Introduction.
I have tried to calculate the rate of exploitation of workers in various Canadian capitalist companies (see for example The Rate of Exploitation of the Workers of Rogers Communications Inc., One of the Largest Private Employers in Toronto or The Rate of Exploitation of the Workers of the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC), One of the Largest Private Employers in Toronto and in Canada ). I think it is time to expand such calculations to capitalist emloyers in other countries and continents. To that end, I will try to calculate the rate of exploitation of workers for some of the largest capitalist employers in various continents. I have already calculated the rate of exploitation for the employer Tencent in China (Asia) (The Rate of Exploitation of Tencent (China) Workers) and Sonatrach in Algeria (Africa) ( The Rate of Exploitation of Sonatrach Workers in Africa ).
Another such large capitalist employer in Latin America is Petrobras, a Brazilian oil company. Here are some more details about this capitalist employer. From Annual report, 2019-2020, page 12:
We are a Brazilian company with over 57,000 employees committed to generate more value for our shareholders and the society. We are the largest company in market capitalization in Latin America, with a market capitalization of US$101.1 billion as of December 31, 2019. We are one of the largest producers of oil and gas in the world, primarily engaged in exploration and production, refining, energy generation and trading. We have acquired expertise on deep and ultra-deepwater exploration and production as a result of almost 50 years spent developing the Brazilian offshore basins,
becoming world leaders in this segment.
The Nature of the Rate of Exploitation
But what is the rate of exploitation? And why not use the usual rate of profit or the rate of return? The rate of profit is calculated as profit divided by investment. Since employers purchase both the means for work–buildings, computers, office supplies, raw material–and hire workers–we can classify investment into two categories: c, meaning constant capital, or the capital invested in commodities other than workers; and v, or variable capital, the capital invested in the hiring of workers for a certain period of time (wages, salaries and benefits).
The purpose of investment in a capitalist economy is to obtain more money (see The Money Circuit of Capital), and the additional money is surplus value when it is related to its source: workers working for more time than what they cost to produce themselves. The relation between surplus value and variable capital (or wages and salaries) is the rate of surplus value or the rate of exploitation, expressed as a ratio: s/v.
When the surplus is related to both c and v and expressed as a ratio, it is the rate of profit: s/(c+v).
In Marxian economics, you cannot simply use the economic classifications provided by employers and governments since such classifications often hide the nature of the social world in which we live. The rate of profit underestimates the rate of exploitation since the surplus value is related to total investment and not just to the workers. Furthermore, it makes the surplus value appear to derive from both constant capital and variable capital.
I decided to look at the annual report of some of the largest private companies in various cities in Canada if they are available in order to calculate the rate of exploitation at a more micro level than aggregate rates of surplus value at the national or international level. Politically, this is necessary since social democrats here in Toronto (and undoubtedly elsewhere) vaguely may refer to exploitation–while simultaneously and contradictorily referring to “decent work” and “fair contracts.” Calculating even approximately the rate of exploitation at a more micro level thus has political relevance.
I used data 2019 to calculate since the data for later years, due to the Covid pandemic, undoubtedly skewed the normal exploitation of Petrobras workers. Perhpas once annual reports for 2024 have been published, it would be better to look at such rates of exploitation for that year since the pandemic’s effects may have diminished substantially by that time.
Conclusions First
As usual, I start with the conclusion in order to make readily accessible the results of the calculations for those who are more interested in the results than in how to obtain them.
The Rate of Exploitation of Petrobras Workers
To calculate the rate of exploitation or the rate of surplus value, we need to divide Profit or Surplus value (s) or Income before income taxes by Variable capital (v) or Employee Benefits Expenses.
So, with the adjustments in place, the rate of exploitation or the rate of surplus value=s/v=29,516.6/6,422.2=4.6, or in percent terms, 460%.
This means that, in terms of money, $1 of wage or salary of a regular Petrobras worker results in $4.60 surplus value or profit for free. Alternatively, for every hour worked, a Petrobras worker works 276 minutes (or 4 hours 36 minutes) for free for Petrobras. Or, within one hour of work, a worker receives an equivalent of her hourly wage in 11 minutes and works for free for 49 minutes for Petrobras.
In a 6-hour (360 minutes) work day, the worker produces her/his wage in 1 hour 4 minutes (64 minutes) and works 4 hours 56 minutes (296 minutes) for free for Petrobras.
In an 8-hour (480 minutes) work day, the worker produces her/his wage in 1 hour 28 minutes (88 minutes) and works 6 hours 32 minutes (392 minutes) for free for Petrobras.
In a 9-hour (540 minutes) work day, the worker produces her/his wage in 1 hour 36 minutes (96 minutes) and works hours 7 hours 24 minutes (444 minutes) for free for Petrobras.
In a 10-hour (600 minutes) work day, the worker produces her/his wage in 1 hour 47 minutes (107 minutes) and works hours 8 hours 13 minutes (493 minutes) for free for Petrobras.
In an 11-hour (660 minutes) work day, the worker produces her/his wage in 1 hour 58 minutes (118 minutes) and works 9 hours 2 minutes (542 minutes) for free for Petrobras.
In a 12-hour (720 minutes) work day, the worker produces her/his wage in 2 hours 9 minutes (129 minutes) and works 9 hours 51 minutes (591 minutes) for free for Petrobras.
Of course, during the time that the worker works to receive an equivalent of her/his own wage, s/he is subject to the power of management and hence is unfree (see, for instance, Management Rights, Part Four: Private Sector Collective Agreement, Ontario and Employers as Dictators, Part One).
Political Considerations and Conclusion: Does the Existence of a Union and a Collective Agreement Abolish the Exploitation and Oppression of Workers?
Again, the rate of exploitation measures the extent to which workers work for free, producing all the surplus value and hence all the profit for employers. However, even during the time when they work to produce their own wage, they are hardly free. They are subject to the power and dictates of their employer during that time as well.
Do you think that these facts contradict the talk by the left and unionists of “fair wages,” “fair contracts” (see Fair Contracts (or Fair Collective Agreements): The Ideological Rhetoric of Canadian Unions, Part One for the rhetoric of the largest union of private-sector workers in Canada, Unifor) and “decent work?” Do they ignore the reality of life for workers, whether unionized or non-unionized?
If exploitation and oppression of workers is a constant in their lives, even if they are only vaguely aware of it, should this situation not be frankly acknowledged by their representatives? Do such representatives do so? If not, why not? Do workers deserve better than neglecting the social context within which they live and work? Should such problems be addressed head on rather than neglected?
Even if workers were not exploited, they would still be oppressed since they are used as things (means) for purposes which they as a collectivity do not define (see The Money Circuit of Capital). Does that express something fair? Management rights clauses (implied or explicit in collective agreements give management as representative of employers–and as a minority–the power to dictate to workers what to do, when to do it, how to do it and so forth–and is not the imposition of the will of a minority over the majority a dictatorship? (See Employers as Dictators, Part One). Is that fair? Do union reps ever explain how a collective agreement somehow expresses something fair? Is that fair?
There are several unions representing workers at Petrobras, and there exist collective agreements between them and Petrobras (see for example the collective agreement between FUP (Federação Única dos Petroleiros) and Petrobras Biocombustível S/A – PBIO for the period 2023-2025 ( https://fup.org.br/acordo-coletivo-de-trabalho-petrobras-biocombustivel-2023-2025/).
I have been unable to find an explicit management-rights clause in collective agreements between Petrobras and Federação Única dos Petroleiros e Sindicatos. Even so, there is undoubtedly an implicit right for Petrobras to manage production and office operations as it sees fit, subject to the limitations of the collective agreement.
Management rights clause undoubtedly expresses the democratic way of life–for employers. For workers, it expresses a dicatorship (see, for example, the above post on employers as dicators ), modified by but not alterning in any essential way the dictatorial power of employers to oppress and exploir “their” workers.
Should workers not be discussing why management has these rights? Should workers not be discussing whether an unelected management should have such rights? Should workers not be discussing how to organize to abolish this dictatorship? Should workers not be criticizing any union rep who claims that a collective agreement somehow expresses a “fair contract?” A “good contract?” A “decent job?” A “good job?” All other such platitudes?
How does the existence of a collective agreement turn the exploitative and oppresive situation of workers into one where they have a “fair contract” and “decent work?” Unions can limit exploitation and can control some aspects of their working lives, but in principle workers are things to be used by employers even with unions. This does not mean that a non-unionized environment is the same as a unionized environment. With unions that are independent of particular employers, that is to say, are real unions, there is an opportunity for workers to develop organizations of resistance against the power of particular employers.
Workers and not just unions, however, cannot resist the power of the employers as a class unless workers organize as a class, and furthermore they cannot change the situation unless they themselves realize the limitations of their own local, regional and national organizations when faced with the power of the class of employers (and the government that supports them), teach that to their members and are open persistently to criticism from below. In addition, unless they start to organize as a class with the aim of eliminating the class power of employers, they will be subject to a back-and-forth movement of reform and counter-reform (see Anti-Neoliberalism Need Not Be Anti-Capitalist: The Case of the Toronto Radical John Clarke, Part Four: The Welfare State and Neoliberalism, or The Infinite Back and Forth Movement of Capitalism).
The ideology of unions–that somehow they can produce a “fair contract” and “decent work”–needs, though, to be constantly criticized. Workers deserve better than the acceptance of such ideology by the social-democratic or social-reformist left.
The collective agreement–like any employment agreement between workers and employers–fosters the illusion that the workers are paid for the whole working day and hides the economic coercion behind the “agreement” or contract.
Should not the left be constantly exposing this? Is it? What do you think?
Data on Which the Calculation Is Based
The calculation of the rate of exploitation is undoubtedly imperfect, and I invite the reader to correct its gaps. Nonetheless, the lack of any attempt to determine the rate of exploitation at the level of particular employers has undoubtedly reinforced social-reformist tendencies.
Surplus Value (s) or Profit
(In U.S. million $)
[pagina 135] Sales revenues 76,589
Cost of sales (45,732)
Gross profit 30,857 [76,589-45,732=30,857]
Selling expenses (4,476)
General and administrative expenses (2,124)
Exploration costs (799)
Research and development expenses (576)
Other taxes (619)
Impairment of assets (2,848)
Other income and expenses 1,199
Operating income 20,614 [30,857-4,476-2,124-799-576-619-2,848+1,199=20,614]
Net finance income (expense) (8,764)
Results of equity-accounted investments 153
Income before income taxes 12,003 [20,614-8,764+153=12,003]
Adjustments to Calculations
Why make any adjustments to the calculations used by the authors of the annual report? Marxian economics distinguishes between the actual situation–its essence, if you like–and appearances, which in a capitalist society often differ from the actual situation. Appearances can be very deceptive. Capitalist relations objectively distort the real nature of the kind of situation in which people find themselves. We need to adjust the calculations to transform the deceptive appearances into the actual situation.
I will make adjustments according to the order of the above data, with explanations of why I do or do not make adjustments for some (but not all) of the above categories.
First Adjustment of Surplus Value (s) (Income before income taxes)
Selling expenses (4,476)
In Marxian economics, selling expenses are expenses from the point of view of the individual capitalist, but from the point of view of the capitalist class as a whole, it is an expense that is paid out of surplus value since its function is to convert value into the money form or to convert money into commodities, and that presupposes the production of value, with surplus value forming part of that value; it is from this surplus of value that selling expenses are covered. Accordingly, it is necessary to add this expense to “Income before income taxes.”
First Temporary Adjusted Surplus Value or Income before income taxes
16,479 [12,003+4,476=16,479]
Second Adjustment of Surplus Value (s) (Income before income taxes)
General and administrative expenses (2,124)
The next category–“General and administrative expenses”–follows the same logic as the category “Selling expenses.” Of course, it depends on the nature of that work; in a few instances, research and development has been included in such a category, in which case at least part of the expenses due to indeed form real expenses both at the macro and micro levels.
In this particular case, though, although the work of such workers accomplishes something (such as the recording of the transfer of property from one property owner to another)–their work does not change the value of what is produced. Another source must be found to pay continuously for their wages. That source in this instance is surplus value. The same could be said of the means with which the workers accomplish this kind of work.
I will treat this category as being derived from surplus value and accordingly will add the amount to “Income before income taxes.”
Second Temporary Adjusted Surplus Value or Income before income taxes
18,603 [16,479+2,124=18,603]
Third Adjustment of Surplus Value (s) (Income before income taxes)
Other taxes (619)
Categories related to taxes are considered to be paid out of surplus value since, in general, taxes paid by employers are derived from surplus value (that is why it is unnecessary to deduct income taxes from profits–it would be necessary to add it again to determine surplus value). Consequently, it is necessary to add 619 to “Income before income taxes.”
Third Temporary Adjusted Surplus Value or Income before income taxes
19,222 [18,603+619=19,222]
Fourth Adjustment of Surplus Value (s) (Income before income taxes)
Other income and expenses 1,199
This category is more complicated; the annual report further breaks it down into the following subcategories:
Gains / (losses) related to legal, administrative and arbitration proceedings (1,520)
Pension and medical benefits – retirees (1,371)
Unscheduled stoppages and pre-operating expenses (1,321)
Variable compensation program (643) [pagina 306]
Gains/(losses) with Commodities Derivatives (370)
Voluntary Separation Plan – PDV (198)
Profit sharing (43)
Employee Career and Compensation Plan – PCR (2)
Institutional relations and cultural projects (180)
Operating expenses with thermoelectric power plants (128)
Government grants 238
Results on disposal/write-offs of assets and on remeasurement of investment retained
with loss of control 6,046
Expenses/Reimbursements from E&P partnership operations 383
Amounts recovered from Lava Jato investigation 220
Equalization of expenses – Production Individualization Agreements 2
Gains / (losses) on decommissioning of returned/abandoned areas (155)
Others 241
Total 1,199 [-1520-1,371-1,321-643-370-198-43-2-180-128+238+6,046+383+220+2-155+241=-5,776+6,975=1,199]
I will skip over for now those subcategories that also involve adjustments to variable capital or wages and not just surplus value or profit.
Gains / (losses) related to legal, administrative and arbitration proceedings (1,520)
Numbers in parentheses are considered expenses from the point of view of the capitalist employer and thus reduce the amount of “Income before income taxes.” However, losses related to legal and other such proceedings, though an expense from the point of view of the particular capitalist employer, are paid out of surplus value (the money has to come from somewhere). Such an expense is not recouped by such services increasing the value of the commodities produced. (The same logic applies to legal expenses paid by workers for workers. Workers who pay for such services use wages as their source for paying for such services, and the results generally are not recouped but are a pure loss of revenue for workers.)
Accordingly, it is necessary to add 1,520 to “Income before income taxes.”
Fourth Temporary Adjusted Surplus Value or Income before income taxes
20,742 [19,222+1,520=20,742]
Fifth Adjustment of Surplus Value (s) (Income before income taxes)
Institutional relations and cultural projects (180)
This subcategory may be considered something akin to philanthropy and promoting the company by funding certain projects–the source of this funding is surplus value. Thus, it should be added to “Income before income taxes.”
Fifth Temporary Adjusted Surplus Value or Income before income taxes
20,922 [20,742+180=20,922]
Sixth Adjustment of Surplus Value (s) (Income before income taxes)
Government grants 238
Government grants evidently are income not derived from the specific exploitation of Petrobras workers (although it may well be derived from the exploitation of all Brazilian workers, depending on the flow of taxes and government transfer payments). It therefore needs to be subtracted from “Income before income taxes.”
Sixth Temporary Adjusted Surplus Value or Income before income taxes
20,684 [20,922-238=20,684]
Seventh Adjustment of Surplus Value (s) (Income before income taxes)
One final category involves only an adjustment to surplus value or profit or “Income before income taxes without involving a simultaneous adjustment of variable capital or wages and salaries.
In order to make further adjustments to surplus value or profit on the basis of other subcategories in “Other income and expenses”, it is necessary to make adjustments to variable capital (v) or “Salaries and Employee Benefits Expenses.”
Net finance income (expense) (8,764)
In Marxian theory, it is necessary to question whether some expenses are expenses for both the individual employer and for the class of employers (and fractions of their class, such as those who live on interest). When they are expenses at the macro level of the class of employers and not just at the micro level of the particular employer, the expense is deducted from total revenue. On the other hand, there are expenses that are expenses for the individual employer but are not expenses when looked at from the point of view of the class of employers; in such an instance, they are paid out from the surplus value produced or obtained by workers and are to be included in income before taxes.
For example, finance expenses or interest expense are such a category.
As I wrote in another post:
Interest in many instances can be treated as part of the surplus value produced and therefore added to net income since, although from the point of view of the individual capitalist it is an expense, from the capitalist economy as a whole it is derived from the production of surplus value.
Accordingly, it is necessary to add 8,764 to surplus value or profit or “Income before Income Taxes.”
Seventh Temporary Adjusted Surplus Value or Income before income taxes
29,448 [20,684+8,764=29,448]
Further adjustments to surplus value or profit involve simultaneous adjustments to variable capital (v) or Salaries and Employee Benefit Expenses.” Consequently, I will now turn to consider this category.
Calculation of Variable Capital (V) (Salaries and Employee Benefits Expenses)
Salaries 4,184.9
Employee training 48.9
Profit-sharing distributions 43.0
Variable compensation program 643
Total Salaries and Employee Benefits Expenses 4919.8 [4,184.9+48.9+43+643=4919.8]
Now that we have shifted to consideration of variable capital or wages/salaries and benefits, before I make further adjustments to surplus value or profit, I will first limit myself to making adjustments to variable capital or wages/salaries and benefits that do not involve simultaneous adjustments to surplus value or profits.
I therefore need to look first at some of the subcategories from the category “Other income and expenses” before considering further the subcategories immediately above and their corresponding numbers.
First Adjustment of Variable Capital (Salaries and Employee Benefits Expenses)
Pension and medical benefits – retirees (1,371)
This subcategory is treated as an expense–and indeed it is. However, this expense should be included in calculating variable capital since it forms not only part of the cost of hiring workers, but workers also receive benefits from the expense. Consequently:
First Temporary Adjusted Variable Capital (Total Salaries and Employee Benefits Expenses)
6,290.8 [4,919.8+1,371=6,290.8]
Second Adjustment of Variable Capital (Salaries and Employee Benefits Expenses)
Voluntary Separation Plan – PDV (198)
The annual report describes this plan as follows:
Voluntary Severance Programs
On April 24, 2019, the Board of Directors approved the Company’s Voluntary Severance Program (PDV). Petrobras employees may join the program from May 2, 2019 to June 30, 2020, provided they are retired under the Brazilian Social Security Institute (INSS) by the end of the enrollment period. The program aims to adapt size of the Company’s workforce and optimize costs.The recognition of the provision for expenses with this plan occurs to the extent that the employees join the program. Accordingly, the Company has already registered 3,045 enrollments and 966 separations.
In addition, the Company launched two new voluntary severance programs with the same legal advantages and indemnity as PDV, but intended for non-retired employees with specific regulations. These programs are destined to the corporate segment employees (Corporate PDV) and to employees of divestment units (Specific PDVs). The Corporate PDV has already registered 243 enrollments and 28 separations.
Severance programs form part of the cost of employing workers (just as partially or wholly funded pensions by employers do).
Second Temporary Adjusted Variable Capital (Total Salaries and Employee Benefits Expenses)
6,488.8 [6,290.8+198=6,488.8]
Third Adjustment of Variable Capital (Salaries and Employee Benefits Expenses)
Employee Career and Compensation Plan – PCR (2)
There is no explanation for this subcategory in the annual report. I asked the following of AI (ChatGPT):
What does the following mean from the Petrobras annual report? “Employee Career and Compensation Plan – PCR”
The answer:
The “Employee Career and Compensation Plan (PCR)” in Petrobras’ annual report refers to a formal system the company has implemented to manage employee career development and compensation. This plan typically includes:
- Career Progression: Guidelines for how employees can advance within the company, including criteria for promotions, professional development, and opportunities for growth.
- Compensation: The structure of salaries, bonuses, and other financial benefits, ensuring that compensation is aligned with employee performance, skills, and responsibilities.
- Alignment with Corporate Goals: The plan is usually tied to company-wide objectives to incentivize employees to work toward organizational success.
In essence, the PCR is a strategic tool for managing human resources, aiming to attract, retain, and motivate employees by providing clear career paths and competitive compensation.
I asked a more specific question:
Is it limited to managerial employees?
Answer:
No, the Employee Career and Compensation Plan (PCR) at Petrobras is not typically limited to managerial employees. Such plans generally cover all employee levels, including both managerial and non-managerial staff. The purpose of a PCR is to provide a structured framework for career progression, development, and compensation for all employees, regardless of their position.
However, the specifics of the plan may vary, with different career tracks, compensation models, and development opportunities tailored to different categories of employees (e.g., technical staff, administrative staff, managers). Higher-level managerial roles might have additional performance incentives or benefits, but the overall plan is designed to support the career growth and compensation of the entire workforce.
Finally, I wanted to make sure that there was not double counting, so I asked the following:
How is this different from “Employee training?”
Part of the answer that is relevant is:
Key Differences:
- PCR is broader and deals with long-term career growth, promotion opportunities, and compensation, while training is more specific to enhancing certain skills or knowledge.
- PCR affects the structure of an employee’s role in the company over time (e.g., raises, promotions), while training deals with immediate performance improvement and skill acquisition.
Given that there seems no basis for assuming that such compensation is skewed either towards regular workers or managerial workers, I will assume that the entire amount is allocated to the cost of hiring and employing (using) workers. Accordingly:
Third Temporary Adjusted Variable Capital (Total Salaries and Employee Benefits Expenses)
6,490.8 [6,488.8+2=6490.8]
I will not make any further adjustments based on the other subcategories of “Other income and expenses.” In addition to being beyond my own limited knowledge of accounting, I have decided not to complicate the calculations any further on the basis of this category. Others with more knowledge can correct the calculations.
I now turn to adjustments that involve simultaneous adjustments to profit or surplus value and salaries and benefits
Eighth Temporary Adjustment of Profit or Surplus Value (s) (Income before income taxes) and Fourth Temporary Adjustment of Salaries and Benefits (Variable Capital, or v)
Employee training 48.9
Training expenses are expenses allocated to the costs involved in developing the skills of workers; they enhance the value of labour power. From Ryuji Sasaki (2021), A New Introduction to Karl Marx New Materialism, Critique of Political Economy, and the Concept of Metabolism:
The reproduction cost of labor power includes not only the cost of reproducing the individual wageworker, but also the cost of raising the worker’s children or training costs necessary for a worker to acquire vocational skills.
This cost enhances the value of labour power; consequently, its inclusion in “Salaries and Employee Benefits Expenses” is legitimate; it is unnecessary to make any adjustments for this subcategory.
On the other hand, concerning the next category, “Profit-sharing distributions,” whether to include the entire amount in variable capital or “Salaries and Employee Benefits Expenses” is more questionable. In connection with this category, the annual report reads:
In September 2019, we also offered employees holding a higher education degree and receiving a monthly salary of US$2,960.36 or more the option to negotiate their labor conditions through individual employment agreements. Currently, 3% of our employees are under individual employment agreements.
Merely having a degree, of course, does not necessarily mean that such workers are engaged in exploiting other workers and receiving a part of the surplus value or profit produced as a consequence. However, it is likely that some of them do indeed work at supervisory or managerial levels and receive a part of the surplus value because. Accordingly, I will assume that 10 percent of the amount of the category “Profit-sharing distributions” is actually surplus value or profit and not salaries that are due to actual work. In other words, some of “profit-sharing distributions” is likely due to such workers obliging other workers to work at a certain level.
It would be necessary to have more detailed information to determine whether more or less of the money obtained in this category were due to actual work or due to the exploitation of other workers.
On the assumption of 10 percent, though, this means that 10 percent of 43 (that is to say, 4.3) is subtracted from “Total Salaries and Employee Benefits Expenses” and added to “Surplus Value or Income before income taxes“.
Eighth Temporary Adjusted Surplus Value or Income before income taxes
29, 452.3 [29,448+4.3=29,452.3]
Fourth Temporary Adjusted Variable Capital (Total Salaries and Employee Benefits Expenses)
6486.5 [6,490.8-4.3=6486.5]
Ninth and Final Adjustment of Profit or Surplus Value (s) (Income before income taxes) and Fifth and Final Adjustment of Salaries and Benefits (Variable Capital, or v)
Variable compensation program (643)
The same logic applies to this category as to the category “profit sharing.” Accordingly, on the assumption of 10 percent of 643, 64.3 is subtracted from “Total Salaries and Employee Benefits Expenses” and added to “Surplus Value or Income before income taxes“.
Ninth and Final Adjusted Profit or Surplus Value or (s) or Income before income taxes
29,516.6 [29,452.3+64.3=29,516.6]
Fifth and Final Adjusted Variable Capital (Total Salaries and Employee Benefits Expenses)
6,422.2 [6486.5-64.3=6,422.2]
The Rate of Exploitation of Petrobras Workers
To calculate the rate of exploitation or the rate of surplus value, we need to divide Profit or Surplus value (s) or Income before income taxes by Variable capital (v) or Employee Benefits Expenses.
So, with the adjustments in place, the rate of exploitation or the rate of surplus value=s/v=29,516.6/6,422.2=4.6, or in percent terms, 460%.
This means that, in terms of money, $1 of wage or salary of a regular Petrobras worker results in $4.60 surplus value or profit for free. Alternatively, for every hour worked, a Petrobras worker works 276 minutes (or 4 hours 36 minutes) for free for Petrobras. Or, within one hour of work, a worker receives an equivalent of her hourly wage in 11 minutes and works for free for 49 minutes for Petrobras.
Of course, during the time that the worker works to receive an equivalent of her/his own wage, s/he is subject to the power of management and hence is unfree (see, for instance, Management Rights, Part Four: Private Sector Collective Agreement, Ontario and Employers as Dictators, Part One).
The length of the working day varies: Petrobras workers generally follow labor practices in compliance with Brazilian labor laws, which regulate an 8-hour workday, or 44 hours weekly. However, variations in work schedules are common depending on the nature of the job (administrative vs. operational roles) and collective bargaining agreements. These agreements may specify different arrangements, but all practices adhere to national and international labor standards. For more detailed insights into Petrobras’ labor practices and collective agreements, you can consult their website (Petrobras).
The Length of the Working Day
I found only one specific reference to the length of working days in the annual report–a complaint against Petrobras relating to overtime in relation to a 12-hour working day:
2) The plaintiff claims Petrobras failed to pay overtime for standby work exceeding 12-hours per day. It also demands that the Company respects a 12-hour limit of standby work per workday,
There are several unions representing workers at Petrobras. I did look at one collective agreement between FUP (Federação Única dos Petroleiros) and Petrobras Biocombustível S/A – PBIO for the period 2023-2025 (see https://fup.org.br/acordo-coletivo-de-trabalho-petrobras-biocombustivel-2023-2025/ ). Appendices 12 and 13 show working days of 6, 8 and 12.
Some answers to the question of working hours on the Indeed website come up with the following:
Eight hours on average.
I start at 8 am and stop at 7 pm
Nine to Ten.
From the above, I will use the following lengths of the working day and the rate of exploitation to calculate the distribution of working hours between the number of hours workers work that is equivalent to their wage or salary (including benefits) and the number of hours they work for free for employers: 6, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 hours.
In a 6-hour (360 minutes) work day, the worker produces her/his wage in 1 hour 4 minutes (64 minutes) and works 4 hours 56 minutes (296 minutes) for free for Petrobras.
In an 8-hour (480 minutes) work day, the worker produces her/his wage in 1 hour 28 minutes (88 minutes) and works 6 hours 32 minutes (392 minutes) for free for Petrobras.
In a 9-hour (540 minutes) work day, the worker produces her/his wage in 1 hour 36 minutes (96 minutes) and works hours 7 hours 24 minutes (444 minutes) for free for Petrobras.
In a 10-hour (600 minutes) work day, the worker produces her/his wage in 1 hour 47 minutes (107 minutes) and works hours 8 hours 13 minutes (493 minutes) for free for Petrobras.
In an 11-hour (660 minutes) work day, the worker produces her/his wage in 1 hour 58 minutes (118 minutes) and works 9 hours 2 minutes (542 minutes) for free for Petrobras.
In a 12-hour (720 minutes) work day, the worker produces her/his wage in 2 hours 9 minutes (129 minutes) and works 9 hours 51 minutes (591 minutes) for free for Petrobras.
Of course, during the time that the worker works to receive an equivalent of her/his own wage, s/he is subject to the power of management and hence is unfree (see, for instance, Management Rights, Part Four: Private Sector Collective Agreement, Ontario and Employers as Dictators, Part One).
Political Considerations and Conclusion: Does the Existence of a Union and a Collective Agreement Abolish the Exploitation and Oppression of Workers?
Again, the rate of exploitation measures the extent to which workers work for free, producing all the surplus value and hence all the profit for employers. However, even during the time when they work to produce their own wage, they are hardly free. They are subject to the power and dictates of their employer during that time as well.
Do you think that these facts contradict the talk by the left and unionists of “fair wages,” “fair contracts” (see Fair Contracts (or Fair Collective Agreements): The Ideological Rhetoric of Canadian Unions, Part One for the rhetoric of the largest union of private-sector workers in Canada, Unifor) and “decent work?” Do they ignore the reality of life for workers, whether unionized or non-unionized?
If exploitation and oppression of workers is a constant in their lives, even if they are only vaguely aware of it, should this situation not be frankly acknowledged by their representatives? Do such representatives do so? If not, why not? Do workers deserve better than neglecting the social context within which they live and work? Should such problems be addressed head on rather than neglected?
Even if workers were not exploited, they would still be oppressed since they are used as things (means) for purposes which they as a collectivity do not define (see The Money Circuit of Capital). Does that express something fair? Management rights clauses (implied or explicit in collective agreements give management as representative of employers–and as a minority–the power to dictate to workers what to do, when to do it, how to do it and so forth–and is not the imposition of the will of a minority over the majority a dictatorship? (See Employers as Dictators, Part One). Is that fair? Do union reps ever explain how a collective agreement somehow expresses something fair? Is that fair?
There are several unions representing workers at Petrobras, and there exist collective agreements between them and Petrobras (see for example the collective agreement between FUP (Federação Única dos Petroleiros) and Petrobras Biocombustível S/A – PBIO for the period 2023-2025 ( https://fup.org.br/acordo-coletivo-de-trabalho-petrobras-biocombustivel-2023-2025/).
I have been unable to find an explicit clause in collective agreements between Petrobras and Federação Única dos Petroleiros e Sindicatos. Even so, there is undoubtedly an implicit right for Petrobras to manage production and office operations as it sees fit, subject to the limitations of the collective agreement.
Management rights clause undoubtedly expresses the democratic way of life–for employers. For workers, it expresses a dicatorship (see, for example, the above post on employers as dicators ), modified by but not alterning in any essential way the dictatorial power of employers to oppress and exploir “their” workers.
Should workers not be discussing why management has these rights? Should workers not be discussing whether an unelected management should have such rights? Should workers not be discussing how to organize to abolish this dictatorship? Should workers not be criticizing any union rep who claims that a collective agreement somehow expresses a “fair contract?” A “good contract?” A “decent job?” A “good job?” All other such platitudes?
How does the existence of a collective agreement turn the exploitative and oppresive situation of workers into one where they have a “fair contract” and “decent work?” Unions can limit exploitation and can control some aspects of their working lives, but in principle workers are things to be used by employers even with unions. This does not mean that a non-unionized environment is the same as a unionized environment. With unions that are independent of particular employers, that is to say, are real unions, there is an opportunity for workers to develop organizations of resistance against the power of particular employers.
Workers and not just unions, however, cannot resist the power of the employers as a class unless workers organize as a class, and furthermore they cannot change the situation unless they themselves realize the limitations of their own local, regional and national organizations when faced with the power of the class of employers (and the government that supports them), teach that to their members and are open persistently to criticism from below. In addition, unless they start to organize as a class with the aim of eliminating the class power of employers, they will be subject to a back-and-forth movement of reform and counter-reform (see Anti-Neoliberalism Need Not Be Anti-Capitalist: The Case of the Toronto Radical John Clarke, Part Four: The Welfare State and Neoliberalism, or The Infinite Back and Forth Movement of Capitalism).
The ideology of unions–that somehow they can produce a “fair contract” and “decent work”–needs, though, to be constantly criticized. Workers deserve better than the acceptance of such ideology by the social-democratic or social-reformist left.
The collective agreement–like any employment agreement between workers and employers–fosters the illusion that the workers are paid for the whole working day and hides the economic coercion behind the “agreement” or contract.
Should not the left be constantly exposing this? Is it? What do you think?
The Abolitionary 