.

Yes, the union leadership was probably relieved. However, that does not mean that the rank-and-file necessarily were.

The underestimation of the co-optive capacity of the capitalist state leads Gindin to fail to support the potential opposition to the government arising from various sources–a lost opportunity. 

Bill 24, as a specific piece of  authoritarian legislation, was the continuation of earlier authoritarian legislation, such as Bill 5, which had changed–in 2018 mid-municipal elections–ward boundaries. In 2021, when the Ontario Supreme Court judged parts of Bill 254 (which pertained to doubling the length of time a third party could run pre-election ads) to be unconstitutional,  Ford used the notwithstanding clause to pass Bill 307–which contained those parts judged unconsttutional; the use of the notwithstanding clause to quash a judges rulings should be seen in the context of provincial elections the following year–which Ford won. More directly relevant was Bill 124, which capped public-sector wage increases to one percent per year for three years. Just recently, on November 29, the Ontario Supreme Court judged the Bill unconsitutional; Ford’s government is appealing the decision. 

There has been plenty of evidence that Ford has used the political system to quash even liberal political democracy when he can. Given that only about 43.5 percent or, to put it the other way, about 56.5 percent did not bother to vote in the 2022 provincial elections, this in itself indicates that actual support for Ford was probably quite a bit lower. Given the historical record of Ford’s authoritarian administration, and the use of the notwithstanding clause to break not only the union but also set a precedent that could be used to block “free collective bargaining” in the future not only in Ontario but across Canada, the potential for substantial opposition to Ford’s government was there. Furthermore, given the pent-up lives of many during the COVID pandemic, the potential was probably even greater. 

Gindin ignores this potential. 

And what did Gindin do before this situation to call into question the typical union model of “free collective bargaining?” His advocacy of Jane McAlevey’s approach to organizing as deep organizing (with stress tests to see how much power workers have) is a start, but he vastly underestimates the need to engage in ideological struggle if micro-organizing is going to be linked effectively with macro organizing with the aim of overcoming and abolishing the class power of employers. His own defence of unions’ use of such rhetoric as “decent work,” fair contracts” and so forth hardly prepared workers for a grasp of the inadequacy of collective bargaining and collective agreements as vehicles for realizing their interests. 

Gindin then provides a rather weak explanation of why Ford backed down by agreeing to repeal Bill 28: 

And yet Ford did back down in the shadow of labour’s threat of an all-out war with his government. What are we to make of this? Though speculative, it seems that it was not so much the fear of a successful general strike that moved Ford, but a growing web of contradictions. He had been trying to carry the populist banner of representing ‘the little man’ and nurturing labour leaders to his side. But the chain of events that the education strike set off exposed his true anti-worker colours and lost him the seven endorsements, primarily from unions in the construction trades, that he had previously recruited.

I will not explore further Gindin’s speculation except to speculate that it was indeed probably “the fear of a successful general strike that moved Ford.” Gindin wants to play down the possibility of such a successful strike and thus provides a speculative account of why Ford backed down that does not involve evidence that a general strike might have achieved more than Gindin is willing to admit. 

He then paints a geneal strike as somehow useful at times but not the only or even the most appropriate weapon workers can use to accomplish their goals: 

None of this denies that general strikes can be a crucial instrument in labour’s arsenal in the struggle to make our society more democratic and equal and our lives more secure and meaningful. But ill-prepared general strikes may also expose the weakness of the labour movement rather than showcase its potential. And general strikes are not necessarily the strategic pinnacle of labour opposition.

Consider the contrast with the Days of Action in the mid-1990s. In that earlier period the labour movement understood that it didn’t have the strength to call and sustain a general strike. The alternative chosen was to turn to a series of community shut-downs. This allowed labour to start with communities where it was stronger, concentrate their best organizers there, spend a good deal of time to prepare for each action, and ultimately sustain the protest over eleven one-day regional strikes over two and a half years.

Firstly, there are undoubtedly times when the call for a general strike would be ill-advised. When I attended a second rally in Toronto in support of the education workers on November 11, 2022, there were perhaps only 300 protesters when compared to the 10,000 a week earlier. Despite this, Socialist Action, a far-left political organization here in Toronto, had a poster that called for a general strike; it was evident that such a call for a general strike would fall mostly on deaf ears at this stage. However, before the calling off of the strike on November 7, the potential for a successful strike was much greater to at least force Ford to repeal Bill 28 before workers were to go back to work. It also had the potential to snowball into a call for the repeal of Bill 124 (the legislation that limited public-sector workers’ wages to one percent per year–which a court has recently declared invalid, a decision which Ford has appealed). 

Secondly Gindin refers to the Days of Action and the lack of a general strike but rather eleven one-day regional strikes over two and half years.” What was accomplished by such a tactic? Gindin fails to specify what was gained. Was it a further advance in the organizational capacity of workers? A further understanding of the class nature of our society? A further weakening of the legitimacy of government? When I came to Toronto at the end of August 2013. the left was dominated by social democrats or social reformers–and Gindin reinforced their dominance by failing to engage in any real criticism of their political position. 

Why Didn’t CUPE Stay on Strike?

This section tries to answer the question in the heading: 

Why Didn’t CUPE Stay on Strike?

The most vexing question emerging out of the education workers’ strike is how it ended. Rather than following the common union practice of staying on strike until there was a concrete offer on hand and ratified by the membership, the leadership ended the strike, returned to negotiations, and also accepted a blackout on information.

The practical point here is that the return to work took the pressure off the employer. Even if talks broke down and picket lines returned, in the interim the momentum of the strike will likely have been eroded. The democratic point is that staying on strike until workers have seen and ratified a deal gives concrete expression to the promise that ‘the union belongs to the workers’. Furthermore, the labour movement seemed to be solidly behind the strike and polls showed the workers had the support of more than six parents in ten. Why, after all the preparations and this apparently favourable moment, would the union end the strike?

As for the media blackout on information, usually justified as allowing the bargaining to ‘go more smoothly’, this generally comes from employers more concerned with trying to freeze the union’s on-going mobilization. For the union, on the other hand, keeping the members informed was a matter of respecting the wisdom of workers and of the commitment to continuous organizing. Transparent bargaining could also facilitate getting a better read on where the members were at as the conflict progressed.

Moreover, in light of Ford’s recent embarrassed retreat, the union had some leverage in rejecting a bargaining blackout. Anxious to quickly end the strike, Ford would have had trouble delaying bargaining so as to control and block information flows. (The obvious compromise was to put any blackout on hold; if bargaining did seem at some point to demand a blackout this could, through mutual agreement be reconsidered.)

Gindin is right to point out the unusual backing down of the reps for the education workers in calling off a strike until demands had been met. The lack of transparency in negotiations is also of concern since this reflects typical anti-democratic behaviour of many union reps. 

Gindin further argues: 

Yet, there were two factors making the continuation of the strike problematic. First, Ford’s eating humble pie changed the dynamics of the bargaining conflict. The labour movement’s prime concern had been Ford’s removal of the right to strike and once that was defeated, the use of that right became secondary. For the labour movement, the negotiations between the education workers and the government drifted towards becoming a more or less ‘normal’ labour-management confrontation.

Ford’s “eating humble pie” did indeed change “the dynamic of the bargaining conflict”–for union reps. Their focus was on defending “free collective bargaining,” and once that had been achieved by a written guarantee by Ford that he would appeal the law, they “drifted towards becoming a more or less ‘normal’ labour-management confrontation. This should have been met by a radical critique of not only this shift but the obvious earlier idealzing of the whole collective-bargaining process and the resulting collective-bargaining agreements as inadequate expressions of the interests of workers. Gindin has done no such thing. 

The radical left needs to explicitly address the inadequacies of the collective-bargaining process, critizing union rhetoric at every turn. It needs to use every opportunity to open up debate about the legitimacy of that process–and such a debate has not been opened up since I moved to Toronto in 2013. Should not socialists be addressing this explicitly whenever they can? 

The second factor to which Gindin refers is parent support: 

Along similar lines, the support of parents could not be indefinitely counted on. After Ford had shown some ‘flexibility’ in annulling his legislation and expressing a readiness to modify his final offer, parents could be expected to pressure the union to show a parallel flexibility by ending the strike and returning to negotiations.

It is true that parents cannot be the determining factor for union strategies – the first consideration must be the workers affected – but neither can the reaction of parents be easily dismissed. Parent attitudes can affect the morale of workers and are critical to any future alliance for improvements in school conditions and funding. And with a good number of parents themselves workers, a relationship to parents is also critical to the building of a more coherent working class. Still, risking the loss of parent support might have been the route to go if it weren’t for the second factor.

Continuing the strike demanded a strike-able issue but in moving to a wage settlement, the union undermined both the staffing issue and the possibility of continuing the strike to win more. This clearly requires some unpacking. In doing so, the point isn’t to make judgements with the benefit of hindsight, but to explore some of the dynamics of bargaining to the end of rethinking future tactics/strategies.

It is true that parent support would likely not last indefinitely–short of much more radical measures. Gindin’s point is that the union could have tried to shift the central issue in bargaining from wages to the other issue of staffing levels–which would resonate more with parents than wage increases. This was perhaps a tactical error even for union reps–they could have achieved more at the bargaining table if they could sustain parent support.

Gindin then, interestingly enough, suggests an alternative scenario that would have addressed the staffing issue even if it were not a priority for the bargining committee: 

When they did, any pressure on the government moving on staffing was essentially gone. The union could not sustain a strike on staffing alone, which would have been a hard task in any case but certainly after wages, the workers main issue, was settled. Like wages, the call for more staffing went against Ford’s determination to continue reductions in expenditures across the public sector. What was distinct about staffing was that it challenged employers’ sacred ‘management right’ to rule the workplace. Getting the government to bend on staffing would be especially difficult and uncertain.

To have escaped this dilemma, the union would likely have had to concentrate on the staffing issue before getting to wages. This may seem peculiar given that wages were the obvious priority. But there is a distinction between priorities and the tactics of putting a package together. Unions in fact commonly try to address critical workplace and management rights issues before turning to wages, even when wages increases are the main goal.

When Ford offered to modify the government’s final offer in exchange for the union ending the strike and returning to the table, what if the union had responded not by pointing to wages but by leaving the wages to the side – knowing they would in the end return to the centre – and demanding some movement on staffing before they ended the strike? If Ford bit and offered something – anything – that in itself would give the workers a breakthrough to build on. If he didn’t, then twinning wages and staffing (unlike staffing alone) could sustain the continuation of the strike.

This indeed could have been done. Pressing for an inroad into what is traditionally management rights would have opened up the possibility of further politicizing the issue. However, such a possibility would have to be built on and not just swept under the rug–which is what the social-democratic or reformist left do so often. 

In addition, Gindin does not question the adequacy of addressing staffing levels–which have to do with adequate services under the existing school system. Adequate staffing levels appears then to assume that the school system is itself adequate and what is needed is an expansion of money and current services–and public education will be adequate. Public education, however, is riveted with contradictions and inadequacies, such as the rhetoric of addressing the educational needs of children while simultaneously using grades or marks to control, oppress and stream students (see in general the series of posts titled “Critical Education Articles Placed in the Teacher Staff Lounge While I Was a Teacher” and for the partiular criticism of the use of grades or marks in schools see  Critical Education Articles Placed in the Teacher Staff Lounge While I Was a Teacher, Part Fifteen: Progressive Versus Regressive Grading Systems in Schools). 

Did the Education Workers Win or Lose?

This final section before drawing up lessons learned is a summing up of whether the education workers won or lost. 

Did the Education Workers Win or Lose?

It’s hard to claim a victory when wages will fall even further behind inflation and staffing remains as is. But what can be said is that the internal organizing among the education workers and their readiness to strike illegally mattered. In a mere two days, the education workers had, remarkably, forced an aggressive Premier to back off a law dangerous to the labour movement as a whole, pushed the employer to drop concessionary demands like the erosion of paid sick days, and in spite of Ford’s absolute ‘final offer’, raised wages by a dollar across the workforce in each year of the agreement (a near doubling of the earlier offer).

Beyond this, the education workers were a showcase for implementing systematic member organizing into union strategy and demonstrating that workers can fight back even in the worst of circumstances. The education workers tried to derail the grim austerity agenda the Ford government has been pursuing but fell short. This poses a challenge to the larger labour movement to acknowledge its decades long internal crisis and start to confront seriously what reversing that crisis will mean.

It will take time to assess whether, considering everything, this strike is deemed a win or not. It will take some time to get a read on whether the education workers and the labour movement as a whole came out of this stronger or weaker. Time to learn about the impact on the consciousness and confidence of the education workers and time to see how the union deals with lingering disappointment. Time, that is, to see whether the example of the education workers affects the orientation and culture of the labour movement.

The education workers did indeed gain something–an increase in wages that they would otherwise have not gained, They also gained in organizing themselves and in learning to organize themselves. These positive gains also must include the negative gain of defeating Bill 28. However, largely what was gained was–a return to the status quo without any real questioning of the premises of the class power of employers. There is little indication that the workers drew any radical conclusions about the nature of working for an employer, the limitations of collective bargaining and collective agreements or the nature of class oppression and class exploitation.

Why is that? 

My prediction is that what transpired will have little effect on “the orientation and culture of the labour movement.” It had the potential to do so–but the potential was wasted–and Gindin, ultimately, is in agreement with such waste even if he is not conscious of his implicit agreement.

Gindin then refers to what he claims is needed for the labour movement: 

Of the various indicators of whether labour is, at long last, turning the corner, four challenges/tests seem especially pivotal.

He actually refers to five, not four, “challenges/tests”: 

1. Organizing

Activists should be pressing the parent union of the education workers CUPE, the largest union in the country, to extend the education/training carried out with such success in its education sector to the rest of CUPE. And activists everywhere should push their union to emulate the internal organizing the education workers did, adapted of course to their own circumstances. Among other things this would require setting up a cross-union school for training instructors. and essentially adding ‘organizing schools’ to the characterization of what unions are.

Yes, internal organizing and organizing schools should be created–but they should be combined with a critical part of such education–on the one hand, the critical determination of the nature of the kind of society in which we live and, on the other hand, a critical discussion of the limits of collective bargaining and collective agreements. 

The second challenge/test: 

2. Coordination

It is stunning that in the face of the 1% caps on public sector wage agreements, no systematic coordination occurred across unions. There have been ad hoc attempts to coordinate bargaining in some sectors like health, but it has been limited. Any broader coordination across unions will be difficult, yet with the public sector facing common attacks from the state, it’s surely time for the creation of a permanent council of public sector unions to strategize and build solidarity for the confrontations that we know are sure to come.

Yes, this too should arise. However, coordination across the public sector that fails to be crticial of union rhetoric is likely to result in the same kind of business union concerns that individual unions address. For example, when I attended a meeting of the Toronto Airport Workers Assembly (TAWC), an organization where union reps from various local unions whose jurisdiction is Toronto Pearson Airport workers, the meeting seemed like an enlarged union meeting, with the concerns of union reps being addressed without any critical larger issues being addressed (for addtional information on TAWC, see the posts  The Toronto Airport Workers’ Council (TAWC): One Step Forward and Two Steps Backward?    and  The Pearson Survey of the 50,000 Employees at the Toronto International Airport: A Document Expressing the Ideology of Employers  as well as TAWC’s Facebook page https://www.facebook.com/search/top?q=tawc%3A%20toronto%20airport%20workers%27%20council. What we also need is not just defensive coordination but offensive coordination. Unions have not engage in offensive tactics and strategies for a long time–and that does not just mean going on strike to achieve better contracts; it also means coordinating efforts with the explicit purpose of challenging the class power of employers in various ways, such as economic, political and ideological struggle. 

Gindin refers to the third challenge/test–and it sounds radical: 

3. Addressing Class

While organizing at the base and coordinating at the top complement each other, both need a clear strategic vision. What are workers being educated and trained for? What struggles would coordination prepare workers for? Some four decades ago Doug Fraser, then president of the UAW, clearly identified the emerging reality: “A class war is being waged in this country but only one class is fighting.” This remains true today and workers have suffered immensely for it. If this is to change, workers must come to grips with who they are, who is there with them, and where they ‘fit’ in the system. Class penetrates every aspect of workers’ lives and unless workers integrate class into how they think and act, the future will, if anything, be even worse than the past and present.

There is evidence that  what Gindin means by “class” is quite different from what I understandin by class. Thus,  part of the nature of class is to criticize slogans that hide the real nature of oppression and exploitation at work. As Gindin wrote on  November 24, 2017: 

Debating whether a job is ‘decent‘ is a misdirection.  Everyone pretty much knows, I think, that workers are exploited even if their conditions improve. ‘Decent jobs’ or a ‘good contract’ are a way of expressing defensive gains when radical gains are not even on the table and we – those on this exchange – don’t have the capacity tooter [to offer?] them any kind of alternative jobs. So criticizing them for this hardly seems an effective way to move them to your view – which is not to say you shouldn’t raise it but that you shouldn’t be surprised when they don’t suddenly act on your point.

Gindin’s approach is far from Marx’s approach. From a letter written by Marx to Arnold Ruge, September 1843 (Marx-Engels Collected Works, Volume 3, page 142): 

But, if constructing the future and settling everything for all times are not our affair, it is all the more clear what we have to accomplish at present: I am referring to ruthless criticism of all that exists,
ruthless both in the sense of not being afraid of the results it arrives at and in the sense of being just as little afraid of conflict with the powers that be.

“Everyone pretty much knows … that workers are exploited even if their conditions improve.” Really? I doubt that. Where is the evidence that workers or even the so-called radical left here in Toronto take seriously the nature of exploitation in Toronto? It is nowhere to be found.  Who is this everyone?

Indeed, it is one of the basic features of capitalist relations (class relations in a capitalist society) that they take the form of a relation between things and thus hide the nature of class exploitation. Social relations between workers become an objective relation that controls the workers rather than vice versa.  From Nicholas Gray (Winter 2012), “Against Perversion and Fetish: The Marxian Theory of Revolution as Practical Demystification,” in pages 13-24, Studies in Social and Political Thought, Volume 20, page 19: 

Thus, in bourgeois society, although individuals hold their “social power in their pocket” or “in the shape of a thing” (Marx, 1973, p. 157), in fact it is they who are beholden to it, or under its sway: they are “ruled by abstractions” (their own social relations which have become abstracted from them – i.e. alienated from them) (1973, p. 164). The alienation of social power goes hand in hand with an ontological inversion characteristic of the money form of value: money is transformed from means of exchange to a relation of power which subjugates individuals; a social relation alienated such that
it becomes autonomous, self-standing, and an end in itself.

These objective relations between workers results in their exploitation–but such exploitation is not visible–unlike earlier kinds of society. From Meghnad Desai (1974), Marxian Economic Theory, page 16: 

The contradiction between the juridically free status of the labourer and his exploitation is the original contradiction of capitalism. It is original since it appears at the origin in capitalism. In  no other society does exploitation take the value form [objective form of the relations between producers] since in no society does it have to be masked from visible relationships.

Class relations are hidden by relations of exchange, or relations of buying and selling commodities. Desai, page 23: 

The difference lies not in the characterization of the productive process, similar for all schools of
economics, but in the process of buying and selling labour power,  which lies at the beginning of the productive process and leads to appropriation of surplus value by one class. Throughout all the participants perceive only legitimate exchange relations and not unequal relations of class and
exploitation.

Exploitation is hardly evident in a class society characterized by capitalist relations of production, distribution, exchange and consumption. Quite to the contrary. The capitalist process of exploitation appears in the form of its opposite. From Desai, page 55: 

In Neoclassical economic theory, preferences and technology are the structural relations which explain the observed pricequantity data. Marx would reject these Neoclassical relations as not
penetrating beneath the surface of exchange relationships to the relations of production and the forces of production. But Marx went further than this. He also emphasised that the observed reality was the inverse or mirror image of the true social relationship. Thus, exchange shows equality where the true relationships are of exploitation. In this sense, observed reality is upside down, and empirical data unless approached within a value theoretic framework would lead to conclusions which will contradict the predictions of the value theory.

Exchange relations appear as what they are–formal relations of equality between buyer and seller. No one threatens through the use of physical violence for workers to work for a particular employer. This formal exchange relation, however, conflicts with the exploitation and oppression of workers when they are working.

In addition to exchange relations hiding the real nature of exploitation, distribution relations also hide the nature of exploitation. Although I have tried to calculate the rate of exploitation of specific workers working for specific employers (see for example The Rate of Exploitation of Workers at Magna International Inc., One of the Largest Private Employers in Toronto, Part One), the amount of surplus value or profit particular employers receive need not and indeed rarely coincides with the surplus value that their workers produce. The amount of surplus value (s) or profit employers receive is mediated through the distribution of the surplus value produced according to the rule of equal rates of profit for equal amount of total capital invested (for an example of this complicating issue, see my response to a comment made by Biswadip Dasgupta on my post  The Rate of Exploitation of Workers at Air Canada, One of the Largest Private Employers in Canada). As Desai remarks, page 56: 

The role of price mechanism and exchange in Marx’ s theory is to mask surplus value and make it appear legitimate as profit. The profit of anyone particular firm, industry or Department does not equal the surplus value produced by it. … The link between profits and surplus value becomes complex and in fighting against exploitation workers cannot fight against their own industry’s owners in isolation; they have to fight the whole system.

What workers face immediately, however, is a particular employer so that the fight has its point of departure there but has class exploitation as its background and supposition.

Given the nature of capitalist reality, exploitation is hardly evident to workers. An ideological struggle is thus necessary to expose such a reality–but Gindin obviously considers such struggle to be secondary to the magic of “organization.” As I wrote in another post: 

Mr. Gindin fails to see the need to combine a specific kind of organization with ideological struggle. To be sure, without organization workers cannot gain power, but workers will unlikely gain power without engaging in organization and ideological struggle simultaneously. Mr. Gindin minimizes the importance of ideological struggle and exaggerates the importance of mere changes in organizational struggles (such as Ms. McAlevey’s innovations in organizing). Both are required simultaneously, and that means engaging in an ideological battle with the traditional left. Mr. Gindin, however, indulges the social-democratic left and panders to them by avoiding an ideological struggle. Any organization that emerges as a consequence will unlikely be more than an organization that accepts the power of employers as a class.

Gindin ignores the specific nature of exploitation in a capitalist society–its hidden nature. 

Or is Gindin referring to some union reps being aware of exploitation, such as Wayne Dealy (executive director of CUPE local 3902) or Tracy McMaster (union steward, former president of the Greater Toronto Area Council, to which are affiliated 35 local unions of the Ontario Public Service Employees Union (OPSEU)), and former vice president of the Ontario Public Service Employees Union (OPSEU)? 

Perhaps Dealy plays lip service to the existence of exploitation (although I have never seen any evidence of this), but does he take such exploitation into account when formulating a plan of action? There is no evidence that he does so. Let Gindin provide evidence to the contrary. 

As for Tracy McMaster–“Our Tracy,” as Gindin once called her–her views are linked to Dealy’s response to her email sent to those on the listserve of the Toronto Labour Committee: 

Hello all,
 
Sean,  It was great hearing you on CBC this morning talking about   TAWC!  In case you haven’t heard, our neighbours the Molson’s   workers from Local 325 CUBGE are on the picket line. Representing  airport & airline workers I spoke at their Solidarity BBQ last week   at the International Drive/Carlingview entrance. They are in a tough battle with a huge corporate (and American) giant in Coors and could  really use our support. Please boycott Molsons products for the  duration of the strike, and feel free to drop by the picket line  -honking support is also welcome! The workers just want a fair deal, good jobs, pension security and fair benefits [my emphases] but the employer won’t even bargain.  I hope you all   will join me in showing solidarity with the brewery workers from   Local 325! 
 
In solidarity,

 

Tracy
Since I wanted to open up debate on such an issue, I responded thus: 
Hello everyone,
 
 
I would like to respond to Tracy’s reference to a “fair deal” and  “good job.”
 
These workers do certainly deserve to be supported in various   ways–it is a question of solidarity.
 
However, I do hear often enough such terms by those who support  unions. I too support unions, but the use of such terms needs to be  debated.
 
Having worked in a brewery for about four years, I do have some  experience in the area. I fail to see how what workers at a brewery  do is considered to be a good job. They are used as means to obtain  
more money for investors. Is being used to obtain more money for investors something to be proud of?
 
Would a parent sincerely want her or his child to be used to obtain   more money for others? To be treated as a means to that end?
 
Yes, brewery workers may receive higher wages than some, and they  may receive benefits as well (if they fight for them through  organizing themselves). However, is this adequate compensation for  
being treated, ultimately, as things to be used by investors and  their representatives in order to obtain more money? Do we not   deserve better–much better?
 
But let us assume that these workers have whatever is called a good  job and are not used by others (a cooperative could be such a  situation where workers have more control over their immediate  working lives). Firstly, what of the other workers in other  industries, or those who work in the public sector?Are their lives  not a means for obtaining a profit (the private sector), or for  realizing the mission of the particular public sector (without much  control over their own working lives). Even on the assumption that a particular group of workers have somehow a “good” job involves other  workers lacking control over their working lives. Such a situation  contradicts the principle of solidarity among workers,does it not?
 
Unless of course there is a growing movement for all workers to  control their working lives–which involves the conscious intent to  do so and the practical effort to realize such a goal.
 
The same logic applies to a “fair” deal.
 
What is meant by a “good job,” a “decent job,” or a “fair deal?”
 

Fred

Dealy responded thus: 
Is this meant to be a serious intervention or are you taking the piss?
 
 
Wayne G. Dealy
Ph.D. Candidate
Department of Political Science
University of Toronto
My response: 
It is meant to be a serious intervention. If Wayne Dealy has  something against the intervention–apart from emotional venting and insults-he is welcome to debate the issue.
 
Social democrats, unionists and others who consider themselves to be progressive often refer to good or decent jobs and fair contracts  (deals). This is an assumption that is rarely questioned. Indeed,  the tone of Wayne’s response is indicative of the lack of real  concern over the issue of the power of employers as a class in  relation to employees as a class. In other words, Wayne’s response  itself shows just how much the issue needs to be debated. That topic will start to be addressed at the next Toronto Labour Committee on  March 9, from 7:00-9:00 at 31 Wellesley.
 
Fred Harris, Ph. D., philosophy of education, former brewery worker
By the way, the topic was never addressed by the Toronto Labour Committee at the date and time indicated–and never while I was a member of that organization. 
 
Dealy’s response: 

wayne.dealy@utoronto.ca

Deepest apologies. Those fourteen words have been buried deep inside me for years and they could no longer be contained. I regret that you suffered so for their ill-timed appearance.
 
Apologies too for not showing more gratitude for the fact that you deigned to use Tracy’s call for picket-line support to explain to us in plain language how wage labour is exploitative. Sam, David, Tracy et al, I hope you all were taking notes. All of us on this list are obviously and sorely in need of simple explanations of such things; fortunately Fred is here to fill that void.
 
On a more personal note, thanks to your second intervention, my consciousness has been raised even further: I now see the problem all along was my “lack of real concern over the issue of the power of
employers as a class in relation to employees as a class”.
 
And the fact that you were able to suss me out from my fourteen ill-chosen words? Mind. Blown.
 
Thanks again, truly, for sharing your insights. This group is extremely fortunate to have a Promethean figure like yourself who so selflessly kept the ember of class analysis alive so that it could be shared with all us sinners.
 
Wayne.
 
p.s. If I had wanted to insult you I would have called you a condescending prick
Gindin’s intervention involves his cavalier dismissal in the quote above of my concerns, beginning with: “Debating whether a job is ‘decent‘ is a misdirection.”
 
Further evidence that McMaster does not take exploitation and oppression seriously is one of her emails, a response to an email I sent, part of which is reproduced below: 

On Feb 2, 2018, at 4:32 PM, Frederick Harris <arbeit67@hotmail.com> wrote:

The idea that 20,000 new members have been organized as part of a collective-bargaining unit is certainly better than not belonging to a collective-bargaining unit. One has to wonder, though, what Jane McAlevey would think about such an accomplishment. Is it the old model of a union engaging in collective bargaining while the membership grieve mainly through legal means (the grievance procedure) and, otherwise, remain passive? Is it the model where at best 2,000 of those members attend union meetings (probably substantially less, if the number who attended UNITE HERE Local 75 meetings is any indication)? Where union really means an objectified social structure that fails to really unify the workers against management on a day-to-day basis?

Of course, since there are no details provided about what organizing 20,000 part-time workers actually means for the lives of these 20,000 workers, it is difficult to determine how significant this is.

What is needed, instead of merely citing numbers (purely quantitative considerations), is an opening into a qualitative debate and conversation about the goals of the labour movement and of the union movement and their relation to the power of employers as a class–unless of course we already have fairness, economic justice and fair contracts–in the best of all possible worlds.

Fred

McMaster responded as follows: 

Tracy MacMaster
Fri 2018-02-02 7:33 PM
 
Hi Fred,
I don’t normally repsond to your emails, but I feel compelled.  20,000 workers, who for 50 years had almost no protections in the workplace, since they were excluded from many of the most basic protections of the Employment Standards Act, will now have a voice in the workplace.  The potential to improve their material circumstances, as well as their health – precarious workers are at greater risk for negative health outcomes, due to uncertainty, and of course poverty – gives me hope.
 
Having worked alongside numerous activists on this project for the past 13 years, I can only express delight that they finally have come this far.  Collective bargaining is limited and imperfect, but a fuck-ton better than none [my emphasis]. I hope you can attend the meeting to hear what’s going on with them, particularly in the context of the pressure being put on their employer through the recent faculty strike. Theory is a marvelous thing, but we need to acknowledge concrete gains and losses if we have any hope of affecting change.
 
In solidarity,
Tracy
In the first place, I had already recognized that collective bargaining that results in a collective bargaining is better than no collective agreement. In the second place, her claim that “collective bargaining is limited and imperfect” sounds like more union rhetoric. If it is limited and imperfect, in what way? If so, what is McMaster doing about it? The reference to “limited and imperfect” is union rhetoric that hides any real consideration of such limits and imperfections and taking them to heart. The only way to convince Ms. McMaster, as far as I can see, is to–agree with her. She idealizes collective bargaining and fails to address its limitations.
 
I sincerely doubt that McMaster takes seriously the limitations and imperfections of collective bargaining. If there is such evidence, others should provide us. If she did, she would have discussed such limitations and imperfections as well as what needs to be done to overcome such limitations and imperfections. She merely pays lip service to such limitations and imperfections. In practice, she operates entirely in terms of collective bargaining.
 
Gindin’s claim that “Everyone pretty much knows, I think, that workers are exploited even if their conditions improve” rings hollow both at the level of working class in general and at the level of so-called trade-union activists. 

The fourth “challenge/test” also seems to be radical: 

4. Union Transformation

Carrying out the above projects is not just a matter of adding certain functions to unions. To deal with them seriously is to recognize that what is at stake is transforming our unions. Truly addressing all of the above means changing union structures and priorities, how unions allocate their funds, the role of the staff, the leadership’s relationship to their members, the unions’ approach to bargaining, and its orientation to ‘politics’.

Given Gindin’s position in point three above (unless he has changed his position in the meantime), his call for transforming unions is insufficient. When faced with a challenge by me of a typical union position, he defended the union position and criticized my position without a thought. His meaning of what union transformation involves and what I mean are obviously quite different. 

Furthermore, in Gindin’s article, he implies above that going out on strike 

It is true that there were some hints of a reawakening within the labour movement. OPSEU’s (Ontario Public Sector Union) college strike.

How was the college strike an indication “of a reawakening within the labour movement?” Gindin fails to explain how this was so. Going out on stike as a means to obtain a collective agreement has formed part of the union scene even during the Second World War and has formed a part of that scence during the post-War settlement. That strikes have decreased in frequency does not mean that a resurgence in strikes questions the premises of the class power of employers in any way. It may just be a tactic to obtain a better collective agreement. 

How is this change to arise if not through criticism? Through open debate? I withdrew from the Toronto Labour Committee and started this blog in large part because of the lack of open debate in the Toronto Labour Committee over issues that I consider important. I fail to see how Gindin’s position has changed in the meantime. Perhaps he can enlighten his readers on this point. 

The only change that Gindin seems to propose concretely is to follow Jane McAlevey’s model of organizing. He fails to address how the macro issue of the class power of employes is to be addressed (McAlevey fails to address it). He nowhere takes into account how the nature of capitalist economic, political, legal and ideological relations hide the nature of exploitation and oppression. He also fails to address the issue of how unions are to be transformed when they persistently define the limits of their actions in terms of collective bargaining. Even McAlevey repeatedly refers to “good contracts”–as if there were such a thing. 

Fifth challenge: Politics

5. Politics

The problems workers face go beyond any workplace, union, or sector. And at some point we need to clearly address why things are the way they are: Why do inequalities keep rising? Why is there unemployment and why is there inflation? Why do we have a looming environmental crisis? Politics is not so much about good policies as about building the social base so we have the power to see those policies implemented. At the centre of building such a base is the making of a working class with the understandings, coherence, individual and collective capacities, and confidence to make change. At this moment in time, the over-riding political question is how we to organize ourselves so as to build that kind of working class. The Ontario CUPE education workers gave us a glimpse of what is needed and what is possible. Will the labour movement in Canada build on this? There is much more to be done. •

Note Gindin’s focus here: increasing inequalities, unemployment, inflation, the environmental crisis. All of these are real enough and of concern for workers, but there is also the daily politics of subordinating billions of workers’ lives and wills to the power of employers. No mention of exploitation here. I guess we never really need to make exploitation an essential aspect of any critical approach to class politics. 

Gindin seems also to asusme that what is needed is to develop the social power of workers–so that they can push through policies that the state will then implement–why else refer to “have the power to see those policies implemented”? Who does the implementing of policies is vital. It is crucial that workers not only “have the power to see those policies implemented” but that they have the power to implement them as well and to oversee such implementation–the democratisation of the state through the abolition of its hierarchical, separate and objective nature (see the post The CUPE Education Workers Strike: A Lesson on the Nature of the Public Sector for an elaboration of this)–in effect abolishing the nature of the state as an oppressive feature in our lives and self-government through an a great expansion of who is elected (administrators and judgeds would themselves be elected) and a great expansion of control over those elected through the right to recall elected officials–real accountability, not the pseudo-accountability of the present neoliberal state. 

Conclusion

On the positive side,  he rightly emphasizes the unique nature of the situation–especially Ford’s use of the notwithstanding clause. Gindin also emphasizes the need for deep organizing as suggested by Jane McAlevey–and how the education workers used that principle to organize their own strike. In addition, he correctly assesses the probable desire of union leaders to return to the status quo of “free collective bargaining” as soon as possible. Furthermore, Gindin also usefully refers to the need to consider tactical considerations (and public support) when emphasizing certain bargaining demands, Finally, he justifiably indicates that the education workers did make some gains

,  -but . He certainly does not really engage with the issue of how working for an employer is oppressive and exploitative nor how collective-bargaining and collective agreements cannot adequately address this common situation of workers

There are nontheless many problems with Gindin’s analysis. Gindin’s approach clings to caution, caution and more caution. His underestimation of the uniqueness of the situation to unify the union movement not only in Ontario but also in Canada leads him, in part to be overly cautious. This cautious attitude is reinforced by his underestimation of the probable level of public support for the striking workers. He also downplays the probabe real fear that Ford experienced of a possible general strike.

Despite his recognition of the need to fashion bargaining demands that take into account likely public reaction (especially in the public sector) while making inroads in management rights, he does not consider the larger qualitative issue of the adequacy of the social services provided in the public sector (such as the adequacy of the grading system to meet the learning needs of students). 

Gindin leaves open the impact of the education workers’ strike on the union and labour movement. My assessment is that there will be little impact of what occurred on the larger labour movement. Gindin ignores both the specific hidden nature of exploitation and the co-optive capacity of the modern capitalist state. 

Organizing will continue on the same basis, and “free collective bargaining” will continue to be idealized. Even deep organizing will fail to address the wider class issues. So too will coordination within the public sector unless it addresses the exploitative and oppressive nature of the employment relaitonship and the inadequacies of “free collective bargaining.” 

Gindin’s call for making class central sounds radical, but his understanding of class does not come to grips with the specific nature of capitalist exploitation and oppression. Given the nature of class exploitation and oppression in modern capitalism, his call for union transformation, accordingly, has a hollow ring to it since he fails to address the economic, political and ideological obstacles to such a transformation. Similarly, his call for class politics sounds radical, but he apparently conceives the modern government, with its hierarchy and anti-democratic executive structure, to be the vehicle for the realization of the social power of the working class. Class politics, however, also needs to involve a radical breaking down of the hierarchy through the expansion of the election of administrators and judges and the closer control of them by workers and the general public. 

Now that the opportunity for a general strike or at least a more unified union and labour movement–along with advanced in the repeal of repressive Bills (such as Bill 124) through workers’ own initiative rather than through the courts–has been lost, what will Gindin do? Probably continue to engage in his slow, social-reformist approach that will not serve the interests of the working class as a whole. 

All in all, Gindin’s article, like Rosenfeld’s article, expresses conservative radicalism or radical coservativism.

 

Once Again on the General Strike that Almost Was in Ontario, Canada, Part One: The Debate Between Adam King and Abdul Malik

Introduction

For some of the context of the strike, see a couple of earlier posts (The Case of the Possible General Strike of Ontario Unionized Workers: Critique of Conservative Radicalism or Radical Conservatism and The CUPE Education Workers Strike: A Lesson on the Nature of the Public Sector).

A few more leftists have made commentary on the initial strike of 55,000 education workers and the possibility of a general strike in Ontario. There is a debate between Adam King and Abdul Malik and in the online newsletter Passage  https://readpassage.com/should-cupe-have-kept-education-workers-on-strike/). Then there is Sam Gindin’s analysis on the Socialist Project’s website  https://socialistproject.ca/2022/12/education-workers-lead-but-come-up-short/.

I will restrict this post to the debate between King and Malik and will reserve another post to Gindin’s analysis.

King takes the position that CUPE’s(the Canadian Union of Public Employee) Ontario School Boards Council of Unions (OSCBU) made the right decision in calling off the strike since Doug Ford agreed, in writing, to repeal Bill 28, the draconian piece of legislation that not only legally forced the striking workers to return to work before they even started the strike but also used the notwithstanding clause of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to prevent any legal challenge to the legislation.

His argument basically is that CUPE’s OSBCU, had it not called off the strike, would have faced one definite oppressive force–the continued existence of Bill 28–and was facing a possible other oppressive force–the Ontario Labour Relations Board’s future decision of whether the walkout was illegal, which, if that were the case, would have workers face a $4,000 a day fine and the union a $500,000 a day fine (for a total of a $220.5 million a day fine) for the walkout, which started on November 4 (a Friday) and continued on Monday, November 7.

Thus, on the issue of the continued existence of Bill 28, he has this to say:

Again, continuing the strike would have left the bill in place — an extremely risky move.

Yes, it would have been risky–but such is life in a society dominated by a class of employers. Workers risk their lives in various ways every day by working for an employer (see for example  Working and Living in a Society Dominated by a Class of Employers May Be Dangerous to Your Health  )-but King is silent about the need to fight against this risk; rather, he prefers to look at the risk of the continued effect of Bill 28. (As an aside, when I was a teacher at Ashern Central School, during a staff meeting, Rick Trittart, the Safety Officer for Lakeshore School Division, indicated that educational assistants could not legally refuse to work if their students were violent or otherwise consttuted a threat to the health and well-being of educational assistants if such conditions formed a regular part of their work (educatonal assistants form part of CUPE OSBCU).

Yes, it is necessary to take into account the level of risk when determining whether to act in a certain manner, but it is also necessary to consider the daily risks that workers face as means to be used by employers for purposes over which workers have little or no say. Furthermore, King himself admits that there was substantial support for the striking workers:

Abdul claims that the union had “considerable leverage” and “a favourable legal position.” I don’t dispute that the Canadian labour movement came to the aid of CUPE in a remarkable way.

Given the level of support, both in terms of the union movement and the general public, it would seem logical to take this support into consideration when determining the level of risk. Malik rightly emphasizes the level of support and momentum that Ford’s use of the notwithstanding clause had generated:

It’s worth mentioning just how rare the degree of mobilization around Bill 28 actually was. From public support to member mobilization and the threat of solidarity strikes, this was a lightning-in-a-bottle opportunity that would otherwise be unfathomable. The sheer momentum behind this strike can’t be overstated, and is possibly a reason the government backed down so quickly. It’s not a stretch to say this was a generational opportunity to exert pressure and win concessions with far-reaching implications for the broader conditions of working people. If power concedes nothing without a demand, OSBCU was in a position to insist on far more than what they settled for by collapsing the picket lines.

He counters this observation by adding the other possible oppressive situaiton which the striking workers faced: the possible finding by the Ontario Labour Relations Board that the strike was illegal:

I fail to see how the union was in anything but a horrendous legal position. At best, they might have received a favourable decision from the Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB) after the marathon unlawful strike hearing brought by the government over the weekend. On the other hand, we still don’t know the contents of that decision. Had the OLRB found in the government’s favour and deemed the strike illegal, the government would then have been in a position to levy the considerable fines contained in Bill 28 (double the amount for members, and 20 times the amount for unions normally stipulated by the Ontario Labour Relations Act).

Being in a precarious legal position does not mean that the workers would have been in a precarious power position; if the OLRB had declared the strike illegal, then the workers would have had to decide to continue to strike despite the legal repression or to desist. The issue of the legitimacy of the law could then have become an issue–but King assumes that the declaration of something as illegal by the OLRB would have to be respected.

This is a conservative stance, obviously–caution, more caution, and still more caution. Malik rightly questions such a cautious position, given the momentum and support for the striking workers:

While workers staying and continuing to leave Bill 28 in place would have posed risks, it’s important to reassert that with enough groundswell and unions on picket lines threatening to shut down the province in full, any legal hazards would be largely moot. Moreover, the legal confines of business unionism, and in particular Canada’s adherence to the Rand Formula, exist largely to confine and manage worker dissent. Strict adherence to legal procedure already puts labour in a losing position, as we’ve seen through the decline of union density due to layoffs, cutbacks and government endorsed capital flight for decades.

Malik also points out how, historically, wildcat strikers have often not suffered the threats which governments have made so that King’s estimation of the real threat overstates the risk:

Historical precedent with Canadian wildcat strikes has also demonstrated disciplinary action is often mitigated through mediation, compromise and other legal avenues.

This cautious attitude is in line with King’s evident faith in the collective-bargaining system as a mechanism that produces “good contracts.” He uses this phrase a couple of times in his defense of CUPE OSBCU’s decision to call off the strike:

Second, ending the protest in no way implies the fight is over. There’s a good contract [my emphasis]to win. CUPE members and supporters can still play a role in ensuring that happens.

And again:

 Yes, the protests at MPP offices have ceased and members have returned to work, but there’s a struggle ongoing for a good contract [my emphasis].

Since I have criticized this and similar phrases in other posts, I refer the reader to earlier posts (see, for example, The Canadian Labour Congress’s Idealization of the Collective-Bargaining Process and Review of Jane McAlevey’s “A Collective Bargain: Unions, Organizing, and the Fight for Democracy”: Two Steps Backward and One Step Forward, Part One).

Further evidence of King’s union rhetoric is his reference to a “fair deal”:

Moreover, union leaders made it clear during their press conference on Monday that they will remain on “standby” until education workers secure a fair deal [my emphasis].

Since I have criticized such union rhetoric specifically in relation to CUPE in another post, I refer the reader to that post for evidence of such union rhetoric (see Fair Contracts (or Fair Collective Agreements): The Ideological Rhetoric of Canadian Unions, Part One: The Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE)).

King’s focus on achieving a collective agreement without addressing wider issues also comes out in his weak justification for OBSCU’s decision to call off the strike without any call for an immediate repeal of Bill 28 before doing so:

Before addressing each point a bit more, I have to say that I think too much is made of the government not reconvening to repeal Bill 28 immediately. I agree that the haste with which the bill was passed stands in sharp contrast to the heel-dragging involved in its repeal. However, the union made sure to get Ford’s commitment in writing and bargaining has already resumed, which is equally as important.

Malik answers his objectiion thus:

While you can suggest frustration at the delayed repeal of Bill 28 is an overreaction, it’s also important to look at the idea of momentum here. A delay from people getting off the picket line and back in schools, alongside receding outrage toward the government’s outright animosity for the working class, makes it extremely difficult to whip up new anger or support as the news cycle continues to churn. Delaying Bill 28’s repeal is nothing but a concerted effort to enforce a cooldown period for labour militancy — and labour has played right into the government’s hands.

King’s approach essentially reduces all struggles to one centered on collective bargaining and collective agreements–well within the limits of the purposes of bureaucratic trade unions and their representatives.

The resulting collective agreement resulted in an actual wage increase was $1 per hour across the board for four years (an across-the-board increase was one of CUPE’s demands–and not a percentage increase offered by the Conservative Ford government ) (see the tentative memormandum of settlement at   https://osbcu.ca/img/tentative_cupe_mos_2022_11_23.pdf#:~:text=The%20wage%20increase%20for%20all%20job%20classifications%20within,hour%202025-2026%20%241%20per%20hour%20b%29%20Salaried%20Employees   ). The issue of inadequate staffing levels, however, was not addressed, so working conditions will still remain at earlier intensive and oppressive levels.

Conclusion

King’s position in supporting the decision to call off the strike reflects the typical union idealization of the collective-bargaining process and collective agreements. He assumes, without question, that the primary purpose of going out on strike is to achieve a “good contract” and a “fair deal.” The continued threat of Bill 28 and the possible threat of facing massive fines argue against continuing the strike.

Malik’s position, on the other hand, points out that there was considerable support for the strike and that momentum was building–and such momentum would have likely made the existence of Bill 28 a moot point. Furthermore, historically, wildcat strikes have not ended up with massive fines as such threats evaporate as alternatives are found. By  calling off the strike and returning to work, CUPE effectively broke the momentum that could have maintained pressure on the Ford goverment and obtained much more than they actually did.

Malik’s analysis is certainly more relevant–it shows how the potentialities of a situation precipated by an oppressive action by government could galvanize workers into opposing such a dictator. He recognizes that the potentiality was wasted when CUPE called off the strike before returning to the bargaining table.

Given that that potentiality no longer exists, what are radicals to do? While trying to organize workers, should they not try to have workers come to grips realistically with the limitations of collective bargaining and collective agreements in addressing their exploitation and oppression?