The Meaning of Being Hired, Fired and Laid Off

The following is a debate on Facebook I had with a pro-employer right-winger. The context was the closing down of the Oshawa GM auto factory (among others) in Ontario, Canada, the loss of around 3,000 direct jobs there and the possible loss of around 15,000 additional workers due to the spin-off losses of the suppliers of the factory.

I initially indicated that the 15,000 workers would be fired, not laid off. A right-winger named Jim Edgeworth argued that they were laid off rather than fired and referred to Brampton (Ontario, Canada) workers at Chrysler allegedly eight years ago as proof that the 15,000 workers would be laid off, not fired.

The issue is interesting in terms of what hiring, firing and laying off mean—something lost in most discussions about “jobs.”

I do not report the verbatim arguments of Jim Edgeworth; he deleted his arguments from Facebook.

Let us assume for the moment that that is true. Then all the more reason to eliminate a class of employers that must fire “over 15,000” since they cannot exploit them adequately (to say “laid off” assumes that that is temporary).

Of course, this person is not really concerned about the 15,000 fired. Rather, he is concerned about defending the interests of employers at any cost.

I then respond to Edgeworth’s reference to the Brampton workers at Chrysler:

Who defines what constitutes “laid off.” Are the Brampton workers still waiting around, expecting to be rehired? Or have they moved on to other employers? The person needs to provide facts to substantiate the view that workers have somehow being “laid off”–despite not working for the same worker for “eight years ago.”

I ignored Edgeworth’s attempt to insult me, and wrote:

This right-winger, evidently, is more concerned with his own egotistical nature than with addressing the problems and sufferings of real human beings–a characteristic of employers, who use human beings as means for their own end of obtaining more and more money.

Rather than indulging in the same kind of trite behavior, let us look at this so-called fact of being laid off or being fired. To be laid off or fired, it is first necessary to be hired. What does it mean to be hired by Chrysler at Brampton?

To be hired requires that the workers themselves lack economic independence–the means by which they can realize their act of working belong to others–to a minority called employers. At a brewery, for example, the soaker, filler and labeler are owned by the brewery employer and not by the workers who use the soaker, filler or labeler (and not by those workers who produced the soaker, filler and labeler).

If workers were economically independent, they would be able to sell the commodities that they produced than their own capacity or ability to work.

Workers in a society characterized by production mainly for exchange need money in order to obtain the means necessary for them to live (means of consumption). They then sell their capacity to work as a commodity (a thing to be exchanged and used by another) for money, and then they buy other commodities necessary to live.

To obtain the money necessary to live, they must sell their capacity to labour to the owners of the means of production (call such means MP). We can then show the process of hiring, from the point of view of the employer, as M-C (=L), where M represents the money of the employer, – or a dash represents an exchange, C represents a commodity and L represents the specific commodity sold by the worker, labour power or the capacity to work or use the means of production (MP).

Of course, L (labour power or the capacity to work by using the means of production) is bought only in order to oblige the workers to use the means of production (MP) owned by employers, and the means of production (MP) is generally must be purchased before labour power (L) since the employer only has temporary power to use of labour power (L) and cannot own L outright (unlike the means of production, MP).

The initial exchange of the employer is then divided into two parts: M-C(L) and M-C (MP), or M-C(=L+MP).

We now have sufficient information to understand what being fired and what being laid off mean. One of the major functions of money in a capitalist society is to unite workers (L) and means of production (MP)–because capitalist property relations ensure that workers and the conditions of their living are separated into two opposed classes.

When workers are laid off, they are temporarily separated from the means of production (MP), with the real possibility of being united with them again with the same employer (of course, the nature of the means of production may change due to technological change). Being laid off is a temporary severance of the relationship between the workers and the means of production, on the one hand, and the particular employer on the other.

It should be noted that it is the employer who makes a decision to lay off and not the workers.

Workers who are fired have the relationship between them and the means of production, on the one hand, and a particular employer on the other, permanently broken or severed.

In a capitalist society, workers do not have to legally work for a particular employer; they are not full-time slaves. As a class, of course, they do have to work for the class of employers as long a capitalism persists–otherwise, capitalism could not continue to exist.

Now, this right-winger claims that workers who have not worked for eight years for Chrysler in Brampton are laid off because they have the right of recall (according to a collective agreement, undoubtedly, since workers do not have the right to recall otherwise).

Practically, these workers have had to look for other employment (or received income from government assistance–or starved). How else would they continue to live? The right of recall hardly takes precedence over the need to live. The right of recall after eight years of time, practically, results in being fired (severed permanently from using the means of production and having a real relation to the employer by being exploited by the employer).

But since the right-winger does not specify where he obtains his information concerning the right of recall, let us take a look at the collective agreement between Oakley subassembly Windsor ULC Brampton plant and Unifor Local 1825 (October 4, 2013-October 3, 2016). On page 16, clause 12.03, it says the following:

“Seniority will be lost and an employee will be terminated if an employee: …
“(c) is laid off and not recalled for a period of eighteen (18) months or for a period of time equal to the employee’s accumulated seniority at date of layoff, whichever is greater, with a maximum of thirty six (36) months”

The right-winger, of course, does not really care whether the workers eight years ago were fired or laid off–nor with understanding the difference between them nor with understanding the kind of society in which we live. He is a superficial mouthpiece of employers and, like employers, he has used the workers at Brampton to serve his own egotistical ends.

By the way, the left share similar beliefs to this right-winger–despite their opposition toward each other. Both he and the left believe in the necessity of employers. He considers anything employers as a class do as good whereas the left believe in the humanization of the employer-employee relation. Why else would the left talk about “decent work,” “fair wages,” (expressed by, for example, Tracy McMaster, president of Greater Toronto Area Council, to which are affiliated 35 local unions of the Ontario Public Service Employees Union (OPSEU)), “economic justice,” (expressed by John Cartwright, president, Toronto & York Region Labour Council), “fairness” (as in the expression “Fight for $15 and Fairness,” a grassroots and union movement in Ontario), and Fair Labour Laws (as posted on the JFAAP website but copied from a union (Jane and Finch Action Against Poverty, a grassroots organization in one of poorer and racialized areas of Toronto)? All in the context of a society characterized by the use of human beings as means for the private sector employers to obtain more and more money (and public sector employers to use workers as means for purposes not defined by them but by senior management).

Such is the nature of the right and the social-reformist left.

Should we workers not understand better what it means to be hired, fired and laid off in order to grasp better the nature of our lives? Does the social-reformist left provide us with the tools necessary to understand our own experiences? Do they themselves bother in providing us with an understanding of our own experiences in this world? If not, why not? And if not, does that not demonstrate both a lack of democracy among the social-reformist left?

Does not the social-reformist left not have contempt for the regular worker when they remain silent about the meaning of the social structures which workers experience on a regular basis as a class?

The Canadian Left’s Lack of a Vision of the Good Life Beyond a Class of Employers

Stanley Aronowitz, in his book The Death and Life of American Labor: Toward a New Workers’ Movement (New York: Verso, page 162) , points out how the left has in effect abandoned any real intention of developing a movement powerful enough to challenge a system dominated by the class of employers:

Professional intellectuals need not be the only formulators of a new vision of the good life, but they may be needed to boldly put the questions associated with the good life back on the table. As we have seen, even political groups motivated by the promise of new social arrangements refrain from openly discussing their transformative views in their trade unions or in public forums, for fear they will be labeled as sectarians and lose access to the rank and file.

This self-censorship among U.S. radicals is nothing new. It dates from two closely related developments: Samuel Gompers’s refusal to link the labor movement to an ideological flag, a stance that led more radical thinkers to form the rival IWW; and the Socialist Party’s entry, with both feet, into the electoral arena, where the terms of engagement implied acceptance of the capitalist system as the given framework within which the struggles for social reform were to be conducted.

The Canadian left, probably like much of the left, refuse to try to open up debate about where the labour movement is really going. Rhetoric, such as “decent work,” “a good job,” “fair wages,” ‘economic justice” and indeed “fairness” in general are thrown around without the left ever bothering explaining what they mean by such terms.

The Toronto left, for example, is certainly afraid of trying to oblige union representatives to justify their platitudes such as “decent work.” Thus, in Toronto there was a call for supporting the striking brewery workers here. Such a call is certainly to be supported. However, to justify such a call, it was claimed that the brewery workers wanted decent jobs and a fair wage. The call went was sent over a list serve through an organization to which I belonged (the Toronto Labour Committee), headed by Sam Gindin, Herman Rosenfeld and Paul Gray. I decided to criticize the use of such expressions while also indicating the need for supporting the striking brewery workers (I had worked as a brewery worker in Calgary, Alberta, Canada, for about four years, and I knew about wages and working conditions from personal experience).

Eventually, I was called a “condescending prick” by a union representative, and the only defense of my action came from Herman Rosenfeld, who claimed that both I and the union representative were both right (it is nice to be able to have your cake and eat it too).

The point of all this is–there is a decided lack of discussion within the union movement and in the public sphere here in Toronto (and, I suspect, elsewhere in North America)–due to such intimidation tactics. The rhetoric of democracy within the left is just that–it is rhetoric.

There is no real discussion about the obvious dictatorship which billions of workers experience daily in their lives. There is no discussion of any alternative vision of what kind of life we humans really deserve. There is rhetoric of social justice, but there is no real substantial discussion of what that means and no movement towards building a society worthy of our nature as human beings.

There is much talk of resistance–but to what end? Resistance for resistance sake? To hold on to what we have? Not to dare think of anything beyond $15 and fairness or the idea of decent work? The hostility I met from the union reps and the so-called radical left when I questioned such ideas evidently expresses a lack of vision of the good life. For the so-called progressive left, there have been employers, there are employers, and there will always be employers. Such is the nature of the “progressive” left these days. They lack any vision of the good life beyond the class of employers.

 

Confessions of a Union Representative Concerning the Real Power of Employers

In the context of the process of passing legislation related to the Westray mining disaster (ultimately diluted to satisfy the interests of employers), a union representative explicitly expressed the reality that workers face when they work for employers. The problem with this explicit admission of the power of employers is that it does not play any real role in the education of the working class. Compare what is said below with union rhetoric about “decent jobs” or a “fair wage.” From Steven Bittle, Still Dying for a Living:
Shaping Corporate Criminal Liability After the Westray Mine Disaster,
doctoral dissertation, page 202:

Another union representative expressed concern [with the proposed government legislation] that unions can be held responsible for workplace accidents, noting that unions and employees have little decision-making control with the organization:

“…basically we wanted the legislation to go after corporate bosses, basically, because
they’re the ones that make the decisions. At the end of the day any decision that’s
made on anything to do with the business comes about as a result of management’s
decision. It doesn’t come about because of a union decision. We wish, but it doesn’t.
They have the ultimate authority to manage, and that authority is only restricted by
terms of a collective agreement, and in very few cases, maybe in terms of regulations or legislation. So we were hoping that it would focus more on criminal liability for those that have the power to make decisions. But in reality what it does is that it will hold anybody accountable if the investigation shows there was any part played in any particular incident by anybody from the janitor right up to the CEO. Now some people will argue, why not? Well normally, in my experience in almost forty years, is that any decision made by the janitor is usually something that is usually handed down from above, right. And there are very few cases where you could actually cite where somebody at that level had any type of malicious intent to do anything to cause harm “(Union representative, Interview 12).

One of the distinguishing features of human beings is our capacity to choose–our capacity to be free, to make decisions. The union representative openly admits that in the context of businesses, it is management that mainly decides and that all that a collective agreement does is restrict the authority of management to decide. Regulation and legislation, in a few cases, also limit that authority. Other than that, management has dictatorial powers at work. In other words, workers are treated as things at work–as objects to be used; they are thing-like objects, without the power to participate equally in decisions that affect their lives.

And the social-reformist left repeatedly refer to “decent jobs” and “fairness.” Even the so-called radical left (see the previous post, Social-Reformist Leftist Activists Share Assumptions with the Right) engage in such rhetoric. How being treated as things can be magically converted into decent jobs and fair wages is beyond me. The religious nature of this rhetoric (most frequently expressed by trade unionists) is obvious by the lack of any critical discussion concerning whether it reflects the experience of the millions (and indeed billions) of workers worldwide.

What do you think of the above honest statement of the reality or situation of even the more privileged section of the working class (for, generally, unionized workers are more privileged) when compared to the rhetoric of “decent work” and “fair wages” or “fairness” as expressed by the social-reformist left (and even the radical left)?

Should we not start discussing these issues openly and honestly? Are we? If we are not, why are we not doing so?

Unions and Safety on Jobs Controlled by Employers

The following tries to explain why unions do not adequately address the safety concerns of rank-and-file workers who work for an employer. Of course, safety conditions in non-unionized settings may be even worse, but we should not idealize unionized settings either. They are better than non-unionized settings, generally, but they remain inadequate since workers’ safety and well-being are sacrificed for the benefit of the particular employer as well as for the benefit of the class of employers.

From Tom Dwyer (1991), Life and Death at Work: Industrial Accidents as a Case of Socially Produced Error. (New York: Springer Science+Business Media), page 77:

Continue reading “Unions and Safety on Jobs Controlled by Employers”

Social-Reformist Leftist Activists Share Assumptions with the Right

In an earlier post (Basic Income: A Critique of the Social-Reformist Left’s Assumptions and Analysis: Part Two), I argued that the social-reformist leftist activist Mr. Bush used Karl Marx’s theory of surplus value for conservative (reformist purposes). This post will expand on this view by pointing out, in a more theoretical way, how Mr. Bush, undoubtedly like many of his social-reformist comrades, share assumptions with their apparent enemies, the right, such as the conservatives.

Mr. Bush referred to Marx’s theory of surplus value and assumed that this was the primary feature of Marx’s theory. Undoubtedly it is an important aspect of Marx’s theory, but Mr. Bush, by referring to the “messy business of material reality,” including “costs,” crassly assumes that costs are somehow a fixed standard that leftists are somehow not to question. The “messy business of material reality” is assumed, in other words, to be a fixed fact rather than a fluid reality created by human beings and therefore subject to change by them.

Mr. Bush assumes, like Doug Ford and other conservatives, that things (including human beings), have “costs” (the “messy business of material reality)–without inquiring into the nature of those costs or why such things have such costs in the first place.

Let us, however, refer to Marx (and not to the shared assumptions of Mr. Bush and Doug Ford). From Capital, Volume 1, pages 173-175,

Political economy has indeed analysed value and its magnitude, however incompletely, and has uncovered the content concealed within these forms. But it has never once asked the question why this content has assumed that particular form, that is to say, why labour is expressed in value, and why the measurement of labour by its duration is expressed in the magnitude of the product.  These formulas, which bear the unmistakable stamp of value of the belonging to a social formation in which the process of production has mastery over man, instead of the opposite, appear to the political economists’ bourgeois consciousness to be as much a self-evident and nature-imposed necessity as productive labour itself.

The first point is that value and its magnitude (which is related to price, money and “cost”) is an expression of a kind of society in which “process of production has mastery over man [and woman], instead of the opposite.”

The second point is that Marx relates his labour theory of value in order to reveal the social and alienated nature of the labour involved in the development of money and in “costing” things. From Capital, Volume 1, pages 168-169:

Consequently, it was solely the analysis of the prices of commodities which led to the determination of the magnitude of value, and solely the common expression of all commodities in money which led to the establishment of their character as values.
It is however precisely this finished form of the world of commodities – the money form – which conceals the social character of private labour and the social relations between the individual workers, by making those relations appear as relations between material objects, instead of revealing them plainly.

Other authors agree that Marx’s concern is not just with a theory of surplus value but with a theory of surplus value. Thus, John Weeks, in his work Capital, Exploitation and Economic Crisis (New York: Routledge, page 19):

Value acts as a regulator of price once the entire product, all inputs, are monetized;
until this occurs, the product is not a commodity in its entirety and all the
concrete labor time expended on it need not be replaced by money. This occurs
only with the development of capitalist production. It is important not to
become entangled in semantics. “Value” regulates price under capitalist relations
and can be used as a tool of analysis only in capitalist society.

Value regulates cost or the price of what is produced because both the items used to produce something have a price and what is produced with those commodities generally have a price (public services on the produced side excepted). Cost is not some neutral fact in a capitalist society but in an integral aspect that characterizes the very nature of the kind of society in which we live: a capitalist society (modified by public services but not altered fundamentally).

Marx’s theory of value, which Mr. Bush completely ignores, is designed to capture that essential aspect. This is one of the reasons why, before he analyzed capital, he analyzed commodities and money.

Mr. Bush, like Mr. Proudhon, a nineteenth century leftist socialist reformist before him, simply assumes that costs are natural. He refers to these costs as the “messy business of material reality”–as if material reality were somehow by nature characterized by prices and costs. Doug Ford undoubtedly shares the same belief.

In other words, Mr. Bush, a self-avowed social-reformist leftist, shares similar beliefs as Doug Ford about the nature of society despite apparent opposing ideologies. The same could be said of many trade unionists. Do they not believe that costs are natural? That the “messy business of material reality” must necessarily include costs and prices? A social world without costs and prices would be impossible for them.

How can such a shared belief not but fail to have limits in practice? Already Mr. Bush has equated fighting for a $15 minimum wage and other employment law reforms with “fairness.”

What does the radical left do in Toronto (and probably elsewhere)? It is afraid to criticize Mr. Bush’s ideology. After all, Mr. Bush is–doing something. He is “progressive.” Such progress, however, will lead to a backlash since its limits are limits shared by him and Doug Ford. Mr Bush will not seek to go beyond the limits of the power of employers. He will become an apologist for employers, ultimately, since he considers costs and prices to be inevitable–like Doug Ford does. He will, in practice, engage in tactics and strategies that will limit the capacity of workers to free themselves from the power of employers as a class once and for all. He has already begun the process ideologically by claiming that $15 an hour as a minimum wage is somehow fair.

The radical left, then, would do better by criticizing Mr. Bush’s position (and the position of trade unionists similar to that of Mr. Bush). Otherwise, it forms part of the problem rather than part of the solution. By not criticizing such positions as that of Mr. Bush, by remaining silent, it panders after the elite and fails to address the needs of the working class, unionized or non-unionized. Those needs involve exposing the produced conditions of their oppression and exploitation and the proposal of an alternative vision of a society without such oppression and exploitation–which only they can produce.

In other words, the radical left, by failing to develop an independent position and merging with the amorphous “progressive left” (aka, the social-reformist left), has aligned itself with a clique of elitist activists within the labour movement rather than with the working class as a whole.

By doing so, the radical left indirectly aligns itself with the right–such as Doug Ford, since Mr. Bush and Doug Ford share certain assumptions.

 

 

Management Rights, Part Four: Private Sector Collective Agreement, Ontario

The social-democratic left typically is incapable of dealing with the issue of the power of management. There is little or no discussion over such issues despite the existence of the power of the class of employers at various levels of society: economic, political, social and cultural. This silence expresses both the power of the class of employers and the poverty of the social-democratic left.

Indeed, the social-reformist left often uses such phrases as a “decent job,” or “decent work”–as if for most people in a capitalist society there is such a thing. Alternatively, the standard used by the left to judge what constitutes decent work and a decent job assumes the legitimacy of the power of employers.

Such a standard is assumed and not justified, of course, by the social-reformist left. Indeed, I even heard one so-called radical leftist in Toronto claim that the phrase “decent work” expressed a defensive maneuver on the part of the left. Such a view is convenient for those who fear alienating unions.

However, is it in the interests of workers to hide the reality of work that is undignified and involves their treatment as things in one way or another?

In the following clause, should not the members of the union have discussed the clause thoroughly? What is the likelihood that they have? My wager is that they have not done so. If not, should not the union be criticized? Should not the radical left who fail to criticize such unions also be criticized?

 

From

COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT
between
AIR CANADA
And those employees
In the service of
AIR CANADA
As represented by
UNIFOR
LOCAL 2002
Contract No. 31
As modified by the Memorandums of Agreement
dated June 13th 2015
Effective: March 1st 2015, to February 28th 2020

pages 2-3:

ARTICLE 3 RESERVATIONS OF MANAGEMENT
3.01 Subject to the provisions of this Collective Agreement, the control and direction of the working forces including the right to hire, suspend or discharge for cause, dispense with, to advance or set back in
3
classification, to reassign, to transfer or lay off because of lack of work or for other legitimate reasons, is vested solely in the Company.
3.02 These enumerations shall not be deemed to exclude other prerogatives not enumerated, and any of the rights, powers or authority of the Company are retained by the Company except those which are subject to the provisions of this Collective Agreement.

Comments from John Urkevich, AESES-UM Business Agent, to my Critique of the Grievance and Arbitration Procedure: Letter to the Editor, Inside The Association of Employees Supporting Educational Services (AESES), Vol. 17, No. 4, May 1994

As I wrote in my last post (Critique of the Grievance and Arbitration Procedure: Letter to the Editor, Inside The Association of Employees Supporting Educational Services (AESES), Vol. 17, No. 4, May 1994), I would provide the business agent’s reply to my letter to the editor in the same volume of the union newsletter. Here it is verbatim:

Mr. Harris’ comments are noteworthy in several respects albeit difficult to understand. I  believe that Mr. Harris is attempting to convey the message that a collective agreement only goes so far in reducing management’s unbridled right to manage its affairs and its working force and therefore a union, any union, is only as effective as the collective agreement it has to work with on behalf of its membership.

I would agree, as would most, that collective agreements only limit management’s right to manage and that which is not specifically abridged by a collective agreement remains within the employer’s purview. This right, however, is tempered by legislation which dictates that the exercising of management rights must be reasonable, fair, non-arbitrary, non-discriminatory and in good faith. Although arbitrators do not generally accept the argument that because there is a collective agreement, management is restricted to dealing only with those functions as specified in the agreement unless there is union agreement, neither do arbitrators accept the argument that management has an unfettered right to act completely as it wishes, in particular when it comes to severing or detrimentally affecting an employee benefit.

Mr. Harris reiterates the definition of a grievance which is found in our collective agreement but in so doing leaves the impression that such a definition is restrictive. I would suggest that this defines a grievance in its broadest sense.

Arbitration is the final step in the grievance procedure and therefore is part and parcel of the procedure and not an entity of its own. The arbitration of a grievance occurs only if the parties cannot come to a mutually acceptable resolution of the issue either during the process or before a grievance is ever filed. Many of the issue that arise during the life of a collective agreement are resolved without either the necessity of a grievance of arbitration. Depending on the state of the employer/employee relationship, common sense and fairness can prevail without a confrontation.

The reason that management does not file grievances is because the employer/employee relationship is such that the employer acts and the employee reacts. The union’s right to be proactive is curbed by the law which prohibits employees from withholding their services during the term of a collective agreement and specified that all agreements must contain a method of resolving disputes which arise during the term without a work stoppage (grievance procedure). Whenever management takes an action the employee must continue as normal whether or not the employer is correct (there are some exceptions). This is aptly coined as the “work now–grieve later” principle. If this were not the case then I suspect that management grievances would be a fact of life.

I do not agree, as Mr. Harris suggests, that because management’s right is merely restricted by a collective agreement that employees should not voice their concerns or their problems, unless it is certainty that a grievance is winnable. Union members should always check with their union representative any questionable act of management. After all the employer only has control over the how, what, and when, it does not have the right to treat employees in an unjust or undignified manner. Employees are not channel.

I have provided Mr. Urkevich’s response in full without my intervention so that the reader could see the whole response before I begin to analyze the response (an opportunity which I did not have since, as I said, I was no longer a member of the union).

….Mr. Harris is attempting to convey the message that a collective agreement only goes so far in reducing management’s unbridled right to manage its affairs and its working force and therefore a union, any union, is only as effective as the collective agreement it has to work with on behalf of its membership.

I fail to see how anyone could infer from what I wrote that that is the message that I wanted to convey. Unions need to teach their members the limitations of the legal rights of union members as contained in collective agreements–and those legal rights are very limited. That is what I wanted to convey.

Union representatives, in order to “sell” a contract, often exaggerate the fairness of a collective agreement and thereby do their members a disservice because they then teach them the opposite; they imply that, by being “fair,” collective agreements are not very limited instruments for protecting their collective interests. See, for example, reference to a “fair contract” by the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) Local 3902 of the University of Toronto (CUPE 3902, University of Toronto Education Workers).

I would agree, as would most, that collective agreements only limit management’s right to manage and that which is not specifically abridged by a collective agreement remains within the employer’s purview. This right, however, is tempered by legislation which dictates that the exercising of management rights must be reasonable, fair, non-arbitrary, non-discriminatory and in good faith.

Mr. Urkevich, like many union representatives, begs the question. Why does he assume what he needs to prove, namely, that the employer/employee relation can be “reasonable, fair?” In the money circuit of capital, for example, it has been shown that employees are mere means for the benefit of employers (see  The Money Circuit of Capital). Indeed, as I wrote in that section:

Immanuel Kant, a German philosopher, argued that, in order to act ethically, it is necessary to treat people never as means only but as ends in themselves: “For, all rational beings stand under the law that each of them is to treat himself and all others never merely as means but always at the same time as ends in themselves” (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. New York: Cambridge University Press, page 41). Human beings need to be treated as ends and not as means. To treat human beings as ends in themselves, it is necessary to have those who engage in realizing the ends also engaged in participating in the formulation of the ends.

If human beings, as employees, are treated as means to others’ ends, then how is such a situation “fair and reasonable”? For the employer, by definition, it is fair and reasonable. Is it for the workers though? Does not Mr. Urkevitch take the point of view of the employer as his standard? Should we? Why?

Is not Mr. Urkevich’s reference to “legistlation which dictates that the exercising of management rights must be reasonable, fair, non-arbitrary, non-discriminatory and in good faith” meant to justify Mr. Urkevitch’s own role as union business agent since, otherwise, Mr. Urkevich would be justifying unreasonable actions, unfair actions, and so forth.

Although arbitrators do not generally accept the argument that because there is a collective agreement, management is restricted to dealing only with those functions as specified in the agreement unless there is union agreement, neither do arbitrators accept the argument that management has an unfettered right to act completely as it wishes, in particular when it comes to severing or detrimentally affecting an employee benefit.

Of course arbitrators would not permit employers to let managers do what they will with employee benefits or, for that matter, employees in general. The treatment has to be consistent with the line of business. However, this leaves management with a very wide latitude of power to determine what can and cannot be done at work.

Whenever management takes an action the employee must continue as normal whether or not the employer is correct (there are some exceptions). This is aptly coined as the “work now–grieve later” principle. If this were not the case then I suspect that management grievances would be a fact of life.

Mr. Urkevitch, like many union representatives, assume without further ado that the employer/employee relation is inherently reasonable. I categorically deny that, and for reason already provided in reference to Kant and the money circuit of capital.

Management has a monopoly of decision-making power except as restricted by the collective agreement (and limited legislation); why employers have such a monopoly of decision-making power Mr. Urkevitch does not even question–undoubtedly like many other trade-union representatives and social-reformists.

Mr. Urkevitch merely repeats what needs to be explained: “Whenever management takes an actio the employee must continue as normal…” Why must the employee do so? Because of economic coercion, perhaps? (See “Capitalism needs economic coercion for its job market to function” (Ontario Coalition Against Poverty: OCAP)). It is the economic power of employers compared to employees that shapes legislation in favour of employers?

Mr. Urkevitch, undoubtedly like many union representatives, with a manipulative “if” (“If this were not the case”–but it is not the case–and that makes all the difference in the world for the daily lives of unionized workers–seeks to minimize the importance of the fact that it is mainly unions that file grievances and not management–because management has the power to make the major decisions that effect the lives of millions of workers.

I do not agree, as Mr. Harris suggests, that because management’s right is merely restricted by a collective agreement that employees should not voice their concerns or their problems, unless it is certainty that a grievance is winnable.

This reasoning is pure fantasy. Employees should voice their concern in various ways–even if the grievance is not winnable. Where did I imply that only if the grievance is winnable should workers voice their concern?

After all the employer only has control over the how, what, and when, it does not have the right to treat employees in an unjust or undignified manner. Employees are not channel.

This last sentence likely sums up the attitude of many union representatives. No, employees are not chattel, that is to say, they are not slaves, owned 24 hours a day. They are not required to work for a particular employer. No one forces them to work for a particular employer.

However, just as with the manipulative use of the word “if” above, Mr. Urkevitch uses the word “only” in order to minimize the importance of how much power management has over the lives of even unionized workers: “the employer only [my emphasis] has control over the how, what, and when….”

Mr. Urkevitch evidently does not think that “control over the how, what, and when” is “unjust or undignified.”

I do. (See above, referring to Kant and the money circuit of capital). Employers, by controlling “the how, what, and when”–control the lives of workers, which is undignified and unjust.

Union representatives, like Mr. Urkevitch, however, obviously believe that it is just. They believe in the justice of the collective agreement, where “the employer only has control over the how, what, and when.”

Union representatives imply, often enough, that there is somehow something fair about collective agreements. No one seems to challenge them to explain what they mean by fair collective agreements.

For instance, here is an example from a relatively recent union representative in Ontario:

Toronto (24 May 2018)…

Warren (Smokey) Thomas, President of the Ontario Public Service Employees Union (OPSEU/NUPGE) said he is hopeful the employer is ready to step up and do what is right for 20,000 of its workers who have suffered for decades under appalling working conditions.

“We’ve heard countless horror stories from our new members about poor pay and job security, no vacation time, they don’t even get sick days,” said Thomas.
“The fact our members overwhelmingly voted to join OPSEU/NUPGE in the largest organizing drive in Canadian history sends a strong message that times are changing. I hope this employer will work with us and make sure our members get a fair contract,” he said.

Of course, unions generally do improve wages and working conditions, but such improvements do not give them the right to declare that any collective agreement is somehow fair. They abuse their position by doing so, and by abusing their position, they open themselves up to legitimate criticism.

Unfortunately, few among the so-called left engage in such criticism. Rather, at best they follow along behind the unions, seeking “openings” here and there to open up discussion rather than openly criticizing all talk of fair contracts or collective agreements. They do a disservice to the regular worker but certainly aid both union representatives–and the class of employers.

One final point: although any particular employee is not obliged to work for any particular employer, what of the class of emloyees in relation to the class of employers? Can the class of employees simply not work for an employer, freely and realistically? If not, what does that make them?

So many questions, but so few answers–by union representatives and, undoubtedly, by many social reformists.